Applying Lessons Learned From the COVID‐19 Global Pandemic to Increase Radioactive Source Security System Resilience.
Abstract not provided.
Swinney, Ryan↗
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INSEN 2023 Yearly Updates
The International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) is the primary international network for nuclear security educational initiatives. INSEN plays a central role in fostering collaboration and knowledge-sharing among nuclear security education experts worldwide. In the wake of the global pandemic, INSEN remained committed to strengthening nuclear security education and resumed in-person activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed its continued dedication and support to the network’s mission and presented new activities aimed at elevating global nuclear security efforts. Throughout the year and during the annual and leadership meetings, working groups showcased their vibrant work and presented innovative ideas, invigorating the attendees’ dedication to their crucial work. Comprehensive presentations by the IAEA during the INSEN annual and leadership meetings highlighted the importance of the network and its continued commitment to promoting nuclear security on a global scale. One notable and encouraging trend was the increase in network membership, signifying a growing commitment to nuclear security worldwide and the continued interest in nuclear security from member states and international organizations. The value of initiatives such as the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative was emphasized at the annual meeting, accenting the need for diverse perspectives and expertise to ensure a secure nuclear landscape.
96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
Report series: Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for the 1960s Dormitories and 1950s Quonset Hut Foundations, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [3 Reports Consolidated]
The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the town of Mercury at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans—including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury—are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury in 2017. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District, as well as the identification of its contributing components. This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C, but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 153 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was referred to as the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report evaluates resources dating to the 1950s and 1960s between Jangle and Knothole Streets and south of Ranger Avenue in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of all resources in that area between Sandstone and Greenhouse Avenues as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties, as detailed in this report, indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
The Architecture of Area 12 Camp - Nevada's Atomic Ghost Town. An Architectural Survey of Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada
The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish 10 buildings and one structure in Area 12 Camp at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Program, and Environmental Management mission requirements and to reduce dangers to site workers from some of these resources. These demolitions constitute an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. These resources were recorded and evaluated as individually ineligible for the National Register of Historic Places (National Register or NRHP) by Menocal and Shaw (2019). Upon review by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and internal review by Desert Research Institute (DRI) and NNSA/NFO staff, it was determined that these resources needed to be rerecorded and evaluated in relation to what appeared to be a National Register-eligible Historic District made up of the entirety of Area 12 Camp. Based on preliminary information, it appeared that all 11 resources would likely be contributing elements of that historic district. With that assumption in mind, recording of the entire proposed Area 12 Camp Historic District was done for three purposes. First, it would result in a definitive significance evaluation of the 11 resources in question. Second, recording of the entire camp would be offered as an appropriate mitigation measure for the demolition of these resources. Third, it would present an essential background for future management of resources within the district boundaries. Prior to the present survey, Area 12 Camp had not yet been systematically recorded; therefore, DRI surveyed an area of approximately 229 acres for architectural resources. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended eligible for the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A and C. It is unevaluated under Criteria B and D. The Area 12 Historic District contains 71 Principal Resources, which include landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, 69 (including 10 of the 11 resources to be removed) are recommended as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1960 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the government reservation now called the NNSS was named the Nevada Test Site (NTS).
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Challenges and Opportunities for the Development of Commercial Maritime Surface Vessel Nuclear Propulsion (CMNP)
Maritime transport and trade are currently responsible for producing nearly 1 billion metric tons of CO2 emissions annually, representing 2.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions. While maritime shipping is acknowledged as the most efficient carrier of goods in terms of its costs and carbon intensity, the sector relies overwhelmingly on the use of heavy fuel oil (HFO). This fuel source currently is unmatched in terms of its global availability, safety, security of supply, price, and energy density. Combined, these characteristics are responsible for the outsized contribution of the sector to the global economy: roughly 90% of all transported goods spend time at sea. Commercial maritime nuclear propulsion provides opportunities to transition maritime trade to clean energy but also comes with challenges. Both are covered in this report based on 60+ interviews with professionals from the maritime and nuclear energy sectors.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Lessons Learned from Virtual Execution of Security System Evaluations During the COVID-19 Global Pandemic.
