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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supervisory Control with Dual Tasking in Post G-Transition Vehicle Landings

BACKGROUND Landing during exploration spaceflight may consist of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. Supervisory control, particularly when performed under cognitive load with additional monitoring tasks, is essential for ensuring overall mission success during landing contingencies. Evaluating performance in a relevant Human Landing System (HLS) supervisory landing task after long-duration microgravity exposure can help identify potential risks from human error and sensorimotor alterations. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. Although training and landing aids facilitate successful landings despite disorientation, these adaptive changes may heighten cognitive demand, which must be considered in the landing strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition while the sensorimotor system remains in a state of adaptive flux to inform appropriate countermeasures. METHODS A Multi-attribute Lunar Table Battery (MALTB) task was developed for an iOS tablet device to provide flexible crew testing and training capabilities in-flight and on the ground. Elements of the tablet task were derived from the Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB, Cegarra et al. 2020). The task requires crew members to study a map of a planned landing site and memorizing the terrain and surface landmarks to inform potential divert maneuvers during landing. The user will oversee a series of approaches through touchdown simulations on the tablet with an external camera view of the Lunar surface. The primary responsibility of the crew member will be to execute a divert if the guidance recommended site is erroneous (e.g., the guidance projected landing target is not within 10m of the planned landing site center), or the projected landing site is no longer suitable due to surface obstacles. Considering vehicle maneuverability and fuel reserves, the divert capabilities will diminish as the task progresses. In cases where a divert is initiated, a new landing target will need to be designated by the user and will be evaluated for the proximity to the original pre-planned site. A secondary operational monitoring task will challenge the user's cognitive reserve by requiring the user to maintain several gauges within acceptable limits and respond to a visual indicator while completing the landing approach. Outcome measures include distance from the planned landing site to the user-initiate divert landing location, ground slope at the new landing site, time to divert, the ability to accomplish the secondary monitoring tasks, and perceived workload. The tablet task is being evaluated in a ground-based study to determine the learning effect of first-time users. The tablet task will be utilized in a flight study to test performance multiple times postflight. Future potential testing in-flight have been identified for capsules with iOS tablet devices. Multi-attribute Lunar Table Battery Task MALTB comprises video footage of thirty distinct landing conditions. The landing scenarios feature various landing sites (n = 3), hazardous object sizes (n = 6), sun azimuth degrees (n = 4), camera modes (i.e., fixed or gimbaled), and navigation bias (i.e., true or false). Each seventy second trial uses a sixty-degree constant glideslope trajectory. The application architecture and layout include user identification setup and data storing, a guided walkthrough of the task and interface components, practice mode for task familiarization, and a modified Bedford workload scale administered following task completion. The time-based dependent measures are saved locally to the iOS Files application and post-processing scripts have been developed to evaluate the remaining measures of performance. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew monitoring capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew performance will help better characterize the landing risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This project is funded by NASA’s Human Research Program Human Health Countermeasures Element. REFERENCES Cegarra J, Valery B, Avril E, Calmettes C, Navarro J (2020) OpenMATB: A Multi-Attribute Task Battery promoting task customization, software extensibility and experiment replicability. Behav Res Methods 52:1980-1990 doi: 10.3758/s13428-020-01364-w

