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NASA NTRS2010

Operational Lessons Learned from the Ares I-X Flight Test

The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I. Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions. To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB, several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle s configuration had to be removed to accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing, transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B. Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than the Shuttle s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle. Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.

Davis, Stephan R.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Exoplanet Community Report on Direct Infrared Imaging of Exoplanets

Direct infrared imaging and spectroscopy of exoplanets will allow for detailed characterization of the atmospheric constituents of more than 200 nearby Earth-like planets, more than is possible with any other method under consideration. A flagship mission based on larger passively cooled infrared telescopes and formation flying technologies would have the highest angular resolution of any concept under consideration. The 2008 Exoplanet Forum committee on Direct Infrared Imaging of Exoplanets recommends: (1) a vigorous technology program including component development, integrated testbeds, and end-to-end modeling in the areas of formation flying and mid-infrared nulling; (2) a probe-scale mission based on a passively cooled structurally connected interferometer to be started within the next two to five years, for exoplanetary system characterization that is not accessible from the ground, and which would provide transformative science and lay the engineering groundwork for the flagship mission with formation flying elements. Such a mission would enable a complete exozodiacal dust survey (<1 solar system zodi) in the habitable zone of all nearby stars. This information will allow for a more efficient strategy of spectral characterization of Earth-sized planets for the flagship missions, and also will allow for optimization of the search strategy of an astrometric mission if such a mission were delayed due to cost or technology reasons. (3) Both the flagship and probe missions should be pursued with international partners if possible. Fruitful collaboration with international partners on mission concepts and relevant technology should be continued. (4) Research and Analysis (R&A) should be supported for the development of preliminary science and mission designs. Ongoing efforts to characterize the the typical level of exozodiacal light around Sun-like stars with ground-based nulling technology should be continued.

Danchi, William C.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Integrated Human-Robotic Missions to the Moon and Mars: Mission Operations Design Implications

For most of the history of space exploration, human and robotic programs have been independent, and have responded to distinct requirements. The NASA Vision for Space Exploration calls for the return of humans to the Moon, and the eventual human exploration of Mars; the complexity of this range of missions will require an unprecedented use of automation and robotics in support of human crews. The challenges of human Mars missions, including roundtrip communications time delays of 6 to 40 minutes, interplanetary transit times of many months, and the need to manage lifecycle costs, will require the evolution of a new mission operations paradigm far less dependent on real-time monitoring and response by an Earthbound operations team. Robotic systems and automation will augment human capability, increase human safety by providing means to perform many tasks without requiring immediate human presence, and enable the transfer of traditional mission control tasks from the ground to crews. Developing and validating the new paradigm and its associated infrastructure may place requirements on operations design for nearer-term lunar missions. The authors, representing both the human and robotic mission operations communities, assess human lunar and Mars mission challenges, and consider how human-robot operations may be integrated to enable efficient joint operations, with the eventual emergence of a unified exploration operations culture.

Korth, David↗
NASA NTRS2007

Integrated Human-Robotic Missions to the Moon and Mars: Mission Operations Design Implications

For most of the history of space exploration, human and robotic programs have been independent, and have responded to distinct requirements. The NASA Vision for Space Exploration calls for the return of humans to the Moon, and the eventual human exploration of Mars; the complexity of this range of missions will require an unprecedented use of automation and robotics in support of human crews. The challenges of human Mars missions, including roundtrip communications time delays of 6 to 40 minutes, interplanetary transit times of many months, and the need to manage lifecycle costs, will require the evolution of a new mission operations paradigm far less dependent on real-time monitoring and response by an Earthbound operations team. Robotic systems and automation will augment human capability, increase human safety by providing means to perform many tasks without requiring immediate human presence, and enable the transfer of traditional mission control tasks from the ground to crews. Developing and validating the new paradigm and its associated infrastructure may place requirements on operations design for nearer-term lunar missions. The authors, representing both the human and robotic mission operations communities, assess human lunar and Mars mission challenges, and consider how human-robot operations may be integrated to enable efficient joint operations, with the eventual emergence of a unified exploration operations culture.

human robotic missions↗
NASA NTRS2006

Integrated human-robotic missions to the Moon and Mars : mission operations design implications

