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At least 163 records · Page 9

Xenon International Overview

The Xenon International system is a fully automated unattended system designed to collect, separate, purify, quantify, and perform nuclear counting on radioxenon isotopes as well as transmit data using two-way communications (Figure 1). Xenon International is designed to stringent requirements that make it an high performance next-generation-system for use in nuclear explosion monitoring networks such as the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater and Surface Water Sampling and Analysis Plan (CY 2021)

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2021 at the U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring is performed by the GWPP. Groundwater and surface water monitoring will be performed in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12. Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2021 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding a data summary table presented in Section 4) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2021) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F. Modifications to the CY 2021 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. Each modification to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as an addendum to this sampling and analysis plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2010

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2010 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2010 will be in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 540.1A and the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring during CY 2010 will be performed primarily in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley, and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge, along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2010 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. All modifications to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as addenda to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2010 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2010) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA Tech Briefs, March 2004

Topics covered include: 1) Advanced Signal Conditioners for Data-Acquisition Systems; 2) Downlink Data Multiplexer; 3) Viewing ISS Data in Real Time via the Internet; 4) Autonomous Environment-Monitoring Networks; 5) Readout of DSN Monitor Data; 6) Parallel-Processing Equalizers for Multi-Gbps Communications; 7) AIN-Based Packaging for SiC High-Temperature Electronics; 8) Software for Optimizing Quality Assurance of Other Software; 9) The TechSat 21 Autonomous Sciencecraft Experiment; 10) Software for Analyzing Laminar-to-Turbulent Flow Transitions; 11) Elastomer Filled With Single-Wall Carbon Nanotubes; 12) Modifying Ship Air-Wake Vortices for Aircraft Operations; 13) Strain-Gauge Measurement of Weight of Fluid in a Tank; 14) Advanced Docking System With Magnetic Initial Capture; 15) Blade-Pitch Control for Quieting Tilt-Rotor Aircraft; 16) Solar Array Panels With Dust-Removal Capability; 17) Aligning Arrays of Lenses and Single-Mode Optical Fibers; 18) Automatic Control of Arc Process for Making Carbon Nanotubes; 19) Curved-Focal-Plane Arrays Using Deformed-Membrane Photodetectors; 20) Role of Meteorology in Flights of a Solar-Powered Airplane; 21) Model of Mixing Layer With Multicomponent Evaporating Drops; 22) Solution-Assisted Optical Contacting; 23) Improved Discrete Approximation of Laplacian of Gaussian; 24) Utilizing Expert Knowledge in Estimating Future STS Costs; 25) Study of Rapid-Regression Liquefying Hybrid Rocket Fuels; and 26) More About the Phase-Synchronized Enhancement Method.

Source record↗

Comprehensive framework for assessing and optimizing existing research networks

Conservation, monitoring, and research networks, or collections of ecological research sites unified under a common mission of data collection or a research mission, are essential infrastructure for understanding large landscapes. However, most networks developed opportunistically over decades rather than through systematic design, creating potential limitations in the ability to address conservation challenges across entire regions. We developed a framework to evaluate how well an existing research network represents the environmental conditions its members study and devised an approach to rank sites of priority for strategic expansion. Our approach measures performance through environmental representativeness, geographic coverage, and adequacy for scientific inference and thus optimizes limited monitoring resources to maximize scientific impact. We demonstrated this approach with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service Experimental Forests and Ranges Network (EFRN), a 79‐site network across the United States that grew opportunistically over a century. At the national scale, the network effectively captured high‐biomass forests important for carbon cycle research; 82% of forest biomass was in well‐represented areas. Some areas in Texas, Florida, the Rocky Mountains, and the West Coast had no relevant EFRN sites, which limits the ability to make regional inferences. A fundamental challenge for the EFRN was that sites improving regional extent coverage sometimes provided minimal national benefits, which can create conflicts between local and global priorities. Adding the highest‐ranked candidate site provided a relevant site for 17% of currently poorly represented 1‐km pixel cells nationally, but regional and national site rankings varied considerably due to nested spatial inference. This framework provides quantitative tools for strategic infrastructure decision‐making, ensures that limited monitoring resources maximize conservation impact, and can be applied broadly to address the widespread challenge of optimizing conservation and monitoring networks worldwide.

