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At least 163 records · Page 9

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NASA NTRS2013

Galactic Cosmic Ray Event-Based Risk Model (GERM) Code

This software describes the transport and energy deposition of the passage of galactic cosmic rays in astronaut tissues during space travel, or heavy ion beams in patients in cancer therapy. Space radiation risk is a probability distribution, and time-dependent biological events must be accounted for physical description of space radiation transport in tissues and cells. A stochastic model can calculate the probability density directly without unverified assumptions about shape of probability density function. The prior art of transport codes calculates the average flux and dose of particles behind spacecraft and tissue shielding. Because of the signaling times for activation and relaxation in the cell and tissue, transport code must describe temporal and microspatial density of functions to correlate DNA and oxidative damage with non-targeted effects of signals, bystander, etc. These are absolutely ignored or impossible in the prior art. The GERM code provides scientists data interpretation of experiments; modeling of beam line, shielding of target samples, and sample holders; and estimation of basic physical and biological outputs of their experiments. For mono-energetic ion beams, basic physical and biological properties are calculated for a selected ion type, such as kinetic energy, mass, charge number, absorbed dose, or fluence. Evaluated quantities are linear energy transfer (LET), range (R), absorption and fragmentation cross-sections, and the probability of nuclear interactions after 1 or 5 cm of water equivalent material. In addition, a set of biophysical properties is evaluated, such as the Poisson distribution for a specified cellular area, cell survival curves, and DNA damage yields per cell. Also, the GERM code calculates the radiation transport of the beam line for either a fixed number of user-specified depths or at multiple positions along the Bragg curve of the particle in a selected material. The GERM code makes the numerical estimates of basic physical and biophysical quantities of high-energy protons and heavy ions that have been studied at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) for the purpose of simulating space radiation biological effects. In the first option, properties of monoenergetic beams are treated. In the second option, the transport of beams in different materials is treated. Similar biophysical properties as in the first option are evaluated for the primary ion and its secondary particles. Additional properties related to the nuclear fragmentation of the beam are evaluated. The GERM code is a computationally efficient Monte-Carlo heavy-ion-beam model. It includes accurate models of LET, range, residual energy, and straggling, and the quantum multiple scattering fragmentation (QMSGRG) nuclear database.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management at NASA

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions. This risk management structure of functions has been taught to projects at all NASA Centers and is being successfully implemented on many projects. This presentation will give project managers the information they need to understand if risk management is to be effectively implemented on their projects at a cost they can afford.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: A NASA Program Initiative

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Requirements management at NASA

Requirements have always been acknowledged as the backbone of any system. However, in many past development efforts, requirements were paid little heed. At NASA, in recent years, the hue and cry for project development has been "Faster, Better, Cheaper and Safer". This has impacted the way we develop software; it has increased the risks to quality, safety and reliability. At NASA, the Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is working with projects to emphasize the criticality of requirements throughout development, not just in the initial phases. This emphasis is on requirements relationship to all aspects of quality, including reliability and safety. In this presentation, we will look at some of these relationships through the eyes of quality.

Requirement management↗

NASA NTRS2008

A Testbed for Evaluating Lunar Habitat Autonomy Architectures

A lunar outpost will involve a habitat with an integrated set of hardware and software that will maintain a safe environment for human activities. There is a desire for a paradigm shift whereby crew will be the primary mission operators, not ground controllers. There will also be significant periods when the outpost is uncrewed. This will require that significant automation software be resident in the habitat to maintain all system functions and respond to faults. JSC is developing a testbed to allow for early testing and evaluation of different autonomy architectures. This will allow evaluation of different software configurations in order to: 1) understand different operational concepts; 2) assess the impact of failures and perturbations on the system; and 3) mitigate software and hardware integration risks. The testbed will provide an environment in which habitat hardware simulations can interact with autonomous control software. Faults can be injected into the simulations and different mission scenarios can be scripted. The testbed allows for logging, replaying and re-initializing mission scenarios. An initial testbed configuration has been developed by combining an existing life support simulation and an existing simulation of the space station power distribution system. Results from this initial configuration will be presented along with suggested requirements and designs for the incremental development of a more sophisticated lunar habitat testbed.

Lawler, Dennis G.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned from Space Shuttle flight software and Mission Control software

The techniques utilized by NASA to manage risk in the development and operations of flight software and Mission Control Center software for the Space Shuttle are reviewed. Particular attention is given to independent software in the backup flight system, structured requirements and design techniques, multiple levels of testing in development and production, independent testing following production, and independence of development and production, and the Mission Control Center model for Real Time Data System project.