For most of the history of space exploration, human and robotic programs have been independent, and have responded to distinct requirements. The NASA Vision for Space Exploration calls for the return of humans to the Moon, and the eventual human exploration of Mars; the complexity of this range of missions will require an unprecedented use of automation and robotics in support of human crews. The challenges of human Mars missions, including roundtrip communications time delays of 6 to 40 minutes, interplanetary transit times of many months, and the need to manage lifecycle costs, will require the evolution of a new mission operations paradigm far less dependent on real-time monitoring and response by an Earthbound operations team. Robotic systems and automation will augment human capability, increase human safety by providing means to perform many tasks without requiring immediate human presence, and enable the transfer of traditional mission control tasks from the ground to crews. Developing and validating the new paradigm and its associated infrastructure may place requirements on operations design for nearer-term lunar missions. The authors, representing both the human and robotic mission operations communities, assess human lunar and Mars mission challenges, and consider how human-robot operations may be integrated to enable efficient joint operations, with the eventual emergence of a unified exploration operations culture.

Lee, Young↗
NASA NTRS2010

Life Cycle Cost Growth Study for the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office

The D&NF Program Office LCC Management Study provides a detailed look at the drivers underlying cost overruns and schedule delays for five D&NF missions. While none of the findings are new, the study underlines the importance of continued emphasis on sound project management techniques: a clean project management structure with a clear definition of roles and responsibilities across the various partners in a project, an understanding of institutional standards and procedures and any differences among the partners, and the critical need for a comprehensive IMS that can be used easily and routinely to identify potential threats to the critical path. The study also highlights the continuing need for realistic estimates of the total LCC. Sufficient time and resources must be allocated early in a project to ensure that the appropriate trade studies and analyses are performed across all aspects of a mission: spacecraft, ground system, operations concept, and fault management, to ensure that proposed and confirmed costs truly reflect the resource requirements over the entire mission life cycle. These studies need to include a realistic review of the assumptions underlying the use of new technologies, the integration of heritage and new hardware and software into the total mission environment, and any development and test savings based on heritage technology and lessons learned. Finally, the LCC Management Study stresses the need to listen to, carefully consider, and take positive action regarding the issues raised during reviews by the expert review teams.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2013

Robotic Technology Development at Ames: The Intelligent Robotics Group and Surface Telerobotics

Future human missions to the Moon, Mars, and other destinations offer many new opportunities for exploration. But, astronaut time will always be limited and some work will not be feasible for humans to do manually. Robots, however, can complement human explorers, performing work autonomously or under remote supervision from Earth. Since 2004, the Intelligent Robotics Group has been working to make human-robot interaction efficient and effective for space exploration. A central focus of our research has been to develop and field test robots that benefit human exploration. Our approach is inspired by lessons learned from the Mars Exploration Rovers, as well as human spaceflight programs, including Apollo, the Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station. We conduct applied research in computer vision, geospatial data systems, human-robot interaction, planetary mapping and robot software. In planning for future exploration missions, architecture and study teams have made numerous assumptions about how crew can be telepresent on a planetary surface by remotely operating surface robots from space (i.e. from a flight vehicle or deep space habitat). These assumptions include estimates of technology maturity, existing technology gaps, and likely operational and functional risks. These assumptions, however, are not grounded by actual experimental data. Moreover, no crew-controlled surface telerobotic system has yet been fully tested, or rigorously validated, through flight testing. During Summer 2013, we conducted a series of tests to examine how astronauts in the International Space Station (ISS) can remotely operate a planetary rover across short time delays. The tests simulated portions of a proposed human-robotic Lunar Waypoint mission, in which astronauts in lunar orbit remotely operate a planetary rover on the lunar Farside to deploy a radio telescope array. We used these tests to obtain baseline-engineering data.

