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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1990

Systems engineering and integration: Cost estimation and benefits analysis

Space Transportation Avionics hardware and software cost has traditionally been estimated in Phase A and B using cost techniques which predict cost as a function of various cost predictive variables such as weight, lines of code, functions to be performed, quantities of test hardware, quantities of flight hardware, design and development heritage, complexity, etc. The output of such analyses has been life cycle costs, economic benefits and related data. The major objectives of Cost Estimation and Benefits analysis are twofold: (1) to play a role in the evaluation of potential new space transportation avionics technologies, and (2) to benefit from emerging technological innovations. Both aspects of cost estimation and technology are discussed here. The role of cost analysis in the evaluation of potential technologies should be one of offering additional quantitative and qualitative information to aid decision-making. The cost analyses process needs to be fully integrated into the design process in such a way that cost trades, optimizations and sensitivities are understood. Current hardware cost models tend to primarily use weights, functional specifications, quantities, design heritage and complexity as metrics to predict cost. Software models mostly use functionality, volume of code, heritage and complexity as cost descriptive variables. Basic research needs to be initiated to develop metrics more responsive to the trades which are required for future launch vehicle avionics systems. These would include cost estimating capabilities that are sensitive to technological innovations such as improved materials and fabrication processes, computer aided design and manufacturing, self checkout and many others. In addition to basic cost estimating improvements, the process must be sensitive to the fact that no cost estimate can be quoted without also quoting a confidence associated with the estimate. In order to achieve this, better cost risk evaluation techniques are needed as well as improved usage of risk data by decision-makers. More and better ways to display and communicate cost and cost risk to management are required.

Dean, ED↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management Issues - An Aerospace Perspective

Phased-approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks--risk office personnel. Each group is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest-level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk reporting and communication is an essential element of risk management and will combine both qualitative and quantitative elements.. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management. Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner, Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA's Risk Management System

Leadership is key to success. Phased-approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks -- risk office personnel. Each group is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest-level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk reporting and communication is an essential element of risk management and will combine both qualitative and quantitative elements. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management. Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Concurrent System Engineering and Risk Reduction for Dual-Band (RF/optical) Spacecraft Communications

This paper describes a system engineering approach to examining the potential for combining elements of a deep-space RF and optical communications payload, for the purpose of reducing the size, weight and power burden on the spacecraft and the mission. Figures of merit and analytical methodologies are discussed to conduct trade studies, and several potential technology integration strategies are presented. Finally, the NASA Integrated Radio and Optical Communications (iROC) project is described, which directly addresses the combined RF and optical approach.

Fielhauer, Karl, B.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the $\textit{Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems}$ (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Incorporation of Human Risk Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) With Mishap Investigations to Un-Silo Knowledge

NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has been a central driver in efforts to understand, mitigate, and communicate the 29 human systems risks monitored by the board. As a result of the collaboration between research, operations, and technical authorities, large bodies of knowledge have been collected and digested to represent the current understanding of the risks. As a part of these bodies of knowledge, directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have been developed to communicate the current understanding of the causal relationship of the hazards, contributing factors, countermeasures, other risks, and outcomes that contribute to the overall risk. This risk knowledge is applied in a theoretical sense for potential incidents during exploration even while informed by surveillance data. However, there have been mishaps and close calls during past space exploration that intersect with one or more of the Human System Risks DAGs and knowledge bases. The purpose of this exercise was to un-silo this risk knowledge and connect it to the close call of EVA 23 through the development of a DAG representing the intersection of the HSRB Risks and the events of the close call. The development of the DAG occurred through an iterative process, with each iteration expanding and/or refining the nodes and connections described by the source materials. In addition to the risk documentation developed by the HSRB, lessons learned and other mishap investigation documents were utilized to understand the events that led to water entering the helmet of a crewmember on the EVA. New nodes specific to the events of EVA 23 were interconnected with existing HSRB DAG nodes and edges. Nodes within the DAG were defined within a “DAG-tionary” with any updates to a definition that may have previously existed from the HSRB DAGs, and edges were recorded in a matrix. Both the DAG-tionary and matrix describe where nodes and edges are present across the Risk and Mishap DAG. This DAG will then be reviewed by experts outside of HSRB and HRP to confirm that interpretations of the non-health related events (such as the engineering nodes) are represented accurately. DISCUSSION This process highlighted a method by which the knowledge generated among the contributing members of the HSRB Risks can be effectively adapted and utilized through the tools employed by the Risk Custodian teams. By leveraging these tools, new context and insights to the information at hand can be brought forward to address current spaceflight challenges. Moreover, un-siloing this knowledge through future DAGs and other efforts can drive interprofessional collaboration and foster communication. This will enable teams to work together more effectively, leveraging their diverse expertise to tackle the complex challenges of space exploration and human research. Ultimately, this collaboration will bring NASA closer to achieve agency goals and contribute to the overall shared mission and vision.

