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NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Risk Management System

Phased‐approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks - not just risk office personnel. Each group/department is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest‐level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management.  Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Space-based Networking Technology Developments in the Interplanetary Network Directorate Information Technology Program

Described recent development of communications protocols, services, and associated tools targeted to reduce risk, reduce cost and increase efficiency of IND infrastructure and supported mission operations. Space-based networking technologies developed were: a) Provide differentiated quality of service (QoS) that will give precedence to traffic that users have selected as having the greatest importance and/or time-criticality; b) Improve the total value of information to users through the use of QoS prioritization techniques; c) Increase operational flexibility and improve command-response turnaround; d) Enable new class of networked and collaborative science missions; e) Simplify applications interfaces to communications services; and f) Reduce risk and cost from a common object model and automated scheduling and communications protocols. Technologies are described in three general areas: communications scheduling, middleware, and protocols. Additionally developed simulation environment, which provides comprehensive, quantitative understanding of the technologies performance within overall, evolving architecture, as well as ability to refine & optimize specific components.

scheduling↗

NASA NTRS2007

RF and Optical Communications: A Comparison of High Data Rate Returns From Deep Space in the 2020 Timeframe

As NASA proceeds with plans for increased science data return and higher data transfer capacity for science missions, both RF and optical communications are viable candidates for significantly higher-rate communications from deep space to Earth. With the inherent advantages, smaller apertures and larger bandwidths, of optical communications, it is reasonable to expect that at some point in time and combination of increasing distance and data rate, the rapidly emerging optical capabilities would become more advantageous than the more mature and evolving RF techniques. This paper presents a comparison of the burden to a spacecraft by both RF and optical communications systems for data rates of 10, 100, and 1000 Mbps and large distances. Advanced technology for RF and optical communication systems have been considered for projecting capabilities in the 2020 timeframe. For the comparisons drawn, the optical and RF ground terminals were selected to be similar in cost. The RF system selected is composed of forty-five 12-meter antennas, whereas the selected optical system is equivalent to a 10-meter optical telescope. Potential differences in availability are disregarded since the focus of this study is on spacecraft mass and power burden for high-rate mission data, under the assumption that essential communications will be provided by low-rate, high availability RF. For both the RF and optical systems, the required EIRP, for a given data rate and a given distance, was achieved by a design that realized the lowest possible communications subsystem mass (power + aperture) consistent with achieving the lowest technology risk. A key conclusion of this paper is that optical communications has great potential for high data rates and distances of 2.67 AU and beyond, but requires R&D and flight demonstrations to prove out technologies.

Williams, W. Dan↗

NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. Formalization of the process for creating these causal diagrams will enable the creation of a composite risk network that is vetted by members of the NASA community and configuration managed. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document outlines the pilot process, the standardized approaches, and guidance for risk custodian teams when creating and updating DAGs as a part of the NASA Human System Risk Management process.

Risk↗

NASA NTRS2011

Simplified Architecture for Precise Aiming of a Deep-Space Communication Laser Transceiver

The simplified architecture is a minimal system for a deep-space optical communications transceiver. For a deepspace optical communications link the simplest form of the transceiver requires (1) an efficient modulated optical source, (2) a point-ahead mechanism (PAM) to compensate for two-way light travel, (3) an aperture to reduce the divergence of the transmit laser communication signal and also to collect the uplink communication signal, and (4) a receive detector to sense the uplink communication signal. Additional components are introduced to mitigate for spacecraft microvibrations and to improve the pointing accuracy. The Canonical Transceiver implements this simplified architecture (see figure). A single photon-counting smart focal plane sensor combines acquisition, tracking, and forward link data detection functionality. This improves optical efficiency by eliminating channel splits. A transmit laser blind sensor (e.g. silicon with 1,550-nm beam) provides transmit beam-pointing feedback via the two-photon absorption (TPA) process. This vastly improves the transmit/receive isolation because only the focused transmit beam is detected. A piezoelectric tiptilt actuator implements the required point-ahead angle. This point-ahead mechanism has been demonstrated to have near zero quiescent power and is flight qualified. This architecture also uses an innovative 100-mHz resonant frequency passive isolation platform to filter spacecraft vibrations with voice coil actuators for active tip-tilt correction below the resonant frequency. The canonical deep-space optical communications transceiver makes synergistic use of innovative technologies to reduce size, weight, power, and cost. This optical transceiver can be used to retire risks associated with deep-space optical communications on a planetary pathfinder mission and is complementary to ongoing lunar and access link developments.

