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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Post-irradiation examination of legacy high burnup fuel to support safety testing

Safety/transient testing to evaluate performance under off-normal conditions is an essential pillar for both the development of Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF) and the optimization of fuel operation economics beyond current discharge burnups. Among other factors, the successful interpretation of the transient testing results relies upon the knowledge of the initial conditions of the test, including the characteristics of the fuel system under scrutiny. When testing pre-irradiated material, the assumptions that the fuel and the cladding still have the same properties as in the pre-irradiation stage is obviously wrong and could affect the results of the test. This is particularly true the more burnup accumulates in the fuel rod and irradiation progresses. The knowledge of the initial microstructure of both fuel and cladding allows a clearer interpretation of the subsequent transient testing results, provides validation of the physical phenomena underlying the model predictions and eliminates the uncertainties related to the limited knowledge of the sample status before the test. One example is the phenomenon of fine fragmentation that occurs in Light Water reactor (LWR) fuel. During a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Reactivity Initiated Transient (RIA) the fuel can severely fragment. During LOCA, high burnup fuel tend to finely fragment, which has raised safety concerns due to the increased likelihood of dispersal of such small particles once the cladding has burst and due to the increased fission gas release. Therefore, efforts have been devoted to the assessment of a pulverization threshold that could determine the conditions under which fine fragmentation is predominant. However, the lack of information regarding the initial conditions of the fuel, and the connections between those conditions and the pre-transient irradiation history, have hindered the development of a fully mechanistic fragmentation and pulverization criterion. The empirical relationships rely on conservative estimations, due to the lack of information on critical material properties and characteristics. More generally, experimental evidence of the irradiation-induced modifications at microstructural scale are necessary to determine the behavior of the material at the macroscopic scale, with the latter being the one of technological interest. Significant progress has been made in the last two decades in the developments of analytical materials science techniques that can be applied to highly radioactive materials, such as high burnup fuels. The availability of new techniques and the improvement of existing ones has enabled investigations previously not possible that can deepen the understanding of the fuel characteristics and properties at high burnup. The better knowledge of material behavior and irradiation-induced phenomena could help the prediction of its performance. In this context, the scope of the present work is to apply a wide portfolio of advanced characterization techniques to determine properties that are relevant for safety and performance. The results are interpreted in the context of engineering scale post-irradiation examinations and available information on the irradiation conditions.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advances in actinide thin films: synthesis, properties, and future directions

Actinide-based compounds exhibit unique physics due to the presence of 5f electrons, and serve in many cases as important technological materials. Targeted thin film synthesis of actinide materials has been successful in generating high-purity specimens in which to study individual physical phenomena. These films have enabled the study of the unique electron configuration, strong mass renormalization, and nuclear decay in actinide metals and compounds. The growth of these films, as well as their thermophysical, magnetic, and topological properties, have been studied in a range of chemistries, albeit far fewer than most classes of thin film systems. This relative scarcity is the result of limited source material availability and safety constraints associated with the handling of radioactive materials. Here, we review recent work on the synthesis and characterization of actinide-based thin films in detail, describing both synthesis methods and modeling techniques for these materials. Further, we review reports on pyrometallurgical, solution-based, and vapor deposition methods. We highlight the current state-of-the-art in order to construct a path forward to higher quality actinide thin films and heterostructure devices.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗
DOE OSTI2023

Modification in Applying Appendix D of 40 CFR Part 61 to Heated Solid Radionuclide Materials With High Melting and Boiling Points

Appendix D of Title 40 Part 61 of the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provides a procedure that US Department of Energy (US DOE) facility owners and operators can use to estimate radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere for dose calculations instead of measuring emissions for minor sources under the 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities, regulation. The procedure assumes that any radioactive material heated above 100 °C is completely vaporized and emitted to the atmosphere. In 1991, the US DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) requested approval to use different release fractions (RFs) for uranium because of its high melting and boiling points. In response to the request, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) Region IV approved the use of modified RFs for elemental uranium provided no reaction had taken place to alter its chemical form. In 2015, the ORR requested approval to use different RFs for tungsten, again because of its high melting and boiling points. EPA Region IV approved the use of modified RFs for heated radioactive tungsten metal. In accordance with the two precedents set for heating uranium and radioactive tungsten metals, in 2016, the ORR requested approval to use modified RFs in a similar fashion for other radioactive solid metals and compounds with melting and boiling points above 500 °C that might be heated above 100 °C in future research projects and experiments. EPA Region IV again granted approval to use modified RFs for the list of compounds. This note discusses the proposed modified RFs and their development.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Distribution of U, Pu and Np in a Mo-99 Recovery Process using Sachtopore NP (titania based) Absorbent Material

