Earth resources technology satellite operations control center and data processing facility. Book 1 - Systems studies Final report
Systems analysis for ERTS ground data handling system and operations control center
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Systems analysis for ERTS ground data handling system and operations control center
Systems analysis for ERTS NASA Data Processing Facility system and subsystems
Systems analysis for ERTS NASA Data Processing Facility subsystems, installation, and support functions
Included in this plan are general objectives through Day 7, operational guidelines and restraints. Following the activation of all subsystems (through Day 3), special series of payload operations were performed to obtain data samples for the different combinations of exposure/gain settings. This took place from Day 4 through Day 7. The Orbit Adjust was employed to perform vernier corrections after the orbit had been defined. The orbit data was collected through Day 3, with the corrections being made from Day 4 through Day 7. ERTS command auxiliary memory (ECAM) was turned on in Day 3 and the memory dumped to a narrow band tape recorder. A verification of memory was done in the off line mode. ECAM was not used in a payload support mode until Day 7.
Six material concepts at Mach 2.0 and three material concepts at Mach 2.55 were proposed. The resulting evaluations, based on projected development, production, and operating costs, indicate that aircraft designs with advanced composites as the primary material ingredient have the lowest fare premiums at both Mach 2.0 and 2.55. Designs having advanced metallics as the primary material ingredient are not economical. Advanced titanium, employing advanced manufacturing methods such as SFF/DB, requires a fare premium of about 30 percent at both Mach 2.0 and 2.55. Advanced aluminum, usable only at the lower Mach number, requires a fare premium of 20 percent. Cruise speeds in the Mach 2.0-2.3 regime are preferred because of the better economics and because of the availability of two material concepts to reduce program risk - advanced composites and advanced aluminums. This cruise speed regime also avoids the increase in risk associated with the more complex inlets and airframe systems and higher temperature composite matrices required at the higher Mach numbers typified by Mach 2.55.
Research aircraft have become increasingly dependent on advanced electronic control systems to accomplish program goals. These aircraft are integrating multiple disciplines to improve performance and satisfy research objective. This integration is being accomplished through electronic control systems. Systems design methods and information management have become essential to program success. The primary objective of the system design/information tool for aircraft flight control is to help transfer flight control system design knowledge to the flight test community. By providing all of the design information and covering multiple disciplines in a structured, graphical manner, flight control systems can more easily be understood by the test engineers. This will provide the engineers with the information needed to thoroughly ground test the system and thereby reduce the likelihood of serious design errors surfacing in flight. The secondary object is to apply structured design techniques to all of the design domains. By using the techniques in the top level system design down through the detailed hardware and software designs, it is hoped that fewer design anomalies will result. The flight test experiences are reviewed of three highly complex, integrated aircraft programs: the X-29 forward swept wing; the advanced fighter technology integration (AFTI) F-16; and the highly maneuverable aircraft technology (HiMAT) program. Significant operating technologies, and the design errors which cause them, is examined to help identify what functions a system design/informatin tool should provide to assist designers in avoiding errors.
No abstract available
Autonomous UAV transmission line inspection served as a reference mission for NASA demonstration of UAV deployment for economic benefit; this paper reports corona sensing advances in development of that reference mission. Unmanned aerial vehicles can serve as a platform for autonomous sensing and location of high voltage coronal discharge. Simple processing of commercial corona camera imagery can automate discharge localization and documentation. Inexpensive ultraviolet point sensors can sense discharge when carried close to the defect with a UAV. Augmented with a parabolic mirror, point sensor range can be increased to a safe inspection standoff distance, at the cost of a narrowed field of view. Results from a test flight of an augmented UV sensor are described. The imaging approach is superior in sensitivity and acquisition time, while the point sensor approach has superior size, weight, cost and durability advantages.
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The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.
The Operational Process for Trigger Identification and Comprehension (OPTIC) is a standalone, downloadable application designed to enhance the CyOTE (Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment) methodology and will be made available for free download to industry. OPTIC brings key CyOTE functionalities into focus. OPTIC aids OT professionals in analyzing and determining whether an observed anomaly may indicate possible malicious activity or merely a maintenance related irregularity.
The Small Spacecraft Technology (SST) program within NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate, expands the ability to execute unique missions through rapid development and demonstration of capabilities for small spacecraft applicable to exploration, science and the commercial space sector. Through targeted development and frequent in space testing, the program: • Enables execution of missions at much lower cost than previously possible • Substantially reduces the time required for development of spacecraft • Enables new mission architectures through the use of small spacecraft • Expands the reach of small spacecraft to new destinations and challenging new environments • Enables the augmentation of existing assets and future missions with supporting small spacecraft. The program achieves its objectives through: • Identification and investment in the development of new subsystem technologies to enhance or expand the capabilities of small spacecraft • Sponsorship of flight demonstrations of new technologies, capabilities and applications for small spacecraft • Promotion of the use of small spacecraft as platforms for testing and demonstrating technologies and capabilities that might have more general applications in larger-scale spacecraft and systems Technologies funded by the program that are key to advancing the utility and capability of small spacecraft were demonstrated in 2022 and 2023. Notable on-orbit demonstrations include the following. • The Cislunar Autonomous Positioning System Technology Operations and Navigation Experiment’s (CAPSTONE) navigation technology that was demonstrated for the first time in 2023 could provide autonomous onboard navigation information for future lunar missions, minimizing or eliminating human-in-the-loop mission operations. • The optical communications technology also demonstrated in 2023 by the TeraByte InfraRed Delivery (TBIRD) payload that launched on Pathfinder Technology Demonstrator-3, achieved 200 gigabit per second (Gbps) throughput on a space-to-ground optical link between a satellite in orbit and Earth, the highest data rate ever achieved by optical communications technology. • The precision laser pointing performance of NASA’s CubeSat Infrared CrossLink A (CLICK) spacecraft’s fine steering mirror control system was successfully demonstrated. This element of the laser communications system will be used to demonstrate two-way crosslink communication in low-Earth orbit by CLICK B/C anticipated to launch in late 2024. Investments in subsystem technology development through funding to university, industry, and other government partners in a number of areas will be discussed. Among others, topic areas include propulsion, autonomous swarm technology, edge computing, and thermal control. Additionally, the status of the CubeSat-alternative platform, DiskSat, strategies for accelerating the demonstration of technology payloads via the Realizing Rapid, Reduced-cost high-Risk Research (R5) project, and the status of recently completed and upcoming on-orbit demonstrations will also be presented.