robotics↗
NASA NTRS1986

CID-720 aircraft high-environment flight instrumentation system

The high-environment flight instrumentation system was designed to acquire Langley's structural response data during the full scale transport-controlled impact demonstration test. There was only one opportunity for data acquisition. Thus, a high reliability and crashworthy design approach was implemented. The approach featured multi-level redundancy and a vigorous quality assurance testing program. Complying with an accelerated schedule, the instrumentation system was developed, tested and shipped within 18 months to Dryden Flight Research Facility. The flight instrumentation system consists of two autonomous data systems, DAS #1 and #2, and an excellent checkout subsystem. Each data system is partitioned into four pallets. The system was designed to operate on manned and unmanned flights. There are 176 data channels per data system. These channels are sequentially sampled and encoded into 1 megabit/sec pulse code modulation (PCM) data signal. To increase the probability of success, a special PCM distribution subsystem was developed. This subsystem distributes the PCM signal to two transmitters, one delay memory, and eight recorder tracks. The data on four of these trackes was digitally delayed approximately 300 msec to maximize data acquisition during impact. Therefore each data system's data is redundantly recorded onboard and on the ground. There are two time code generators. Parallel time from each is encoded into both data systems. Serial time from each is redundantly recorded on both onboard recorders. Instrumentation power is independent of aircraft power and self-contained.

Calloway, R. S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Human Factors in Training

Future space missions will be significantly longer than current Shuttle missions and new systems will be more complex than current systems. Increasing communication delays between crews and Earth-based support means that astronauts need to be prepared to handle the unexpected on their own. As crews become more autonomous, their potential span of control and required expertise must grow to match their autonomy. It is not possible to train for every eventuality ahead of time on the ground, or to maintain trained skills across long intervals of disuse. To adequately prepare NASA personnel for these challenges, new training approaches, methodologies, and tools are required. This research project aims at developing these training capabilities. Training efforts in FY07 strongly focused on crew medical training, but also began exploring how Space Flight Resource Management training for Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Controllers could be integrated with systems training for optimal Mission Control Center operations. Beginning in January 2008, the training research effort will include team training prototypes and tools. The Training Task addresses Program risks that lie at the intersection of the following three risks identified by the Project: 1) Risk associated with poor task design; 2) Risk of error due to inadequate information; 3) Risk associated with reduced safety and efficiency due to poor human factors design.

Barshi, Immanuel↗
NASA NTRS2002

Aeronautical Communications Research and Development Needs for Future Air Traffic Management Applications

Continuing growth in regional and global air travel has resulted in increasing traffic congestion in the air and on the ground. In spite of occasional temporary downturns due to economic recessions and catastrophic events, average growth rates of air travel have remained high since the 1960s. The resulting congestion, which constrains expansion of the air transportation industry, inflicts schedule delays and decreases overall system efficiency, creating a pressing need to develop more efficient methods of air traffic management (ATM). New ATM techniques, procedures, air space automation methods, and decision support tools are being researched and developed for deployment in time frames stretching from the next few years to the year 2020 and beyond. As these methods become more advanced and increase in complexity, the requirements for information generation, sharing and transfer among the relevant entities in the ATM system increase dramatically. However, current aeronautical communications systems will be inadequate to meet the future information transfer demands created by these advanced ATM systems. Therefore, the NASA Glenn Research Center is undertaking research programs to develop communication, methods and key technologies that can meet these future requirements. As part of this process, studies, workshops, testing and experimentation, and research and analysis have established a number of research and technology development needs. The purpose of this paper is to outline the critical research and technology needs that have been identified in these activities, and explain how these needs have been determined.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) Remote Teleoperation Studies Under Four Lunar Communication Latencies