Matthew McDonnell↗
NASA NTRS2015

Resource Prospector (RP) - Early Prototyping and Development

The Resource Prospector (RP) is an In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) technology demonstration mission under study by the NASA Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate's (HEOMD) Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Division. The mission, currently planned to launch in 2020, will demonstrate extraction of oxygen from lunar regolith to validate ISRU capability. The mission will address key Strategic Knowledge Gaps (SKGs) for robotic and human exploration to the Moon, Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs), and ultimately Mars, as well as meet the strategic goals of the Global Exploration Roadmap (GER), offered by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG). In this roadmap, the use of local resources is specifically addressed relating to human exploration. RP will provide knowledge to inform the selection of future mission destinations, support the development of exploration systems, and reduce the risk associated with human exploration. Expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit to asteroids and Mars will require the maximum possible use of local materials, so-called in-situ resources. The moon presents a unique destination to conduct robotic investigations that advance ISRU capabilities, as well as providing significant exploration and science value. Lunar regolith contains useful resources such as oxygen, water, silicon, and light metals, like aluminum and titanium. Oxygen can be separated from the regolith for life support (breathable air), or used to create rocket propellant (oxidizer). Regolith can be used to protect against radiation exposure, be processed into solar cells, or used to manufacture construction materials such as bricks and glass. RP will characterize the constituents and distribution of water and other volatiles at the poles of the Moon, enabling innovative uses of local resources, in addition to validating ISRU capabilities. This capability, as well as a deeper understanding of regolith, will be valuable in the exploration of near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) and Mars. In order to reduce risk and explore system designs, the RP project is attempting two-fold approaches to development as it looks towards flight. We continue to explore flight planning, requirements, and interfaces definition by using Engineering Test Units (ETUs), looking towards lunar deployment, while also using fiscal year 2015 to develop, build and test an earth-terrestrial prototype rover and payload system. This terrestrial prototype, called "RP15", is built to both inform the system design, and to be a partnership advocacy tool for this unique mission. RP15 must be affordable within the resource and time constraints of fiscal year 2015, while working to the following Needs, Goals, and Objectives provided by HEOMD/AES: 1. Demonstrate rover mobility in a 1g environment 2. The Surface Segment (prototype rover + payload system) shall represent the flight system concept with as much fidelity as affordable (limited by cost and schedule) - Surface Segment shall be the approximate size/dimension/footprint -Surface Segment shall package all the expected devices (instruments, systems, etc.), even if some facets are mocked-up due to time/cost constraints -Overall Surface Segment fidelity negotiable to make achievable 3. Priority should be given to illustrating mission functionality over support functionality, which exists solely to support mission functionality This paper will provide an overview of RP project developments, including the design and build, capturing the development and initial integrated testing of RP15 in relevant environments.

Lunar↗
NASA NTRS2024

Bumper Implementation of LMEEM

The Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) maintains the Bumper 3 computer program (referred to as “Bumper”) to perform Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk assessments for spacecraft. To perform its calculations, this program requires detailed mathematical models of the space environments and can include those models representing orbital debris, micrometeoroids, and lunar ejecta. The lunar ejecta environment is a projectile environment specific to the lunar surface. Due to the Moon’s lack of an atmosphere, meteoroids frequently strike the lunar surface. When this happens, the impact ejects material radially away from the impact point, which can pose a potential impact hazard to surface-based hardware. This lunar ejecta environment was previously described in 1969, in NASA Special Publication SP-8013, which was used as the basis for a model that will be referred to in this document as the “SP-8013 environment model,” or simply, “SP-8013.” Since around 2020, this model has been used in MMOD risk assessments for the Human Landing System (HLS) program and other lunar surface programs. A new lunar meteoroid ejecta environment was developed via a computer code named Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), produced by the Natural Environments Branch (NEB) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). A global lunar surface environment definition using LMEEM is to be provided in the Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision J in 2024. Contact the NASA MSFC Natural Environments Branch for an in-depth discussion of the LMEEM environment model and its derivation. This environment model will supersede SP-8013 for MMOD risk assessments. To perform such assessments, Bumper must read data from text files output by LMEEM and use that data in risk calculations. The purpose of this document is to: •Demonstrate verification that the Bumper code has properly implemented the LMEEM environment model (Section 3) •Discuss the LMEEM environment as understood through an initial environment file (Section 4) •Compare the calculated risk due to the SP-8013 and LMEEM models (Section 5)

Bumper↗
NASA NTRS1989

Human error and the search for blame

Human error is a frequent topic in discussions about risks in using computer systems. A rational analysis of human error leads through the consideration of mistakes to standards that designers use to avoid mistakes that lead to known breakdowns. The irrational side, however, is more interesting. It conditions people to think that breakdowns are inherently wrong and that there is ultimately someone who is responsible. This leads to a search for someone to blame which diverts attention from: learning from the mistakes; seeing the limitations of current engineering methodology; and improving the discourse of design.

