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At least 163 records · Page 9

Measurement of Gas Bubbles Encased in Bitumen Nuclear Waste Drums with Muon Scattering Tomography - 18237

In some countries low and intermediate level nuclear waste is stored in steel containers with either pure bitumen added to fill the free volume, or after mixing of the waste with bitumen. Oxidation of the bitumen by interacting with the nuclear waste results in the production of hydrogen. Since pure bitumen is impermeable to water and gases, this hydrogen can assemble in bubbles, possibly resulting in bitumen overflowing out of the waste containers. It is necessary to develop ways of measuring the gas bubbles present in nuclear waste without intervening and compromising the container. We show that this can be done using muon scattering tomography, by applying an analysis method, first developed to find high-Z materials in a lower Z background of concrete, to data from a low-Z material in a higher Z background. The performance of this method is shown, by implementing it on Monte Carlo simulation data. A resolution on the total gas volume of 1.6±0.8% has been achieved for bubbles of 2 liters or more. It is also shown that the method can determine if the gas is located in separate bubbles or concentrated in a bigger one. (authors)

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DROP TESTS RESULTS OF REVISED CLOSURE BOLT CONFIGURATION OF THE STANDARD WASTE BOX, STANDARD LARGE BOX 2, AND TEN DRUM OVERPACK PACKAGINGS

The Transuranic (TRU) Disposition Project at Savannah River Site will require numerous transfers of radioactive materials within the site boundaries for sorting and repackaging. The three DOT Type A shipping packagings planned for this work have numerous bolts for securing the lids to the body of the packagings. In an effort to reduce operator time to open and close the packages during onsite transfers, thus reducing personnel exposure and costs, an evaluation was performed to analyze the effects of reducing the number of bolts required to secure the lid to the packaging body. The evaluation showed the reduction to one-third of the original number of bolts had no effect on the packagings capability to sustain vibratory loads, shipping loads, internal pressure loads, and the loads resulting from a 4-ft drop. However, the loads caused by the 4-ft drop are difficult to estimate and the study recommended each of the packages be dropped to show the actual effects on the package closure. Even with reduced bolting, the packagings were still required to meet the 49 CFR 178.350 performance criteria for Type A packaging. This paper discusses the effects and results of the drop testing of the three packagings.

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Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

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Low Level and Transuranic Waste Segregation and Low Level Waste Characterization at the 200 Area of the Hanford Site - 12424

This paper describes the waste measurement and waste characterization activities carried out by ANTECH Corporation (ANTECH) and CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) at the 200 Area of the Hanford Site under Contracts No. 22394 and No. 40245 for the US Department of Energy (DOE). These include Low Level Waste (LLW) and Transuranic (TRU) Waste segregation and LLW characterization for both 55-gallon (200-litre) drums with gross weight up to 454 kg and 85-gallon over-pack drums. In order to achieve efficient and effective waste drum segregation and assay, ANTECH deployed an automated Gamma Mobile Assay Laboratory (G-MAL) at the trench face in both 200 Area West and East. The unit consists of a modified 40 foot ISO shipping container with an automatic flow through roller conveyor system with internal drum weigh scale, four measurement and drum rotation positions, and four high efficiency high purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors with both detector and shadow shields. The unit performs multiple far-field measurements and is able to segregate drums at levels well below 100 nCi/g. The system is sufficiently sensitive that drums, which are classified as LLW, are characterized at measurement levels that meet the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). With measurement times of between 20 and 30 minutes the unit can classify and characterize over 40 drums in an 8-hour shift. The system is well characterized with documented calibrations, lower limits of detection (LLD) and total measurement uncertainty. The calibrations are confirmed and verified using nationally traceable standards in keeping with the CHPRC measurement requirements. The performance of the system has been confirmed and validated throughout the measurement process by independent CHPRC personnel using traceable standards. All of the measurement and maintenance work has been conducted during the period under a Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) compliant with the applicable criteria of NQA-1 (2000). This includes not only the calibrations and measurements but also the data analysis activities of the ANTECH Subject Matter Experts (SME) and ANTECH support and maintenance activities as well as the activities of CHPRC staff who recover, transport and load waste drums and disposition measured and characterized drums. The overall processes of drum recovery and analysis are described in the paper. Specific spectral data is presented which illustrates the segregation, sentencing and assay process for different types of drums with different radionuclide profiles. The process of identifying and quantifying a wide range of non-TRU radionuclide isotopes is explained and illustrated with spectral examples. The difficulties associated with the measurement of drums with a high gamma ray background, usually arising from high levels of Cs-137 are considered. These drums, which would normally be declared indeterminate and treated as TRU, are addressed under contract No. 40245 by the deployment of the ANTECH Neutron Mobile Assay Laboratory. This is an Active-Passive neutron assay system housed in a modified ISO shipping container. The unit is designed for the measurement and assay of both drums and crates (including B-25 boxes and SWB containers) and will quantify the content of both plutonium and uranium. The neutron system has been employed to perform further evaluation on indeterminate drums to classify them to either LLW or TRU. The experiences of both gamma ray and neutron system operation in different conditions are described; as are the issues of throughput, drum handling and system maintenance. All of these are considered in the overriding context of safe drum handling and safe assay system operation. (authors)

