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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9

Pre-Installation Acceptance (PIA) Functional Performance of the Design Verification Test (DVT) Exploration Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

In an effort that began with technology investment by NASA in a few key components during the Constellation Program and then evolved to demonstrate a packaged Portable Life Support System (PLSS) as part of the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program, the next evolution of the PLSS is now a key component of the Exploration Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) and is assembled as a Design Verification Test (DVT) unit. The xEMU has been detailed with respect to completing a demonstration on the International Space Station (ISS) with support of units for initial lunar capability. The xEMU completed the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) with subsequent Safety Review Panel (SRP) Phase I reviews in 2019-2020. The objectives for DVT are to validate requirements, train the team, learn how to fabricate the hardware with appropriate process controls, assemble the hardware, test the hardware, determine the failure mechanisms/limits of the hardware design and buy down the most risk possible for the qualification and flight phases of the development. With completion of the assembly and initial functional testing of the DVT PLSS in laboratory ambient conditions and vacuum conditions the xEMU has progressed significantly into the DVT objectives. A key part of the test sequences for DVT and all future phases is the Pre-Installation Acceptance (PIA) functional testing which validates the performance of integrated systems including: primary thermal control, auxiliary thermal control, suit ventilation, primary oxygen, secondary oxygen, power distribution, as well as caution and warning all with respect to the applied requirements. This discussion will include an overview of the assembly, summary of the PIA functional testing, lessons learned, and corrective actions implemented moving forward into the remainder of the DVT phase for xEMU.

Colin Campbell↗

Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) Failures in Thin Film Resistors

Field failures of nichrome thin film resistors have been investigated recently for several pieces of space flight hardware. These failures have involved resistance shifts ranging from a few percent to complete open circuits. Failure analysis and duplication of these failures have revealed that the failures were caused by electrostatic discharge. The failure characteristics and the circuit conditions necessary for failure have been studied for several types of thin film resistors including nichrome and tantalum nitride resistive elements. The effects of latent damage and resistive pattern design will also be discussed.

Hull, Scott M.↗

Contamination Examples and Lessons from Low Earth Orbit Experiments and Operational Hardware

Flight experiments flown on the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station, Mir, Skylab, and free flyers such as the Long Duration Exposure Facility, the European Retrievable Carrier, and the EFFU, provide multiple opportunities for the investigation of molecular contamination effects. Retrieved hardware from the Solar Maximum Mission satellite, Mir, and the Hubble Space Telescope has also provided the means gaining insight into contamination processes. Images from the above mentioned hardware show contamination effects due to materials processing, hardware storage, pre-flight cleaning, as well as on-orbit events such as outgassing, mechanical failure of hardware in close proximity, impacts from man-made debris, and changes due to natural environment factors.. Contamination effects include significant changes to thermal and electrical properties of thermal control surfaces, optics, and power systems. Data from several flights has been used to develop a rudimentary estimate of asymptotic values for absorptance changes due to long-term solar exposure (4000-6000 Equivalent Sun Hours) of silicone-based molecular contamination deposits of varying thickness. Recommendations and suggestions for processing changes and constraints based on the on-orbit observed results will be presented.

Pippin, Gary↗

Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method

This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

R-Hope: Development Approach to Extreme Non-volatile Memory Reuse Onboard the Curiosity Rover

The MSL Curiosity rover landed on Mars on August~5, 2012. Over time, one of its two computers experienced critical hardware memory failure. This non-volatile NAND flash memory held file system partitions and tunable parameters needed for running rover flight software. The project assembled a design and development team to re-purpose a NOR flash memory hardware chip, only 1.5\% of the size of the NAND, to hold the file systems and parameters. The usable NOR memory required major software changes to accommodate the new limitations of slower access speeds, vastly different physical layout, and smaller size. This presentation discusses the approach, challenges, and outcomes of restoring function to the computer so it can act as a ``lifeboat'' in event of problems with the primary computer.

Peper, Nick↗

Should we attempt global (inlet engine airframe) control design?