Abstract not provided.
Smith, Bryce↗
Strengthening U.S. National Security Through Advanced Energy Innovation
NREL's work in strategic energy security is focused on keeping the United States secure and its citizens safe by applying expertise in advanced energy systems and technologies to prevent energy system disruptions from any source, natural or human. NREL pursues national security objectives by providing partners an accurate understanding of national and international security implications of global energy trends; novel installation, facility, and operational energy solutions; access to NREL R&D capabilities to incorporate advanced energy technologies and biomaterials into mission requirements; and the ability to test future technologies using large-scale grid modeling.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Material Resilience in Harsh Service Conditions
Resilience describes the attributes of a material that allow it to withstand or resist detrimental environmental effects degrading properties and performance. In service, materials may experience harsh or extreme conditions, but even modest thermal or load conditions experienced over a long period can degrade performance. Thus, the National Nuclear Security Administration mission requires predictive understanding of materials performance in harsh and extreme conditions over long periods. This performance is particularly relevant for applications in which replacement is impractical, impossible, or costly. This area of leadership addresses the evolution of material properties in environments that include static and dynamic stress, radiation, and chemical or thermal extremes. A particular focus is on situations when environments coexist or for which collection of experimental data is challenging or impossible. The capability to predict and control the nature and evolution of properties to allow designing resilience is a crucial aspect of mission success in national nuclear, global, and energy security.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
Women as a Force Multiplier for Bringing Nuclear Forensic Capabilities to the International Stage
In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Integrating science for water security governance
Hydrological extremes are intensifying globally, increasing the complexity of decisions required to ensure water security. Advances in hydrological science, modeling, and data systems have expanded the technical frontier of water research, yet uptake of scientific insights in policy and management decisions remains limited. This persistent science–policy gap is not primarily a failure of knowledge generation or robustness, but an institutional challenge shaped by how scientific and governance systems are organized, coordinated, and connected to support the effective use of scientific knowledge. These challenges are particularly pronounced in multi-level and transboundary water governance, where decisions span jurisdictions and require coordination across institutional and political boundaries. We synthesize research at the science–policy interface and evidence from water security initiatives to show how institutional arrangements, scientific tool development, and research practices enable or constrain the sustained use of scientific knowledge in water-security governance processes. Building on these insights, we develop ‘shared decision infrastructure’ as a framing to describe how scientific knowledge is embedded within the institutional, relational, and procedural arrangements that connect science to decision-making processes over time. We translate this framing into a practical intervention roadmap centered on institutional design, tool translation, sustained co-production, and outcome-oriented evaluation to support the integration of science into ongoing governance processes. By positioning science as shared decision infrastructure, the roadmap clarifies how researchers can design scientific efforts that support more coordinated, accountable, and adaptive water security decisions amid deepening uncertainty.
M whitney, Kristen [NASA Goddard Space Flight Cent↗
The AgMIP Coordinated Global and Regional Assessments (CGRA) of Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and Food Security
The Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) has been working since 2010 to construct a protocol-based framework enabling regional assessments (led by regional experts and modelers) that can provide consistent inputs to global economic and integrated assessment models. These global models can then relay important global-level information that drive regional decision-making and outcomes throughout an interconnected agricultural system. AgMIPs community of nearly 800 climate, crop, livestock, economics, and IT experts has improved the state-of-the-art through model intercomparisons, validation exercises, regional integrated assessments, and the launch of AgMIP programs on all six arable continents. AgMIP is now launching Coordinated Global and Regional Assessments (CGRA) of climate change impacts on agriculture and food security to link global and regional crop and economic models using a protocol-based framework. The CGRA protocols are being developed to utilize historical observations, climate projections, and RCPsSSPs from CMIP5 (and potentially CMIP6), and will examine stakeholder-driven agricultural development and adaptation scenarios to provide cutting-edge assessments of climate changes impact on agriculture and food security. These protocols will build on the foundation of established protocols from AgMIPs 30+ activities, and will emphasize the use of multiple models, scenarios, and scales to enable an accurate assessment of related uncertainties. The CGRA is also designed to provide the outputs necessary to feed into integrated assessment models (IAMs), nutrition and food security assessments, nitrogen and carbon cycle models, and additional impact-sector assessments (e.g., water resources, land-use, biomes, urban areas). This presentation will describe the current status of CGRA planning and initial prototype experiments to demonstrate key aspects of the protocols before wider implementation ahead of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.
