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In April 1980, a Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) was destroyed in a flash fire during a functional test in the Johnson Space Center's crew systems laboratory. During this lecture, Mr. Nowetner discussed what happened to cause this failure, what safety message resulted from it, lessons learned from these mistakes, and how to leverage earned knowledge.
The operational and energy transfer characteristics of the Dish Stirling Solar Receiver (DSSR) combustor/heat exchanger system was evaluated. The DSSR is designed to operate with fossil fuel augmentation utilizing a swirl combustor and cross flow heat exchanger consisting of a single row of 4 closely spaced tubes that are curved into a conical shape. The performance of the combustor/heat exchanger system without a Stirling engine was studied over a range of operating conditions and output levels using water as the working fluid. Results show that the combustor may be started under cold conditions, controlled safety, and operated at a constant air/fuel ratio (10 percent excess air) over the required range of firing rates. Furthermore, nondimensional heat transfer coefficients based on total heat transfer are plotted versus Reynolds number and compared with literature data taken for single rows of closely spaced tubes perpendicular to cross flow. The data show enhanced heat transfer for the present geometry and test conditions. Analysis of the results shows that the present system meets specified thermal requirements, thus verifying the feasibility of the DSSR combustor design for final prototype fabrication.
Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UASs) are being utilized throughout the disaster and emergency response domain, including in wildland firefighting operations. While UASs can offer safety benefits in comparison to crewed aircraft, such as removing the human pilot from the vehicle so that they are not exposed to the same risks and the ability to operate in low-visibility conditions, they are not without tradeoffs. For example, it can be challenging for UAS pilots (UASPs) to build situation awareness of the airspace in which their UAS is operating. In order to address some of the challenges associated with using UASs and provide greater assistance to the firefighters and incident personnel in the wildland firefighting environment, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the Advanced Capabilities for Emergency Response Operations (ACERO) project. Building on previous NASA research, ACERO will explore the implementation of a traffic management system in the wildland fire environment to enhance safety and support situation awareness. ACERO draws on the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system previously demonstrated in an urban environment. However, a traffic management system implemented in the wildland fire environment is expected to look and function much differently in order to meet the unique needs of this domain. At the outset of the ACERO project, interviews were conducted with five UASPs who operate UASs at wildland fire incidents. The interviews focused on exploring UASPs’ initial insights about the application of a traffic management system in wildland firefighting and understanding the unique needs of this environment. The UASPs discussed a range of topics including, the shape, size, and organization of UAS operations in the wildland fire environment, information needs for a user interface, such as traffic and map information, an alerting function when other traffic nears their operation area, and the importance of conformance monitoring. The UASPs also discussed their willingness to share operational information to support safety. In this paper, we describe the foundational work upon which ACERO will build and summarize the information and insights gathered during the UASP interviews, some of which have already informed the development of the ACERO work.
Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UASs) are being utilized throughout the disaster and emergency response domain, including in wildland firefighting operations. While UASs can offer safety benefits in comparison to crewed aircraft, such as removing the human pilot from the vehicle so that they are not exposed to the same risks and the ability to operate in low-visibility conditions, they are not without tradeoffs. For example, it can be challenging for UAS pilots (UASPs) to build situation awareness of the airspace in which their UAS is operating. In order to address some of the challenges associated with using UASs and provide greater assistance to the firefighters and incident personnel in the wildland firefighting environment, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the Advanced Capabilities for Emergency Response Operations (ACERO) project. Building on previous NASA research, ACERO will explore the implementation of a traffic management system in the wildland fire environment to enhance safety and support situation awareness. ACERO draws on the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system previously demonstrated in an urban environment. However, a traffic management system implemented in the wildland fire environment is expected to look and function much differently in order to meet the unique needs of this domain. At the outset of the ACERO project, interviews were conducted with five UASPs who operate UASs at wildland fire incidents. The interviews focused on exploring UASPs’ initial insights about the application of a traffic management system in wildland firefighting and understanding the unique needs of this environment. The UASPs discussed a range of topics including, the shape, size, and organization of UAS operations in the wildland fire environment, information needs for a user interface, such as traffic and map information, an alerting function when other traffic nears their operation area, and the importance of conformance monitoring. The UASPs also discussed their willingness to share operational information to support safety. In this presentation, we describe the foundational work upon which ACERO will build and summarize the information and insights gathered during the UASP interviews, some of which have already informed the development of the ACERO work.
