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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

The Energy Transition: Advanced Nuclear Needed but Address Climate Vulnerabilities Now

The term “Energy Transition” is an attempt to capture an elaborate set of activities related to the modernization and decarbonization of energy grids. Performed concurrently and often in an ad hoc manner across local, state, regional and national boundaries, it is bringing chaos to what should arguably be one of the most conservatively managed of all critical infrastructure sectors. What’s more, with climate change producing an increasing tempo of extreme events, confidence in the intended resilient and redundant structure of the electric grids is likely to ebb. Even without these climate induced stressors, the nation’s electric grid was built for an earlier century. In addition to a drive towards greater efficiency via digitization and a continuing price decline in distributed energy resources (DERs), one could argue that climate change concerns are the primary driver of the energy transition. Non-CO2 emitting generation sources like wind and solar have become an important part of the overall generation fleet, albeit ones that cannot be counted upon to provide dispatchable power. Current projections indicate deployment of even larger percentages of DERs in coming years. Until far better storage capabilities arrive, the variability of wind and solar, inconsistent performance of traditional thermal generation plants, and energy delivery failures associated with natural gas pipelines will reinforce mounting reliability concerns. This pertains to both electric transmission and distribution. The recent shuttering of nuclear power plants in Germany, Japan, the US and elsewhere are also putting more downward pressure on dispatchable generation. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has roiled energy markets worldwide and forced some countries to return to coal as a primary fuel. In view circumstances such as these, it is essential that significant changes be made to policies and planning criteria, and to the standards and code on which they are based. Given the accelerating pace of extreme weather events, this needs to occur as soon as possible.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Smart Inverters, Dumb Risk: Taking Control of IBR Security in the Digital Age

This presentation addresses the security challenges posed by Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) in the modern energy landscape. The presentation highlights the vulnerabilities and risks associated with IBRs, including the potential for cyber-attacks, the impact of insecure defaults, and the systemic risks posed by supply chain dependencies. Key topics covered include: 1) The increasing digital transformation in energy systems and the associated security risks. 2) Specific vulnerabilities in IBRs, including weak passwords, hardcoded credentials, and insecure web application interfaces. 3) The implications of persistent connectivity and the strategic risks posed by foreign-manufactured components. 4) The role of regulatory frameworks, such as NERC CIP, in addressing these challenges and the limitations of current oversight. 5) Practical solutions for mitigating risks, including secure design practices, vendor risk assessments, and the importance of strong passwords and role-based access control. The presentation underscores the necessity of a comprehensive, system-of-systems approach to securing IBRs, emphasizing the need for collaboration across various stakeholders, including operators, developers, and regulators, to ensure the resilience and security of the energy grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide: Version 1.0 [Slides]

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system's lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements - but does not replace - the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system's engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Generating SBoMs Utilizing Structured Threat Information Expression JSON bundles

With cyber-attacks on the rise, information is one of the first lines of defense. Now more than ever, security experts and developers need efficient ways to know if their software may be outdated or vulnerable to emerging threats. By generating a Software Bill of Material based on STIX2/JSON bundles, security experts and developers can ensure that they know where to find what can go wrong with their systems before the hackers do. As part of the Infrastructure Expression project, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is currently working on ways that can aid in the development of efficient SBOMs using Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX). Doing so can provide an efficient first line of defense for detection and monitoring that can be easily used by cyber personnel from beginners to highly skilled experts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Effects of the Hydrophobic Block Length Ratio of Poly(vinylbenzyl N -methylpiperidinium carbonate)- b -polyethylene- b -poly(vinylbenzyl N -methylpiperidinium carbonate) Block Copolymers for Anion Exchange Membrane Electrolysis

