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NASA NTRS2009

A History of Space Toxicology Mishaps: Lessons Learned and Risk Management

After several decades of human spaceflight, the community of space-faring nations has accumulated a diverse and sometimes harrowing history of toxicological events that have plagued human space endeavors almost from the very beginning. Lessons have been learned in ground-based test beds and others were discovered the hard way - when human lives were at stake in space. From such lessons one can build a risk-management framework for toxicological events to minimize the probability of a harmful exposure, while recognizing that we cannot foresee all events. Space toxicologists have learned that relatively harmless compounds can be converted by air revitalization systems into compounds that cause serious harm to the crew. Our toxic risk management strategy now includes an assessment of the fate of any compound that might be released into the atmosphere. Propellants are highly toxic compounds, yet we have not always been able to thoroughly isolate the crew from exposure to these toxicants. Leakage of fluids from systems has resulted in hazardous conditions at times, and the behavior of such compounds inside a spacecraft has taught us how to manage potentially harmful escapes should they occur. Potential combustion events are an ever-present threat to the wellbeing of the crew. Such events have been sufficiently common that we have learned that one cannot judge the health threat of a given fire by the magnitude of the event. Management of such risks demands monitoring of combustion products. In the category of unpredictable toxic events, if one assumes that fires are predictable, we can place experience with toxic microbial metabolites, upsets during repair operations, and discharges from filters that have accumulated a substantial load of pollutants in their absorption beds. Management of such events requires a broad-spectrum, real-time analytical capability to discern the identity and concentrations of pollutants if they enter the atmosphere. Adverse events are an integral part of any human activity, and the spacefaring community must learn as much as possible from mistakes and near misses.

James, John T.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Turning Operational Lessons Learned into Design Reality

The capabilities and limitations of a particular system design are well known by the people who operate it. Operational workarounds, operational notes and lessons learned are traditional methods for dealing with and documenting design shortcomings. The beginning of each new program brings the hope that hard-learned lessons will be incorporated into the next new system. But often operations personnel find their well-intentioned efforts frustrated by an inability to have their inputs considered by design personnel who have strictly-scoped requirements that are coupled with ambitious cost and schedule targets. There is a way for operational inputs to make it into the design, but the solution involves a combination of organizational culture and technical data. Any organization that utilizes this approach can realize significant benefits over the life cycle of their project.

Brady, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Inflatable Habitat Health Monitoring: Implementation, Lessons Learned, and Application to Lunar or Martian Habitat Health Monitoring

NASA's exploration mission is to send humans to the Moon and Mars, in which the purpose is to learn how to live and work safely in those harsh environments. A critical aspect of living in an extreme environment is habitation, and within that habitation element there are key systems which monitor the habitation environment to provide a safe and comfortable living and working space for humans. Expandable habitats are one of the options currently being considered due to their potential mass and volume efficiencies. This paper discusses a joint project between the National Science Foundation (NSF), ILC Dover, and NASA in which an expandable habitat was deployed in the extreme environment of Antarctica to better understand the performance and operations over a one-year period. This project was conducted through the Innovative Partnership Program (IPP) where the NSF provided the location at McMurdo Station in Antarctica and support at the location, ILC Dover provided the inflatable habitat, and NASA provided the instrumentation and data system for monitoring the habitat. The outcome of this project provided lessons learned in the implementation of an inflatable habitat and the systems that support that habitat. These lessons learned will be used to improve current habitation capabilities and systems to meet the objectives of exploration missions to the moon and Mars.

Rojdev, Kristina↗

NASA NTRS2009

Evaluating Failures and Near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

