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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

How open data and interdisciplinary collaboration improve our understanding of space weather: A risk and resiliency perspective

Space weather refers to conditions around a star, like our Sun, and its interplanetary space that may affect space- and ground-based assets as well as human life. Space weather can manifest as many different phenomena, often simultaneously, and can create complex and sometimes dangerous conditions. The study of space weather is inherently trans-disciplinary, including subfields of solar, magnetospheric, ionospheric, and atmospheric research communities, but benefiting from collaborations with policymakers, industry, astrophysics, software engineering, and many more. Effective communication is required between scientists, the end-user community, and government organizations to ensure that we are prepared for any adverse space weather effects. With the rapid growth of the field in recent years, the upcoming Solar Cycle 25 maximum, and the evolution of research-ready technologies, we believe that space weather deserves a reexamination in terms of a “risk and resiliency” framework. By utilizing open data science, cross-disciplinary collaborations, information systems, and citizen science, we can forge stronger partnerships between science and industry and improve our readiness as a society to mitigate space weather impacts. The objective of this manuscript is to raise awareness of these concepts as we approach a solar maximum that coincides with an increasingly technology-dependent society, and introduce a unique way of approaching space weather through the lens of a risk and resiliency framework that can be used to further assess areas of improvement in the field.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

RAVEN User Manual

RAVEN is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed to provide dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose probabilistic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable to agnostically communicate with any system code. This agnosticism includes providing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are used to allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by inputs files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response, and investigating the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused to- ward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN has started in 2012, when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework became stronger. RAVEN principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concept developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just the individuation of the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the closeness (or not) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. for an important process such as peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. The initial development of RAVEN has been focused on providing dynamic risk assessment capability to RELAP-7, currently under development at the INL and, likely, future replacement of the RELAP5-3D code. Most the capabilities that have been implemented having RELAP-7 as principal focus are easily deployable for other system codes. For this reason, several side activates are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with soft- ware such as RELAP5-3D, etc. The aim of this document is the explanation of the input requirements, focalizing on the input structure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems Cyber Range

As digital technologies expand to meet the needs of a more autonomous, interconnected, and advanced power system, new cybersecurity complexities and vulnerabilities arise. The ARIES Cyber Range enables the energy sector to evaluate these evolutions and validate cybersecurity solutions without impacting live systems. Combining power grid-scale hardware with emulation and simulation approaches, the ARIES Cyber Range can faithfully replicate modern energy systems - from grid physics to communication networks, and everything in between - with real-world fidelity. At NLR, researchers and partners are answering complex power system cybersecurity questions, examining emerging threats to the electric sector, and de risking new security technologies, all at a mission-relevant speed that keeps pace with rapidly evolving systems and hazards.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗
DOE OSTI2021

Synchrophasor spoofing detection and remediation for wide-area damping control

Evolving cyber-attack threats put at risk automatic closed-loop systems to be incorporated in the smart grid. Wide-area control systems are particularly vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks due to sensor remoteness and dependence on satellite communication for time synchronization. A successful cyber-attack on a wide-area controller has the potential to reduce relative stability of the power system or worse, destabilize it. As such, detection algorithms must be deployed as defense against such attacks with the ability to autonomously correct for detected tampering or misoperation. The Spoof Catch and Restore Routine (SCR 2 ), a combination of three real-time spoof detectors, each requiring limited information about the plant, is reported here. Nonlinear simulations of a compromised wide-area control system deployed in the Western Interconnection show the effectiveness of SCR 2 in detecting both delay-type and counterfeit-type spoofing attacks on wide-area sensors.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

NDE Technology Engineering Program for Hanford DST Non-Visual Volumetric Inspection Technology: Phase II RAVIS Radiation Tolerance Test Report