Denning, Peter J.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Space Launch System (SLS) Safety, Mission Assurance, and Risk Mitigation

SLS Driving Objectives: I. Safe: a) Human-rated to provide safe and reliable systems for human missions. b) Protecting the public, NASA workforce, high-value equipment and property, and the environment from potential harm. II. Affordable: a) Maximum use of common elements and existing assets, infrastructure, and workforce. b) Constrained budget environment. c) Competitive opportunities for affordability on-ramps. III. Sustainable: a) Initial capability: 70 metric tons (t), 2017-2021. 1) Serves as primary transportation for Orion and exploration missions. 2) Provides back-up capability for crew/cargo to ISS. b) Evolved capability: 105 t and 130 t, post-2021. 1) Offers large volume for science missions and payloads. 2) Modular and flexible, right-sized for mission requirements.

May, Todd↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS2006

Earth Satellite Population Instability: Underscoring the Need for Debris Mitigation

A recent study by NASA indicates that the implementation of international orbital debris mitigation measures alone will not prevent a significant increase in the artificial Earth satellite population, beginning in the second half of this century. Whereas the focus of the aerospace community for the past 25 years has been on the curtailment of the generation of long-lived orbital debris, active remediation of the current orbital debris population should now be reconsidered to help preserve near-Earth space for future generations. In particular, we show in this paper that even if launch operations were to cease today, the population of space debris would continue to grow. Further, proposed remediation techniques do not appear to offer a viable solution. We therefore recommend that, while the aerospace community maintains the current debris-limiting mission regulations and postmission disposal procedures, future emphasis should be placed on finding new remediation technologies for solving this growing problem. Since the launch of Sputnik 1, space activities have created an orbital debris environment that poses increasing impact risks to existing space systems, including human space flight and robotic missions (1, 2). Currently, more than 9,000 Earth orbiting man-made objects (including many breakup fragments), with a combined mass exceeding 5 million kilograms, are tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network and maintained in the US satellite catalog (3-5). Three accidental collisions between cataloged satellites during the period from late 1991 to early 2005 have already been documented (6), although fortunately none resulted in the creation of large, trackable debris clouds. Several studies conducted during 1991-2001 demonstrated, with assumed future launch rates, the unintended growth potential of the Earth satellite population, resulting from random, accidental collisions among resident space objects (7-13). In some low Earth orbit (LEO) altitude regimes where the number density of satellites is above a critical spatial density, the production rate of new satellites (i.e., debris) due to collisions exceeds the loss of objects due to orbital decay. NASA s evolutionary satellite population model LEGEND (LEO-to-GEO Environment Debris model), developed by the Orbital Debris Program Office at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, is a high fidelity three-dimensional physical model that is capable of simulating the historical satellite environment, as well as the evolution of future debris populations (14, 15). The subject study assumed no rocket bodies and spacecraft were launched after December 2004, and no future disposal maneuvers were allowed for existing spacecraft, few of which currently have such a capability. The rate of satellite explosions would naturally decrease to zero within a few decades as the current satellite population ages. The LEGEND future projection adopts a Monte Carlo approach to simulate future on-orbit explosions and collisions. Within a given projection time step, once the explosion probability is estimated for an intact object, a random number is drawn and compared with the probability to determine if an explosion would occur. A similar procedure is applied to collisions for each pair of target and projectile involved within the same time step. Due to the nature of the Monte Carlo process, multiple projection runs must be performed and analyzed before one can draw reliable and meaningful conclusions from the outcome. A total of fifty, 200-year future projection Monte Carlo simulations were executed and evaluated (16).

Liou, Jer-chyi↗
NASA NTRS2018

Innovations in Spacecraft Proximity & Navigation Lighting

New spacecraft bound for the Moon and Mars should be exploring lighting technologies that can reduce safety risks while increasing capability. The operational lighting environment for these new missions will not have the forgiving 90 minute orbit of the International Space Station. Advances in solid state lighting and optics design are yielding new form factors for lamps that have the potential to reduce operational risk for both humans and imaging systems that are impacted by high contrast lighting environments. This project evaluated light source form factors and control innovations for spacecraft exterior proximity and navigation lighting by building a demonstration test rig and testing the effectiveness of the light sources and their controls to increase visibility and usability.

