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NASA NTRS2010

Environmental Stress Testing of the Single Sample Cylinder: A Proven Consensus Standard for Internal Gas Analysis (IGA) or Residual Gas Analysis (RGA)

In August 2008, Schuessler Consulting was contracted by NASA GSFC in support of the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) program to perform two separate studies on moisture laden air in a stainless steel cylinder that had been designed to become a consensus standard for Test Method 1018. This Test Method was originally released for hybrids under Mil. Std. 883 but was quickly utilized on other microelectronic devices under the auspice of Mil. Std. 750. The cylinder had subsequently been fabricated for the 750 community. It was back-filled with moist air and subsequently analyzed over a period of time under a previous NASA contract. It had been shown that moisture in the 4000 - 5000 ppm range could be analyzed rather precisely with a mass spectrometer, commonly referred to as a Residual Gas Analyzer (RGA). The scope of this study was to ascertain if the composition and precision varied as a function of thermal shock at sub-zero temperatures and whether there was consensus when the standard was submitted to other RGA units. It was demonstrated and published that the consensus standard would yield precise RGA data for moisture within +/- 1% when optimized for a given RGA unit. It has been subsequently shown in this study at Oneida Research Services, that sub-zero storage did not affect that precision when a well-defined protocol for the analysis was followed. The consensus standard was taken to a second facility for analysis where it was found that moisture adsorption on the transfer lines caused precision to drop to +/- 12%. The Single Sample Cylinder (SSC) is a one liter stainless steel cylinder with associated sampling valves and has considerable weight and volume. But this considerable size allows for approximately 300 gas samples of the same composition to be delivered to any RGA unit. Lastly, a smaller cylinder, approximately 75 cc, of a second consensus standard was fabricated and tested with a different mix of fixed gases where moisture was kept in the 100 ppm range. This second standard has the potential of providing 30 gaseous samples and can be readily shipped to any analytical facility that desires to generate comparison RGA data. A series of comparison residual gas analyses was performed at the Honeywell Federal Manufacturing & Technologies facility in the National Nuclear Facility Administration s plant in Kansas City to complete this project. It was shown that improvements in the precision of a given RGA unit can be done by controlling the cycle time for each analysis and increasing analysis temperatures to minimize moisture adsorption. It was also found that a "one time event" in the subzero storage of the large SSC did not effect the units ability to continuously supply precise samples of the same chemistry, however the "event" caused a permanent +8% shift in the reported value of the moisture content. Lastly, a set of SSC RGA results was plotted on a common graph with DSCC "correlation study" RGA data. The result demonstrates the ability of the SSC to remove many of the individual variances that single, individual samples introduce. The consensus standards are now in storage at Oneida Research Services, one of the DSCC certified houses that does RGA to Military Standards, where they await future studies. The analytical data and the operational parameters of the instruments used are provided in the following discussion. Limitations and suggested means for improvement of both precision and accuracy are provided.

Schuessler, Philipp WH↗
NASA NTRS2010

Developing a Logistics Data Process for Support Equipment for NASA Ground Operations

The United States NASA Space Shuttle has long been considered an extremely capable yet relatively expensive rocket. A great part of the roughly US $500 million per launch expense was the support footprint: refurbishment and maintenance of the space shuttle system, together with the long list of resources required to support it, including personnel, tools, facilities, transport and support equipment. NASA determined to make its next rocket system with a smaller logistics footprint, and thereby more cost-effective and quicker turnaround. The logical solution was to adopt a standard Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process based on GEIA-STD-0007 http://www.logisticsengineers.org/may09pres/GEIASTD0007DEXShortIntro.pdf which is the successor of MIL-STD-1388-2B widely used by U.S., NATO, and other world military services and industries. This approach is unprecedented at NASA: it is the first time a major program of programs, Project Constellation, is factoring logistics and supportability into design at many levels. This paper will focus on one of those levels NASA ground support equipment for the next generation of NASA rockets and on building a Logistics Support Analysis Record (LSAR) for developing and documenting a support solution and inventory of resources for. This LSAR is actually a standards-based database, containing analyses of the time and tools, personnel, facilities and support equipment required to assemble and integrate the stages and umbilicals of a rocket. This paper will cover building this database from scratch: including creating and importing a hierarchical bill of materials (BOM) from legacy data; identifying line-replaceable units (LRUs) of a given piece of equipment; analyzing reliability and maintainability of said LRUs; and therefore making an assessment back to design whether the support solution for a piece of equipment is too much work, i.e., too resource-intensive. If one must replace or inspect an LRU too much, perhaps a modification of the design of the equipment can make such operational effort unnecessary. Finally, this paper addresses processes of tying resources to a timeline of tasks performed in ground operations: this enables various overarching analyses, e.g., a summarization of all resources used for a given piece of equipment. Quality Control of data will also be discussed: importing and exporting data from product teams, including spreadsheets-todatabase or data exchange between databases.