There have been a number of studies done in the past drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. Generally, the systemic causes and proximate causes for fatal events have both been examined in considerable detail. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents and failures that narrowly missed being fatal could be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Additionally, review of risk factors for upcoming or future programs will often look at trending statistics, generally focusing on failure/success statistics. Unfortunately, doing so can give a skewed or misleading view of past reliability or a reliability that cannot be presumed to apply to a new program. One reason for this might be that failure/success criteria aren't the same across programs, but also that apparent success can hide systemic faults that, under other circumstances, can be fatal to a program with different parameters. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure and provide very misleading data if it is not examined in detail. This is particularly true for a manned space program where failure/success includes more than making a particular orbit. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. Even more importantly, a thorough understanding of these near miss events can identify conditions that prevented fatalities. Those conditions may be key to a programs reliability, but, without insight to the repercussions if such conditions were not in place, their importance may not be readily clear. As programs mature and political and fiscal responsibilities come to the fore, often there is considerable incentive to eliminate unnecessary conservatism, design margin, redundancy, operational support, testing, training, or safety oversight. An evaluation that demonstrates how these features and capabilities averted disaster can ensure processes that saved lives or missions are not discarded without appropriate review and understanding. Close examination of accidents that almost were can also highlight differences in design from one program to another, either justifying reliability comparisons or negating them. It can also provide considerable insight into how those saving factors were developed and implemented so that similar methods can be used to ensure appropriate life-saving and mission saving factors can be developed, even for a dissimilar space program. The lessons are appropriate for seasoned manned space programs and agencies, but crucial for untried agencies and organizations that are interested in sending man into space. The large body of publicly available near miss and accident data available provide invaluable insight into programmatic, technical, and even political issues that can be addressed before they impact safety. In this paper, we examine a number of these near misses and accidents and steps a program, agency, or potential spacefaring company might take to improve their chances of success and avoid mission or safety disasters using this data.

Barr, Stephanie↗

NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned from Performance Testing of Humans in Spacesuits in Simulated Reduced Gravity

Introduction: The overarching objective of the Integrated Suit Test (IST) series is to evaluate suited human performance using reduced-gravity analogs and learn what aspects of an EVA suit system affect human performance. For this objective to be successfully achieved, the testing methodology should be valid and reproducible, and the partial-gravity simulations must be as accurate and realistic as possible. Objectives: To highlight some of the key lessons learned about partial-gravity analogs and testing methodology, and to suggest considerations for optimizing the effectiveness and quality of results of future tests. Methods: Performance testing of suited and unsuited subjects was undertaken in different reduced-gravity analogs including the Space Vehicle Mockup Facility s Partial Gravity Simulator (POGO), parabolic flight on the C-9 aircraft, underwater environments including NASA s Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) and the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL), and in field analogs including Desert Research and Technology Studies (RATS), the Haughton Mars Project (HMP), and the JSC Rock Pile. Subjects performed level walking, incline/decline walking, running, shoveling, picking up and transferring rocks, kneeling/standing, and task boards. Lessons Learned Analogs: No single analog will properly simulate all aspects of the true partial-gravity environment. The POGO is an ideal environment from the standpoint that there are no time limits or significant volumetric constraints, but it does have several limitations. It allows only 2 translational degrees of freedom (DOF) and applies true partial-gravity offload only through the subject s center of gravity (CG). Also, when a subject is doing non-stationary tasks, significant overhead inertia from the lift column seems to have a negative impact on performance. Parabolic flight allows full translational and rotational DOF and applies offload to all parts of the body, but the simulation lasts less than 30 seconds. When this is coupled with the volumetric constraints of the plane, both task selection and data collection options are significantly limited. The underwater environments also allow all 6 DOF and allow off-loading to be applied throughout the body, but the data collection capabilities are limited to little more than subjective ratings. In addition, water drag negatively affects performance of tasks requiring dynamic motion. Field analogs provide the ability to simulate lunar terrain and more realistic mission-like objectives, but all of them operate at 1-g, so suited human performance testing generally must utilize a reduced-mass or "mockup" suit, depending on study objectives. In general, the ground-based overhead-suspension partial-gravity analogs like POGO allow the most diverse data collection methods possible while still simulating partial gravity. However, as currently designed, the POGO has significant limitations. Design of the Active Response Gravity Offload System (ARGOS) has begun and is focusing on adding full x,y,z translational DOF, improved offload accuracy, increased lift capacity, and active control of the x and y axes to minimize offload system inertia. Additionally, a new gimbal is being designed to reduce mass and inertia and to be able to work with different suits, as the current gimbal only supports suited testing with the Mark III Technology Demonstrator Suit (MKIII).