Ortiz, Gerard G.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Design Consideration on the ACTS T1-VSAT

The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) was developed by NASA as an experimental platform to demonstrate to industry the high risk technologies need for the next generation of communication satellites. The ACTS contains many state-of-the-art technologies including time division multiple accessing, adaptive error correction coding, multiple electronically steerable hopping beam antennas, spectrally efficient SMSK modulation, demand assignment multiple access protocol and on-board baseband circuit switching. An integral part of this testbed is the ACTS T1-very small aperture terminal (VSAT). The requirements imposed on the T1-VSAT demanded numerous design tradeoffs; balancing risk, cost, and implementation. Some of these considerations include: the method used for determining link quality, the development of a low cost and reliable Ka-band high power amplifier, the integration and testing environment for use in development and production and the low cost signal processing solution to high rate burst data. This paper discusses the tradeoffs considered in the selected implementation and the results obtained over the past two years of operation. Recommendations for improvements are also included.

Lilley, Richard D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Role of Trust and Usability in Enabling Spaceflight Crew Autonomy

Future long duration exploration missions will require an increased use of onboard automated systems as spaceflight crews venture further than before and have longer communications delays with ground support. The design of these systems must support appropriate crew trust and have sufficient usability to enable spaceflight crew autonomy or risk being misused while crews wait to communicate with ground support. We evaluated trust & usability in our self-scheduling tool, Playbook, for crew mission timelines. Data was collected in a controlled lab experiment with 31 participants. Participants in the study conducted two tasks: scheduling, where participants were responsible for scheduling a majority of a day's operational tasks, and rescheduling, where participants were provided a schedule and asked to reschedule higher priority activities. We found a significant correlation between system trust and usability, irrespective of self-scheduling tasks. We conclude that system usability may play a bigger role in how trust is learned while conducting novel crew autonomy tasks such as self-scheduling. Future research should investigate the role of usability to encourage appropriate trust in onboard automated crew systems and enable crew autonomy.

crew autonomy↗

NASA NTRS2013

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper

data links↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analytical Framework for Rodent/NHP Data Set Utilization to Inform Human CNS Risk Estimation

Objectives Review and inform on tactics to analyze & communicate data from animal research (e.g., rodents, mini-pigs, NHPs, et al) exposed to single and combinations of spaceflight hazards, using NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) process for the Behavioral Medicine Risk - To quantitatively inform Behavioral Medicine Risk posture - i.e., likelihood (L) and consequence (C) - To help inform estimation of crew health standards for operational task performance (i.e., Fitness For Duty, Space Permissible Exposure Levels, Permissible Operational Limits).

Brain↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Elevated CO2 Could Undermine an Exploration Crew's Ability to Independently Respond to Unanticipated, Time- and Safety-Critical Anomalies

Safety and mission critical anomalies are inevitable on NASA exploration missions. Delays and interruptions in communication with Earth-experts drives the requirement that crew resolve some time- and safety-critical anomalies on their own. The HRP, HFBP, Human-System Integration Architecture (HSIA) risk refers to the possibility that, during communication blackouts and thus the absence of vast ground expertise, a small crew may not be able to independently respond to unanticipated, time-critical malfunctions or to detect safety critical procedure errors.

carbon dioxide↗

NASA NTRS2004

The NASA Continuous Risk Management Process

As an intern this summer in the GRC Risk Management Office, I have become familiar with the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process. In this process, risk is considered in terms of the probability that an undesired event will occur and the impact of the event, should it occur (ref., NASA-NPG: 7120.5). Risk management belongs in every part of every project and should be ongoing from start to finish. Another key point is that a risk is not a problem until it has happened. With that in mind, there is a six step cycle for continuous risk management that prevents risks from becoming problems. The steps are: identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate & document. Incorporated in the first step are several methods to identify risks such as brainstorming and using lessons learned. Once a risk is identified, a risk statement is made on a risk information sheet consisting of a single condition and one or more consequences. There can also be a context section where the risk is explained in more detail. Additionally there are three main goals of analyzing a risk, which are evaluate, classify, and prioritize. Here is where a value is given to the attributes of a risk &e., probability, impact, and timeframe) based on a multi-level classification system (e.g., low, medium, high). It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of these levels are probably different for each project. Furthermore the risks can be combined into groups. Then, the risks are prioritized to see what risk is necessary to mitigate first. After the risks are analyzed, a plan is made to mitigate as many risks as feasible. Each risk should be assigned to someone in the project with knowledge in the area of the risk. Then the possible approaches to choose from are: research, accept, watch, or mitigate. Next, all risks, mitigated or not, are tracked either individually or in groups. As the plan is executed, risks are re-evaluated, and the attribute values are adjusted as necessary. Metrics are established and monitored as tools for risk tracking. Also a trigger or threshold should be set on the metric data that indicates when an action is needed. Results of this tracking are usually evaluated and reported in a relevant format at weekly or monthly meetings. Choosing controls is the subsequent step, which involves the effects of the tracking. The three basic controls are: close, continue tracking, and re- plan. Finally communicate & document is the last step, but occurs throughout the process. It is vital that main risks, plans, changes, and progress are known by everyone in the project. A good way to keep everyone updated and inform other projects of common issues is by thoroughly documenting project risks. NASA sees value in risk management and believes that projects have greater probability or success by using the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process.

