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DOE OSTI2020

Preliminary Analysis of Postclosure DPC Criticality Consequences

One of the objectives of the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy's Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign is to better understand the technical basis, risks, and uncertainty associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. Commercial nuclear power generation in the U.S. has resulted in thousands of metric tons of SNF, the disposal of which is the responsibility of the DOE (Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982). Any repository licensed to dispose the SNF must meet requirements regarding the longterm performance of that repository. For an evaluation of the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently being used to store and transport SNF but were not designed for permanent geologic disposal. A two-phase study has been initiated to begin examining the potential consequences, with respect to longterm repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. Phase I, a scoping phase, consisted of developing an approach intended to be a starting point for the development of the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be required either to exclude criticality from or to include criticality in a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate; Phase I is documented in Price et al. (2019). The Phase I approach guided the analyses and simulations done in Phase II to further the development of these modeling tools and techniques as well as the overall knowledge base. The purpose of this report is to document the results of the analyses conducted during Phase II. The remainder of Section 1 presents the background, objective, and scope of this report, as well as the relevant key assumptions used in the Phase II analyses and simulations. Subsequent sections discuss the analyses that were conducted (Section 2), the results of those analyses (Section 3), and the summary and conclusions (Section 4). This report fulfills the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign deliverable M2SF-20SN010305061.

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DOE OSTI2020

Consequence Analysis of Residual Water in a Storage Canister - 20484

Recent observations from projects sponsored under the DOE-Nuclear Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition campaign show that residual free water, well above the 0.4 gm-moles that correspond to a 3 torr rebound pressure after a 30-minute hold following prototypic drying, may remain within SNF canisters used for long-term dry storage. Specifically, experimental observations in an Integrated Research Project showed subzero temperatures and a local pocket of frozen water in a mockup fuel assembly subjected to an industry practiced drying process. In gas sampling and analysis from the High Burnup (HBU) Demonstration project, using a fully loaded and dried SNF canister, indicated presence of 100 g of residual water had remained in the canister. The effects of residual water in terms of potential adverse impacts on the condition of the SNF and the canister internals during long-term dry storage has been rigorously evaluated to address inadvertent residual water contents. The impact of residual water on the fuel and canister internals, with a focus on the oxidation of the cladding and of postulated exposed (breached-clad) fuel, were evaluated using an integrated set of time-dependent environmental conditions with semi-empirical materials oxidation models. An 'integration model,' with coupled sub-models, developed and previously used by the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis (CNWRA), was applied and expanded with improved sub-models for water radiolysis, and for cladding and fuel oxidations. Cladding oxidation models for various alloys were developed using the rate constants for various cladding alloys in the dry storage temperature range. A burnup-dependent fuel oxidation model was developed; it accounted for inhibition effect of fission products on fuel oxidation rates. The potential for extension of the initial breach flaw (1 mm hole) was evaluated by two separate mechanics criteria. In the first case, a critical cladding strain criterion was used. In the second case, a critical stress intensity was used to evaluate stability of a planar axial flaw postulate. A failure condition exists when a sufficient amount of fuel oxidation (at the postulated breached-clad location) causes fuel pellet swelling to load the cladding to meet a mechanics criterion for flaw extension. The integration model's results provide the following insights. The radiolysis-generated oxygen is consumed with a partitioning between the cladding and the fuel. The extent of cladding oxidation is no more than 2 μm additional consumption of the cladding metal even with 10 moles of residual water, indicating that changes in cladding conditions due to water are expected to be negligible. The conditions for cladding failure (breach opening size extension) directly correlates with the extent of fuel oxidation. Fuel oxidation significant to extend the breach could occur even with 5.5 moles of residual water. The results indicate that fuel oxidation vis-a-vis cladding oxidation is more likely under a higher radiation field, i.e., when radiolytic decomposition of the residual water occurs in few years compared to several decades, and that the conditions to cause failure are increased with fuel and cladding temperatures approaching the peak storage temperature limit of 400 deg. C. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2025

