Results for “safety critical software” — Page 9

NASA NTRS2023

Trades, Architecture, and Design of the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) Product

Future expeditions will enable exploration and study of the planetary surfaces of the Moon and Mars by performing extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. Present-day International Space Station (ISS) EVA operations require an intricate choreography of crew, space suits, tools, systems, and flight teams to plan, train, and execute with limited advanced informatics. In this paper, the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) project team at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) characterizes the design space for developing a modular augmented reality (AR) device for a spacesuit form factor that can support crew decision-making for EVA. The Joint AR product was defined via trade studies and market analysis of previous EVA display efforts, various AR components such as optics, commercial AR systems, light engines, data interfaces, and graphics engine software. This paper outlines the defining architectural design decisions, including safety criticality considerations, interfaces, and computer architectures. The outcomes of these studies result in a prototype design which is defined here as the Joint AR product. This work aims to enable a community-wide discussion toward realizing necessary suit-compatible AR features and capabilities for future missions.

Paromita Mitra↗

NASA NTRS2023

Trades, Architecture, and Design of the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) Product

Future expeditions will enable exploration and study of the planetary surfaces of the Moon and Mars by performing extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. Present-day International Space Station (ISS) EVA operations require an intricate choreography of crew, space suits, tools, systems, and flight teams to plan, train, and execute with limited advanced informatics. In this paper, the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) project team at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) characterizes the design space for developing a modular augmented reality (AR) device for a spacesuit form factor that can support crew decision-making for EVA. The Joint AR product was defined via trade studies and market analysis of previous EVA display efforts, various AR components such as optics, commercial AR systems, light engines, data interfaces, and graphics engine software. This paper outlines the defining architectural design decisions, including safety criticality considerations, interfaces, and computer architectures. The outcomes of these studies result in a prototype design which is defined here as the Joint AR product. This work aims to enable a community-wide discussion toward realizing necessary suit-compatible AR features and capabilities for future missions.

Paromita Mitra↗

NASA NTRS1997

A Framework for Performing Verification and Validation in Reuse Based Software Engineering

Verification and Validation (V&V) is currently performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission- critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors, especially errors related to critical processing, as early as possible during the development process. The system application provides the context under which the software artifacts are validated. This paper describes a framework that extends V&V from an individual application system to a product line of systems that are developed within an architecture-based software engineering environment. This framework includes the activities of traditional application-level V&V, and extends these activities into domain engineering and into the transition between domain engineering and application engineering. The framework includes descriptions of the types of activities to be performed during each of the life-cycle phases, and provides motivation for the activities.

Addy, Edward A.↗

NASA NTRS1996

The Application of V&V within Reuse-Based Software Engineering

Verification and Validation (V&V) is performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors as early as possible during the development process. Early discovery is important in order to minimize the cost and other impacts of correcting these errors. In reuse-based software engineering, decisions on the requirements, design and even implementation of domain assets can can be made prior to beginning development of a specific system. in order to bring the effectiveness of V&V to bear within reuse-based software engineering. V&V must be incorporated within the domain engineering process.

Addy, Edward↗

NASA NTRS1991

A research program in empirical computer science

During the grant reporting period our primary activities have been to begin preparation for the establishment of a research program in experimental computer science. The focus of research in this program will be safety-critical systems. Many questions that arise in the effort to improve software dependability can only be addressed empirically. For example, there is no way to predict the performance of the various proposed approaches to building fault-tolerant software. Performance models, though valuable, are parameterized and cannot be used to make quantitative predictions without experimental determination of underlying distributions. In the past, experimentation has been able to shed some light on the practical benefits and limitations of software fault tolerance. It is common, also, for experimentation to reveal new questions or new aspects of problems that were previously unknown. A good example is the Consistent Comparison Problem that was revealed by experimentation and subsequently studied in depth. The result was a clear understanding of a previously unknown problem with software fault tolerance. The purpose of a research program in empirical computer science is to perform controlled experiments in the area of real-time, embedded control systems. The goal of the various experiments will be to determine better approaches to the construction of the software for computing systems that have to be relied upon. As such it will validate research concepts from other sources, provide new research results, and facilitate the transition of research results from concepts to practical procedures that can be applied with low risk to NASA flight projects. The target of experimentation will be the production software development activities undertaken by any organization prepared to contribute to the research program. Experimental goals, procedures, data analysis and result reporting will be performed for the most part by the University of Virginia.