Pokorny, Frank M.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Ground-Based Capabilities for Lunar Infrastructure Testing

A focus of NASA’s Moon-to-Mars objectives is the development of the infrastructure on the lunar surface that will be needed to support broader lunar surface operations. This infrastructure is intended to support both United States and international partners to expand human presence on the lunar surface. As this lunar infrastructure is designed and established, it will be critical to ensure that the various hardware elements work together to both enable the capabilities and to avoid unintended actions. NASA’s Glenn Research Center (GRC) is establishing ground-based testing and emulation facilities to mimic the lunar environment that the surface power and communications infrastructure will operate in. These facilities are intended to represent power and communications providers, users, and interfaces to ensure that systems operate as intended to support the lunar economy. They will empower industry to rapidly evaluate new technologies under realistic conditions. In 2023 GRC is opening a new, state-of-the-art, Aerospace Communications Facility featuring hardware-in-the-loop and ground-to-orbit testbeds. The Multiple Asset Testbed for Research in Innovative Communications Systems (MATRICS) capability will emulate the lunar communications environment, enabling validation of mission concepts and technologies to reduce risk through performance and operations testing, training, and uncover potential issues in compatibility among communication systems providers and users. In addition to the communications testbed, GRC is also developing a full-scale power grid to reduce lunar mission risk. The Adaptable Surface Power Integration and Research (ASPIRE) project aims to reduce mission and hardware risk via high-fidelity integrated testing and pave the way for commercially supplied utility power on the lunar surface. The facility will be scalable and highly adaptable and will be available to NASA, Industry, Academia, and International Partners. ASPIRE will allow developers to integrate and demonstrate their power solutions in a relevant environment, and it will be able to characterize the lunar power performance in representative mission contexts.

ground-based testing↗

NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗

NASA NTRS2013

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

Iannicca, Dennis C.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessment of the State of Communication Delay Research in Preparation for Missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit

NASA’s mission-operations paradigm, established during Project Mercury and minimally evolving through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions, has primarily depended on real-time support from a ground team of experts. This ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years, managing the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. However, this operational paradigm, which has seen little change in its Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), will face challenges during long-duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. Lunar missions may experience one-way communication latencies ranging from 3 to 14 seconds, while Mars missions will encounter up to a 44-minute round-trip latency at a maximum distance from Earth. Communication delays negatively impact the behavioral health and performance of individuals and crews operating across the multi-team space-to-ground system. Previous research indicates that increased isolation and the challenges posed by delayed communication lead to heightened stress, frustration, adverse behavioral symptoms, and reduced individual performance. NASA has investigated the nature and effectiveness of managing this shift in complex operations since early 2000, but additional research is necessary to assess the issues associated with communication latencies and identify effective countermeasures. This work aimed to examine the evidence from 20 years of research on comm delays. We systematically reviewed the past 20 years of communication delay literature, focusing on how this research aligns with relevant, high-priority needs in the HSIA, Team, and BMed Risks. This type of panoramic review has not been done since 2013; a current, aggregated picture of what has been studied and how is needed to inform additional studies and mitigation development. Additional perspectives were gained from interviews with the research participants, operations experts, and communication delay researchers. Results from this effort will help characterize the risk posed by communication latency for upcoming Artemis missions and point toward potential mitigations. The final results will be presented. For the literature review, we formed a search term seed set drawing from languages used in two papers representative of the previous state of knowledge and supplemented it with additional search terms. We conducted literature searches on Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science and searched NASA project archives for output from NASA-sponsored research. This search yielded 150 papers, of which 48 were relevant. SME interviews provided perspective on key communication delay issues and concerns and what is being worked on to mitigate those issues. Preliminary results of the literature review have been presented. Final results to be presented include the results of the literature review and findings from the interviews.