Muratore, John F.↗

NASA NTRS1992

STGT program: Ada coding and architecture lessons learned

STGT (Second TDRSS Ground Terminal) is currently halfway through the System Integration Test phase (Level 4 Testing). To date, many software architecture and Ada language issues have been encountered and solved. This paper, which is the transcript of a presentation at the 3 Dec. meeting, attempts to define these lessons plus others learned regarding software project management and risk management issues, training, performance, reuse, and reliability. Observations are included regarding the use of particular Ada coding constructs, software architecture trade-offs during the prototyping, development and testing stages of the project, and dangers inherent in parallel or concurrent systems, software, hardware, and operations engineering.

Usavage, Paul↗

NASA NTRS2004

Development of Risk Assessment Matrix for NASA Engineering and Safety Center

This paper describes a study, which had as its principal goal the development of a sufficiently detailed 5 x 5 Risk Matrix Scorecard. The purpose of this scorecard is to outline the criteria by which technical issues can be qualitatively and initially prioritized. The tool using this score card has been proposed to be one of the information resources the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) takes into consideration when making decisions with respect to incoming information on safety concerns across the entire NASA agency. The contents of this paper discuss in detail each element of the risk matrix scorecard, definitions for those elements and the rationale behind the development of those definitions. This scorecard development was performed in parallel with the tailoring of the existing Futron Corporation Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA) software tool. IRMA was tailored to fit NESC needs for evaluating incoming safety concerns and was renamed NESC Assessment Risk Management Application (NAFMA) which is still in developmental phase.

Malone, Roy W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ground Risk Informed Operational Planning for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Increasing quantities of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) operations present many challenges in terms of safe adoption and integration into existing airspace. The ability to study and quantify the risk to third parties on the ground prior to flight is an important step toward enabling Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations. The Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) software is a capability developed by NASA to assist with third-party risk quantification and risk-informed flight planning. In this paper, two nominal flight paths intended to represent an infrastructure inspection mission are evaluated using the software to demonstrate its utility. A method is also introduced for adding other NASA-developed capabilities into a single architecture to assess a broader set of operational risks associated with BVLOS operations. These capabilities include a navigation system performance prediction tool, a high fidelity vehicle dynamics model, high resolution wind field data, and other information pertinent to operators. Data produced by these capabilities are combined to enable use of the Performance Based Navigation (PBN) concept borrowed from conventional aviation, providing quantified flight path uncertainty for where the sUAS is likely to be relative to its nominal flight plan. Ground risk is assessed within this region of uncertainty, giving a higher level of confidence in the solution compared to an analysis of only the nominal flight path.

Ground Risk↗

DOE OSTI2025

Improving Cyber Situational Understanding

Effective cybersecurity operations require the ability to analyze large amounts of information to assess security risks and formulate defensive strategies against adversaries. This has become more complex in recent years as the sprawl and interconnectivity of devices grows through implementation of virtualization, cloud computing, and Internet of Things (IoT). The amount of data and analysis required for effective cybersecurity command and control decisions far exceeds humans’ capacity to perform manually. We characterize the analysis problem as cyber situational understanding. The research presented to improve cyber situational understanding focuses on vulnerability analysis and threat intelligence. Regarding vulnerabilities, entities must analyze and plan work for between thousands and tens of thousands of software vulnerabilities annually. Entities heavily use network firewalls to limit vulnerability exposure. As a result, some of these vulnerabilities permit exposure to adversarial exploitation, whereas others are inaccessible and therefore present negligible risk of exploitation. Distinguishing between high and low risk software vulnerabilities requires a deep understanding of the vulnerability, network firewall protection, and characteristics of the targeted device. This problem is solved by extracting network service features from vulnerability data features using both machine-learning and natural language processing. Then, the network firewall topology is parsed to determine which vulnerabilities are reachable by adversaries. Ultimately, a state-based safety analysis ascertains which vulnerabilities are unsafe. A related vulnerability analysis problem occurs in cybersecurity operations when associating an entity’s hardware and software assets to public vulnerability databases. Assets often reveal hardware and software through installation artifacts and network service identification, and entities store these artifacts in inventory databases. However, software and hardware vendors apply a standard Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) naming convention when publicly reporting vulnerabilities. Associating these two datasets often requires many hours to days of manual inspection. The proposed solution automates the mapping approach of human analysts using fuzzy matching techniques, natural language processing, and, ultimately, machine learning to present a small set of recommendations for mapping the two datasets. The result significantly reduces human analysis time and reduces the occurrence of false positives in vulnerability notifications. Finally, cyber threat intelligence (CTI) requires associating cyber observable artifacts, such as IP addresses, URIs, and file hashes, with cyber threat tactics, techniques, and procedures. Unfortunately, most CTI data is compartmentalized across multiple organizations and cannot be shared due to the legal and reputational risk with cyber threat being associated with the entity. The approach to solving this problem inovlves using a distributed ledger with anonymous token spending and authentication. This allows a consortium of semi-trusted entities to share the workload of curating CTI for a threat sharing community’s cooperative benefit.