Remotely operating a lunar rover from Earth while subject to an Earth-Moon time delay of multiple seconds could result in a dangerous state where the roving vehicle is either damaged or lost, thereby potentially compromising an entire mission or series of missions. Providing the right capabilities to the remote operator to manage inherent communication latencies will be important for remote driving to be successful. NASA conducted two studies to investigate the average speed and number of kilometers per day that an operator on Earth could teleoperate a notional Artemis unpressurized rover with minimal remote operator capabilities under 0- and 4-second communication delays (April 2023 study) and 6- and 8-second delays (August 2023 study). A primary goal of these studies was to understand if an Artemis Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) could cover 6 kilometers (km) in 24 hours when operated remotely. During the April 2023 evaluation, eight test operators used an in-house simulation of the lunar surface South Pole to teleoperate a NASA government reference LTV. Each operator received approximately 30 minutes of remote driving familiarization/training prior to their test run. Operators viewed the surrounding terrain via a single, rover mast-mounted, high-resolution camera with pan/tilt/zoom capabilities; continuous communication was provided throughout all testing. In the August 2023 evaluation, remote operators received approximately 3 hours of familiarization training in each latency, and the simulation environment provided remote operators with an operator-selected rate limiter to enable finer sensitivity in the hand controller and a predictive circle function to better assist operators with predicting the path the vehicle could take. All test operators were able to successfully navigate and drive through six different types of terrain and five planned traverse scenarios using natural lighting under all communication delays. Results for average speeds for each communication delay, computed by averaging the data from all test conditions for that latency and all operators, are shown in the table below. The average speed data was then used to derive the total time needed to cover 6 km, 8 km, and 20 km (distances relevant to LTV-SYS071 and -029 requirements). Remote operators drove slower and used the brake more frequently when subject to a communication latency as opposed to no communication latency. Subjective workload assessments revealed that while operating in a latency the overall workload significantly increased when compared to a 0-s delay with mental demand, frustration, and performance being the primary contributing factors. Driving strategies in the 0-s delay did not vary significantly among subjects; however, in the 4-s delay condition, three different driving strategies were identified. In the 6-s and 8-s latency conditions the operator’s use of the cruise control to maintain speed was more apparent. Additionally, over the course of the August study, the operator took advantage of the predictive circle indicator on the navigation display and over 95% of the operator’s navigation used the mast camera 180-degree panning function for ground truthing in terms of boulders and craters. Operators started to define more specific parameters in driving strategies for general operations. This consisted of setting the vehicle into a low-speed cruise mode of approximately 11.5 kph and noticing driving performance of the vehicle seemed to be much harder at slower speeds 0.4–0.8 kph; however, the vehicle was more responsive at speeds of 2.9–3.6 kph. Regardless of communication delay, operators used both the horizontal translation rails and the vehicle fenders as guides to predict a path for the vehicle through heavily concentrated terrain features. Test operators acknowledged that the teleoperations training for this study was substantially less than what an actual LTV remote operator will ultimately receive. They estimated a minimum of 20 to 100 hours spread across multiple days and weeks (e.g., strategies included immersion training over a 3-day period, to a short 8-week starter program) would be needed to get an operator ~ 60% proficient (i.e., able to complete a subset of remote driving tasks), to a yearlong program for full proficiency in remote driving tasks under all terrain types and natural lighting conditions. Remotely operating a vehicle on another planetary body while subject to communication latency is a complex task. Speed, distance covered, time spent driving, time spent navigating, brake usage and rock contacts are all affected by operator workload, driving strategies, workstation ergonomics and training. These studies provided a “first-look” answer to a potential system requirement (namely if a remote operator could cover a given distance in a given amount of time); however, considerable general knowledge was gained to begin to understand what it will take to make a successful lunar rover teleoperator.

LTV↗
NASA NTRS1992

Scanning electron microscope observations of brine shrimp larvae from space shuttle experiments

Brine shrimp are encysted as gastrula stage embryos, and may remain dehydrated and encysted for years without compromising their viability. This aspect of brine shrimp biology is desirable for studying development of animals during space shuttle flight, as cysts placed aboard a spacecraft may be rehydrated at the convenience of an astronaut, guaranteeing that subsequent brine shrimp development occurs only on orbit and not on the pad during launch delays. Brine shrimp cysts placed in 5 ml syringes were rehydrated with salt water and hatched during a 9 day space shuttle mission. Subsequent larvae developed to the 8th larval stage in the sealed syringes. We studied the morphogenesis of the brine shrimp larvae and found the larvae from the space shuttle experiments similar in rate of growth and extent of development, to larvae grown in sealed syringes on the ground. Extensive differentiation and development of embryos and larvae can occur in a microgravity environment.

short duration↗
NASA NTRS2025

Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) Remote Teleoperation Studies Under Four Lunar Communication Latencies

