Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “safety requirements”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9

Water ingress testing of Pressure Cooker 1006027150 REVAB-021

The requirements of this water ingress test are defined in PA-RD-01009, TA-55 Criticality Safety Requirements. “The container design should be capable of preventing the entry of more than 50 ml water when subjected to water spray at a flow of up to 2 inches water per hour for 2 hours or when immersed in water up to a depth of 6 inches above the top of the container for the same period of time.” The six allen screw fasters on the lid of the container were torqued to approximately 45 inch-pounds with a calibrated torque wrench in a crisscross pattern to ensure equal force distribution. The container management team of ORI-2 has developed a standard practice of gathering 5 data points to increase the statistical confidence in the data. This method has been demonstrated in previous LA-URs and approved official memorandums as follows: LANL Memo, SPE-2: 19-016 dated August 22, 2019; LANL Memo, SPE-2:19-020 dated September 24, 2019; and LA-UR-19-28268, Water Ingress Testing of Commercially Available Containers for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Early Engagement of Safety and Mission Assurance Expertise Using Systems Engineering Tools: A Risk-Based Approach to Early Identification of Safety and Assurance Requirements

Decades of systems engineering practice have demonstrated that the earlier the identification of requirements occurs, the lower the chance that costly redesigns will needed later in the project life cycle. A better understanding of all requirements can also improve the likelihood of a design's success. Significant effort has been put into developing tools and practices that facilitate requirements determination, including those that are part of the model-based systems engineering (MBSE) paradigm. These efforts have yielded improvements in requirements definition, but have thus far focused on a design's performance needs. The identification of safety & mission assurance (S&MA) related requirements, in comparison, can occur after preliminary designs are already established, yielding forced redesigns. Engaging S&MA expertise at an earlier stage, facilitated by the use of MBSE tools, and focused on actual project risk, can yield the same type of design life cycle improvements that have been realized in technical and performance requirements.

Requirement↗

Marine Energy Technology Development Risk Management Framework

Over the past decades, the global marine energy industry has suffered a number of serious technological and commercial setbacks. To help reduce the risks of industry failures and advance the development of new technologies, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed a Marine Energy Risk Management Framework in 2015, with this revision published in 2024. This risk management framework shall be utilized on all DOE Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) projects that require system testing in the open water. By addressing uncertainties, the Marine Energy Risk Management Framework increases the likelihood of successful development of marine energy converter technology. It covers projects of any technology readiness level technology performance level (TPL) and all risk types (e.g. technological risk, regulatory risk, commercial risk) over the development cycle. This risk framework is not a substitute for other risk management procedures that may be required for marine operations, such as installations at sea, hoisting and rigging, safe diver operations, and other safety requirements. This risk framework is intended to meet DOE's risk management expectations for marine energy technology research and development efforts from WPTO. It also provides an overview of other relevant risk management tools and documentation.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

NASA safety standard for lifting devices and equipment

NASA's minimum safety requirements are established for the design, testing, inspection, maintenance, certification, and use of overhead and gantry cranes (including top running monorail, underhung, and jib cranes), mobile cranes, derrick hoists, and special hoist supported personnel lifting devices (these do not include elevators, ground supported personnel lifts, or powered platforms). Minimum requirements are also addressed for the testing, inspection, and use of Hydra-sets, hooks, and slings. Safety standards are thoroughly detailed.

Source record↗

Development of the ISS NORS

This paper will discuss the design and development of the Nitrogen Oxygen Recharge System (NORS) for the International Space Station (ISS). The emphasis of the paper is the collaborative effort between The Boeing Company and Cobham in the crafting of the architecture of the system to meet NASA's requirements. Specific examples to be discussed include the inclusion of the pneumatic isolation valve for compliance with safety requirement, the inclusion of a single stage regulator with flow limiter versus a two-stage regulator, and the use of integrated assemblies as opposed to separate valves/regulators. The paper will also discuss NORS experience with integrated assemblies (common body) verses prior ISS hardware and Cobham trade study efforts, to include lessons learned and potential applications to future programs.

Brandon, Richard↗

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

Model Based Engineering↗

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering (REV B)

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses, GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System Safety Engineering for NASA if adequate modeling processes and environment are established.