Knight, J. C.↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗

NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System Performance on Exploration Flight Test 1

This paper will present an overview of the flight test objectives and performance of the Orion Launch Abort System during Exploration Flight Test-1. Exploration Flight Test-1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched atop a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. This flight test was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety. This test included the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. NASA is currently designing and testing the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). Orion will serve as NASA's new exploration vehicle to carry astronauts to deep space destinations and safely return them to earth. The Orion spacecraft is composed of four main elements: the Launch Abort System, the Crew Module, the Service Module, and the Spacecraft Adapter (Fig. 1). The Launch Abort System (LAS) provides two functions; during nominal launches, the LAS provides protection for the Crew Module from atmospheric loads and heating during first stage flight and during emergencies provides a reliable abort capability for aborts that occur within the atmosphere. The Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) consists of an Abort Motor to provide the abort separation from the Launch Vehicle, an Attitude Control Motor to provide attitude and rate control, and a Jettison Motor for crew module to LAS separation (Fig. 2). The jettison motor is used during a nominal launch to separate the LAS from the Launch Vehicle (LV) early in the flight of the second stage when it is no longer needed for aborts and at the end of an LAS abort sequence to enable deployment of the crew module's Landing Recovery System. The LAS also provides a Boost Protective Cover fairing that shields the crew module from debris and the aero-thermal environment during ascent. Although the Orion Program has tested a number of the critical systems of the Orion spacecraft on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. A number of flight tests have been conducted and are planned to demonstrate the performance and enable certification of the Orion Spacecraft. Exploration Flight Test 1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. Orion's first flight was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety, such as heat shield performance, separation events, avionics and software performance, attitude control and guidance, parachute deployment and recovery operations. One of the key separation events tested during this flight was the nominal jettison of the LAS. Data from this flight will be used to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. The LAS nominal jettison event on Exploration Flight Test 1 occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff (See Fig. 3). The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. A suite of developmental flight instrumentation was included on the flight test to provide data on spacecraft subsystems and separation events. This paper will focus on the flight test objectives and performance of the LAS during ascent and nominal jettison. Selected LAS subsystem flight test data will be presented and discussed in the paper. Exploration Flight Test -1 will provide critical data that will enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.

McCauley, R.↗

NASA NTRS1996

A Framework for Performing V&V within Reuse-Based Software Engineering

Verification and validation (V&V) is performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors, especially errors related to critical processing, as early as possible during the development process. Early discovery is important in order to minimize the cost and other impacts of correcting these errors. In order to provide early detection of errors, V&V is conducted in parallel with system development, often beginning with the concept phase. In reuse-based software engineering, however, decisions on the requirements, design and even implementation of domain assets can be made prior to beginning development of a specific system. In this case, V&V must be performed during domain engineering in order to have an impact on system development. This paper describes a framework for performing V&V within architecture-centric, reuse-based software engineering. This framework includes the activities of traditional application-level V&V, and extends these activities into domain engineering and into the transition between domain engineering and application engineering. The framework includes descriptions of the types of activities to be performed during each of the life-cycle phases, and provides motivation for the activities.