Hydrogen Fueling Infrastructure Research and Station Technology (H2FIRST) is a project initiated by the DOE in 2015 and executed by Sandia National Laboratories and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to address R&D barriers to the deployment of hydrogen fueling infrastructure. One key barrier to the deployment of fueling stations is the land area they require (i.e. "footprint"). Space is particularly a constraint in dense urban areas where hydrogen demand is high but space for fueling stations is limited. This work presents current fire code requirements that inform station footprint, then identifies and quantifies opportunities to reduce footprint without altering the safety profile of fueling stations. Opportunities analyzed include potential new methods of hydrogen delivery, as well as alternative placements of station technologies (i.e. rooftop/underground fuel storage). As interest in heavy-duty fueling stations and other markets for hydrogen grows, this study can inform techniques to reduce the footprint of heavy-duty stations as well. This work characterizes generic designs for stations with a capacity of 600 kg/day hydrogen dispensed and 4 dispenser hoses. Three base case designs (delivered gas, delivered liquid, and on-site electrolysis production) have been modified in 5 different ways to study the impacts of recently released fire code changes, colocation with gasoline refueling, alternate delivery assumptions, underground storage of hydrogen, and rooftop storage of hydrogen, resulting in a total of 32 different station designs. The footprints of the base case stations range from 13,000 to 21,000 ft 2 . A significant focus of this study is the NFPA 2 requirements, especially the prescribed setback distances for bulk gaseous or liquid hydrogen storage. While the prescribed distances are large in some cases, these setback distances are found to have a nuanced impact on station lot size; considerations of the delivery truck path, traffic flow, parking, and convenience store location are also important. Station designs that utilize underground and rooftop storage can reduce footprint but may not be practical or economical. For example, burying hydrogen storage tanks underground can reduce footprint, but the cost savings they enable depend on the cost of burial and the cost land. Siting and economic analysis of station lot sizes illustrate the benefit of smaller station footprints in the flexibility and cost savings they can provide. This study can be used as a reference that provides examples of the key design differences that fueling stations can incorporate, the approximate sizes of generic station lots, and considerations that might be unique to particular designs.
The journey to Mars will require advancements in many existing technologies, including space power and energy storage systems. According to the 2015 NASA Technology Roadmaps, energy storage is a critical technology area to develop for both terrestrial as well as future long-term space missions. Currently, batteries represent one of the major areas in need of advancement, both in terms of energy density as well as safety. Recently, concerns regarding the fire safety of commercial lithium-ion batteries have prompted efforts to produce nonflammable battery components, namely the electrolyte and separator. Commercial lithium-ion batteries utilize polyolefin separators imbibed with a lithium salt dissolved in cyclic carbonates. This separator/electrolyte combination imparts good ionic conductivities in the range of 10(exp -2) to 10(exp -3) S/cm. However, the cyclic carbonates and polyolefin separator are inherently flammable. Room-temperature ionic liquids (RTILs) appear to be a safer alternative to cyclic carbonates. They offer good ionic conductivities, similar to those observed in cyclic carbonates, but are inherently nonvolatile and nonflammable giving them a safety advantage. Many promising RTILs for battery electrolytes are not compatible with commercial polyolefin separator materials. Polyimide aerogels possess an open-porous, fibrillar network architecture which offers a high degree of porosity (typically greater than 85 porous), required for lithium ion conduction, as well as good mechanical properties. Furthermore, these materials are compatible with all tested RTILs. By creating a polyimide gel and imbibing the gel with a RTIL containing a lithium salt instead of super critically drying them to form aerogels, a nonflammable separator/electrolyte system with conductivities in the range of 1x10(exp -3) S/cm has been demonstrated.
On October 24-25, 2014, NASA Headquarters and the NASA Glenn Research Center sponsored the CombustionLab Workshop in Pasadena, CA as part of the 30th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Gravitational and Space Research. The two-day event brought together scientists and engineers from academia, industry, other government agencies, and international space agencies. The goal of the workshop was to identify key engineering drivers and research priorities, and to provide overall recommendations for the development of the next generation of combustion science experiments for the International Space Station (ISS). The workshop was divided in to 6 topical areas: Droplets, Sprays and Aerosols; Non-Premixed Flames; Premixed Flames; High Pressure and Supercritical Reacting Systems; Fire Safety; Heterogeneous Reaction Processes. Each of these areas produced summary findings which were assembled into a report and were integrated into the NASA budget planning process. The summary results of this process are presented with implementation plans and options for the future.