This test report provides the results of radiation tolerance robustness testing that was performed on samples of robotic components and an ultrasonic guided wave air-slot sensor that represent components/sub-systems of the Robotic Air-slot Volumetric Inspection System (RAVIS) that has been engineered for volumetric inspection of Hanford tank bottom plates via under-tank refractory pad air-slots. The specific components tested for 1) functionality during active irradiation and 2) tolerance to cumulative radiation dose (until failure or upon reaching a cumulative dose test limit) were: • four samples each of a printed circuit board (PCB) and direct current (DC) motor, which are robotic components, and • 26 ultrasonic piezoelectric elements (samples) inside an air-slot sensor. The robotic components are part of the RAVIS air-slot inspection crawler drive control system that is responsible for remote communication with and actuation of the air-slot inspection crawler. The failure of either of these components during under-tank deployment would require manual retrieval via the crawler’s tether, which risks damage to the robot/refractory/tank. Preemptive replacement of the components at appropriately conservative dose/time intervals informed by failure dose would reduce the likelihood of under-tank failure. The components were included in radiation tolerance testing to quantify their failure doses to inform replacement intervals. The air-slot sensor is responsible for collecting ultrasonic inspection data (scan images) for the tank bottom plates during under-tank deployment. Compromised signal quality due to elevated noise levels caused by gamma radiation would compromise inspection performance. The air-slot sensor was included in radiation tolerance testing to quantify the impact of active irradiation on sensor signal quality. The irradiation and in-situ functional tests of the PCBs, DC motors and air-slot sensor took place in June and July 2020 at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Testing was performed at a gamma dose rate near 300 rad/hr., which, in the absence of under-tank dose rate data, has been conservatively estimated to be the upper-bound dose rate beneath the primary tanks at Hanford. Irradiation took place at elevated temperatures of 150-200°F to determine failure doses that reflect the compounding effects of gamma radiation and heat. The test results revealed: • The DC motors can tolerate being actively irradiated at the high dose rate at 200°F and can tolerate a cumulative dose of 300,000 rad, that which would be incurred after 5 years of service at the 300 rad/hr dose rate. The component therefore meets minimum and preferred radiation tolerance and lifecycle requirements for robotic components. • The air-slot sensor can tolerate being actively irradiated at the high dose rate at 150°F and can tolerate a cumulative dose of 60,000 rad, that which would be incurred after 1 year of service at the 300 rad/hr dose rate. The sensor therefore meets minimum radiation tolerance and lifecycle requirements. • The PCB can tolerate being actively irradiated at the high dose rate, but can only tolerate a cumulative dose of 19,000 rad at 150-200°F. The PCB does not meet minimum radiation tolerance and lifecycle requirements; however, because the component is considered replaceable, it can be replaced before a cumulative dose of 19,000 rad is reached, determined through either monitoring with a dosimeter or scheduled time intervals that are calculated based on conservative estimates of under-tank dose rates.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

End-to-End Encryption for Cyber-Physical Systems Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Cyber-physical systems require reliable, safe, and secure control of critical infrastructure, combining computational and networking capabilities, which heighten the risk of cyber attacks. These attacks can disrupt the physical process, causing unforeseen consequences. One solution is the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to protect the control loop, allowing for secure computations and communications without compromising signal and control system privacy. The challenge with FHE, however, is its requirement for inputs to be integers. This presentation introduces a modified Learning With Errors (LWE) FHE approach that encodes control system dynamics and signals into integers. Our proposed scheme leverages a generalized LWE encoding function and modifies the Gentry-Sahai-Waters gadget decomposition tool to encrypt the control system. Using the modified LWE scheme, we formalize a fully encrypted control system, supported by simulated results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Encrypted Control Using Modified Learning With Errors-based Schemes

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) require reliable, safe, and secure control of critical infrastructure, combining computational and networking capabilities, which heighten the risk of cyber attacks. These attacks can disrupt the physical process, causing unforeseen consequences. One solution is the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to protect the control loop, allowing for secure computations and communications without compromising signal and control system privacy. The challenge with FHE, however, is its requirement for inputs to be integers. This paper introduces a modified Learning With Errors (LWE) FHE approach that encodes control system dynamics and signals into integers. Our proposed scheme leverages a generalized LWE encoding function and modifies the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) gadget decomposition tool to encrypt the control system. Using the modified LWE scheme, we formalize a fully encrypted control system, supported by simulated results.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Security of DERs and Grid Edge Technologies [Slides]

Distributed energy resources (DERs) offer significant value for incorporating diverse generation technologies and improving reliability. They also present a new set of cybersecurity challenges. The move of generation to the grid edge can also mean more distributed control systems and expanded communication networks, resulting in an increase in attack surface. This presentation will discuss definitions and essential terms related to DERs; developments and deployment trends for DERs; recent cyber attacks on operational technology and industrial systems; cyber risk arising from distributed grid resources; and ways in which standards may help mitigate some of these risks.