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Modeling delayed thermal runaway in nitric acid-soaked cat litter mixed with radioactive waste

Thermal ignition of radioactive waste within a 55-gallon drum was simulated by using a pressure-dependent waste decomposition model (Hobbs et al. in Process Saf Environ Prot https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2022.09.047, 2022) calibrated with data from full-scale drum experiments (Parker et al. in The thermolytic response of a surrogate RNS waste mixture at the drum scale. Los Alamos National Laboratory Report LA-UR-16-21760, 2016) and validated with experiments from multiple laboratories (Hobbs et al. in Thermal analysis of aged nitric acid-soaked kitty litter in TRU waste drums-23370.WM2023 Conference, Phoenix, AZ, 2023). The acceleration of nitric acid chemistry reacting with an organic cat litter leading to thermal ignition was likely triggered by a restricted vent in the drum. Here, we address whether the form of the rate equation in (Hobbs et al. in Process Saf Environ Prot https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2022.09.047, 2022) is sufficient to extrapolate thermal ignition within aged drums of similar content that have been stored in Texas for over nine years by investigating four different reaction rate forms for waste decomposition. A critical reaction rate reduction analysis is performed on each of these models to determine if delayed thermal runaway within vented aged waste is possible after nine years. We found that a pressure-dependent first-order rate expression not only predicted the accidental ignition of the waste drum, but the form also matches multiple experiments from different laboratories. Even though the waste composition decreases over time, the model predicts that acceleration leading to thermal runaway is possible if the waste is confined, even after 9 years. In conclusion, waste containing oxidizers such as nitric acid should not be mixed with organic adsorbents, especially if the waste is confined.

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Waste Control Specialists Technical Review Team Report

1. Modeling of Drum 68660 and the WCS Drums: A calibrated model of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Drum 68660 indicates that pressurization of the drum by restriction of drum venting could have led to the thermal runaway reaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 2014, supporting the hypothesis that the contents of the drum were not fundamentally different from the overall remediated nitrate salt (RNS) waste stream. 2. Nitric Acid Reactions and Aging of the Waste: The stability of the WCS RNS waste with respect to autocatalytic thermal runaway due to nitric acid chemistry should increase over time as the nitric acid is depleted from chemical reactions in the drum. However, this cannot be confirmed because of the lack of long-term experimental data on the impact of aging on the reactivity of RNS waste. The calibrated model indicates that the waste drums retain most of their reactive components, metal nitrate salts and sWheat Scoop ® , even after eight years. 3. Pressure Effects and Runaway Reactions: The calibrated model indicates that if the drums and standard waste boxes (SWBs) are not allowed to pressurize during transport or storage and they are stored at historical WIPP repository temperatures, then an autocatalytic thermal runaway event is not expected to occur. Since the cause of Drum 68660 pressurization is not known, decision makers are not able to tailor mitigating strategies to the initiating event. Consequently, mitigating strategies must consider all feasible internal and external events that could lead to the pressurization of the drums. 4. Temperature Effects and Runaway Reactions: Temperature also has a strong influence on the stability of the waste. The calibrated model indicates that cooling the drums or SWBs can reduce the possibility of autocatalytic thermal runaway reactions. Simulations suggest that for a drum with a plugged vent, the probability of thermal runaway may be reduced or eliminated if wastes are maintained at or below 43 °F through active cooling measures from the initiation of transport until emplacement at WIPP.

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Fluor Idaho Technical Investigation-ARP V Lid Ejection Reactants and Mechanism - 19521

In April 2018, four 208.2-L (55-gal) drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory Site became over-pressurized, resulting in lid ejection and expulsion approximately 50% of the contents. The parent drums were part of a retrieval effort and were exhumed from a portion of Subsurface Disposal Area Pits 11 and 12 beginning in 1974 and ending in 1978. Drums were later retrieved from the cargo containers, characterized using real-time radiography and nondestructive assay, and opened. The contents were visually inspected and repackaged into new 'daughter' drums within the Accelerated Retrieval Project V facility. Lid ejection occurred 7-12 hours after repackaging. The lid ejections were accompanied by significant heat generation. Empirical evidence of heat generation was observed in each reacted drum. The heat generated was sufficient to warp the high-density polyethylene liner (< 122 to 137 deg. C) in three of the drums and char the drum paint (∼400 deg. C) on one drum. To determine the potential reactant(s), a comprehensive chemical analysis was performed by two independent laboratories, Southwest Research Institute and Savannah River National Laboratory, on the reacted drum contents, ejected drum material, and related drums. A comprehensive chemical compatibility analysis was performed, and the most likely reactant(s) were identified. The oxidation of depleted uranium was the source of the heat generation. The presence of depleted uranium in the daughter drums and its chemical behavior (reactive properties and lack of visual indicators during packaging) are consistent with the event. The heat generated was sufficient to accelerate secondary chemical reactions leading to significant gas formation sufficient to generate pressures well in excess of the pressures needed to eject the lid and contents. These reactions fall into two categories: (1) simple volatilization of organics and water present in the drum and (2) hydrolysis of beryllium carbide, which generated significant quantities of methane gas. (authors)