Norcross, Jason R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Evaluating Failures and near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

Studies done in the past have drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents can be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Binary pass/fail launch history is often used for risk, but this also has limitations. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. This paper intends to show how near-miss lessons learned can provide crucial data for any new human spaceflight programs that are interested in sending man into space

Barr, Stephanie↗

NASA NTRS2010

LDCM Ground System. Network Lesson Learned

This slide presentation reviews the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) and the lessons learned in implementing the network that was assembled to allow for the acquisition, archiving and distribution of the data from the Landsat mission. The objective of the LDCM is to continue the acquisition, archiving, and distribution of moderate-resolution multispectral imagery affording global, synoptic, and repetitive coverage of the earth's land surface at a scale where natural and human-induced changes can be detected, differentiated, characterized, and monitored over time. It includes a review of the ground network, including a block diagram of the ground network elements (GNE) and a review of the RF design and testing. Also included is a listing of the lessons learned.

Gal-Edd, Jonathan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Space Station Control Moment Gyroscope Lessons Learned

Four 4760 Nms (3510 ft-lbf-s) Double Gimbal Control Moment Gyroscopes (DGCMG) with unlimited gimbal freedom about each axis were adopted by the International Space Station (ISS) Program as the non-propulsive solution for continuous attitude control. These CMGs with a life expectancy of approximately 10 years contain a flywheel spinning at 691 rad/s (6600 rpm) and can produce an output torque of 258 Nm (190 ft-lbf)1. One CMG unexpectedly failed after approximately 1.3 years and one developed anomalous behavior after approximately six years. Both units were returned to earth for failure investigation. This paper describes the Space Station Double Gimbal Control Moment Gyroscope design, on-orbit telemetry signatures and a summary of the results of both failure investigations. The lessons learned from these combined sources have lead to improvements in the design that will provide CMGs with greater reliability to assure the success of the Space Station. These lessons learned and design improvements are not only applicable to CMGs but can be applied to spacecraft mechanisms in general.

Gurrisi, Charles↗

NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned in Building the Ares Projects

Since being established in 2005, the Ares Projects at Marshall Space Flight Center have been making steady progress designing, building, testing, and flying the next generation of exploration launch vehicles. Ares is committed to rebuilding crucial capabilities from the Apollo era that made the first human flights to the Moon possible, as well as incorporating the latest in computer technology and changes in management philosophy. One example of an Apollo-era practice has been giving NASA overall authority over vehicle integration activities, giving civil service engineers hands-on experience in developing rocket hardware. This knowledge and experience help make the agency a "smart buyer" of products and services. More modern practices have been added to the management tool belt to improve efficiency, cost effectiveness, and institutional knowledge, including knowledge management/capture to gain better insight into design and decision making; earned value management, where Ares won a NASA award for its practice and implementation; designing for operability; and Lean Six Sigma applications to identify and eliminate wasted time and effort. While it is important to learn technical lessons like how to fly and control unique rockets like the Ares I-X flight test vehicle, the Ares management team also has been learning important lessons about how to manage large, long-term projects.

Sumrall, John Phil↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Space Flight Chart: Lessons Learned Gone Viral

This presentation will explore the surprising history and events that transformed a mundane spreadsheet of historical spaceflight incidents into a popular and widely distributed visual compendium of lessons learned. The Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Space Flight Chart (a.k.a. The Significant Incidents Chart) is a popular and visually captivating reference product that has arisen from the work of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Flight Safety Office (FSO). It began as an internal tool intended to increase our team s awareness of historical and modern space flight incidents. Today, the chart is widely recognized across the agency as a reference tool. It appears in several training and education programs. It is used in familiarization training in the JSC Building 9 Mockup Facility and is seen by hundreds of center visitors each week. The chart visually summarizes injuries, fatalities, and close calls sustained during the continuing development of human space flight. The poster-sized chart displays over 100 total events that have direct connections to human space flight endeavors. The chart is updated periodically. The update process itself has become a collaborative effort. Many people, spanning multiple NASA organizations, have provided suggestions for additional entries. The FSO maintains a growing list of subscribers who have requested to receive updates. The presenters will discuss the origins and motivations behind the significant incidents chart. A review of the inclusion criteria used to select events will be offered. We will address how the chart is used today by S&MA and offer a vision of how it might be used by other organizations now and in the future. Particular emphasis will be placed on features of the chart that have met with broad acceptance and have helped spread awareness of the most important lessons in human spaceflight.