models↗
Decadal-Scale Hydrothermal Alteration of Basalt: Implications for Long-Term Reactivity in Subsurface Technologies
Global demands to secure critical mineral supply chains and managing water resources require innovative resource management strategies. Subsurface basalt reservoirs offer a dual-purpose application, where CO2 enhanced critical metal recovery can be coupled with water remediation strategies for the extraction of economically important and environmentally relevant elements. This study utilizes static batch experiments conducted on Columbia River Basalt Group samples to evaluate long-term fluid–rock interactions relevant to coupled subsurface applications. Samples were reacted under elevated temperature and pressure conditions, for 296 and 4,061 days, providing a unique dataset to assess geochemical evolution, element partitioning, and aqueous chemistry over decadal timescales. The alteration was dominated by silicate, aluminosilicate, and oxide phases. Progressive hydrothermal alteration increased the cation exchange capacity through the formation of secondary minerals (e.g. clays and zeolites), influencing solute retention, ion exchange behavior, and aqueous chemistry. Grain-scale and bulk analyses revealed selective cation release and retention patterns, establishing a mechanistic baseline for predicting element mobility. These geochemical constraints inform the prospective use of CO2-enhanced metal recovery for critical resources (e.g. Co, Ni, Mn, Mg, Ti, Fe) and associated water-quality impacts, providing a foundation for the design and management of engineered fluid–rock systems in basalt reservoirs.
Gibson, Marie N.↗
Report on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods
The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the modern world has impacted nearly every application imaginable. This includes nuclear proliferation detection, which offers the potential to improve existing capabilities as well as create new ones. Proliferation detection seeks to detect and characterize attempts by state and non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons or associated technology, materials, or knowledge. Such a mission is vitally important for global stability and security but is notoriously difficult. By leveraging advances in AI, exciting opportunities exist to enhance the proliferation detection regime. The Data Science and AI portfolio within the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) seeks to leverage the capabilities of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) national laboratories and other partners to develop AI systems that can accomplish otherwise impossible tasks in support of proliferation detection. As part of its efforts, the portfolio has created a series of workshops on Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection to help define the requirements for suitable AI systems, share successful research and best practices, and foster connection and understanding between the relevant parties including researchers and end-users. Each workshop in the series focuses on a specific and critical aspect of AI to enable it to accomplish proliferation detection objectives. The first workshop focused on explainability techniques; the second workshop and the topic of this report, covers methods for incorporating domain awareness into AI. The Next-Gen AI for Proliferation Detection Workshop: Domain-Aware Methods took place virtually over two days in February 2021 and included four keynote presentations, 22 technical presentations, and a concluding panel. The presentations, discussions, and workshop findings are summarized in this report.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Securing Critical Materials for the U.S. Electric Vehicle Industry: A Landscape Assessment of Domestic and International Supply Chains for Five Key Battery Materials
This study explores the prospective supply of upstream critical materials, providing insights into the U.S.'s capacity to meet its Electric Vehicle (EV) and Energy Storage System (ESS) deployment targets for 2035. It evaluates the proportion of critical materials demand that can be met by domestic upstream sources and the amount that will require non-U.S. sources. The analysis considers geological resources and current international development activities, contributing to the understanding of mineral supply security as the global community strives for net-zero emissions by 2050. The study focuses on five materials assessed in the 2023 DOE Critical Materials Assessment – Lithium, Nickel, Cobalt, Graphite, and Manganese.