Electrolysis of water to produce hydrogen from renewable electricity is an extremely attractive strategy to reduce energy dependence on fossil fuels. Development of membrane and ionomer materials that maintain high performance with long lifetimes is needed. We developed and investigated the performance and durability of a series of polyethylene-based ABA triblock copolymer anion exchange ionomer and membrane (AEI, AEM) materials for anion exchange membrane water electrolysis. Poly(vinylbenzyl N-methylpiperidinium carbonate)-b-polyethylene-b-poly(vinylbenzyl N-methylpiperidinium carbonate) was synthesized with different hydrophobic/hydrophilic block ratios (1.02:1, 2.58:1, and 4.46:1) resulting in a range of ion exchange capacities (1.1–1.8 meq g –1 ) and water swelling (23–154%) characteristics. All AEMs showed full anionic dissociation, as evidenced by linear Arrhenius correlations, and excellent carbonate conductivity of 8–94 mS cm –1 at 50 °C. Hydrophilic phase separation may offer superior chemical durability by only wetting the ion-conducting region of the polymer and avoiding attack at the nonwetted backbone. We evaluated the performance and durability of these AEMs as a function of hydrophobic polyethylene (PE) content. The AEM containing the least amount of PE displayed the highest performance of 1 A cm –2 at 2.3 V but degraded at 40 mV h –1 before catastrophically failing after <3 h at 0.5 A cm –2 . With greater PE-containing AEMs, the degradation rate was reduced by 3 orders of magnitude with only a 0.2 V increase in voltage. Constant current electrolysis for 50 h resulted in a voltage change of 0.3 mV h –1 in a single-cell water electrolyzer and 1 M potassium carbonate. In a 600 h test, the voltage change in the final 200 h was impressively low for an experimental film, 58 μV h –1 . Postmortem analysis indicated that the membrane did not thin and that water becomes more tightly hydrogen-bound in the polymer after electrolysis.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2019

Performance of Structural Materials in Biomass Liquefaction Environments

Liquid fuels including gasoline, diesel and jet fuel produced from biomass offer an alternative to fossil-derived fuels and provide a route to reduction of net carbon dioxide production. Thermochemical liquefaction is one of the routes being investigated, and there are a few facilities currently producing liquid fuels using the pyrolysis process. There are alternative processes also under development, but all these processes involve exposure of metallic structural materials at elevated temperature, and in some cases, elevated pressures. The chemical environments associated with these processes can be very aggressive toward structural materials. Examination of process system components after operation and in-situ exposures of alloy test samples have revealed that commonly used stainless steels like 304L and 316L are proving susceptible to relatively rapid scaling and internal (typically intergranular) attack that can extend up to a few grains deep after only ~50-500 hours of exposure time. Characterization by analytic electron microscopy shows that this attack can be associated with multiple mechanisms, including internal oxidation and internal sulfidation, along with alloy grain boundary Cr depletion. This paper presents an overview of the authors’ recent characterization efforts and in-progress studies to gain insight into the mechanism(s) and kinetics of internal attack inthermochemical liquefaction and related process environments.

Brady, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hot corrosion behavior of 304 & P91 graded composite transition joint under molten sulfate salts

A novel graded composite transition joint (GCTJ) between AISI 304 stainless steel and ASTM A335 P91 steel, has been demonstrated remarkablely superior creep performance compared to the conventional dissimilar metal weldment (DMW) under equivalent conditions. However, this advance is challenged by hot corrosion under salt deposition at elevated temperatures. Here, this study investigates the hot corrosion behavior of 304&P91 GCTJ exposed to sulfate salts at 700°C. Compared to the 304 steel, corrosion attacks initiate in the P91 triangle, where the dual-phase microstructure of ferrite and tempered martensite significantly influences pitting initiation. Anodic dissolution mainly occurs within the tempered martensite due to more vulnerable sites within the tempered martensite. With prolonged exposure, corrosion propagates across both phases, and the corrosion depth within the P91 triangle is related to the exposed surface area ratio between 304 and P91. Electrochemical analysis reveals the occurrence of galvanic corrosion between the 304 and P91, with a positive linear relationship between anodic dissolution current density (I a ) and the exposed surface area ratio between 304 and P91 in molten salts, further emphasizing the critical impact of this ratio on the corrosion severity in the P91 triangle. These findings underscore the importance of transition zone design optimization in mitigating localized corrosion.