The feasibility of multivariable design of the entire airplane control system is briefly addressed. An intermediate step in that direction is to design a control for an inlet engine augmentor system by using multivariable techniques. The supersonic cruise large scale inlet research program is described which will provide an opportunity to develop, integrate, and wind tunnel test a control for a mixed compression inlet and variable cycle engine. The integrated propulsion airframe control program is also discussed which will introduce the problem of implementing MVC within a distributed processing avionics architecture, requiring real time decomposition of the global design into independent modules in response to hardware communication failures.

Carlin, C. M.↗

Reliability achievement in high technology space systems

The production of failure-free hardware is discussed. The elements required to achieve such hardware are: technical expertise to design, analyze, and fully understand the design; use of high reliability parts and materials control in the manufacturing process; and testing to understand the system and weed out defects. The durability of the Hughes family of satellites is highlighted.

Lindstrom, D. L.↗

Compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback recovery using a read buffer

Multiple instruction rollback (MIR) is a technique that has been implemented in mainframe computers to provide rapid recovery from transient processor failures. Hardware-based MIR designs eliminate rollback data hazards by providing data redundancy implemented in hardware. Compiler-based MIR designs have also been developed which remove rollback data hazards directly with data-flow transformations. This paper focuses on compiler-assisted techniques to achieve multiple instruction rollback recovery. We observe that some data hazards resulting from instruction rollback can be resolved efficiently by providing an operand read buffer while others are resolved more efficiently with compiler transformations. A compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback scheme is developed which combines hardware-implemented data redundancy with compiler-driven hazard removal transformations. Experimental performance evaluations indicate improved efficiency over previous hardware-based and compiler-based schemes.

Alewine, N. J.↗

Compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback recovery using a read buffer

Multiple instruction rollback (MIR) is a technique that has been implemented in mainframe computers to provide rapid recovery from transient processor failures. Hardware-based MIR designs eliminate rollback data hazards by providing data redundancy implemented in hardware. Compiler-based MIR designs have also been developed which remove rollback data hazards directly with data-flow transformations. This paper describes compiler-assisted techniques to achieve multiple instruction rollback recovery. We observe that some data hazards resulting from instruction rollback can be resolved efficiently by providing an operand read buffer while others are resolved more efficiently with compiler transformations. The compiler-assisted scheme presented consists of hardware that is less complex than shadow files, history files, history buffers, or delayed write buffers, while experimental evaluation indicates performance improvement over compiler-based schemes.

Alewine, Neal J.↗

Using Generic Data to Establish Dormancy Failure Rates

Many hardware items are dormant prior to being operated. The dormant period might be especially long, for example during missions to the moon or Mars. In missions with long dormant periods the risk incurred during dormancy can exceed the active risk contribution. Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) need to account for the dormant risk contribution as well as the active contribution. A typical method for calculating a dormant failure rate is to multiply the active failure rate by a constant, the dormancy factor. For example, some practitioners use a heuristic and divide the active failure rate by 30 to obtain an estimate of the dormant failure rate. To obtain a more empirical estimate of the dormancy factor, this paper uses the recently updated database NPRD-2011 [1] to arrive at a set of distributions for the dormancy factor. The resulting dormancy factor distributions are significantly different depending on whether the item is electrical, mechanical, or electro-mechanical. Additionally, this paper will show that using a heuristic constant fails to capture the uncertainty of the possible dormancy factors.

Reistle, Bruce↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the displays and controls subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Displays and Controls (D and C) subsystem hardware. The function of the D and C hardware is to provide the crew with the monitor, command, and control capabilities required for management of all normal and contingency mission and flight operations. The D and C hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed consists of the following: Acceleration Indicator (G-METER); Head Up Display (HUD); Display Driver Unit (DDU); Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI); Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI); Attitude Director Indicator (ADI); Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI); Surface Position Indicator (SPI); Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI); Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA); Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA); Event Timer (ET); Mission Timer (MT); Interior Lighting; and Exterior Lighting. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

Field Programmable Gate Array Failure Rate Estimation Guidelines for Launch Vehicle Fault Tree Models

Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionic systems heavily utilize the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuit (IC). FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MIL-STD-1553B, and in control signal commands such as in solenoid/servo valves actuations. This paper will demonstrate guidelines to estimate FPGA failure rates for a launch vehicle, the guidelines will account for hardware, firmware, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC, FPGA memory and clock. The firmware portion will provide guidelines on the high level FPGA programming language and ways to account for software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will provide guidelines on environment susceptibility as well as guidelines on tailoring other launch vehicle programs historical data to a specific launch vehicle.