Microgrids require reliable communication systems for equipment control, power delivery optimization, and operational visibility. To maintain secure communications, Microgrid Operational Technology (OT) networks must be defensible and cyber-resilient. The communication network must be carefully architected with appropriate cyber-hardening technologies to provide security defenders the data, analytics, and response capabilities to quickly mitigate malicious and accidental cyberattacks. In this work, we outline several best practices and technologies that can support microgrid operations (e.g., intrusion detection and monitoring systems, response tools, etc.). Then we apply these recommendations to the New Jersey TRANSITGRID use case to demonstrate how they would be deployed in practice.
With the advent of broadcast television as a constant source of information throughout the NASA manned space flight Mission Control Center (MCC) at the Johnson Space Center (JSC), the current Video Transport System (VTS) characteristics provides the ability to visually enhance real-time applications as a broadcast channel that decision making flight controllers come to rely on, but can be difficult to maintain and costly. The Operations Technology Facility (OTF) of the Mission Operations Facility Division (MOFD) has been tasked to provide insight to new innovative technological solutions for the MCC environment focusing on alternative architectures for a VTS. New technology will be provided to enable sharing of all imagery from one specific computer display, better known as Display Sharing (DS), to other computer displays and display systems such as; large projector systems, flight control rooms, and back supporting rooms throughout the facilities and other offsite centers using IP networks. It has been stated that Internet Protocol (IP) applications are easily readied to substitute for the current visual architecture, but quality and speed may need to be forfeited for reducing cost and maintainability. Although the IP infrastructure can support many technologies, the simple task of sharing ones computer display can be rather clumsy and difficult to configure and manage to the many operators and products. The DS process shall invest in collectively automating the sharing of images while focusing on such characteristics as; managing bandwidth, encrypting security measures, synchronizing disconnections from loss of signal / loss of acquisitions, performance latency, and provide functions like, scalability, multi-sharing, ease of initial integration / sustained configuration, integration with video adjustments packages, collaborative tools, host / recipient controllability, and the utmost paramount priority, an enterprise solution that provides ownership to the whole process, while maintaining the integrity of the latest technological displayed image devices. This study will provide insights to the many possibilities that can be filtered down to a harmoniously responsive product that can be used in today's MCC environment.
As energy infrastructure becomes more interconnected, understanding cybersecurity risks to production systems requires integrating operational and computer security knowledge. We interviewed 18 experts working in the field of energy critical infrastructure to compare what information they find necessary to assess the impact of computer vulnerabilities on energy operational technology. These experts came from two groups: 1) computer security experts and 2) energy sector operations experts. We find that both groups responded similarly for general categories of information and displayed knowledge about both domains, perhaps due to their interdisciplinary work at the same organization. Yet, we found notable differences in the details of their responses and in their stated perceptions of each group’s approaches to impact assessment. Their suggestions for collaboration across domains highlighted how these two groups can work together to help each other secure the energy grid. Our findings inform the development of interdisciplinary security approaches in critical-infrastructure contexts.
Space shuttle operations, maintenance, and integration of ground support system, logistics, checkout, and recovery
Space Station Freedom technology will have the potential for numerous applications in an early lunar base program. The benefits of utilizing station technology in such a fashion include reduced development and facility costs for lunar base systems, shorter schedules, and verification of such technology through space station experience. This paper presents an assessment of opportunities for using station technology in a lunar base program, particularly in the lander/ascent vehicles and surface modules.
The JBS Foods 2021 Ransomware Attack Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the JBS ransomware cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In late May 2021, one of the world’s largest meat producers, JBS Foods, announced they had fallen victim to a worldwide ransomware attack, later found to be REvil ransomware. In the United States alone, JBS Foods accounts for nearly 25% of beef and roughly 20% of pork production. Adversaries initially launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the company’s Information Technology (IT) networks in Australia, but the attack impacted operations in Brazil, Canada, and the United States, as well. The attack caused plant operations in all four countries to shut down for at least one day. All nine of the U.S. meatpacking plants temporarily shut down because of the attack. The adversaries initially demanded a $\$$22 million ransom for the company’s data, but later negotiated the ransom down to $\$$11 million even after JBS Foods restored most of their systems. JBS Foods eventually paid the $\$$11 Million for reassurance from the adversaries that none of their customers’ data would be compromised in the future. Despite its short duration, the attack still caused large stocks of meat to spoil. The incident also underscored how adversaries can simultaneously compromise and move laterally through global subsidiaries of an organization. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (in a sequence of 21 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 361 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Sixteen of the identified techniques used during the JBS Foods cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 308 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 163 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 75 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.