Clark, Toni A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Slippery Lubricant-Infused Silica Nanoparticulate Film Processing for Anti-Biofouling Applications

Microbial biofilm build-up in water distribution systems can pose a risk to human health and pipe material integrity. The impact is more devastating in space stations and to astronauts due to the isolation from necessary replacement parts and medical resources. As a result, there is a need for coatings to be implemented onto the inner region of the pipe to minimize the adherence and growth of biofilms. Lubricant-infused surfaces has been one such interesting material for anti-biofouling applications in which their slippery property promotes repellence to many liquids and thus prevents bacterial adherence. Textured and porous films are suitable substrate candidates to infuse and contain the lubricant. However, there is little investigation in utilizing a nanoporous thin film as the substrate material for lubricant infusion. A nanoporous film has high porosity within the structure which can promote greater lubricant infusion and retention. The implementation as a thin film structure aids to reduce material consumption and cost. In our study, we utilized a well-studied nanoporous thin film fabricated via layer-by-layer assembly of polycations and colloid silica and calcination for greater stability. The film was further functionalized to promote fluorinated groups upon the surface and pores of the film, which then could interact with a fluorinated lubricant. The pristine nanoporous film was characterized to determine its morphology, thickness, wettability, and porosity. The lubricant-infused film was then tested for its lubricant layer stability upon various washing conditions and its performance against bacterial biofilm adherence as a result of its slippery and thus anti-biofouling property.

biofilm↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk Characterization Research for Artemis II: Human Factors and Behavioral Performance

BACKGROUND Artemis II will be the first time NASA astronauts go beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) since the Apollo era, and the first astronauts heading into space in the Orion vehicle. As such, it provides a critical opportunity to refine our understanding of the likelihood and consequences associated with the Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Sleep Risks, and prepare for future Moon and Mars missions. However, Artemis II research efforts are uniquely shaped by in-mission data collection constraints. There is currently no in-mission crew time available to complete measures. In-mission data will need to be collected unobtrusively from available data streams (e.g., audiovisual, existing records such as schedules, and actigraphy). Accordingly, the overarching goal of our research is to utilize Artemis II data to further define the likelihood and consequences of these risks, and to create an unobtrusive research infrastructure that can be expanded to include future Artemis missions. This goal spans four aims across three research phases: (1) identify and operationally define key performances metrics and constructs across the four aforementioned risks, (2) develop an unobtrusive methodology and coding scheme for in-mission data collection, (3) characterize performance decrements due to Bmed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep Risks, and (4) develop a data infrastructure for future Artemis missions. The following details results of Phase I efforts in which we address Aims 1 and 2 to develop an unobtrusive measurement plan and coding scheme to capture key constructs, contributing factors, and performance decrements across each risk area. METHOD As part of Phase I, we conducted an interdisciplinary literature review and consulted with SMEs to identify unobtrusive methodologies that leverage text, audio, and/or video data as well as conceptualize key performance metrics, contributing factors, and BMed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep risk constructs related to performance decrements. The Phase I effort resulted in a finalized pre- and post-mission protocol for Artemis II, along with a measurement and coding scheme for in-mission Artemis II data. Phase II will involve data collection from the upcoming Artemis II mission. Phase III will include data processing, coding, depiction, analysis, and report writing of the Artemis II data. RESULTS & DISCUSSION To date, we have completed Phase I efforts. Specifically, we identified BMed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep risk constructs related to performance metrics, summarized how these constructs can be measured using audiovisual data collected during the mission, and worked with NASA’s HFBP Element to finalize a data collection protocol that leverages audiovisual input from the Orion spacecraft system. Our protocol includes novel unobtrusive methodologies that adhere to in-mission data streams and subsequent constraints (e.g., limited storage space on GoPro cameras, ambient noise impeding audio files) to best capture in-mission phenomena across each risk area. We will present our results from Phase I efforts, namely best practices for unobtrusive measurement as identified through literature reviews and SME consultation as well as codebook excerpts for use in Artemis II. We will include a description of planned work as we prepare for Phase II and Phase III of this research plan and the Artemis II mission itself. SUMMARY We describe progress on our Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Research for Artemis II study.

behavioral health↗
NASA NTRS1996

Independent Verification and Validation of Complex User Interfaces: A Human Factors Approach

The Usability Testing and Analysis Facility (UTAF) at the NASA Johnson Space Center has identified and evaluated a potential automated software interface inspection tool capable of assessing the degree to which space-related critical and high-risk software system user interfaces meet objective human factors standards across each NASA program and project. Testing consisted of two distinct phases. Phase 1 compared analysis times and similarity of results for the automated tool and for human-computer interface (HCI) experts. In Phase 2, HCI experts critiqued the prototype tool's user interface. Based on this evaluation, it appears that a more fully developed version of the tool will be a promising complement to a human factors-oriented independent verification and validation (IV&V) process.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2017