33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
Women as a force multiplier for bringing nuclear forensic capabilities to the international stage
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009-2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the U.S. Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next six years, a small team comprised of a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercises documentation was developed in the 2009-2015 timeframe, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Technologies for Networked Enabled Operations
Current point-to-point data links will not scale to support future integration of surveillance, security, and globally-distributed air traffic data, and already hinders efficiency and capacity. While the FAA and industry focus on a transition to initial system-wide information management (SWIM) capabilities, this paper describes a set of initial studies of NAS network-enabled operations technology gaps targeted for maturity in later SWIM spirals (201 5-2020 timeframe).
Glass, B.↗
Launching to the Moon, Mars, and Beyond
America is returning to the Moon in preparation for the first human footprint on Mars, guided by the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration. This presentation will discuss NASA's mission today, the reasons for returning to the Moon and going to Mars, and how NASA will accomplish that mission. The primary goals of the Vision for Space Exploration are to finish the International Space Station, retire the Space Shuttle, and build the new spacecraft needed to return people to the Moon and go to Mars. Unlike the Apollo program of the 1960s, this phase of exploration will be a journey, not a race. In 1966, the NASA's budget was 4 percent of federal spending. Today, with 6/10 of 1 percent of the budget, NASA must incrementally develop the vehicles, infrastructure, technology, and organization to accomplish this goal. Fortunately, our knowledge and experience are greater than they were 40 years ago. NASA's goal is a return to the Moon by 2020. The Moon is the first step to America's exploration of Mars. Many questions about the Moon's history and how its history is linked to that of Earth remain even after the brief Apollo explorations of the 1960s and 1970s. This new venture will carry more explorers to more diverse landing sites with more capable tools and equipment. The Moon also will serve as a training ground in several respects before embarking on the longer, more perilous trip to Mars. The journeys to the Moon and Mars will require a variety of vehicles, including the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, and the Lunar Surface Access Module. The architecture for the lunar missions will use one launch to ferry the crew into orbit on the Ares I and a second launch to orbit the lunar lander and the Earth Departure Stage to send the lander and crew vehicle to the Moon. In order to reach the Moon and Mars within a lifetime and within budget, NASA is building on proven hardware and decades of experience derived from the Apollo Saturn, Space Shuttle, and contemporary commercial launch vehicle programs. Less than one year after the Exploration Launch Projects Office was formed at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, engineers are testing engine components, firing test rocket motors, refining vehicle designs in wind tunnel tests, and building hardware for the first flight test of Ares I, scheduled for spring 2009. The Vision for Exploration will require this nation to develop tools, machines, materials, and processes never before invented, technologies and capabilities that can be turned over to the private sector to benefit nearly all aspects of life on Earth. This new pioneering venture, as did the Apollo Program before it, will contribute to America's economic leadership, national security, and technological global competitiveness and serve as an inspiration for all its citizens.
Sumrall, John P.↗
Multi-Agent Control Planes for Quantum Networks: A Scalable Architecture for Autonomous Quantum Internet Management
Quantum networks are expected to enable distributed quantum computing, secure communication, and global entanglement distribution. However, operating such networks presents significant challenges, including stochastic quantum processes, fragile entanglement resources, dynamic topology, and cross-layer control requirements. Current quantum network control architectures largely rely on centralized or hierarchical controllers inspired by classical software-defined networking (SDN). While effective for small testbeds, these approaches face scalability, latency, and reliability limitations as quantum networks grow. This paper proposes a multi-agent control plane architecture for quantum networks. In this design, intelligent software agents operate at quantum nodes, repeaters, and orchestration layers, collectively managing entanglement generation, routing, purification, and scheduling. The distributed intelligence of the agent system allows the network to adapt dynamically to quantum hardware variability and environmental noise. We argue that multi-agent systems provide significant advantages over centralized control approaches, including scalability, resilience, local autonomy, and real-time adaptation. The paper discusses architectural design principles, agent coordination mechanisms, and research challenges in deploying multi-agent control planes for the emerging quantum Internet.
Alnajjar, Anees [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000237101601)↗