Remotely operating a lunar rover from Earth while subject to an Earth-Moon time delay of multiple seconds could result in a dangerous state where the roving vehicle is either damaged or lost, thereby potentially compromising an entire mission or series of missions. Providing the right capabilities to the remote operator to manage inherent communication latencies will be important for remote driving to be successful. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted two studies to investigate the average speed and number of kilometers per day that an operator on Earth could teleoperate a notional Artemis unpressurized rover with minimal remote operator capabilities under 0- and 4-second communication delays (April 2023 study) and 6- and 8-second delays (August 2023 study). A primary goal of these studies was to understand if an Artemis Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) could cover 6 kilometers (km) in 24 hours when operated remotely. During the April 2023 evaluation, eight test operators used an in-house simulation of the lunar surface South Pole to teleoperate a NASA government reference LTV. Each operator received approximately 30 minutes of remote driving familiarization/training prior to their test run. Operators viewed the surrounding terrain via a single, rover mast-mounted, high-resolution camera with pan/tilt/zoom capabilities; continuous communication was provided throughout all testing. In the August 2023 evaluation, remote operators received approximately 3 hours of familiarization training in each latency, and the simulation environment provided remote operators with an operator-selected rate limiter to enable finer sensitivity in the hand controller and a predictive circle function to better assist operators with predicting the path the vehicle could take. All test operators were able to successfully navigate and drive through six different types of terrain and five planned traverse scenarios using natural lighting under all communication delays. Results for average speeds for each communication delay, computed by averaging the data from all test conditions for that latency and all operators, are shown in the table below. The average speed data was then used to derive the total time needed to cover 6 km, 8 km, and 20 km. Remote operators drove slower and used the brake more frequently when subject to a communication latency as opposed to no communication latency. Subjective workload assessments revealed that while operating in a latency the overall workload significantly increased when compared to a 0-s delay with mental demand, frustration, and performance being the primary contributing factors. Driving strategies in the 0-s delay did not vary significantly among subjects; however, in the 4-s delay condition, three different driving strategies were identified. In the 6-s and 8-s latency conditions the operator’s use of the cruise control to maintain speed was more apparent. Additionally, over the course of the August study, the operator took advantage of the predictive circle indicator on the navigation display and over 95% of the operator’s navigation used the mast camera 180-degree panning function for ground truthing in terms of boulders and craters. Operators started to define more specific parameters in driving strategies for general operations. This consisted of setting the vehicle into a low-speed cruise mode of approximately 1–1.5 kph and noticing driving performance of the vehicle seemed to be much harder at slower speeds 0.4–0.8 kph; however, the vehicle was more responsive at speeds of 2.9–3.6 kph. Regardless of communication delay, operators used both the horizontal translation rails and the vehicle fenders as guides to predict a path for the vehicle through heavily concentrated terrain features. Test operators acknowledged that the teleoperations training for this study was substantially less than what an actual LTV remote operator will ultimately receive. They estimated a minimum of 20 to 100 hours spread across multiple days and weeks (e.g., strategies included immersion training over a 3-day period, to a short 8-week starter program) would be needed to get an operator ~ 60% proficient (i.e., able to complete a subset of remote driving tasks), to a yearlong program for full proficiency in remote driving tasks under all terrain types and natural lighting conditions. Remotely operating a vehicle on another planetary body while subject to communication latency is a complex task. Speed, distance covered, time spent driving, time spent navigating, brake usage and rock contacts are all affected by operator workload, driving strategies, workstation ergonomics and training. These studies provided a “firstlook” answer to a potential system requirement (namely if a remote operator could cover a given distance in a given amount of time); however, considerable general knowledge was gained to begin to understand what it will take to make a successful lunar rover teleoperator.