Samuel Jacobs↗
NASA NTRS2000

Proceedings of the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) Conference 2000

The ACTS experiments program, which began in December 1993 and consisted of 103 different experiments, has made significant contributions to minimizing the risk of advanced satellite communications technology. The ACTS Conference 2000 (AC2000) was held to report the results of the program since the last ACTS conference was held in 1995 and to celebrate the end of a very successful satellite program. The conference was held on May 31, 2000, as part of the 6th Ka-band Utilization Conference in Cleveland, Ohio. Approximately 280 representatives of industry, academia, and government attended. The conference was organized into two parts: a technical session during the day and an evening reception. During the day, a series of five technical sessions included presentations of 17 papers covering the results of the experiment activity and technical performance of the satellite. In the evening, a reception was held to celebrate the end of the ACTS Experiments Program on one of NASA's most successful experimental communications satellite. These proceedings were developed to capture the entire event, including the evening reception.

Bauer, Robert↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

It Depends - An Overview of Probabilistic Risk Analysis Concepts

How do you understand the data and assumptions in your probabilistic analysis? The PRA analyst needs to understand the data and input assumptions to effectively communicate the system/mission's risks. The decision maker also needs to understand conservatisms and how to interpret uncertainty in the PRA results. Properties such as assumptions on the distributions, uncertainty, use of test data, and common cause modeling can be the subject of much discussion, but often are the leading drivers of a risk profile.

risk assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗
DOE OSTI2021

Impact of cyberattacks on safety and stability of connected and automated vehicle platoons under lane changes

Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) offer a huge potential to improve the operations and safety of transportation systems. However, the use of smart devices and communications in CAVs introduce new risks. CAVs would leverage vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication, thus providing additional system access points compared to traditional systems. Automation makes these systems more vulnerable and increases the consequences of cyberattacks. This study utilizes an infrastructure-based communication platform consisting of cooperative adaptive cruise control and lane control advisories developed by the authors to perform cyber risk assessment of CAVs. The study emulates three types of cyberattacks (message falsification, dedicated denial of service, and spoofing attacks) in a representative traffic environment consisting of multiple CAV platoons and lane change events to analyze the safety and stability impacts of the cyberattacks. Simulation experiments using VISSIM reveals that traffic stream and CAV string is unstable under all three types of cyberattacks. The worst case is represented by the message falsification attack. Increases in volatility are observed over a no attack case, with variations increasing by an average of 43%–51% along with an increase of over 3000 crash conflicts. Similarly, lane change crash conflicts are observed to be more severe compared to rear end crash conflicts, showing a higher probability of severe injuries. Further, the case of slight cyberattack on a single CAV also creates significant disruption in the traffic stream. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals the statistical significance of the results. Furthermore, these results pave the way for future design of secure systems from a monitoring perspective.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS2023

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - The Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther from Earth, spacecraft designs must optimize mass and volume while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) office develops, implements, and ensures compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability, and quality assurance. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program S&MA integration functions, and provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS2021

Perceptions of Climate Risk and Use of Climate Risk Information by Natural Resource Conservation Stakeholders Participating in ADVANCE Projects in Asia and Latin America