NASA↗

Linear and Nonlinear Analyses of a Wind-Tunnel Balance

The NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) has been designing strain-gauge balances for utilization in wind tunnels since its inception. The utilization of balances span a wide variety of aerodynamic tests. A force balance is an inherently critically stressed component due to the requirements of measurement sensitivity. Force balance stress analysis and acceptance criteria are under review due to LaRC wind tunnel operational safety requirements. This paper presents some of the analyses done at NASA LaRC. Research and analyses were performed in order to investigate the structural integrity of the balances and better understand their performance. The analyses presented in this paper are helpful in understanding the overall behavior of an existing balance and can also be used in design of new balances to enhance their performance. As a first step, maximum load combination is used for linear structural analysis. When nonlinear effects are encountered, the analysis is extended to include the nonlinearities. Balance 1621 is typical for LaRC designed balances and was chosen for this study due to its traditional high load capacity, Figure 1. Maximum loading occurs when all 6 components are applied simultaneously with their maximum value allowed (limit load). This circumstance normally will not occur in the wind tunnel. However, if it occurs, is the balance capable of handling the loads with an acceptable factor of safety? Preliminary analysis using Pro/Mechanica indicated that this balance might experience nonlinearity. It was decided to analyze this balance by using NASTRAN so that a nonlinear analysis could be conducted. Balance 1621 was modeled and meshed in PATRAN for analysis in NASTRAN. The model from PATRAN/NASTRAN is compared to the one from Pro/Mechanica. For a complete analysis, it is necessary to consider all the load cases as well as use a dense mesh near all the edges. Because of computer limitations, it is not feasible to analyze model with the dense mesh near all edges. In the present study, the dense mesh is limited to the surface on the end of the axial sections.

Karkehabadi, R.↗

U.S. experience in satellite servicing and linkage to the Space Station era

A history of on-orbit servicing and repair is given with emphasis placed on the Solar Maximum Repair Mission. The experience gained thus far in on-orbit servicing and the design of the Space Station's servicing capabilities impose the following requirements on users: (1) satellites must have a standard grapple for capture and a standard berthing interface, (2) Space Station safety requirements must meet to preclude damage to the Space Station or injury to the EVA crew, (3) sensitive instruments will need to implement remotely controlled protective devices to prevent damage, and (4) satellite thermal systems must be designed to maintain survival temperatures during transfer from orbit to the Space Station servicing facility.

Browning, R. K.↗

A Safety Conundrum Illustrated: Logic, Mathematics, and Science Are Not Enough

In an ideal world, conversations about whether a particular system is safe, or whether a particular method or tool enhances safety, would be emotion-free discussions concentrating on the level of safety required, available evidence, and coherent logical, mathematical, or scientific arguments based on that evidence. In the real world, discussions about safety are often not emotion-free. Political and economic arguments may play a bigger role than logical, mathematical, and scientific arguments, and psychological factors may be as important, or even more important, than purely technical factors. This paper illustrates the conundrum that can result from this clash of the ideal and the real by means of an imagined conversation among a collection of fictional characters representing various types of people who may be participating in a safety discussion.

Holloway, C. M.↗

How Mockups, a Key Engineering Tool, Help to Promote Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education

The United States ranking among the world in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education is decreasing. To counteract this problem NASA has made it part of its mission to promote STEM education among the nation s youth. Mockups can serve as a great tool when promoting STEM education in America. The Orion Cockpit Working Group has created a new program called Students Shaping America s Next Space Craft (SSANS) to outfit the Medium Fidelity Orion Mockup. SSANS will challenge the students to come up with unique designs to represent the flight design hardware. There are two main types of project packages created by SSANS, those for high school students and those for university students. The high school projects will challenge wood shop, metal shop and pre-engineering classes. The university projects are created mainly for senior design projects and will require the students to perform finite element analysis. These projects will also challenge the undergraduate students in material selection and safety requirements. The SSANS program will help NASA in its mission to promote STEM education, and will help to shape our nations youth into the next generation of STEM leaders.

McDonald, Harry E.↗

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Launch vehicle integration requirements for SP-100

SP-100 is the designation for a nuclear reactor-based power plant being developed for both civil and military missions beginning in the 1990s for such potential space applications as communication satellites, space radar, electric propulsion and space stations. Typically, a system using the SP-100 along with a selected upper stage system would be launched by the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Space Shuttle System into a near-earth orbit, deployed, and through upper stage propulsion burn(s) be inserted/transferred to its mission orbit. The nature of the advanced design SP-100 gives rise to a set of issues that require special attention to assure that payloads using this power plant are physically and functionally compatible with the NSTS and meet the safety requirements thereof. The purpose of this document is to define and present the requirements and interface provisions that, when satisfied, will ensure technical compatibility between SP-100 systems and the NSTS.