Addy, Edward A.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Remote Diagnosis of the International Space Station Utilizing Telemetry Data

Modern systems such as fly-by-wire aircraft, nuclear power plants, manufacturing facilities, battlefields, etc., are all examples of highly connected network enabled systems. Many of these systems are also mission critical and need to be monitored round the clock. Such systems typically consist of embedded sensors in networked subsystems that can transmit data to central (or remote) monitoring stations. Moreover, many legacy are safety systems were originally not designed for real-time onboard diagnosis, but a critical and would benefit from such a solution. Embedding additional software or hardware in such systems is often considered too intrusive and introduces flight safety and validation concerns. Such systems can be equipped to transmit the sensor data to a remote-processing center for continuous health monitoring. At Qualtech Systems, we are developing a Remote Diagnosis Server (RDS) that can support multiple simultaneous diagnostic sessions from a variety of remote subsystems.

Deb, Somnath↗

NASA NTRS1991

The role of reliability graph models in assuring dependable operation of complex hardware/software systems

The complexity of computer systems currently being designed for critical applications in the scientific, commercial, and military arenas requires the development of new techniques for utilizing models of system behavior in order to assure 'ultra-dependability'. The complexity of these systems, such as Space Station Freedom and the Air Traffic Control System, stems from their highly integrated designs containing both hardware and software as critical components. Reliability graph models, such as fault trees and digraphs, are used frequently to model hardware systems. Their applicability for software systems has also been demonstrated for software safety analysis and the analysis of software fault tolerance. This paper discusses further uses of graph models in the design and implementation of fault management systems for safety critical applications.

Patterson-Hine, F. A.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Trades, Architecture, and Design of the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics (Joint AR) Product

Future expeditions will enable exploration and study of the planetary surfaces of the Moon and Mars by performing extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. Present-day International Space Station (ISS) EVA operations require an intricate and tight choreography of crew, space suits, tools, systems, and flight teams to plan, train, and execute with limited advanced informatics. Additionally, EVA operations, aside from the Apollo Lunar surface missions, have predominately focused on maintenance and construction tasks where success criteria are clearly measurable. However, future exploration missions expect to enable crew to carry out scientific objectives in increasingly Earth-independent ways. In this paper, the Joint Augmented Reality Visual Informatics System (Joint AR) characterizes the design space for developing a modular augmented reality (AR) device for a spacesuit form factor that can support crew decision-making for EVA. This paper highlights the project’s experience with a product-focused management style and use-case centered systems engineering approach to iteratively design, build, and test. The Joint AR product features were defined via trade studies and market analysis of previous EVA display efforts, various AR components such as optics, commercial AR systems, light engines, data interfaces, graphics engine software and analog test beds. We outline the defining architectural design decisions, including safety criticality considerations, suit mounting interfaces, computer architectures, and partnership contracting mechanisms. The outcomes of these studies, architecture decisions, and management requirements result in a recommended design which is the Joint AR product. We discuss the evolution, development of these system components, and what work remains. We hope to share a unified understanding of various design decisions and how they impact the future of crew members’ access to data during Lunar and Martian EVAs. This ongoing effort can enable a community-wide discovery process toward realizing necessary AR features and capabilities for future missions.

Augmented Reality↗

NASA NTRS2014

Is Model-Based Development a Favorable Approach for Complex and Safety-Critical Computer Systems on Commercial Aircraft?

A system is safety-critical if its failure can endanger human life or cause significant damage to property or the environment. State-of-the-art computer systems on commercial aircraft are highly complex, software-intensive, functionally integrated, and network-centric systems of systems. Ensuring that such systems are safe and comply with existing safety regulations is costly and time-consuming as the level of rigor in the development process, especially the validation and verification activities, is determined by considerations of system complexity and safety criticality. A significant degree of care and deep insight into the operational principles of these systems is required to ensure adequate coverage of all design implications relevant to system safety. Model-based development methodologies, methods, tools, and techniques facilitate collaboration and enable the use of common design artifacts among groups dealing with different aspects of the development of a system. This paper examines the application of model-based development to complex and safety-critical aircraft computer systems. Benefits and detriments are identified and an overall assessment of the approach is given.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗

NASA NTRS1987

RICIS research

The principle focus of one of the RICIS (Research Institute for Computing and Information Systems) components is computer systems and software engineering in-the-large of the lifecycle of large, complex, distributed systems which: (1) evolve incrementally over a long time; (2) contain non-stop components; and (3) must simultaneously satisfy a prioritized balance of mission and safety critical requirements at run time. This focus is extremely important because of the contribution of the scaling direction problem to the current software crisis. The Computer Systems and Software Engineering (CSSE) component addresses the lifestyle issues of three environments: host, integration, and target.

Mckay, Charles W.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Safety Metrics for Human-Computer Controlled Systems

The rapid growth of computer technology and innovation has played a significant role in the rise of computer automation of human tasks in modem production systems across all industries. Although the rationale for automation has been to eliminate "human error" or to relieve humans from manual repetitive tasks, various computer-related hazards and accidents have emerged as a direct result of increased system complexity attributed to computer automation. The risk assessment techniques utilized for electromechanical systems are not suitable for today's software-intensive systems or complex human-computer controlled systems.This thesis will propose a new systemic model-based framework for analyzing risk in safety-critical systems where both computers and humans are controlling safety-critical functions. A new systems accident model will be developed based upon modem systems theory and human cognitive processes to better characterize system accidents, the role of human operators, and the influence of software in its direct control of significant system functions Better risk assessments will then be achievable through the application of this new framework to complex human-computer controlled systems.

Leveson, Nancy G↗

NASA NTRS1990

Improving system reliability through formal analysis and use of checks in software

Software is playing increasingly important roles in avionics systems. It is widely used in navigation and, in some cases, in control loops that maintain aircraft stability. To guarantee the safety of flight systems, the FAA requires that critical components have a probability of failure no greater than 10(exp -9) per hour of flight. Software is being used to diagnose system components for failure. SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) was a computer system developed to study the use of software to check for failure and manage processor reconfiguration. To guarantee that software satisfies its specifications, formal verification can be used. With this a program and its specification are viewed as mathematical objects, and a mathematical proof is used to show that the program and its specification are equivalent. In previous research, a theory of checking was developed to offer assistance in analyzing specifications and designing run-time checks. In the theory, checking is considered abstractly in terms of n-ary relations much like those of relational database theory. Within the theory check are categorized, checks on input and checks on results are considered, and formal attention is given to the minimization and logical combination of checks. The focus is upon input checks and the obstacles in checking input to critical systems. A central concern is with a property referred to as independence. The concern is with circumstances under which it is possible to apply isolated, independent checks to separate sensor inputs and be assure that all illegal input will be properly detected. Presently, independence is being investigated and checked in the context of the GCS (Guidance and Control System). The GCS simulator is intended for testing software that implements control laws for landing spacecraft. The large number of inputs and their complex interrelationships provide an exciting context in which to investigate independence and the difficulties of supplying input checks.

Staknis, Mark E.↗

NASA NTRS2000

A Model-based Framework for Risk Assessment in Human-Computer Controlled Systems

The rapid growth of computer technology and innovation has played a significant role in the rise of computer automation of human tasks in modem production systems across all industries. Although the rationale for automation has been to eliminate "human error" or to relieve humans from manual repetitive tasks, various computer-related hazards and accidents have emerged as a direct result of increased system complexity attributed to computer automation. The risk assessment techniques utilized for electromechanical systems are not suitable for today's software-intensive systems or complex human-computer controlled systems. This thesis will propose a new systemic model-based framework for analyzing risk in safety-critical systems where both computers and humans are controlling safety-critical functions. A new systems accident model will be developed based upon modem systems theory and human cognitive processes to better characterize system accidents, the role of human operators, and the influence of software in its direct control of significant system functions. Better risk assessments will then be achievable through the application of this new framework to complex human-computer controlled systems.

Hatanaka, Iwao↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