Wood, Bill↗

NASA NTRS2001

Challenges and Lessons Learned in the Application of Autonomy to Space Operations

NASA's Space Operations Management Office (SOMO) is working toward a goal of providing an integrated infrastructure of mission and data services for space missions undertaken by NASA enterprises. A significant portion of this effort is focused on reducing the cost of these services. We are interested in the potential of autonomy to reduce operations costs. SOMO services support space missions, but are not part of the mission objectives; therefore the level of acceptable risk is very low. In fact, SOMO could be effective ly prevented from applying autonomy if customers merely perceive it as adding risk to their mission(s). We are interested in this workshop from the standpoint of understanding what can be done to realize the potential cost savings due to autonomy while maintaining acceptable risk and serving the needs of our customers. We would like to present our lessons learned so far in adopting autonomy and automation, which we think will contribute to clarifying the challenges facing the use of such technology. SOMO provides services to a diverse and ambitious set of mission customers. Many of these missions are groundbreaking missions for which communications, data, and other operations requirements sometimes cannot be clearly articulated early in the program. This motivates a need for systems that are robust in the face of unanticipated situations so that customer missions are not unreasonably constrained or impacted by "shortcomings" in SOMO services. One of SOMO's primary goals is to realize a paradigm in which SOMO acts as a service provider to organizations that fly space missions for NASA, other government agencies, and even the commercial sector. These organizations purchase SOMO services "by the pound" as customers. We have to provide systems that are not experiments themselves, but rather stable bases from which to do bold experiments. To this end, SOMO also seeks to work closely with industry to see that robust autonomy technology gets infused into products and services for the space industry and beyond. The potential for application of these technologies spans space-based communications networks (e.g. TDRSS) and ground-based assets including communication and tracking antenna systems, data networks, and control centers. There are several problems that are candidates for the application of autonomy, if it can be made reliable enough, including: antenna control, antenna scheduling, communication link scheduling and operation, navigation, attitude determination, fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (for spacecraft or ground assets), and mission-level planning and scheduling. Some attempts have been made to apply autonomy and automation in these areas in the past with varying degrees of success. We will present relevant case histories and the lessons inferred from them. Combining this past experience with anticipated future needs, we can clarify the challenges that must be met in order to realize the benefits of autonomy.

Forrest, David J.↗

NASA NTRS2010

LCROSS Lunar Impactor - Lessons Learned from a Small Satellite Mission

The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science function of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the operational purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-cost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered the importance of small satellite missions. NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project two-years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap (including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be successful. At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons learned.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X: Lessons for a New Era of Spaceflight

Since 2005, the Ares Projects at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) have been developing the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle. On October 28, 2009, the first development flight test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle, Ares I-X, lifted off from a launch pad at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on successful suborbital flight. Despite the President s intention to cancel the Constellation Program of which Ares is a part, this historic flight has produced a great amount of data and numerous lessons learned for any future launch vehicles. This paper will describe the accomplishments of Ares I-X and the lessons that other programs can glean from this successful mission. Ares I was designed to carry up to four astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS). It also was designed to be used with the Ares V cargo launch vehicle for a variety of missions beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO). The Ares I-X development flight test was conceived in 2006 to acquire early engineering and environment data during liftoff, ascent, and first stage recovery. The test achieved the following primary objectives: Demonstrated control of a dynamically similar, integrated Ares I/Orion, using Ares I relevant ascent control algorithms. Performed an in-flight separation/staging event between a Ares I-similar First Stage and a representative Upper Stage. Demonstrated assembly and recovery of a new Ares I-like First Stage element at KSC. Demonstrated First Stage separation sequencing, and quantify First Stage atmospheric entry dynamics, and parachute performance. Characterized the magnitude of integrated vehicle roll torque throughout First Stage flight.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Thermal Model Correlation and Lessons Learned

The Ares I-X vehicle launched and flew successfully on October 28, 2009. This paper will describe the correlation of the vehicle thermal model to both ground testing and flight data. A main purpose of the vehicle model and ground testing was to ensure that the avionics within the vehicle were held within their thermal limits prior to launch and during flight. The correlation of the avionics box temperatures will be shown. Also, the lessons learned in the thermal discipline during the modeling, test, correlation to test, and flight of the Ares I-X flight test vehicle will be described. Lessons learned will cover thermal modeling, as well as management of the thermal discipline, thermal team, and thermal-related actions in design, testing, and flight.