Integrating climate risk information into resilience-building activities in the field is important to ensure that adaptation is based on the best available science. Despite this, many challenges exist when developing, communicating, and incorporating climate risk information. There are limited resources on how stakeholders perceive risks, use risk information, and what barriers exist to limit knowledge integration. This paper seeks to define the following: 1) What do conservation stakeholders consider to be the most significant climate risks they face now and possibly in the future? 2) What have been the most significant barriers to their using climate risk information? 3) What sources and types of knowledge would be most useful for these managers to overcome these barriers? A survey was conducted among stakeholders (n = 224) associated with World Wildlife Fund projects in tropical and subtropical countries. A very high proportion of stakeholders used climate risk information and yet faced integration-related challenges, which included too much uncertainty and the lack of a relevant scale for planning. The main factors preventing the use of climate risk information in decision-making were unavailability of climate risk information, no or limited financial or human resources available to respond, lack of organizational mandate or support, and no or limited institutional incentives. Comparing perceived current and future risks revealed a decline in concern for some future climate hazards. Survey respondents identified scientific reports, climate scientists, and online sources as the most useful information sources of climate risk information, while (i) maps and illustrations; (ii) scenarios format; and (iii) data tables, graphs, and charts were identified as user-friendly formats.

Climate risk↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Transportation System Liftoff Debris Mitigation Process Overview

Liftoff debris is a top risk to the Space Shuttle Vehicle. To manage the Liftoff debris risk, the Space Shuttle Program created a team with in the Propulsion Systems Engineering & Integration Office. The Shutt le Liftoff Debris Team harnesses the Systems Engineering process to i dentify, assess, mitigate, and communicate the Liftoff debris risk. T he Liftoff Debris Team leverages off the technical knowledge and expe rtise of engineering groups across multiple NASA centers to integrate total system solutions. These solutions connect the hardware and ana lyses to identify and characterize debris sources and zones contribut ing to the Liftoff debris risk. The solutions incorporate analyses sp anning: the definition and modeling of natural and induced environmen ts; material characterizations; statistical trending analyses, imager y based trajectory analyses; debris transport analyses, and risk asse ssments. The verification and validation of these analyses are bound by conservative assumptions and anchored by testing and flight data. The Liftoff debris risk mitigation is managed through vigilant collab orative work between the Liftoff Debris Team and Launch Pad Operation s personnel and through the management of requirements, interfaces, r isk documentation, configurations, and technical data. Furthermore, o n day of launch, decision analysis is used to apply the wealth of ana lyses to case specific identified risks. This presentation describes how the Liftoff Debris Team applies Systems Engineering in their proce sses to mitigate risk and improve the safety of the Space Shuttle Veh icle.

Mitchell, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2001

Institutionalizing Lessons Learned

The NASA Integrated Action Team (NIAT) was formed by the NASA Administrator in March 2000. The purpose of this team was to identify the actions that NASA must take to address systemic findings reported in 4 different anomaly investigations. Team membership represented senior managers from all the field centers and NASA Headquarters. NIAT report addressed 165 findings and developed 17 action plans that are described in five themes: people and teams, technology, risk, formulation rigor, and communications. The NIAT actions present a systems solution for strengthening formulation and implementation of programs and improving the environment for their support. NIAT results included: enhancing success by avoiding failures that could have been prevented through good planning and sound practice; ensuring that prudent risks do not compromise safety; and ensuring that mission risks are objectively assessed, appropriately mitigated and consciously accepted by the program team and customers. Definitions of Faster, Better, Cheaper and Success Criteria were also developed and included as part of the NIAT report. As a result of the NIAT report, program and project management process changes were incorporated into NASA's quality system documentation, including NPG 7120.513, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements. This paper describes the NIAT results and the resulting updates to NPG 7120.5 that keep this program and project management description a living process.

McBrayer, Robert O.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Cross-Cutting Risk Framework: Mining Data for Common Risks Across the Portfolio

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk management as an integrated framework, combining risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management to foster forward-thinking and decision making from an integrated risk perspective. Therefore, decision makers must have access to risks outside of their own project to gain the knowledge that provides the integrated risk perspective. Through the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Projects Directorate (FPD) Business Change Initiative (BCI), risks were integrated into one repository to facilitate access to risk data between projects. With the centralized repository, communications between the FPD, project managers, and risk managers improved and GSFC created the cross-cutting risk framework (CCRF) team. The creation of the consolidated risk repository, in parallel with the initiation of monthly FPD risk managers and risk governance board meetings, are now providing a complete risk management picture spanning the entire directorate. This paper will describe the challenges, methodologies, tools, and techniques used to develop the CCRF, and the lessons learned as the team collectively worked to identify risks that FPD programs projects had in common, both past and present.

risk-informed decision making↗