Chakrabarti, Suman↗
NASA NTRS2009

Smart and Intelligent Sensors

John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC) provides rocket engine propulsion testing for NASA's space programs. Since the development of the Space Shuttle, every Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has undergone acceptance testing at SSC before going to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for integration into the Space Shuttle. The SSME is a large cryogenic rocket engine that uses Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) as the fuel. As NASA moves to the new ARES V launch system, the main engines on the new vehicle, as well as the upper stage engine, are currently base lined to be cryogenic rocket engines that will also use LH2. The main rocket engines for the ARES V will be larger than the SSME, while the upper stage engine will be approximately half that size. As a result, significant quantities of hydrogen will be required during the development, testing, and operation of these rocket engines.Better approaches are needed to simplify sensor integration and help reduce life-cycle costs. 1.Smarter sensors. Sensor integration should be a matter of "plug-and-play" making sensors easier to add to a system. Sensors that implement new standards can help address this problem; for example, IEEE STD 1451.4 defines transducer electronic data sheet (TEDS) templates for commonly used sensors such as bridge elements and thermocouples. When a 1451.4 compliant smart sensor is connected to a system that can read the TEDS memory, all information needed to configure the data acquisition system can be uploaded. This reduces the amount of labor required and helps minimize configuration errors. 2.Intelligent sensors. Data received from a sensor be scaled, linearized; and converted to engineering units. Methods to reduce sensor processing overhead at the application node are needed. Smart sensors using low-cost microprocessors with integral data acquisition and communication support offer the means to add these capabilities. Once a processor is embedded, other features can be added; for example, intelligent sensors can make a health assessment to inform the data acquisition client when sensor performance is suspect. 3.Distributed sample synchronization. Networks of sensors require new ways for synchronizing samples. Standards that address the distributed timing problem (for example, IEEE STD 1588) provide the means to aggregate samples from many distributed smart sensors with sub-microsecond accuracy. 4. Reduction in interconnect. Alternative means are needed to reduce the frequent problems associated with cabling and connectors. Wireless technologies offer the promise of reducing interconnects and simultaneously making it easy to quickly add a sensor to a system.

Lansaw, John↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health

This slide presentation reviews the history, and development of NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, and the related Human Integration Design Handbook. Currently being developed from NASA-STD-3000, this project standard currently in review will be available in two volumes, (i.e., Volume 1 -- VCrew Health and Volume 2 -- Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health) and the handbook will be both available as a pdf file and as a interactive website.

Holubec, Keith↗
NASA NTRS2007

Joint Test Report For Validation of Alternatives to Aliphatic Isocyanate Polyurethanes