Advanced aerospace vehicular concepts require advances in many existing technologies, including space power and energy storage systems. Batteries represent one of the major areas in need of improvement, both in terms of energy density and safety, with growing concerns over the fire safety of commercial lithium-ion batteries. This has prompted efforts to develop nonflammable battery components, namely the electrolyte and separator. Existing commercial lithium-ion batteries utilize polyolefin microporous membranes as separators with an electrolyte consisting of a lithium salt dissolved in a mixture of cyclic carbonate solvents. This separator/electrolyte combination has ionic conductivities in the range of 10 −2 to 10 −3 S/cm. However, the cyclic carbonate solvents are inherently flammable. Room-temperature ionic liquids (RTILs) appear to be a safer alternative. They offer good ionic conductivities and are inherently nonvolatile and nonflammable, giving them a safety advantage. However, many promising RTILs for battery electrolytes are not compatible with commercial polyolefin separator materials. Alternative separator materials, such as polyimides, are non-flammable and are capable of accepting RTILs into their structure. Polyimide gels, with a composition of 4,4′-oxydianiline, 3,3′,4,4′-tetracarboxylic dianhydride and cross-linked with Desmodur N3300A, possess an open-porous, fibrillar network architecture which offers a high degree of porosity (typically greater than 85% porosity) for lithium-ion transport and conduction, as well as good mechanical properties. Furthermore, these polyimide gels are compatible with selected imidazolium-based RTILs. Nonflammable separator/electrolyte systems with room-temperature conductivities in the range of 10 −3 S/cm have been evaluated. It has been demonstrated that 1-ethyl-3-methylimidazolium bis(trifluoromethylsulfonyl)imide was the most promising among six RTILs screened, in terms of both ionic conductivity and constant current cycling.
The Space Shuttle vehicle (SSV) is connected to the mobile launch platform (MLP) by four aft skirt hold down studs on each solid rocket booster (SRB). Prior to lift-off, the frangible nuts inside the aft skirt blast containers (BC) are severed into two nut halves by two pyrotechnic booster cartridges. This action releases the SSV and allows the hold down studs to eject through the aft skirt bore and then down into the MLP. USBI has been tasked to upgrade the BC for two specific reasons; 1. to eliminate lead for environmental concerns, and 2. to reduce the chance of nut recontact with the holddown stud. Nut recontact with the stud has been identified as a likely contributor to stud hangups. This upgrade will replace the lead liner with an aluminum foam material. The aluminum foam used as a energy absorber is a proven design in many other aerospace/defense applications. Additional benefits of using the open cell, energy absorbent aluminum foam in place of the solid lead liner are: A. Lead handling/ exposure, and possible contamination, along with hazardous waste disposal will be eliminated; B. Approximately 200 lbs. weight savings will be contributed to each Space Shuttle flight by using aluminum foam over lead; C. The new aluminum liner is designed to catch all shrapnel from frangible nuts thus virtually eliminating chance of foreign object debris (FOD) exiting the HDP, and causing potential damage to the vehicle; D. Potential of using the lighter aluminum liner over lead, allows for easier assembly and disassembly of blast container elements, also allowing for improvements in safety, operator handling, and efficiency of operations. Six BC firing tests will be required to determine if the new liner material will perform in a way to decrease the chance of stud hangups and enhance the ability of the BC to retain blast debris. Testing will be performed at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) facility known as the Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF), and will simulate the SRB hold- down post, with actual BC hardware and pyrotechnics assembled, and then test fired. Initial testing was performed in 1997 using a frangible nut in a static drop test over lead and aluminum foam sheet materials. The aluminum foam showed a dramatic improvement of energy absorption over the lead liner material. Proof-of-Principle testing at the KSC-LETF commenced in May, 1998, and is expected to be completed by June, 1998.