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DOE OSTI2021

Stability Impact of IEEE 1547 Operational Mode Changes Under High DER Penetration in the Presence of Cyber Adversary

The IEEE 1547 standard addresses the integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into Area Electric Power Systems (AEPS). The updated standard, released in 2018 with revisions ongoing, specifies the need for more flexible settings, requiring the DER to remain connected during certain disturbances and provide voltage support via active and reactive power modes. With these increased capabilities comes increased risks, and our analysis of the standard has produced potential settings combinations, which, while allowable under the standard, may actually create instability. This contradicts the main purpose of the revised standard. Since the DER must support a communication interface through which the AEPS operator can change settings, adversarial mode changes are possible via a cyberattack. This concern is heightened as DER penetration increases, where under a reasonable threat model, an attacker could affect multiple DER simultaneously. We have conducted a simulation analysis of potentially adverse combinations of mode change and ridethrough parameters on a hypothetical AEPS with varying degrees of DER penetration. We conclude that certain adverse mode changes, whether through error or cyberattack, can lead to unstable conditions with DER penetrations as low as 24% of the AEPS system capacity.

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DOE OSTI2023

Alerga: Alert Aggregation and Reasoning in GOOSE Simulation Pipeline

IEC 61850 specifies the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol as one option for low latency communication of substation-related events. Due to its strict timing requirements, GOOSE lacks any form of encryption or authentication and has only minimal integrity guarantees. These absences render the protocol vulnerable to a variety of communication anomalies, including adversarial action. In particular, an adversary with access to the substation network can launch man in the middle (MITM) attacks. We propose Alerga, a set of tools to allow operators to mitigate some of the risks of the protocol while retaining its strengths. To that end, we have developed first a GOOSE simulation pipeline including data generation, anomaly detection, alert handling, causal reasoning and data visualization components. The simulator is designed to be modular, allowing operators to swap components to better fit their network capabilities. The volume of alert traffic on a substation network threatens operators with alert fatigue. In order to combat this, we secondly present a novel form of alert aggregation and processing, offering operators a condensed view of any threats to the system. Thirdly, to facilitate the handling of these threats, our causal reasoning system traces the alerts back to their most likely cause, generating an initial hypothesis for operators to investigate.

alert aggregation↗
DOE OSTI2023

High fidelity ground deposition measurement with robots after explosive radiological dispersion

A team of scientists from the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, has assembled a remote-controlled robot to field a few sodium iodide scintillators of different size and shape 18″ above ground for measurement of ground deposition of gamma-emitting particles after an explosion of a radiological dispersal device. This system uses a high-precision differential GPS device with submeter accuracy for radiation mapping. The system is most useful in characterizing large-area contamination and detecting gamma radioactivity in invisible, submicron particulate debris deposited on the ground at surface level or embedded in subsurface up to 3″ deep. The system was assembled as part of a larger effort to integrate advanced radiological detection devices into autonomous or remote-controlled robotic systems to eliminate or minimize the need for emergency responders to enter areas that pose significant health and safety risks to humans following a major radiological incident or accident. Research into autonomous algorithms is required to develop automated robotic systems for radiological survey and characterization activities in highly contaminated areas. The scope of this project also includes developing communications pathways and supporting infrastructure capabilities for different types of robotic technologies. The expected result is an advanced autonomous robotic system with integrated radiation detection electronics that allows emergency response personnel to view data remotely and in real time for radiological emergency response and consequence management purposes.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Demonstration of the Cybersecurity Framework through Real-world Cyber Attack

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity, provides five concurrent and continuous functions to Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover from cyber threats and vulnerabilities to buildings. Based on the core architecture and security best practices defined in the CSF guidelines, we developed the CSF webtools. The CSF webtools provide actionable functions that can be easily adopted by a facility operator to enhance their critical infrastructure security. The essence is captured in a set of “how-to” instructions for the facility operators to adopt, adapt, and apply to their critical infrastructure facilities. When considered together, these functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. The CSF webtools provide an easy to follow set of cybersecurity best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity posture of our nation’s buildings and other critical infrastructures. The CSF webtools are also designed to facilitate communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive to operations levels. Finally, the CSF webtools allow the critical infrastructure operators to assess the overall cybersecurity maturity and posture. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the capabilities of the CSF webtools through an illustrative cyber-attack based on a real-world scenario.