literature review↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Machine Learning for the Validation of Expert-Elicited Causal Risk Diagrams

Exposure to spaceflight poses risk to human health in complex ways. To help manage this risk, the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a set of causal diagrams that attempt to explain how spaceflight hazards generate health risks and lead to adverse outcomes both in-mission, immediately post-mission, and over the long term. These causal risk diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and can function as knowledge graphs of connected risks and outcomes. These DAGs have proven useful for communication, and, through network analysis, have allowed for the identification of structurally important factors in the risk network. However, the utility these DAGs provide is directly proportional to their verisimilitude, making assessment of this trait using empirical data – whether from actual human spaceflight or various spaceflight analogue exposures and model organisms – a high priority. In this research we explore the use of machine learning algorithms to learn DAG structure from empirical data as a means of evaluating human-elicited DAG structures. To do so, we test several different graph structure-learning algorithms on data concerning changes in the bones of rats and mice after exposure to either spaceflight or a spaceflight analogue. We explore potential methods for indexing the similarity between each algorithm’s output DAG with all the others and with that of the expert-elicited DAG. We discuss next steps in this ongoing line of research and open science initiatives underway to complete them.

directed acyclic graphs↗

NASA NTRS2017

A Simulation Base Investigation of High Latency Space Systems Operations

NASA's human space program has developed considerable experience with near Earth space operations. Although NASA has experience with deep space robotic missions, NASA has little substantive experience with human deep space operations. Even in the Apollo program, the missions lasted only a few weeks and the communication latencies were on the order of seconds. Human missions beyond the relatively close confines of the Earth-Moon system will involve missions with durations measured in months and communications latencies measured in minutes. To minimize crew risk and to maximize mission success, NASA needs to develop a better understanding of the implications of these types of mission durations and communication latencies on vehicle design, mission design and flight controller interaction with the crew. To begin to address these needs, NASA performed a study using a physics-based subsystem simulation to investigate the interactions between spacecraft crew and a ground-based mission control center for vehicle subsystem operations across long communication delays. The simulation, built with a subsystem modeling tool developed at NASA's Johnson Space Center, models the life support system of a Mars transit vehicle. The simulation contains models of the cabin atmosphere and pressure control system, electrical power system, drinking and waste water systems, internal and external thermal control systems, and crew metabolic functions. The simulation has three interfaces: 1) a real-time crew interface that can be use to monitor and control the vehicle subsystems; 2) a mission control center interface with data transport delays up to 15 minutes each way; 3) a real-time simulation test conductor interface that can be use to insert subsystem malfunctions and observe the interactions between the crew, ground, and simulated vehicle. The study was conducted at the 21st NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) mission between July 18th and Aug 3rd of year 2016. The NEEMO mission provides ideal conditions for this study with crew in the loop, an active control center, and real-time flow of high latency communications and data. NEEMO crew and ground support will work through procedures including activation of the transit vehicle power system, opening the hatch between the transit vehicle and a Mars ascent vehicle, transferring simulated crewmembers between vehicles, overcoming subsystem malfunctions, sending simulated crewmember on extra-vehicular activities, and other housekeeping activities. This study is enhancing the understanding of high latency operations and the advantages and disadvantages of different communication methods. It is also providing results that will help improve the design of simulation interfaces and inform the design of Mars transit vehicles.

Li, Zu Qun↗

NASA NTRS1994

Design of a walking robot

Carnegie Mellon University's Autonomous Planetary Exploration Program (APEX) is currently building the Daedalus robot; a system capable of performing extended autonomous planetary exploration missions. Extended autonomy is an important capability because the continued exploration of the Moon, Mars and other solid bodies within the solar system will probably be carried out by autonomous robotic systems. There are a number of reasons for this - the most important of which are the high cost of placing a man in space, the high risk associated with human exploration and communication delays that make teleoperation infeasible. The Daedalus robot represents an evolutionary approach to robot mechanism design and software system architecture. Daedalus incorporates key features from a number of predecessor systems. Using previously proven technologies, the Apex project endeavors to encompass all of the capabilities necessary for robust planetary exploration. The Ambler, a six-legged walking machine was developed by CMU for demonstration of technologies required for planetary exploration. In its five years of life, the Ambler project brought major breakthroughs in various areas of robotic technology. Significant progress was made in: mechanism and control, by introducing a novel gait pattern (circulating gait) and use of orthogonal legs; perception, by developing sophisticated algorithms for map building; and planning, by developing and implementing the Task Control Architecture to coordinate tasks and control complex system functions. The APEX project is the successor of the Ambler project.

Whittaker, William↗