Amundsen, Ruth M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment: Lessons Learned

This viewgraph presentation reviews the process of a human space flight conjunction assessment and lessons learned from the more than twelve years of International Space Station (ISS) operations. Also, the application of these lessons learned to a recent ISS conjunction assessment with object 84180 on July 16, 2009 is also presented.

Smith, Jason T.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Flight Dynamics Operations: Methods and Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle Orbit Operations

The Flight Dynamics Officer is responsible for trajectory maintenance of the Space Shuttle. This paper will cover high level operational considerations, methodology, procedures, and lessons learned involved in performing the functions of orbit and rendezvous Flight Dynamics Officer and leading the team of flight dynamics specialists during different phases of flight. The primary functions that will be address are: onboard state vector maintenance, ground ephemeris maintenance, calculation of ground and spacecraft acquisitions, collision avoidance, burn targeting for the primary mission, rendezvous, deorbit and contingencies, separation sequences, emergency deorbit preparation, mass properties coordination, payload deployment planning, coordination with the International Space Station, and coordination with worldwide trajectory customers. Each of these tasks require the Flight Dynamics Officer to have cognizance of the current trajectory state as well as the impact of future events on the trajectory plan in order to properly analyze and react to real-time changes. Additionally, considerations are made to prepare flexible alternative trajectory plans in the case timeline changes or a systems failure impact the primary plan. The evolution of the methodology, procedures, and techniques used by the Flight Dynamics Officer to perform these tasks will be discussed. Particular attention will be given to how specific Space Shuttle mission and training simulation experiences, particularly off-nominal or unexpected events such as shortened mission durations, tank failures, contingency deorbit, navigation errors, conjunctions, and unexpected payload deployments, have influenced the operational procedures and training for performing Space Shuttle flight dynamics operations over the history of the program. These lessons learned can then be extended to future vehicle trajectory operations.

Cutri-Kohart, Rebecca M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Commercially Hosted Government Payloads: Lessons from Recent Programs

In a commercially hosted operational mode, a scientific instrument or operational device is attached to a spacecraft but operates independently from the spacecraft s primary mission. Despite the expected benefits of this arrangement, there are few examples of hosted payload programs actually being executed by government organizations. The lack of hosted payload programs is largely driven by programmatic challenges, both real and perceived, rather than by technical challenges. Partly for these reasons, NASA has not sponsored a hosted payload program, in spite of the benefits and visible community interest in doing so. In the interest of increasing the use of hosted payloads across the space community, this paper seeks to alleviate concerns about hosted payloads by identifying these programmatic challenges and presenting ways in which they can be avoided or mitigated. Despite the challenges, several recent hosted payload programs have been successfully completed or are currently in progress. This paper presents an assessment of these programs, with a focus on acquisition, costs, schedules, risks, and other programmatic aspects. The hosted payloads included in this study are the Federal Aviation Administration's Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) payloads, United States Coast Guard's Automatic Identification System (AIS) demonstration payload, Department of Defense's IP Router In Space (IRIS) demonstration payload, the United States Air Force's Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP), and the Australian Defence Force's Ultra High Frequency (UHF) payload. General descriptions of each of these programs are presented along with issues that have been encountered and lessons learned from those experiences. A set of recommended approaches for future hosted payload programs is presented, with a focus on addressing risks or potential problem areas through smart and flexible contracting up front. This set of lessons and recommendations is broadly applicable to future hosted payload programs, whether they are technology demonstrations, communications systems, or operational sensors. Additionally, we present a basic cost model for commercial access to space for hosted payloads as a function of payload mass

Andraschko, Mark A.↗

NASA NTRS2009

MODIS Science Algorithms and Data Systems Lessons Learned

For almost 10 years, standard global products from NASA's Earth Observing System s (EOS) two Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors are being used world-wide for earth science research and applications. This paper discusses the lessons learned in developing the science algorithms and the data systems needed to produce these high quality data products for the earth sciences community. Strong science team leadership and communication, an evolvable and scalable data system, and central coordination of QA and validation activities enabled the data system to grow by two orders of magnitude from the initial at-launch system to the current system able to reprocess data from both the Terra and Aqua missions in less than a year. Many of the lessons learned from MODIS are already being applied to follow-on missions.

Wolfe, Robert E.↗