The ability to monitor air contaminants in the Shuttle and the International Space Station is important to ensure the health and safety of astronauts. Three specific space applications have been identified that would benefit from a chemical monitor: organic contaminants in crew cabins, propellant contaminants in the airlock, and pre-combustion fire detection. NASA has assessed several commercial and developing electronic noses (e-noses) for these applications. A preliminary series of tests identified those e-noses that exhibited sufficient sensitivity to the vapors of interest. These e-noses were further tested to assess their ability to identify vapors, and in-house software has been developed to enhance identification. This paper describes the tests, the classification ability of selected e-noses, and the software improvements made to meet the requirements for these space program applications.
Since 2012, a series of Spacecraft Fire Experiments (Saffire) have been under development by the Spacecraft Fire Safety Demonstration (SFS Demo) project, funded by NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems Division. The overall objective of this project is to reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with the design of spacecraft fire safety systems for NASA's exploration missions. The approach to achieving this goal has been to define, develop, and conduct experiments that address gaps in spacecraft fire safety knowledge and capabilities identified by NASA's Fire Safety System Maturation Team. The Spacecraft Fire Experiments (Saffire-I, -II, and -III) are material flammability tests at length scales that are realistic for a spacecraft fire in low-gravity. The specific objectives of these three experiments are to (1) determine how rapidly a large scale fire grows in low-gravity and (2) investigate the low-g flammability limits compared to those obtained in NASA's normal gravity material flammability screening test. The experiments will be conducted in Orbital ATK's Cygnus vehicle after it has unberthed from the International Space Station. The tests will be fully automated with the data downlinked at the conclusion of the test before the Cygnus vehicle reenters the atmosphere. This paper discusses the status of the Saffire-I, II, and III experiments followed by a review of the fire safety technology gaps that are driving the development of objectives for the next series of experiments, Saffire-IV, V, and VI.
Would you like to lead a world renowned team that draws out all the talents and expertise of its members and consistently out performs all others in the industry? Ever wonder why so many organizations fail to truly learn from past mistakes only to repeat the same ones at a later date? Are you a program/project manager or team member in a high-risk organization where the decisions made often carry the highest of consequences? Leadership, communication, team building, critical decision-making and continuous team improvement skills and behaviors are mere talking points without the attitudes, commitment and strategies necessary to make them the very fabric of a team. Developing Expert Teams with a Strong Safety Culture, will provide you with proven knowledge and strategies to take your team soaring to heights you may have not thought possible. A myriad of teams have applied these strategies and techniques within their organization team environments: military and commercial aviation, astronaut flight crews, Shuttle flight controllers, members of the Space Shuttle Program Mission Management Team, air traffic controllers, nuclear power control teams, surgical teams, and the fire service report having spectacular success. Many industry leaders are beginning to realize that although the circumstances and environments of these teams may differ greatly to their own, the core elements, governing principles and dynamics involved in managing and building a stellar safety conscious team remain identical.
Baseline rescue and survival concepts for future space station crews are described. Preliminary studies are being carried out to identify potential threats to crew safety and means to counteract the dangers. Significant factors being considered include the type of threat, the warning time, the number of crewmembers, strategies for protection of the crew (including life-support measures redundancy), and the dependence of space station crews on ground personnel. Attention is being given to the impact of safety devices on the space station geometry and cost, as well as the equipment necessary to maintain the crew in a psychological status positive enough to cope with emergencies. Typical threats would be fire, crewmember illness or injury, and abandonment of the station. A Shuttle launch could take up to 12 days, while equipping the space station with an emergency return capsule would permit return on the same day as the capsule was occupied.
The scope of this study considered the first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for Initial Operational Capability (10C) during the early 1990's. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration and debris.
The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) during the early 1990's was considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration and debris. Of particular interest here is volume three (of five volumes) pertaining to the safety impact of human factors.
The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for initial operational capability (IOC) during the early 1990's were considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration and debris.
The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for initial operational capability (IOC) during the early 1990's were considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration, and debris.
Viewgraphs of briefings from the Space Systems and Technology Advisory Committee (SSTAC)/ARTS review of the draft integrated technology plan (ITP) on human support are included. Topics covered include: human support program; human factors; life support technology; fire safety; medical support technology; advanced refrigeration technology; EVA suit system; advanced PLSS technology; and ARC-EVA systems research program.