Galvanic corrosion↗
DOE OSTI2021

An Active Detection Scheme for Sensor Spoofing in Grid-tied PV Systems

In this paper an active detection scheme for sensor spoofing (manipulated externally via a cyber attack) in grid-tied PV systems is discussed. The core of the proposed active detection scheme is to introduce a private (secret) watermarking signal into the control inputs of the DC-DC converter and DC-AC inverter stages to detect any malicious spoofing (manipulation) of voltage/current sensor measurements controlling both the DC-DC converter maximum power point tracking (MPPT) stage and the DC-AC inverter of the grid-tied PV system. Several types of possible spoofing mechanisms (attack models) are discussed. The proposed sensor spoofing attack detector system consists of injecting a small magnitude of digital watermarking signal (DWS) and conduct three statistical watermark tests on the reported sensor measurements to determine if a) the proposed system is healthy and operating as expected b) if sensor signals were spoofed (manipulated) externally or c) if a particular sensor is malfunctioning due to a faulty hardware. It is shown via extensive simulations that the proposed DWS approach is robust in detecting malicious external manipulation of sensors controlling the grid tied PV system. A testing platform is currently under development and the experimental results will be discussed in the conference presentation.

Ibrahim, Hasan↗
DOE OSTI2023

User Guide for the Los Alamos National Laboratory Fallout Calculator (V.1.1)

The Los Alamos National Laboratory Fallout Calculator is a Java™ application that can calculate the dose from many nuclear detonations producing fallout. The fallout calculations are performed for one or multiple selected winds. The winds are from the years 2000 to 2010, for all 12 months, and for the 1 st , 10 th , and 20 th of each month. The winds are available from 0 meters to 50,000 meters altitude MSL. This Fallout Calculator performs ideal calculations. There is no terrain. The ground is perfectly flat at sea level. There is no rain that would cause radioactive hot spots. The wind is historical, not a current wind. Also, the wind is fixed in time. It does not vary over the 24 hours it takes the fallout to arrive on the ground. Therefore, this calculator is suitable for operational type studies. For instance, it can be used to calculate the relative difference in fallout patterns from different possible nuclear laydowns. It can be used to understand how frequently fallout would be likely to occur in a particular part of the US. It could be used to develop plans for how to protect the population from a nuclear attack. However, it should not be used to predict the dose in a city from an actual laydown, or to predict safe corridors for the population to use to egress from areas with high fallout.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Reactive Fe anode for electrolytic reduction of solid metal oxide in molten LiCl-Li 2 O

Iron metal was investigated for use as a consumable anode for electrolytic reduction of solid metal oxides in molten LiCl-Li 2 O (2.0 - 2.4 wt%). Tests were performed where the potential of Fe anodes was increased incrementally from 0.1 to 1.0 V (vs Ni/NiO). Oxide formation on the anode started at a potential of 0.4 V and was identified as FeO via X-ray diffraction. In the absence of a pre-formed oxide layer, severe attack of the anode started at a potential of 0.7 V and was accompanied by an increase in Fe concentration in the salt. When an oxide layer was allowed to form on the anode, the Fe concentration did not increase in the salt. O 2 was detected in the headspace gas at an anode potential of 1.0 V only when an oxide layer was present on the anode. Finally, the results of this study support the idea that an inexpensive sacrificial anode could be an ideal replacement for expensive Pt that is currently widely used for this process.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

The evolution of pit morphology and growth kinetics in aluminum during atmospheric corrosion