Shaw, L. T., Jr.↗

Explicit Dynamic Impact Analysis of the Building 3525 Packages

The safe transport and handling of radioactive material containers is critical to ensure the protection of personnel, facilities, and the environment. Accidental drops during handling pose a significant hazard, necessitating robust design and analysis to mitigate potential consequences. This study presents an explicit dynamic impact analysis of two container designs, the Baby Sugarman and the Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF) Tall Boy, used in Building 3525 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The analysis employed nonlinear finite element modeling in LS-DYNA to simulate free-fall impacts from a height of 16.5 ft across eight critical orientations. The study evaluated deformation, strain failure, and shielding integrity under these extreme conditions. Results demonstrated that both designs maintain structural integrity, with no breaches or loss of shielding under specified administrative controls. Notably, a maximum shielding loss of 10 lbs was observed during a top-corner drop, highlighting the need to limit drop heights to less than 1 ft for certain orientations. These findings underscore the effectiveness of engineering controls and design measures in preventing containment breaches and ensuring compliance with safety requirements. This work provides a comprehensive methodology for impact analysis, contributing valuable insights to the field of radioactive materials packaging and transportation safety.

Martinez, Oscar [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000181814046)↗

Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Update for Gas-Cooled Experiments

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) supports neutron irradiation of several types of experiments. One such experiment type is referred to as a gas leadout. Gas leadout experiments actively flow gas through the experiment which allows for active temperature control. It also allows for in-situ data of the experiment. For example, fission gas migration through a fuel sample can be monitored via activity of the sweep gas. Historically, ex-pile equipment and fission product monitors were housed in shielded ATR cubicles. Due to other facility updates, cubicle space is no longer available for gas leadout experiment equipment. To support continued operation of gas leadout experiments, ATR completed a safety basis update that supports a new housing for leadout equipment that may process potentially contaminated gas. In addition to the structure and associated equipment, technical safety requirements regarding handling and storage of experiments needed to be revised to support fueled gas leadout experiments and associated outage configurations. The safety basis update addressed the full lifecycle of these experiments, including experiment movement and interim storage, and credible abnormal events such as failures or leaks in contaminated gas tubing in occupied areas. This paper discusses the completed analyses performed to support the safety basis update associated with gas leadout experiments, including thermal-hydraulic evaluation, probabilistic analysis, and dose consequence analyses.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Autonomous Control of Space Nuclear Reactors

Nuclear reactors to support future robotic and manned missions impose new and innovative technological requirements for their control and protection instrumentation. Long-duration surface missions necessitate reliable autonomous operation, and manned missions impose added requirements for failsafe reactor protection. There is a need for an advanced instrumentation and control system for space-nuclear reactors that addresses both aspects of autonomous operation and safety. The Reactor Instrumentation and Control System (RICS) consists of two functionally independent systems: the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Supervision and Control System (SCS). Through these two systems, the RICS both supervises and controls a nuclear reactor during normal operational states, as well as monitors the operation of the reactor and, upon sensing a system anomaly, automatically takes the appropriate actions to prevent an unsafe or potentially unsafe condition from occurring. The RPS encompasses all electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry, from sensors to actuation device output terminals. The SCS contains a comprehensive data acquisition system to measure continuously different groups of variables consisting of primary measurement elements, transmitters, or conditioning modules. These reactor control variables can be categorized into two groups: those directly related to the behavior of the core (known as nuclear variables) and those related to secondary systems (known as process variables). Reliable closed-loop reactor control is achieved by processing the acquired variables and actuating the appropriate device drivers to maintain the reactor in a safe operating state. The SCS must prevent a deviation from the reactor nominal conditions by managing limitation functions in order to avoid RPS actions. The RICS has four identical redundancies that comply with physical separation, electrical isolation, and functional independence. This architecture complies with the safety requirements of a nuclear reactor and provides high availability to the host system. The RICS is intended to interface with a host computer (the computer of the spacecraft where the reactor is mounted). The RICS leverages the safety features inherent in Earth-based reactors and also integrates the wide range neutron detector (WRND). A neutron detector provides the input that allows the RICS to do its job. The RICS is based on proven technology currently in use at a nuclear research facility. In its most basic form, the RICS is a ruggedized, compact data-acquisition and control system that could be adapted to support a wide variety of harsh environments. As such, the RICS could be a useful instrument outside the scope of a nuclear reactor, including military applications where failsafe data acquisition and control is required with stringent size, weight, and power constraints.

Merk, John↗

Propulsion controls

Increased system requirements and functional integration with the aircraft have placed an increased demand on control system capability and reliability. To provide these at an affordable cost and weight and because of the rapid advances in electronic technology, hydromechanical systems are being phased out in favor of digital electronic systems. The transition is expected to be orderly from electronic trimming of hydromechanical controls to full authority digital electronic control. Future propulsion system controls will be highly reliable full authority digital electronic with selected component and circuit redundancy to provide the required safety and reliability. Redundancy may include a complete backup control of a different technology for single engine applications. The propulsion control will be required to communicate rapidly with the various flight and fire control avionics as part of an integrated control concept.

Harkney, R. D.↗