Slow Strain Rate Testing of A537 Tank Wall Material

At Savannah River Site (SRS), High-Level Waste is stored in below-grade carbon steel tanks. This waste in part consists of sludge, salt cake, and/or supernate. Preparation of this waste for future processing involves dissolution of the salt cake layer. The salt dissolution process can create conditions that leave the carbon steel tanks susceptible to localized corrosion. The salt to be dissolved contains high concentrations of nitrate, that once released, create an environment that may be conducive to pitting corrosion and/or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon steel. The salt dissolution process also liberates interstitial liquid trapped between the salt crystals. This liquid is initially high in nitrite and hydroxide concentration. High pH and greater ratios of nitrite to nitrate act as inhibitors to minimize corrosion of carbon steel in high nitrate environments. However, as dissolution proceeds, the concentration of nitrate will increase, while the hydroxide and nitrite concentration of the interstitial liquid will deplete and become insufficient to prevent the onset of corrosion attack. Tank blending and the addition of inhibitors are used to ensure adequate concentrations of hydroxide and nitrite. However, this is not desirable during salt dissolution as it can reduce process efficiency and increase the amount of waste that needs processing. This testing program was designed to examine the risk of SCC associated with utilizing the pitting factor (PF) and nitrite/nitrate (NO 2 - /NO 3 - ) ratio limits for handling dissolved salt solutions at an elevated temperature in the carbon steel waste tanks. The previously identified limits are a PF of 1.2 and an NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio of 0.15. The results indicate that as long as the NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio exceeds 0.1 and the PF is above approximately 0.8, there is a discernible safety margin between the open circuit potential (OCP) and the critical cracking potential (CCP) observed during applied potential testing. However, this margin, defined by the difference between the OCP and CCP, is relatively narrow, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 volts. This small margin raises concerns about potential shifts in OCP during waste retrieval operations, which could inadvertently increase the risk of SCC if the OCP approaches or exceeds the CCP. These results confirm that dissolved salt solutions provide a potent chemistry that, under certain conditions, makes carbon steel susceptible to SCC. The next question to consider is the influence these results have on decisions for storage and retrieval of waste from the tanks. For Type III/IIIA waste tanks, the risk of SCC remains very low. First, and most importantly, the post-weld stress relief of the tanks has reduced the residual stress near the welds. Thus, without the stress component, SCC risk is minimized. The material of construction (A537 Carbon steel) for the Type III/IIIA tanks is superior to the steel in its resistance to SCC than the steel that was utilized for the Type I, II, and IV tanks (A285 carbon steel). From a chemistry control standpoint for a Type III/IIIA tank directly involved with handling dissolved salt solutions, the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio limits may be utilized wherein chemistry control provides an extra layer of defense against SCC. Chemistry control for a Type III/IIIA tank minimizes the risk for a tank that may receive the dissolved salt solution, particularly if that tank is a Type I, II, or IV waste tank. On the other hand, if the dissolved salt solution is handled by a Type I, II, or IV waste tank the risk of SCC is real. The potent chemistry, absence of stress relief, and inferior material result in a condition that is conducive to cracking. Efforts should be made to either avoid transferring waste that may not meet the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria to one of these tanks or if it is unavoidable, take measures to minimize the consequences of a leak. As shown by these tests, even if the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria are met, there is a risk that the tank potential may be disturbed in the positive direction and the risk of SCC increase.