Command and Control Software Development Memory Management

This internship was initially meant to cover the implementation of unit test automation for a NASA ground control project. As is often the case with large development projects, the scope and breadth of the internship changed. Instead, the internship focused on finding and correcting memory leaks and errors as reported by a COTS software product meant to track such issues. Memory leaks come in many different flavors and some of them are more benign than others. On the extreme end a program might be dynamically allocating memory and not correctly deallocating it when it is no longer in use. This is called a direct memory leak and in the worst case can use all the available memory and crash the program. If the leaks are small they may simply slow the program down which, in a safety critical system (a system for which a failure or design error can cause a risk to human life), is still unacceptable. The ground control system is managed in smaller sub-teams, referred to as CSCIs. The CSCI that this internship focused on is responsible for monitoring the health and status of the system. This team's software had several methods/modules that were leaking significant amounts of memory. Since most of the code in this system is safety-critical, correcting memory leaks is a necessity.

Programmin↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Predictive Modeling to Assess and Address Challenges and Limitations Associated with Clinical Care and Decision Support in Deep Space

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a method for assessing and integrating the risk of failure in a multivariate system. While it is often applied by engineers designing complex machines, it could also be applied to humans to assess the probability of a health “failure” treating diseases as the multiple “variables” and the human as the “complex machine.” The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was developed to apply PRA to assess medical risk for exploration spaceflight and inform the design of medical systems for space flight. The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault tree probabilistic techniques to classify risk in the space flight environment by leveraging the inherent knowledge of complex space flight system design and testing to quantify risk. However, in harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of “How do we balance astronaut health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on exploration space missions?” remains a profoundly challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is one aspect of the Human Research Program’s efforts to represent space fight human health and performance risks quantitatively.

L Mcintyre↗
NASA NTRS1993

Mission Operations and Command Assurance: Flight Operations Quality Improvements

Flight mission operations systems place human operators in demanding, high risk environments. The objective of Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is to help improve the operational reliability of flight projects by reducing error -- Pareto Analysis shows that the human is the largest error category. MO&CA is a system level task reporting to project flight management and JPL Systems Assurance Division. MO&CA provides direct transfer of knowledge, continuous process improvement, and communication facilitation.

mission↗
NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS2012

Human Systems Integration in Practice: Constellation Lessons Learned

NASA's Constellation program provided a unique testbed for Human Systems Integration (HSI) as a fundamental element of the Systems Engineering process. Constellation was the first major program to have HSI mandated by NASA's Human Rating document. Proper HSI is critical to the success of any project that relies on humans to function as operators, maintainers, or controllers of a system. HSI improves mission, system and human performance, significantly reduces lifecycle costs, lowers risk and minimizes re-design. Successful HSI begins with sufficient project schedule dedicated to the generation of human systems requirements, but is by no means solely a requirements management process. A top-down systems engineering process that recognizes throughout the organization, human factors as a technical discipline equal to traditional engineering disciplines with authority for the overall system. This partners with a bottoms-up mechanism for human-centered design and technical issue resolution. The Constellation Human Systems Integration Group (HSIG) was a part of the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) organization within the program office, and existed alongside similar groups such as Flight Performance, Environments & Constraints, and Integrated Loads, Structures and Mechanisms. While the HSIG successfully managed, via influence leadership, a down-and-in Community of Practice to facilitate technical integration and issue resolution, it lacked parallel top-down authority to drive integrated design. This presentation will discuss how HSI was applied to Constellation, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers. This presentation will discuss how Human Systems Integration (HSI) was applied to NASA's Constellation program, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers on how to accomplish this critical function.

Zumbado, Jennifer Rochlis↗
NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Safety analysis for complex systems

Operational risk assessment considers hardware, environment, and human factors. Technique starts with division of postulated mission into segments which are further subdivided into separate operational steps. Consequences of steps, nonoccurrence, premature operation, out-of-sequence operation, and inadvertent execution are examined at subevent, event, and phase levels. Hazards are identified and treated individually. Analysis is well suited to application in energy and transportation fields.

Onesty, J. P.↗