Al Hassan, Mohammad↗

Orion Backup Flight Software

Orion Backup Flight Software (BFS) is a joint NASA/Lockheed Martin effort designed to prevent the loss of the Orion crew. BFS will only take over in the event the primary flight software (PFSW) fails to operate properly due to either hardware or software failures. Since the PFSW runs identical software on identical hardware, it is conceivable that a single issue could simultaneously bring down all the PFSW. To minimize the likelihood BFS would be affected by the same issue, BFS was specifically designed to be as different as possible from PFSW: BFS runs on different hardware, a separate operating system, a different compiler, does not share software libraries, and is written by a different team of programmers. This presentation will provide a high-level overview of the Artemis missions and the Orion vehicle, as well as provide additional details of the BFS system (including how BFS is different than the PFSW). The overall BFS capability evolution and timeline (milestones reached as well as work remaining) through the Artemis III mission will be discussed. Additionally, the verification and validation plans for BFS will be presented, describing how we ensure that only validated configuration data is loaded onto the flight vehicle. Finally, the presentation will close with lessons learned and future plans for Orion BFS.

Orion↗

Orion Backup Flight Software (BFS)

Orion Backup Flight Software (BFS) is a joint NASA/Lockheed Martin effort designed to prevent the loss of the Orion crew. BFS will only take over in the event the primary flight software (PFSW) fails to operate properly due to either hardware or software failures. Since the PFSW runs identical software on identical hardware, it is conceivable that a single issue could simultaneously bring down all the PFSW. To minimize the likelihood BFS would be affected by the same issue, BFS was specifically designed to be as different as possible from PFSW: BFS runs on different hardware, a separate operating system, a different compiler, does not share software libraries, and is written by a different team of programmers. This presentation will provide a high-level overview of the Artemis missions and the Orion vehicle, as well as provide additional details of the BFS system (including how BFS is different than the PFSW). The overall BFS capability evolution and timeline (milestones reached as well as work remaining) through the Artemis III mission will be discussed. Additionally, the verification and validation plans for BFS will be presented, describing how we ensure that only validated configuration data is loaded onto the flight vehicle. Finally, the presentation will close with lessons learned and future plans for Orion BFS.

CFS↗

Quantifying effectiveness of failure prediction and response in HPC systems : methodology and example.

Effective failure prediction and mitigation strategies in high-performance computing systems could provide huge gains in resilience of tightly coupled large-scale scientific codes. These gains would come from prediction-directed process migration and resource servicing, intelligent resource allocation, and checkpointing driven by failure predictors rather than at regular intervals based on nominal mean time to failure. Given probabilistic associations of outlier behavior in hardware-related metrics with eventual failure in hardware, system software, and/or applications, this paper explores approaches for quantifying the effects of prediction and mitigation strategies and demonstrates these using actual production system data. We describe context-relevant methodologies for determining the accuracy and cost-benefit of predictors. While many research studies have quantified the expected impact of growing system size, and the associated shortened mean time to failure (MTTF), on application performance in large-scale high-performance computing (HPC) platforms, there has been little if any work to quantify the possible gains from predicting system resource failures with significant but imperfect accuracy. This possibly stems from HPC system complexity and the fact that, to date, no one has established any good predictors of failure in these systems. Our work in the OVIS project aims to discover these predictors via a variety of data collection techniques and statistical analysis methods that yield probabilistic predictions. The question then is, 'How good or useful are these predictions?' We investigate methods for answering this question in a general setting, and illustrate them using a specific failure predictor discovered on a production system at Sandia.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bynum, M. C., III↗