A laboratory scale mockup of a prototypical Mo-99 recovery process has been operated in a radioactive materials hood at Savannah River National Laboratory. This equipment has been operated with realistic concentrations of uranium (U-238), plutonium (94% Pu-239), neptunium (Np-237), and non-radioisotopes of common fission products (including Mo). The goal of this work was to determine the amounts of U, Pu, and Np in the liquid waste streams created by the wash streams for the production process. The key question was how the initial acid wash volume will be handled, as this solution contains residual raffinate which amounted to ~ 3% ofthe mass ofthe feed solution in this experiment. If the initial 1.9 bed volumes (BV) of acid wash were recycled as in this experiment then the combined wash solutions can be expected to contain 0.4 g U/L, 2.7 pg Pu/L and < 14 pg Np/L. If, on the other extreme, the entire acid wash solution was discarded as waste, then the combined wash solutions can be expected to contain 11 g U/L, 3.8 pg Pu/L and ~ 80 pg Np/L. The Sachtopore NP absorbent (for Mo-99 recovery) retains a minuscule fraction ofthe U (2.3 mg U per g titania or 0.03% ofthe U in the feed). The uncertainties are too large to determine how close the absorbent is to saturation with U. Less mass but a higher fraction ofthe total Np was retained by the absorbent (0.7 pg Np per g titania or ~2% of the Np in the feed). As has been reported elsewhere, a large fraction ofthe Pu fed to the titania bed was retained by the absorbent (92% of Pu in the feed or 20 pg per g titania).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288

The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.

microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of the 3 m{sup 3} Low Level Radioactive Waste Container in Taiwan - 20037

Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant stopped its business operation in July, 2019, and Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant will also be permanently shut down in 2023. Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act requires a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after being permanently ceased operation. According to the approved decommissioning plan of Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant and the proposed one of Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant, the 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste container is planned to store the low level radioactive wastes with higher radiation produced during the decommissioning. However, 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste containers are not used or developed in Taiwan before. To meet such need, Institute of Nuclear Energy Research develops a new type of 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste container and performs the corresponding analyses and tests based on Guidelines of Applying the Usage License of Low Level Radioactive Waste Containers and Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. In this article, it provides the information of the low level radioactive waste containers that have been approved or is under reviewing in Taiwan, and so do the design specifications of the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container. Besides, the numerical evaluation and test results of the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container are also included in this article. Based on the evaluation and test results, the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container satisfies the requirements of the storage container and industrial package type 2. Institute of Nuclear Energy Research will submit the usage license applications to the authority this year, and the usage licenses would be granted in 2021, expectedly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advancing Vision-based Feedback and Convolutional Neural Networks for Visual Outlier Detection

Machine learning has matured into a technology that has immediate applicability to the surveillance needs of nuclear material storage containers. These containers at LANL are the barrier preventing release of radioactive material to the workers, public, and environment during the storage period of the material. Annual surveillance activities can only provide coverage on a handful of containers. There is a significant need for surveillance tools to identify potential issues and precursors to containment failure that can be used during opportunistic inspections and, more generally, outside of annual surveillance activities. In this report we provide details on the advancement of our proposed embodiment that combines an automation system for taking pictures and a high-accuracy machine learning-driven object detection software. We further showcase the improvements on the software side with progress on extracting unique identification features and advances in detecting damage. The current state of the system captures subject matter expert training and a space-conscious design whose implementation is envisioned in the near future.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Regulatory Treatment of Non-Core Sources of Radioactivity for Advanced Reactor Designs