Huff, Philip↗

NASA NTRS2004

Evaluation of Open-Source Hard Real Time Software Packages

Reliable software is, at times, hard to find. No piece of software can be guaranteed to work in every situation that may arise during its use here at Glenn Research Center or in space. The job of the Software Assurance (SA) group in the Risk Management Office is to rigorously test the software in an effort to ensure it matches the contract specifications. In some cases the SA team also researches new alternatives for selected software packages. This testing and research is an integral part of the department of Safety and Mission Assurance. Real Time operation in reference to a computer system is a particular style of handing the timing and manner with which inputs and outputs are handled. A real time system executes these commands and appropriate processing within a defined timing constraint. Within this definition there are two other classifications of real time systems: hard and soft. A soft real time system is one in which if the particular timing constraints are not rigidly met there will be no critical results. On the other hand, a hard real time system is one in which if the timing constraints are not met the results could be catastrophic. An example of a soft real time system is a DVD decoder. If the particular piece of data from the input is not decoded and displayed to the screen at exactly the correct moment nothing critical will become of it, the user may not even notice it. However, a hard real time system is needed to control the timing of fuel injections or steering on the Space Shuttle; a delay of even a fraction of a second could be catastrophic in such a complex system. The current real time system employed by most NASA projects is Wind River's VxWorks operating system. This is a proprietary operating system that can be configured to work with many of NASA s needs and it provides very accurate and reliable hard real time performance. The down side is that since it is a proprietary operating system it is also costly to implement. The prospect of replacing this somewhat costly implementation is the focus of one of the SA group s current research projects. The explosion of open source software in the last ten years has led to the development of a multitude of software solutions which were once only produced by major corporations. The benefits of these open projects include faster release and bug patching cycles as well as inexpensive if not free software solutions. The main packages for hard real time solutions under Linux are Real Time Application Interface (RTAI) and two varieties of Real Time Linux (RTL), RTLFree and RTLPro. During my time here at NASA I have been testing various hard real time solutions operating as layers on the Linux Operating System. All testing is being run on an Intel SBC 2590 which is a common embedded hardware platform. The test plan was provided to me by the Software Assurance group at the start of my internship and my job has been to test the systems by developing and executing the test cases on the hardware. These tests are constructed so that the Software Assurance group can get hard test data for a comparison between the open source and proprietary implementations of hard real time solutions.

Mattei, Nicholas S.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Simulation and Flight Test Environments for the TASAR Traffic Aware Planner

The Traffic Aware Planner (TAP) software is a flight deck decision support tool that enhances the flight crew’s ability to make flight-optimizing route change requests while airborne. The software provides conflict-free, optimized trajectory suggestions during en route flight to produce time- and fuel-savings compared to the current trajectory. The TAP software requires evaluation in an operational environment with real pilot users to validate projected benefits. To this end, a set of developmental test environments have been developed to mature the software and mitigate technical risk prior to entering operational evaluation. The unique attributes of each test environment were leveraged to provide a range of purpose- and case-dependent TAP software tests. This paper describes the elements of a testing environment, discusses several environments of varying fidelity used to test the TAP software, and provides a review of two case studies highlighting the vital role testing played in the TAP software development process.

Barney, Terique L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Safety-Critical Partitioned Software Architecture: A Partitioned Software Architecture for Robotic

The flight software on virtually every mission currently managed by JPL has several major flaws that make it vulnerable to potentially fatal software defects. Many of these problems can be addressed by recently developed partitioned operating systems (OS). JPL has avoided adopting a partitioned operating system on its flight missions, primarily because doing so would require significant changes in flight software design, and the risks associated with changes of that magnitude cannot be accepted by an active flight project. The choice of a partitioned OS can have a dramatic effect on the overall system and software architecture, allowing for realization of benefits far beyond the concerns typically associated with the choice of OS. Specifically, we believe that a partitioned operating system, when coupled with an appropriate architecture, can provide a strong infrastructure for developing systems for which reusability, modifiability, testability, and reliability are essential qualities. By adopting a partitioned OS, projects can gain benefits throughout the entire development lifecycle, from requirements and design, all the way to implementation, testing, and operations.