Abstract Assessing the lifetimes of alloys in humid, corrosive environments requires growth kinetic information regarding individual instances of damage, e.g. pit growth rates. Corrosion rates measured at the continuum scale using mass change convolute the rate of pit nucleation and growth, providing limited information on local kinetics. The current study used in-situ X-ray computed tomography to measure growth rates of individual pits in aluminum over 100 h of exposure in a humid, chloride environment. While pits grew at relatively constant rates over the first hours after nucleation, significant growth-rate nonlinearities subsequently occurred. These were linked to both droplet spreading, which altered the cathode size, and changes in the mode of pit growth. Pit morphology appeared to influence the dominant growth mode and the duration of pit growth. Post-mortem serial sectioning revealed pits preferentially attacked grain-boundary triple junctions and dislocation boundaries.

Noell, Philip J. (ORCID:0000000346998999)↗
DOE OSTI2024

Essence2.0 Development and Deployment (Final Report)

The objective of the project was to take two core technologies that have been developed under the Recipient’s solid laboratory products and integrate them into a single CyberPhysical awareness platform and complete development on current field-tested prototypes that will extend the integrated capability of the platform. During the final development phase, the Recipient development team and its selected industry partners tested and hardened the platform to ensure resilient and secure operation of the integrated platform. The team also executed substantial field testing and established the framework for defining the organization and/or commercial infrastructure needed to sustain operations and provide readiness for a national scale deployment. The focus of the project was (1) the improvement, refinement, and deployment of technology for the detection of cyber-attacks on utility operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) networks and assets, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) systems; and (2) support for containment and remediation of adversarial threats and actions against those systems and environments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2019

Phasor Measurement Units Optimal Placement and Performance Limits for Fault Localization

Here, the performance limits of faults localization are investigated using synchrophasor data. The focus is on a non-trivial operating regime where the number of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) sensors available is insufficient to have full observability of the grid state. Proposed analysis uses the Kullback Leibler (KL) divergence between the distributions corresponding to different fault location hypotheses associated with the observation model. This analysis shows that the most likely locations are concentrated in clusters of buses more tightly connected to the actual fault site akin to graph communities. Consequently, a PMU placement strategy is derived that achieves a near-optimal resolution for localizing faults for a given number of sensors. The problem is also analyzed from the perspective of sampling a graph signal, and how the placement of the PMUs i.e. the spatial sampling pattern and the topological characteristic of the grid affect the ability to successfully localize faults. To highlight the superior performance of presented fault localization and placement algorithms, the proposed strategy is applied to a modified IEEE 34, IEEE-123 bus test cases and to data from a real distribution grid. Additionally, the detection of cyber-physical attacks is also examined where PMU data and relevant Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network traffic information are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system information and/or operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Supporting Cyber Security of Power Distribution Systems by Detecting Differences Between Real-time Micro-Synchrophasor Measurements and Cyber-Reported SCADA (Final Report)

As modern power grids tend towards greater levels of automation and communication, the challenges of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks are ones that are increasingly demanding attention. Today’s power system has evolved to form the foundational bedrock of modern society, and an attack on this infrastructure could prove disastrous. In this project we were tasked to investigate the use of distribution synchrophasors as an independent isolated sensor network with which we can corroborate, or flag potentially spoofed,Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) data. We adapted an approach to marry the underlying physical properties of power systems with the network communications used by power systems in order to offer insights unattainable by either data stream isolation. While the concept of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is well understood for monitoring network traffic and traditional IT computing systems, the approach discussed in this report is motivated by several key notions: first, current SCADA communications alone presents an incomplete view of the grid. Second, the power grid, and the equipment controlling it, is grounded by laws of physics. Given this, we leverage high-frequency physical grid measurements to understand the physical condition of the grid, and combine this with SCADA. While high-frequency physical grid measurements and SCADA communication over Internet Protocol (IP) networks are fundamentally disparate information sources, when collectively examined through appropriate lenses, they offer a much more nuanced depiction of the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