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) have similar missions and therefore similar facilities and structures in similar environments. The standard practice for protecting metallic substrates in atmospheric environments is the application of an applied coating system. The most common topcoats used in coating systems are polyurethanes that contain isocyanates. Isocyanates are classified as potential human carcinogens and are known to cause cancer in animals. The primary objective of this effort was to demonstrate and validate alternatives to aliphatic isocyanate polyurethanes resulting in one or more isocyanate-free coatings qualified for use at AFSPC and NASA installations participating in this project. This joint Test Report (JTR) documents the results of the laboratory and field testing as well as any test modifications made during the execution of the testing. The technical stakeholders agreed upon test procedure modifications documented in this document. This JTR is made available as a reference for future pollution prevention endeavors by other NASA centers, the Department of Defense and commercial users to minimize duplication of effort. All coating system candidates were tested using approved NASA and AFSPC standard coating systems as experimental controls. This study looked at eight alternative coating systems and two control coating systems and was divided into Phase I Screening Tests, Phase II Tests, and Field Testing. The Phase I Screening Tests were preliminary tests performed on all the selected candidate coating systems. Candidate coating systems that did not meet the acceptance criteria of the screening tests were eliminated from further testing. Phase I Screening Tests included: Ease of Application, Surface Appearance, Dry-To-Touch (Sanding), Accelerated Storage Stability, Pot Life (Viscosity), Cure Time (Solvent Rubs), Cleanability, Knife Test, Tensile (pull-off) Adhesion, and X-Cut Adhesion by Wet Tape After a review of the Phase I test results, four of the alternative coating systems showed substandard performance in relation to the Control Systems and were eliminated from the Phase II testing. Due to the interest of stakeholders and time constraints, however, all eight alternatives were subjected to the following Phase II tests, along with field testing at Stennis Space Center (SSC), Mississippi: Hypergol Compatibility, Liquid Oxygen Compatibility, 18-Month Marine Exposure (Gloss Retention, Color Retention, Blistering, Visual Corrosion, Creepage from Scribe, Heat Adhesion), and Field Exposure (6- and 12-month Evaluation for Coating Condition, Color Retention, Gloss Retention). The remaining four alternative coating systems determined to be the best viable alternatives were carried on to Phase II testing that included: Removability, Repairability, Abrasion Resistance, Gravelometer, Fungus Resistance, Accelerated Weathering, Mandrel Bend Flexibility, and Cyclic Corrosion Resistance. Of the systems that continued to Phase II, three (3) alternative coating systems meet the performance requirements as identified by stakeholders. Two (2) other systems, that were not included in Phase II testing, performed well enough on the 18-Month Marine Exposure, the primary requirement for NASA technical standard NASA-STD-5008, Protective Coating of Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum on Launch Structures, Facilities, and Ground Support Equipment, that they were also considered to be successful candidates. In total, five (5) alternative coating systems were approved for inclusion in the NASA-STD- 5008 Qualified Products List (QPL). The standard is intended to provide a common framework for consistent practices across NASA and is often used by other entities. The standard's QPL does not connote endorsement of the products by NASA, but lists those products that have been tested and meet the requirements as specified.

Lewis, Pattie↗
NASA NTRS2012

Voluntary Consensus Organization Standards for Nondestructive Evaluation of Thin-Walled Metallic Liners and Composite Overwraps in Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

NASA fracture control requirements outlined in NASA-STD-5009 and NASA-STD-5014 are predicated on the availability and use of sensitive nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods that can detect and monitor defects, thereby providing data that can be used to predict failure or reduce the risk of failure in fracture critical components. However, in the case of composite materials and components, including composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs), the effect of defects is poorly understood, the NDE methods used to evaluate locate and size defects are typically at lower technical readiness level than analogous NDE methods used for metals, and demonstration studies to verify the probability of detection (POD) are generally lacking or unavailable. These factors together make failure prediction of fracture critical composite materials and components based on size, quantity, or orientation of defects nearly impossible. Also, when inspecting metal liners in as-manufactured COPVs, sensitivity is lost and only the inner surface of the liner is accessible. Also, NDE of COPVs as applied during manufacturing varies significantly from manufacturer to manufacturer and has not yet been standardized. Although requirements exist to perform NDE immediately after manufacturing to establish initial integrity of the parts, procedural detail for NDE of composites is still nonexistent or under development. For example, in practice, only a visual inspection of COPVs is performed during manufacturing and service, leaving in question whether defects of concern, for example, bridging, overwrap winding anomalies, impact damage below visible threshold, out-of-family strain growth, and liner buckling have been adequately detected and monitored. To address these shortcomings, in 2005 the NASA Nondestructive Evaluation Working Group (NNWG) began funding work to develop and adopt standards for nondestructive evaluation of aerospace composites in collaboration with the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Committee E07 on Nondestructive Testing. Similarly, in 2006 the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) recommended that nondestructive evaluation methods that can predict composite failure in COPVs should be developed and verified, and integrated into the damage control plan for these vessels