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DOE OSTI2024

DECOVALEX-2023: Task C Final Report

The Full-scale Emplacement (FE) heater experiment at the Mont Terri Underground Rock Laboratory (URL) was designed and conducted by Nagra to replicate an emplacement tunnel of Nagra’s reference repository design at 1:1 scale. Alongside testing the technical feasibility of constructing disposal tunnels, emplacing waste containers in the tunnels and then backfilling them, the main goals of the FE experiment are (1) to obtain a better understanding of the coupled effects of induced thermo-hydro-mechanical (THM) processes that may occur and (2) to validate existing coupled THM models (Müller et al., 2017). A key aspect of ensuring safety for repositories located in low-permeability rock involves minimizing any damage to the rock itself, thereby preserving its integrity and promoting a stable environment Amongst a number of processes that could damage the rock is the increase in pore pressure due to thermal loading caused by heat emitted from the waste. To reduce the potential damage of the rock, it is important to analyse the evolution of heat over time due to the heat load of the containers and assess possible consequences by coupled THM models. The aim of Task C of DECOVALEX-2023 was to build 3D numerical models of the FE experiment, focussing in particular on the heating induced pore pressure change in the Opalinus Clay. Data from a large number of sensors were available from the FE experiment for model comparison. These sensors measured temperature and relative humidity in the bentonite around the heaters, and temperature, pressure and displacement/strain in the surrounding Opalinus clay. Data were available from the start of excavation (April 2012) up to August 2020 for most sensors (more than 5 years from the start of heating in December 2014). To fulfil the overall aim of the task, the work was broken down into a number of steps, starting with simpler models to build confidence in each team’s approach and then moving to more complex models that better represent the FE experiment. Step 0 consisted of 2D benchmark models, gradually increasing the number of processes that are represented from thermal (T) only models in Step 0a, to coupled thermal hydraulic (TH) models in Step 0b with a representation of changing porosity, to coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical (THM) models in Step 0c, where porosity changes are calculated by the mechanical model. A detailed specification of processes, parameters, initial and boundary conditions was provided for this step, with the ambition that all teams would work towards close agreement in their model results, thus building confidence in the model implementations. vi It was not straightforward to achieve agreement between the teams, so additional steps (Step 0b2, 0b3, 0c2, 0c3) were added along with derivation of some analytical solutions against which the models could be compared. The reasons for the differences between teams were investigated and found to be caused primarily by different conceptual model assumptions (including temperature dependence of the thermal expansion of water), different model formulations (including porosity evolution) and differences in modelled domain sizes, boundary conditions and grid discretisation. This demonstrates that comparisons between multiple modelling teams and/or comparison with analytical results and experimental data are highly beneficial in providing an indication of uncertainty in model predictions. At the conclusion of Step 0, almost all teams had achieved a close agreement in model results and those that had not achieved an agreement knew the reason for this. Step 1 moved from 2D models to 3D models of the FE experiment without adding technical features like shotcrete or EDZ, and only considering the heating phase. Initially the 3D model was tightly specified to continue to build confidence in the model implementations (Step 1a). The results of Step 1a were compared to the data from the FE-experiment without the teams seeing the data. The teams were then provided with a sub-set of the data from the FE-experiment and invited to consider how best to use the large dataset for model comparison (Step 1b). Teams were then asked to use the data provided to calibrate their models, only changing material property values rather than adding features or processes to their models (Step 1c). In Step 1, teams were asked to only model the heating phase of the experiment, so pressure in the Opalinus Clay was reported as change in pressure since the initial conditions were specified rather than modelled. The change from 2D to 3D models was accompanied by an increase in the dispersion of results between the teams. Some of this was resolved during the task, but some remained and is potentially due to model discretisation. Calibration of parameters was useful in improving the fit of the models to the data but the remaining differences indicated that the models were missing features or processes. In Step 2, the teams were asked to update their models with additional features and processes as well as calibrating parameters to try and improve the fit of the models to the data. Teams were encouraged to represent ventilation of the open FE tunnel prior to backfilling with heaters and bentonite and in Step 2, the absolute pressure in the Opalinus Clay was compared between the teams. Teams took different approaches, but there was consideration of adding shotcrete and an EDZ into the model, representing stress change during excavation and different approaches to modelling ventilation of the FE tunnel. Overall, the documented results showed a very good agreement for temperature. The results for porewater pressure evolution showed a significant improvement for most teams compared to Step 1c with a good agreement to the measurements for several teams whereas some teams overpredicted the pressure increase and others overpredicted the drainage effect especially for the sensors close to the heater. Step 3 was an opportunity for teams to use the models developed in Step 1 and Step 2 to make predictions about the temperature and pressure changes that will be expected at the FE experiment over the next few years in light of the planned changes in thermal output of the heaters.

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