The recent resurgence in advance (non-light water) reactor development has been paralleled by the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing pathways. Specifically, the creation of the RIPB Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) approach and subsequent endorsement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now provides advanced reactor vendors with a defined RIPB method to develop an affirmative safety case for licensing. In addition, the Technology Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) has published guidance on developing a license application based on the LMP approach. To support the utilization of risk information as part of advanced reactor design and licensing efforts, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) has developed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for advanced reactors. The standard, which was formerly approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2021 and recently endorsed by the NRC in trial use Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.247, is an integral standard, covering from initiating events to offsite consequence. A major feature of the standard is that it permits the inclusion of any source of radioactivity material at the site within the plant PRA. Therefore, non-core sources of radioactivity, such as fuel storage, fuel processing, and purification systems, can be included within a single comprehensive plant PRA. For those advanced reactor vendors utilizing a RIPB licensing approach, there is an opportunity to include the non-core sources of radioactivity within the RIPB framework for licensing decision-making, such as the categorization of events, classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and evaluation of the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID). For advanced reactor designs that contain multiple non-core sources of radioactivity, or for monolithic plant sites that include associated fuel facilities, this approach could potentially simplify licensing applications through the use of a single, uniform, and consistent decision-making framework across all radioactive sources at the site. In addition, a RIPB approach could provide additional insights regarding plant behavior, flexibility regarding licensing decision-making, and potentially allow the use of risk information as part of the plant oversight process. Risk-informing these aspects of advanced reactor licensing would also be consistent with the NRC’s risk policy statement. However, there is diverse regulation and guidance regarding the licensing of non-core sources of radioactivity and generally limited experience using RIPB approaches for the evaluation as part of licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Liquid Metal Intrusion Testing Final Report

Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) is concerned about potential interactions between a tin-antimony pewter material used for localized radiation shielding and stainless-steel containers used for storage and movement of radioactive materials when containers are subjected to elevated temperatures. The specific concern is whether pewter constituents can diffuse into grain boundaries and lead to embrittlement of the stainless steel, potentially compromising the ability of stainless steel components to maintain containment. This work will provide a qualitative and quantitative understanding of the depth of penetration of the pewter coating constituents into stainless steel when the test coupons are subjected to a range of thermal environments. The results of the present work will allow LANL to determine conditions for safely using the pewter lined containers.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Update on Development of a U.S. Rail Transport Capability for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste - 20466

This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating and testing prototype railcars that will comply with the safety standard S-2043. This standard was developed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) specifically for railcars used to transport High-Level Radioactive Material (HLRM). AAR defines the term HLRM to include both spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). DOE is in the process of developing and testing prototype railcars that will satisfy Standard S-2043. This is a technical paper that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract governs the obligations of the parties, and this paper in no manner supersedes, overrides, or amends the Standard Contract. This paper reflects technical work which could support future decision making by the Department of Energy (DOE or Department). No inferences should be drawn from this paper regarding future actions by DOE, which are limited both by the terms of the Standard Contract and a lack of Congressional appropriations for the Department to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act including licensing and construction of a spent nuclear fuel repository. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Insulation Activation and Contamination in Low-Power Experiments