additional site↗

NSI operations center

The NASA Science Internet (NSI) Network Operations Staff is responsible for providing reliable communication connectivity for the NASA science community. As the NSI user community expands, so does the demand for greater interoperability with users and resources on other networks (e.g., NSFnet, ESnet), both nationally and internationally. Coupled with the science community's demand for greater access to other resources is the demand for more reliable communication connectivity. Recognizing this, the NASA Science Internet Project Office (NSIPO) expands its Operations activities. By January 1990, Network Operations was equipped with a telephone hotline, and its staff was expanded to six Network Operations Analysts. These six analysts provide 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week coverage to assist site managers with problem determination and resolution. The NSI Operations staff monitors network circuits and their associated routers. In most instances, NSI Operations diagnoses and reports problems before users realize a problem exists. Monitoring of the NSI TCP/IP Network is currently being done with Proteon's Overview monitoring system. The Overview monitoring system displays a map of the NSI network utilizing various colors to indicate the conditions of the components being monitored. Each node or site is polled via the Simple Network Monitoring Protocol (SNMP). If a circuit goes down, Overview alerts the Network Operations staff with an audible alarm and changes the color of the component. When an alert is received, Network Operations personnel immediately verify and diagnose the problem, coordinate repair with other networking service groups, track problems, and document problem and resolution into a trouble ticket data base. NSI Operations offers the NSI science community reliable connectivity by exercising prompt assessment and resolution of network problems.

Zanley, Nancy L.↗

Computer network control plane tampering monitor

A computer network control plane tampering monitor that detects unauthorized alteration of a label-switched path setup for an information packet intended for transmission through a computer network.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Achieving the End State for the Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units at the Nevada National Security Site - 20355

Underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) ended in 1992. To address the impact of radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing on the groundwater resources of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program created the Underground Test Area (UGTA) activity to characterize the radionuclides in groundwater, understand the nature and extent of radionuclide migration, and forecast the distribution of radionuclides in groundwater for 1,000 years. The UGTA activity is regulated by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), an agreement negotiated between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DOE is close to achieving the end state (closure in place with monitoring and institutional control) for three of the five UGTA corrective action units (CAUs) on the NNSS. A number of challenges remain to achieve the end state of the other two CAUs, both located on Pahute Mesa. Pahute Mesa was the location of 82 underground nuclear tests, less than 10% of the total number of tests on the NNSS. Yet, Pahute Mesa contains slightly more than 60% of the total radionuclides (in curies). Based on groundwater sampling in monitoring wells, two radionuclide plumes have migrated several kilometers (km) in groundwater from selected test cavities and have crossed the boundary of the NNSS (yet remain within the boundaries of Federally controlled land). The path to achieve the end state continues to evolve as more data are collected and a better understanding of radionuclide migration in groundwater is developed. DOE has invested in drilling and sampling more than 50 characterization and monitoring groundwater wells over the past 25 years. The data indicate that the primary radionuclide of concern is tritium as it is about 89% of the total radionuclide inventory (in curies). As well, only tritium has been measured in groundwater outside of cavities at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) standard. For one of the tritium plumes that has migrated across the NNSS boundary, the average rate of migration has been measured as about 45 meters (m) per year with the rate of migration at the leading edge of the plume of about 85 meters per year. At that rate of migration, the tritium plume will decay to safe levels and not reach the publicly accessible environment at concentrations above the SDWA standard. Other radionuclides, at concentrations below the SDWA standards, will be monitored to ensure they remain at safe levels. Consequently, the end state path forward for Pahute Mesa has evolved to take full advantage of the data from the monitoring network to constrain uncertainty in model forecasts and to reduce reliance on probabilistic simulations. The focus of the end state approach relies on developing a monitoring well network that is protective of human health by increasing confidence that no radionuclide plume in the groundwater will migrate undetected to the accessible environment, located about 22 km from the nearest up-gradient underground nuclear test. Using the measured data to remove uncertainty, the evaluation of radionuclide migration from Pahute Mesa is directed toward meeting the goals of the end state. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk-based Post Injection Site Care and Monitoring for Commercial-Scale Carbon Storage: Reevaluation of the FutureGen 2.0 Site using NRAP-Open-IAM and DREAM

Modeling was conducted to assess the effectiveness of the NRAP toolset, specifically NRAP-IAM-CS v2 and DREAM, to determine a risk-based PISC period and optimized monitoring network for a commercial-scale CO2 storage project. Realizations from NRAP-IAM-CS v2 revealed that leakage rates of both CO2 and brine were small, on the order of 10-5 kg/s, and occurred primarily during the injection phase in the Ironton-Galesville, the thief zone immediately overlying the injection reservoir. Using this information to design an optimized monitoring well network eliminated one of the two originally planned above zone monitoring wells, resulting a substantial cost reduction for the project. Perhaps the most significant finding from this effort is that NRAP-IAM-CS v2 can be used to define a risk-based, and substantially shorter, PISC period for the site. NRAP-IAM-CS v2 realizations indicate that the majority of risk of endagerment to USDWs decreases within the first 5 years after CO2 injection ends. Doubling this timeframe would still lead to a net PISC period reduction of 40-years and an operational cost reduction in excess of $50M for the project. This study serves as a first-of-its-kind effort to apply NRAP tools to evaluate components of a commercial-scale Class VI UIC permit and provides a foundation for broader application and adoption by the CCS community.