(Avionics Application Standard Software Interface ↗

NASA NTRS2019

Model Based Engineering for Software Assurance

NASA's successful development of next generation space vehicles, habitats, and robotic systems will require reliable hardware and software systems. The aim of this initiative is to develop modeling methodology and tools to support Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) for software assurance and reliability analysis. This effort expands the Unified Modeling Language (UML) software design models to include fault data for the extraction of Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for software. We explored different modeling approaches to integrate the UML software design models with the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) system models to generate an integrated model and reliability tools that take into account software and hardware interfaces.The benefits of this concept directly affect the safety community with quick turnarounds to produce software assurance and reliability analysis artifacts and the ability to visualize failure effects, both hardware and software. The result is enhanced system design integrity and early identification of system risks. This initiative will enable software assurance activities early in the system design lifecycle, facilitating the discovery of design weaknesses and enhancing the capability to produce safe, hazard-free systems

Wang, Lui↗

NASA NTRS1999

Practical Issues in Implementing Software Reliability Measurement

Many ways of estimating software systems' reliability, or reliability-related quantities, have been developed over the past several years. Of particular interest are methods that can be used to estimate a software system's fault content prior to test, or to discriminate between components that are fault-prone and those that are not. The results of these methods can be used to: 1) More accurately focus scarce fault identification resources on those portions of a software system most in need of it. 2) Estimate and forecast the risk of exposure to residual faults in a software system during operation, and develop risk and safety criteria to guide the release of a software system to fielded use. 3) Estimate the efficiency of test suites in detecting residual faults. 4) Estimate the stability of the software maintenance process.

Nikora, Allen P.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Increasing productivity through Total Reuse Management (TRM)

Total Reuse Management (TRM) is a new concept currently being promoted by the NASA Langley Software Engineering and Ada Lab (SEAL). It uses concepts similar to those promoted in Total Quality Management (TQM). Both technical and management personnel are continually encouraged to think in terms of reuse. Reuse is not something that is aimed for after a product is completed, but rather it is built into the product from inception through development. Lowering software development costs, reducing risk, and increasing code reliability are the more prominent goals of TRM. Procedures and methods used to adopt and apply TRM are described. Reuse is frequently thought of as only being applicable to code. However, reuse can apply to all products and all phases of the software life cycle. These products include management and quality assurance plans, designs, and testing procedures. Specific examples of successfully reused products are given and future goals are discussed.

Schuler, M. P.↗

NASA NTRS2018

IV&V Planning & Execution Initiative

Independent verification and validation (IV&V) is a systems engineering discipline which seeks to provide confidence that mission-critical software-dependent systems will operate safely and achieve all mission objectives. In order to optimize application of IV&V resources, it is necessary to identify specific assurance objectives that are most likely to reveal difficulty and therefore to increase confidence. Software assurance literature deals predominantly with the code itself. However, our experience is that the most significant software-related issues are discovered via analysis of other system artifacts such as operations concepts, requirements and design. Consequently, it is desirable to, when assessing risk and defining assurance objectives, consider all facets of the software system architecture. We describe in this presentation progress and lessons learned from an IV&V capability development initiative to enhance the IV&V project planning process using all available architecture information.

Risk↗

NASA NTRS1992

Intelligent fault management for the Space Station active thermal control system

The Thermal Advanced Automation Project (TAAP) approach and architecture is described for automating the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Active Thermal Control System (ATCS). The baseline functionally and advanced automation techniques for Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) will be compared and contrasted. Advanced automation techniques such as rule-based systems and model-based reasoning should be utilized to efficiently control, monitor, and diagnose this extremely complex physical system. TAAP is developing advanced FDIR software for use on the SSF thermal control system. The goal of TAAP is to join Knowledge-Based System (KBS) technology, using a combination of rules and model-based reasoning, with conventional monitoring and control software in order to maximize autonomy of the ATCS. TAAP's predecessor was NASA's Thermal Expert System (TEXSYS) project which was the first large real-time expert system to use both extensive rules and model-based reasoning to control and perform FDIR on a large, complex physical system. TEXSYS showed that a method is needed for safely and inexpensively testing all possible faults of the ATCS, particularly those potentially damaging to the hardware, in order to develop a fully capable FDIR system. TAAP therefore includes the development of a high-fidelity simulation of the thermal control system. The simulation provides realistic, dynamic ATCS behavior and fault insertion capability for software testing without hardware related risks or expense. In addition, thermal engineers will gain greater confidence in the KBS FDIR software than was possible prior to this kind of simulation testing. The TAAP KBS will initially be a ground-based extension of the baseline ATCS monitoring and control software and could be migrated on-board as additional computation resources are made available.

Hill, Tim↗