LTV↗
NASA NTRS1993

Parallel runway requirement analysis study. Volume 1: The analysis

The correlation of increased flight delays with the level of aviation activity is well recognized. A main contributor to these flight delays has been the capacity of airports. Though new airport and runway construction would significantly increase airport capacity, few programs of this type are currently underway, let alone planned, because of the high cost associated with such endeavors. Therefore, it is necessary to achieve the most efficient and cost effective use of existing fixed airport resources through better planning and control of traffic flows. In fact, during the past few years the FAA has initiated such an airport capacity program designed to provide additional capacity at existing airports. Some of the improvements that that program has generated thus far have been based on new Air Traffic Control procedures, terminal automation, additional Instrument Landing Systems, improved controller display aids, and improved utilization of multiple runways/Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) approach procedures. A useful element to understanding potential operational capacity enhancements at high demand airports has been the development and use of an analysis tool called The PLAND_BLUNDER (PLB) Simulation Model. The objective for building this simulation was to develop a parametric model that could be used for analysis in determining the minimum safety level of parallel runway operations for various parameters representing the airplane, navigation, surveillance, and ATC system performance. This simulation is useful as: a quick and economical evaluation of existing environments that are experiencing IMC delays, an efficient way to study and validate proposed procedure modifications, an aid in evaluating requirements for new airports or new runways in old airports, a simple, parametric investigation of a wide range of issues and approaches, an ability to tradeoff air and ground technology and procedures contributions, and a way of considering probable blunder mechanisms and range of blunder scenarios. This study describes the steps of building the simulation and considers the input parameters, assumptions and limitations, and available outputs. Validation results and sensitivity analysis are addressed as well as outlining some IMC and Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) approaches to parallel runways. Also, present and future applicable technologies (e.g., Digital Autoland Systems, Traffic Collision and Avoidance System II, Enhanced Situational Awareness System, Global Positioning Systems for Landing, etc.) are assessed and recommendations made.

Ebrahimi, Yaghoob S.↗
NASA NTRS2017

On the Development and Application of High Data Rate Architecture (HiDRA) in Future Space Networks

Historically, space missions have been severely constrained by their ability to downlink the data they have collected. These constraints are a result of relatively low link rates on the spacecraft as well as limitations on the time during which data can be sent. As part of a coherent strategy to address existing limitations and get more data to the ground more quickly, the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) program has been developing an architecture for a future solar system Internet. The High Data Rate Architecture (HiDRA) project is designed to fit into such a future SCaN network. HiDRA's goal is to describe a general packet-based networking capability which can be used to provide assets with efficient networking capabilities while simultaneously reducing the capital costs and operational costs of developing and flying future space systems.Along these lines, this paper begins by reviewing various characteristics of modern satellite design as well as relevant characteristics of emerging technologies (such as free-space optical links capable of working at 100+ Gbps). Next, the paper describes HiDRA's design, and how the system is able to both integrate and support the operation of not only today's high-rate systems, but also the high-rate systems likely to be found in the future. This section also explores both existing and future networking technologies, such as Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) protocol (RFC4838 citeRFC:1, RFC5050citeRFC:2), and explains how HiDRA supports them. Additionally, this section explores how HiDRA is used for scheduling data movement through both proactive and reactive link management. After this, the paper moves on to explore a reference implementation of HiDRA. This implementation is currently being realized based on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) memory and interface controller that is itself controlled by a local computer running DTN software. Next, this paper explores HiDRA's natural evolution, which includes an integration path for software-defined networking (SDN) switches. This section also describes considerations for both near-Earth and deep-space instantiations of HiDRA, describing how differences in latencies between the environments will necessarily influence how the system is configured and the networks operate. Finally, this paper describes future work. This section includes a description of a potential ISS implementation which will allow rapid advancement through the technology readiness levels (TRL). This section also explores work being done to support HiDRA's successful implementation and operation in a heterogeneous network: such a network could include communications equipment spanning many vintages and capabilities, and one significant aspect of HiDRA's future development involves balancing compatibility with capability.

DTN↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Reduction Autonomy Implementation to Enable NASA Artemis Missions