Waller, Jess↗
NASA NTRS2012

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Command and Data Handling Flight Electronics Subsystem

A document describes a high-performance, modular, and state-of-the-art Command and Data Handling (C&DH) system developed for use on the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) mission. This system implements a complete hardware C&DH subsystem in a single chassis enclosure that includes a processor card, 48 Gbytes of solid-state recorder memory, data buses including MIL-STD-1553B, custom RS-422, SpaceWire, analog collection, switched power services, and interfaces to the Ka-Band and S-Band RF communications systems. The C&DH team capitalized on extensive experience with hardware and software with PCI bus design, SpaceWire networking, Actel FPGA design, digital flight design techniques, and the use of VxWorks for the real-time operating system. The resulting hardware architecture was implemented to meet the LRO mission requirements. The C&DH comprises an enclosure, a backplane, a low-voltage power converter, a single-board computer, a communications interface board, four data storage boards, a housekeeping and digital input/output board, and an analog data acquisition board. The interfaces between the C&DH and the instruments and avionics are connected through a SpaceWire network, a MIL-STD-1553 bus, and a combination of synchronous and asynchronous serial data transfers over RS-422 and LVDS (low-voltage differential-signaling) electrical interfaces. The C&DH acts as the spacecraft data system with an instrument data manager providing all software and internal bus scheduling, ingestion of science data, distribution of commands, and performing science operations in real time.

Nguyen, Quang↗
NASA NTRS2011

Demonstration/Validation of Environmentally-Preferable Coatings for Launch Facilities

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is responsible for a number of facilities/structures with metallic structural and non-structural components in a highly corrosive environment. Metals require periodic maintenance activity to guard against the insidious effects of corrosion and thus ensure that structures meet or exceed design or performance life. The standard practice for protecting metallic substrates in atmospheric environments is the application of an applied coating system. Applied coating systems work via a variety of methods (barrier, galvanic and/or inhibitor) and adhere to the substrate through a combination of chemical and physical bonds. Maintenance at KSC and other NASA Centers is governed by NASA-STD-50088 (Protective Coating of Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum on Launch Structures, Facilities, and Ground Support Equipment) which establishes practices for the protective coating of ground support equipment and related facilities used by or for NASA programs and projects. The Standard is for the design of non-flight hardware used to support the operations of receiving, transportation, handling, assembly, inspection, test, checkout, service, and launch of space vehicles and payloads at NASA launch, landing, or retrieval sites. These criteria and practices contained within the Standard may be used for items used at the manufacturing, development, and test sites upstream of the launch, landing, or retrieval sites. The objective of this effort is to demonstrate and validate environmentally-preferable alternatives in accordance with NASA-STD-50088 and KSC requirements which can then be added to the Approved Products List. This Test Protocol contains the critical requirements and tests necessary to qualify alternatives for structural steel applications. These tests were derived from engineering, performance, and operational impact (supportability) requirements defined by a consensus of KSC participants. A Test Report will document the results of the testing as well as any test modifications made during the execution of the testing. Users of this Test Protocol should check the project's Test Report for additional test details or minor modifications that may have been necessary in the execution of the testing. The technical stakeholders will have agreed upon test procedures modifications documented in the Test Report.

Lewis, Pattie↗
NASA NTRS2014

Salt Spray Test to Determine Galvanic Corrosion Levels of Electroless Nickel Connectors Mounted on an Aluminum Bracket

During preliminary vehicle design reviews, requests were made to change flight termination systems from an electroless nickel (EN) connector coating to a zinc-nickel (ZN) plating. The reason for these changes was due to a new NASA-STD-6012 corrosion requirement where connectors must meet the performance requirement of 168 hr of exposure to salt spray. The specification for class F connectors, MIL-DTL-38999, certifies the EN coating will meet a 48-hr salt spray test, whereas the ZN is certified to meet a 168-hr salt spray test. The ZN finish is a concern because Marshall Space Flight Center has no flight experience with ZN-finished connectors, and MSFC-STD-3012 indicates that zinc and zinc alloys should not be used. The purpose of this test was to run a 168-hr salt spray test to verify the electrical and mechanical integrity of the EN connectors and officially document the results. The salt spray test was conducted per ASTM B117 on several MIL-DTL-38999 flight-like connectors mounted to an aluminum 6061-T6 bracket that was alodined. The configuration, mounting techniques, electrical checks, and materials used were typical of flight and ground support equipment.