Among the diverse advanced nuclear reactor concepts being developed are designs that expect to operate at much higher temperatures than conventional light-water reactors, and therefore require alternative materials for components capable of withstanding these extreme temperatures. Insulation is one such component where alternative high-temperature industrial composites are being considered. Low-power experiments can provide an opportunity for advancing our understanding of material behavior under irradiation; however, these experiments are not without occupational hazards. The focus of this paper is the potential for activation of insulating composites when exposed to neutron fluence during reactor experiments, and to discuss the subsequent contamination of the testing area. This paper will also discuss practical measures for preventing the creation and inhalation of activated particulate matter (i.e., dust), such as engineering and administrative controls and personal protective equipment. This paper evaluates the suitability of several insulation materials for use in reactor experiments based on their activation from neutron irradiation. The materials considered are Pyrogel XTE by Aspen Aerogel, Cerablanket and Kaowool by Morgan Advanced Materials, Thermo-12 Gold by Johns Manville, and Maxsil CF6-2000 by McAllister Mills. Although these materials are not yet widely used in the nuclear industry, they are common in other industries due to their thermal insulating properties. These materials produce dust while handling that can pose health and safety hazards, which could be further exacerbated by activation. The analysis presented in this paper utilizes a deterministic method developed to predict the activation source term of the provided insulation materials. The method calculates the atomic density of each element within the composites and simulates their exposure to a specified neutron flux density representative of low power experimental conditions. During the irradiation phase and throughout the extensive cooling period, neutron absorptions and nuclear decays are tracked for relevant isotopes. The residual activity within each composite is then assessed to identify the material with the lowest potential radiological hazard to workers. Dust will be created during installation and removal of insulating materials and may also be generated during the experiment. Contamination of surrounding surfaces due to dispersion is highly likely unless preventative measures are taken. The results of this analysis are used to estimate an internal dose from inhalation of activated dust, which is significantly lower than the allowable whole-body dose. However, the risk of internal exposure may increase if the dust becomes a transport vector for nuclear material. The goals of this paper are to enhance the understanding of the potential activation and contamination hazards from the use of these insulating materials in low-power nuclear experiments and to foster safer work environments through informed decision-making and strategic planning. This work ultimately contributes to a broader understanding of how new non-nuclear materials for advanced reactors impact the radiological safety of co-located workers, helping to ensure the responsible management of radioactive materials during installation and decommissioning activities.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Los Alamos National Laboratory Release of Cesium-137 Corrective Action Plan

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) was developed by a team chartered by John Sarrao, Deputy Director for Science, Technology, and Engineering (DDSTE), to review and respond to the findings of the Joint National Nuclear Security Administration/Triad National Security (NNSA/Triad) Investigation Team (JIT) Joint Investigation Report for the “Sealed Source Recovery at the University of Washington Harborview Training and Research Facility Results in Release of Cesium-137 on May 2, 2019,” dated March 30, 2020. On May 2, 2019, International Isotopes, Inc. (INIS), a subcontractor to Triad National Security, LLC, inadvertently breached a sealed cesium-137 source at the University of Washington (UW), Harborview Medical Center Research and Training (HRT) building in downtown Seattle while attempting to recover the source for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP). The source breach resulted in contamination of personnel and the HRT building, as well as a release of radioactive material to the environment

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Idaho National Laboratory’s Mobile Hot Cell Transportation: Engineering Solutions for Global Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources.

Title: Idaho National Laboratory’s Mobile Hot Cell Transportation: Engineering Solutions for Global Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources. Abstract: The Mobile Hot Cell (MHC), currently under development by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP), is designed to help international partners meet the unique challenges of end-of-life radioactive material management. The MHC will provide a critical resource for countries that require assistance securing and disposing of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) and orphaned sources in challenging environments, allowing these sources to be secured against misuse and nefarious activities. The MHC is a rapidly deployable system for conditioning and preparing end-of-life radioactive sources for transportation or storage. It is designed to handle sources of up to 1,000 Ci Co-60 equivalent while maintaining full radiological and biological containment. It will be deployable within 48 hours of an alert, making it ideal for emergency situations. The MHC features an operational suite for control, support racks for electronics, pneumatics, and welding systems, and a modular robust steel structure providing radiological shielding and internal robotic support. This design allows configurations for multiple device types to be conditioned and the ability to safely manage routine issues such as leaking or damaged sources. The MHC has been designed with the transportation challenges of rapid deployment to difficult environments in mind. The system weighs approximately 150,000 pounds, with individual systems breaking down into pieces not exceeding 20,000 pounds. Components are to be transportable on standard 20ft ISO containers, with shielding shells on 20ft flat racks. It is estimated that a total of eight containers and flat racks will be required. The use of 20ft containers, as opposed to 40ft containers, minimizes the impact on less developed road infrastructures, enabling the MHC to be positioned in constrained environments such as hospital parking lots. The system’s modularity also allows for deployment using smaller equipment, such as a 10-ton boom truck or forklift, which is crucial given the potential logistical challenges in different countries. This transportation strategy, evaluated in collaboration with Utah State University, ensures the MHC can be deployed via ground, rail, sea, or air, addressing the primary concern of international transport logistics.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Gamma Equipment System Requirements by Application