system model, integrated assessment, reservoir, aq↗

HSNMon: High-Speed Monitoring Software for Omni-Path

HSNMon is a robust high speed network monitoring daemon that provides insight into network availability, hardware failure, and network performance for switches and network cards. HSNMon collects counters, forwarding tables, and error information at high resolution using publicly available Omni-Path Management APIs. The collected data can be forwarded into multiple logging infrastructures including syslog and message queuing systems. HSNMon is only the infrastructure for collecting the network data. It does not include any collected data or proprietary LANL information

Holman, Brett↗

DSN Monitor and Control System, Mark III-80

The Deep Space Network monitor and control system, Mark III-80 is described. The major implementations required to evolve from the Mark III-78 to the Mark III-80 configuration are identified. The affected facilities are the deep space stations and the network operations control center (NOCC). At the deep space stations a stand-alone host processor is implemented. Included are software (host software) changes which provide downline loading to the stand-alone host processor from a disc unit of any idle data system computer. At deep space stations with a 34 m antenna, the microwave subsystem is provided with an interface which allows remote configuration selection at the central monitor and control operator's position. In the NOCC, software changes are implemented to provide precision power monitor and GCF monitor displays.

Leflang, J. G.↗

A Programmable SDN+NFV Architecture for UAV Telemetry Monitoring

With the explosive growth in UAV numbers forecast worldwide, a core concern is how to manage the ad-hoc network configuration required for mobility management. As UAVs migrate among ground control stations, associated network services, routing and operational control must also rapidly migrate to ensure a seamless transition. In this paper, we present a novel, lightweight and modular architecture which supports high mobility, resilience and flexibility through the application of SDN and NFV principles on top of the UAV infrastructure. By combining SDN programmability and Network Function Virtualization we can achieve resilient infrastructure migration of network services, such as network monitoring and anomaly detection, coupled with migrating UAVs to enable high mobility management. Our container-based monitoring and anomaly detection Network Functions (NFs) can be tuned to specific UAV models providing operators better insight during live, high-mobility deployments. We evaluate our architecture against telemetry from over 80flights from a scientific research UAV infrastructure.

Resilience↗

Path-synchronous performance monitoring of interconnection networks based on source code attribution

Examples disclosed herein relate to path-synchronous performance monitoring of an interconnection network based on source code attribution. A processing node in the interconnection network has a profiler module to select a network transaction to be monitored, determine a source code attribution associated with the network transaction to be monitored, and issue a network command to execute the network transaction to be monitored. A logger module creates, in a buffer, a node temporal log associated with the network transaction and the network command. A drainer module periodically captures the node temporal log. The processing node has a network interface controller to receive the network command and mark a packet generated for the network command to be temporally tracked and attributed back to the source code attribution at each hop of the interconnection network traversed by the marked packet.

Chabbi, Milind M.↗

A novel approach to criticality accident detection for a legacy facility

For operations on the Sellafield site involving fissile material a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has traditionally been installed unless an omission case can be made. An omission case would examine if, in the absence of all controls, a criticality could reasonably be expected or whether the potential dose to an operator would remain below a maximum acceptable dose. It is a UK legal requirement for adequate emergency arrangements to be in place for hazards on a nuclear licensed site. For facilities where criticality is credible there is a regulatory expectation that a -Criticality Warning System- should be in place. A -Criticality Warning System- is not necessarily a full CAAS and alternative means of criticality detection may be part of an adequate emergency plan. The Sellafield site has a Magnox fuel reprocessing facility which has been operated since the 1960's. Evaporation of the Medium Active (MA) liquid waste from this process is undertaken in an associated building. Following extensive review of the plant and process a number of maloperations which can route fissile material to the MA evaporator were identified. Adequate controls to prevent these scenarios were shown to be in place. In the unlikely event of a failure of controls leading to sustained loss of fissile material a criticality incident may occur and hence an emergency plan was determined to be necessary. The novel emergency arrangements which were developed utilized the existing gamma monitor network located across multiple building floors. These gamma monitors are present for radiological safety. This emergency arrangement would require rapid interpretation of the gamma alarms by an operator and the manual triggering of a criticality evacuation alarm. The gamma monitors were demonstrated to be able to detect the minimum incident of concern (10{sup 15} fissions) as well as being able to alarm during the ramp up in power of a large criticality incident (10{sup 18} fissions). It was shown that a criticality accident could readily be distinguished from a radiological event (e.g. loss of containment). To support this work, criticality excursion analysis was used to examine the likely characteristics of a criticality in the MA evaporator. This novel arrangement was justified due to a number of factors including: the limited remaining operational lifetime of this facility (<5 years), the low frequency of maloperation coupled with a failure of controls and the crucial risk reduction provided by the continued reprocessing of Magnox fuel. Furthermore, the time and cost involved with design and installation of a standard CAAS would be substantially greater than a plan based upon existing instrumentation. These arguments were accepted by the UK regulator the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