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Wildland Fire Induced Heating of Dome 375 Perma-Con®

AET-1 was tasked by ADEM with determining the temperature rise in the drum contents of drums stored in the Dome 375 Perma-Con® at TA-54 given a wildland fire. The wildland fire causes radiative and convective heating on the Perma-Con® exterior. The wildland fire time histories for the radiative and convective heating environment were provided to AET-1 by EES-16. If the calculated temperature rise results in a drum content temperature over 40 °C, then ADEM desires a design solution to ensure the peak temperature remains below 40 °C. An axi-symmetric FE simulation was completed to determine the peak temperature of the contents of a drum stored in the Dome 375 Perma-Con® during a wildland fire event. Three wildland fire time histories for the radiative and convective heat transfer were provided by EES-16 and were inputs for the FE simulation. The maximum drum content temperature reached was found to be 110 °C while using inputs from the SiteG_2ms_4ign_wind_from_west.xlsx time history input and not including the SWB in the model. Including the SWB in the results in a peak drum content temperature of 61 °C for the SiteG_2ms_4ign_wind_from_west.xlsx inputs. EES-16 decided that by using fuel mitigation efforts, such as mowing the grass and shrubs near the Perma-Con® they could reduce the shrub/grass fuel loading near the Perma-Con® from 1.46 kg/m 2 to 0.146 kg/m 2 and by using a less conservative fuel loading for the debris field inside the Dome 375 perimeter, reducing it from 0.58 kg/m2 to 0.058 kg/m 2 in their model. They also greatly increased the resolution of their radiation model and increased the accuracy of their model’s required convergence value. Using this refined input the maximum drum content temperature was found to be 28 °C with no SWB present in the model. Additionally, this refined input model was modified to include worst case emissivity values for the concrete, drum and Perma-Con® interior, along with adding a 91 second long residual radiative heat flux of 2,000 W/m2 to the end of the refined wildland fire input. For this case the maximum drum content temperature was found to be 32 °C. For Rev. 2 of this calculation and additional simulation was run that included a cable fire heat flux on the exterior of the Perma-Con® that was calculated by FP-DO. Including the cable fire heat flux in the model without the SWB resulted in a peak drum content temperature over time of 43 °C. Including the SWB in the simulation with the cable fire heat flux resulted in a peak drum content temperature over time of 35 °C.

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A Simple, Revolutionary Approach to Waste Packaging Utilizing Proven Technology - 20201

Historically, removing hazardous waste from gloveboxes involves the use of bags as the primary containment method. This method can prove tedious, repetitive, and time consuming to ensure the process follows all safeguards required to contain the waste and mitigate any breach of containment. Layers of bags, yards of tape, and multiple filters are added to the waste stream in order to transfer the hazardous waste from the glovebox safely into the drum package. Then, finally, it can be shipped and disposed of. The process to cut, tie, and tape each bag for disposal involves manual effort by multiple operators. Following Administrative Safety Controls, good operators are able to safely perform those tasks; but, since the bag is the only confinement layer, incidents can occur. Operators, in some cases, are also at close proximity to this waste which may increase the risk of radiation exposure. Once the waste is transferred out through these bags, it is nearly impossible to remove packaged waste that may contain higher dosage levels, thus increasing drum disposal costs incurred by the facility. Exceeding the allowable radiation levels, and drums not fully filled, both contribute significantly to excess disposal costs. Central Research Laboratories (CRL), based in Red Wing Minnesota, has developed the Waste Drum Transfer System (WDTS) building upon the proven technology and containment of the Rapid Transfer Port (RTP) as an alternate, more efficient method of waste transfer. This solution consists of an RTP Alpha port mounted inside a glovebox and Beta assembly unit composed of a drum liner fitted inside a standard 55 gallon drum. The use of the Beta drum liner bypasses the typical use of bags, sleeves or tape to provide leak tight containment. The process to connect and disconnect a drum from the glovebox is achieved by the self-docking and rotating system controls of the RTP Alpha, all done with only one operator standing in an upright ergonomic position. This system also allows for greater flexibility in available Beta connection options, expanding the overall functionality of the system. This system can be disconnected and reconnected multiple times to maximize volume containment. This will minimize drum disposal costs and reduce the overall volume of waste output by more efficiently filling the drums. Radiation levels inside each drum can be monitored and adjusted more efficiently by operators utilizing the reconnect option. Minimal As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels are also achievable with this system. This paper will show how highly efficient packaging and disposal of hazardous waste can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner utilizing the proven RTP technology. Maximized operator productivity and safety, as well as minimized radiation dose exposure, are all attainable through the system's engineered controls. (authors)

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