This document outlines a set of requirements for gamma sensitive systems applied to three different applications: (1) homeland security (search and identification); (2) in-situ quantification; and (3) quantification in a material characterization laboratory. These three applications represent a range of activities that a country might use for locating, identifying, and quantifying radioactive material. These applications require increasing accuracy and system advancements, and skill levels. This document considers systems with various detector types and are characterized by their energy resolution: (1) low resolution (e.g., NaI(Tl) scintillation) and (2) higher resolution (e.g., high-purity germanium [HPGe] solid state) systems. The higher resolution systems also include cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and only mechanically cooled HPGe systems are considered. These detectors and their associated acquisition hardware and analysis software afford a broad range of capabilities with corresponding ranges of complexity, maintainability, and cost. Ultimately, the equipment must meet the measurement goals of the application, and compliance with a given list of hardware specifications does not in itself guarantee meeting those goals. Examples of typical performance objectives for international safeguards applications are documented in International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials (IAEA, STR-368, November 2010). Selection of the detector type best suited to a specific application is often a compromise between “state of the art” or best available option and what is practical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Influence of Aqueous Dispersivity on Transport of Radiological Material at LANL MDA G - 20450

Aqueous dispersivity is a phenomenon by which a solute moving in groundwater mixes with water that does not contain the solute and becomes diluted. Solutes take paths of varying lengths through pore networks or experience slower velocities due to interactions with pore walls. Aqueous dispersivity leads to breakthrough curves with earlier arrival than expected in purely advective systems and persistent 'tails,' or late-arriving, dilute concentrations of the solute. Dispersivity can be longitudinal (in the direction of flow) or transverse (orthogonal to flow). LANL has disposed of radioactive material at Material Disposal Area (MDA) G since the late 1950's. Most of the disposed materials at MDA G are low-level waste (LLW), but other types of radioactive wastes are disposed or stored at the site. For example, there is a collection of remote-handled transuranic waste (RH-TRU) waste in 33 shafts, which were intended to be stored retrievably. Aqueous-phase radionuclides included in models of contaminant transport at MDA G are subject to dispersive processes in porous media of the vadose zone and saturated zone. To model dispersivity at MDA G probabilistically, we created site-specific distributions of aqueous dispersivity. First, we performed a comprehensive review of peer-reviewed publications, reports from other performance assessments of MDA G, and documentation from sites that were considered similar based on expert opinion, such as Yucca Mountain. Data were included from a wide range of sources, so that distributions developed based on the data reflect the current state of knowledge in properties of the subsurface environment. Data were grouped based on value type (e.g., determined via experiment or used in a different model), rock type, zone type (saturated or unsaturated), and site, and were weighted in the distributions according to their relevance to the site and zone type. We combined Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping techniques to produce approximate distributions of mean aqueous dispersivity. Distributions of dispersivity for saturated and unsaturated zone transport are differentiated by data weight and the length scales over which transport occurs. We find that underestimating or disregarding transverse dispersivity may lead to overstating simulated well capture in the saturated zone at MDA G. Neglecting transverse dispersivity is a common assumption due in part to use of one-dimensional transport models that do not consider solute spreading orthogonal to flow. Also, we find that variability in longitudinal dispersivity is associated with substantial travel time alterations in the MDA G unsaturated zone and in simulated contaminant breakthrough times at a downstream observation plane in the MDA G saturated zone. Finally, at large scales (>1000 m), a linear trend between the dispersivity coefficient and length over which transport occurs may overestimate the dispersivity coefficient. Future modeling work with application to solute spreading could include interacting advective and diffusive zones in the highly fractured basalt below MDA G. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Characterization of SDU 6 Sump Water Samples

This report details results from characterization of the Saltstone Disposal Unit 6 (SDU 6) East Sump water samples. In March of 2022, Saltstone Radiation Protection Department (RPD) personnel reported SDU 6 East Sump beta/gamma radiation levels at ~ 33 dpm/mL (~ 15 pCi/mL) beta/gamma in excess of the water sampling limit of 16 dpm/mL (7.2 pCi/mL). Replicate samples obtained from the SDU 6 East Sump were sent to the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for analysis to include pH, limited anions, toxic metals and radionuclides. Subsequent sump samples associated with SDU 7 that has not yet been filled with any radioactive material were also analyzed at SRNL for both nitrate and nitrite.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