To achieve NASA’s Artemis program mission objectives a high level of autonomy and ubiquitous autonomy throughout the systems that are being developed will be necessary. The autonomous systems of Artemis will require a distributed autonomy capability, with autonomous systems organized functionally in a hierarchical architecture, where systems at higher levels of the hierarchy have authority over systems at lower levels. The challenge of developing autonomy technologies and concepts of operations for Artemis has been undertaken by the NASA Gateway Working Group. This group has developed requirements, architectures, concepts of operations, and interface control documents, in the context of a hierarchical distributed architecture that includes the following: a Vehicle System Manager (VSM) that autonomously manages the entire Gateway; Module System Managers (MSMs) that autonomously manage each module; and System Managers (SMs) that autonomously manage systems within a module(i.e. ECLSS).A substantially high level of autonomy needs to be achieved by each element of the hierarchy (VSM, MSM, SM)to meet requirements for uncrewed operations; this includes conditions that will have minimal and/or delayed ground intervention (i.e. requirements for sustainability for months of operation without crew or ground support). To advance an implementation of this autonomy design (Gateway Autonomy Design –GAD), a collaboration was established between the Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL) at NASA Stennis Space Center and Lockheed Martin. The objectives of this partnership were the following: (1)to implement autonomy at the VSM, MSM, and SM levels;(2) to implement communications among a VSM, 2 MSMs, ORION (a visiting vehicle somewhat equivalent to a module) and 1 SM (a power system), and (3) test autonomous operations with representative use cases. A SM backed by a high-fidelity simulation was created to facilitate demonstrations of use cases that originated in a system of a module. Communication between the VSM and MSMs was implemented according to Concepts of Operations and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). Demonstrations were conducted to address nominal and off-nominal operations and multi-module interactions with VSM. Additionally, user interfaces were created to provide awareness about ongoing processes and results while enhancing the demonstration. Demonstrations included the following use cases: (1)Orion as visiting vehicle registers with VSM;(2) VSM reschedules a module’s timelines when another module’s MSM task fails; and (3) a module’s Power System Manager (PSM) standalone demonstration that included component failure diagnostics, tracing component failure to effected components, which in turn, reports failure information up to the VSM for acknowledgement and display. This paper will describe the detailed technology and autonomous systems developed, and the integrated multi-module demonstrations conducted. Also, challenges that must be met to fully implement the GAD defined by Gateway will be addressed.

Autonomous Systems↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Reduction Autonomy Implementation to Enable NASA Artemis Missions

To achieve NASA’s Artemis program mission objectives a high level of autonomy that is ubiquitous throughout the systems that are being developed will be necessary. The autonomous systems of Artemis will require a distributed autonomy capability, with autonomous systems organized functionally in a hierarchical architecture, where systems at higher levels of the hierarchy have authority over systems at lower levels. The challenge of developing autonomy technologies and Concepts of Operations (ConOps) for Artemis has been undertaken by the NASA Gateway Working Group. This group has developed requirements, architectures, ConOps, and interface control documents (ICDs), in the context of a hierarchical distributed architecture that includes the following: a Vehicle System Manager (VSM) that autonomously manages the entire Gateway; Module System Managers (MSMs) that autonomously manage each module; and System Managers (SMs) that autonomously manage systems within a module (i.e. ECLSS). A substantially high level of autonomy needs to be achieved by each element of the hierarchy (VSM, MSM, SM) to meet requirements for uncrewed operations; this includes conditions that will have minimal and/or delayed ground intervention (i.e. requirements for sustainability for months of operation without crew or ground support). To advance an implementation of this autonomy design (Gateway Autonomy Design – GAD), a collaboration was established between the Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL) at NASA Stennis Space Center and Lockheed Martin. The objectives of this partnership were the following: (1) to implement autonomy at the VSM, MSM, and SM levels; (2) to implement communications among a VSM, 2 MSMs, ORION (a visiting vehicle somewhat equivalent to a module) and 1 SM (a power system), and (3) test autonomous operations with representative use cases. A SM backed by a high-fidelity simulation was created to facilitate demonstrations of use cases that originated in a system of a module. Communication between the VSM and MSMs was implemented according to Concepts of Operations and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). Demonstrations were conducted to address nominal and off-nominal operations and multi-module interactions with the VSM. Additionally, user interfaces were created to provide awareness about ongoing processes and results while enhancing the demonstration. Demonstrations included the following use cases: (1) Orion as visiting vehicle registers with VSM; (2) VSM reschedules a module’s timelines when another module’s MSM task fails; and (3) a module’s Power System Manager (PSM) demonstration that included component failure diagnostics, tracing component failure to effected components, which in turn, reports failure information up to the VSM for acknowledgement and display. This paper will describe the detailed technology and autonomous systems developed, and the integrated multi-module demonstrations conducted. Also, challenges that must be met to fully implement the GAD defined by Gateway will be addressed.

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