cybersecurity framework, maturity model, critical ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Effect of GPS Manipulation to Traditional and Next Generation Relay Protection

This project’s objective is to test the effect of GPS timing variations on relay protection algorithms to determine vulnerabilities and the associated hazards to the electric grid. This will focus on differential protection which utilizes peer to peer communication between substations to determine if the current is not equivalent. This requires the use of GPS to sync the two substations and can be vulnerable to GPS manipulation. However, the effects of GPS manipulation are not a commonly known risk. Therefore, this LDRD will address the risks of GPS manipulation for such a widely implemented technology. For differential protection a GPS resilient architecture was implemented and tested for differential protective relays through a direct serial fiber connection between the two relays. This allows for one relay to be the master and provide synchronization outside of timestamp for differential protection.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

SuperLab 2.0 Showcase: Connecting Five Labs to Tackle Grid Complexity and Unlock Unique Grid Asset Potential

SuperLab 2.0 (5-Lab Demo) is a collaborative, national-scale experiment showcasing the coordination of geographically distributed energy assets in real time. The demonstration integrates 25 physical and digital assets, spanning wind, PV, batteries, electrolyzers, DC fast chargers, microgrid controllers, building automation systems, small modular reactor (SMR), control centers, and gas turbines, across five DOE national laboratories-NLR, INL, NETL, LBNL, and SNL. These assets are unified using Energy Sciences Network (ESnet), a low-latency, high-performance U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) network, and controlled via a centralized energy controller hosted at NLR's ARIES facility. The demonstration validates the ability to stress-test hybrid energy systems under dynamic scenarios to de-risk advanced control strategies for greater resilience and flexibility. SuperLab 2.0 (5-Lab Demo) showcased a major advancement in federated national laboratory collaboration, enabling real-time, cross-laboratory experimentation to coordinate geographically dispersed distributed energy resources (DERs) using various communication protocols and networks. SuperLab 2.0 (5-Lab Demo) built on previous demonstrations conducted between NLR-PNNL and NLR-INL connecting diverse assets including distant protection devices, a SMR simulator, and a high temperature electrolyzer (HTE). Previous demos were based on a single connection between two labs with minimal coordination challenges. The 5-Lab demo with a centralized controller, distributed testbeds across different geographical locations, and use of protocols-based communication represents a scenario closer to real-world grid operations that coordinate resources across a region to meet system needs. This experiment studied how local DER controllers interact with a centralized energy controller during normal and abnormal events to maintain reliability. The SuperLab team across the five labs implemented a notional power system model equivalent of transmission and distribution lines, represented by the data networks interconnecting the labs. Each lab continuously exchanged local parameters (such as P and Q) from its Hardware-In-Loop (CHIL) and Power Hardware-In-Loop (PHIL) assets through centralized energy controller at NLR, enabling real-time interaction and coordination across sites. By leveraging ESnet as the communication backbone, the team successfully operated the distributed assets as a unified power system, with each bus represented by a different laboratory. This setup mirrors how assets interact in real-world power systems across dispersed locations with various protocols and latencies. At each lab site, assets were operated using their own local controllers which were coordinated through an overarching operation and control layer of centralized energy controller, equivalent to how an energy management system (EMS) orchestrates assets across a regional or national grid. SuperLab's federated connectivity utilized a Digital Real-Time Simulators (DRTS)-type gateway to connect Controller Hardware-In-Loop (CHIL) and PHIL assets between labs. To enable this federated connection through ESnet, a deterministic network was established where latency variations were consistent. This consistency allowed the development of digital filters for the power system assets across CHIL and PHIL interfaces to avoid unstable and unreliable grid conditions. This report provides an overview of the cross-laboratory configuration and offers insights into interconnecting geographically distributed research assets to test them as if they were co-located. This experiment represents a step toward linking nine DOE national laboratories, enabling nation-wide simulations that can address utility-driven challenges with grid resilience, flexibility, and modernization.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