Rolin, T. D.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Integrated Medical Model Verification, Validation, and Credibility

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) was designed to forecast relative changes for a specified set of crew health and mission success risk metrics by using a probabilistic (stochastic process) model based on historical data, cohort data, and subject matter expert opinion. A probabilistic approach is taken since exact (deterministic) results would not appropriately reflect the uncertainty in the IMM inputs. Once the IMM was conceptualized, a plan was needed to rigorously assess input information, framework and code, and output results of the IMM, and ensure that end user requests and requirements were considered during all stages of model development and implementation. METHODS: In 2008, the IMM team developed a comprehensive verification and validation (VV) plan, which specified internal and external review criteria encompassing 1) verification of data and IMM structure to ensure proper implementation of the IMM, 2) several validation techniques to confirm that the simulation capability of the IMM appropriately represents occurrences and consequences of medical conditions during space missions, and 3) credibility processes to develop user confidence in the information derived from the IMM. When the NASA-STD-7009 (7009) was published, the IMM team updated their verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) project plan to meet 7009 requirements and include 7009 tools in reporting VVC status of the IMM. RESULTS: IMM VVC updates are compiled recurrently and include 7009 Compliance and Credibility matrices, IMM VV Plan status, and a synopsis of any changes or updates to the IMM during the reporting period. Reporting tools have evolved over the lifetime of the IMM project to better communicate VVC status. This has included refining original 7009 methodology with augmentation from the NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document. End user requests and requirements are being satisfied as evidenced by ISS Program acceptance of IMM risk forecasts, transition to an operational model and simulation tool, and completion of service requests from a broad end user consortium including Operations, Science and Technology Planning, and Exploration Planning. CONCLUSIONS: The VVC approach established by the IMM project of combining the IMM VV Plan with 7009 requirements is comprehensive and includes the involvement of end users at every stage in IMM evolution. Methods and techniques used to quantify the VVC status of the IMM have not only received approval from the local NASA community but have also garnered recognition by other federal agencies seeking to develop similar guidelines in the medical modeling community.

Validation↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2015

ISS Crew Transportation and Services Requirements Document

Under the guidance of processes provided by Crew Transportation Plan (CCT-PLN-1100), this document with its sister documents, Crew Transportation Technical Management Processes (CCT-PLN-1120), Crew Transportation Technical Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria (CCT-STD-1140), and Crew Transportation Operations Standards (CCT-STD-1150), and International Space Station (ISS) to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface Requirements Document (SSP 50808), provides the basis for a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) certification for services to the ISS for the Commercial Provider. When NASA Crew Transportation System (CTS) certification is achieved for ISS transportation, the Commercial Provider will be eligible to provide services to and from the ISS during the services phase of the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP).

Commercial Crew Program↗
NASA NTRS2013

Crew Transportation Technical Management Processes

Under the guidance of processes provided by Crew Transportation Plan (CCT-PLN-1100), this document, with its sister documents, International Space Station (ISS) Crew Transportation and Services Requirements Document (CCT-REQ-1130), Crew Transportation Technical Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria (CCT-STD-1140), Crew Transportation Operations Standards (CCT STD-1150), and ISS to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface Requirements Document (SSP 50808), provides the basis for a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) certification for services to the ISS for the Commercial Provider. When NASA Crew Transportation System (CTS) certification is achieved for ISS transportation, the Commercial Provider will be eligible to provide services to and from the ISS during the services phase.

Summary of the technical management process↗
NASA NTRS2015

Chlorophyll Variability in the Oligotrophic Gyres: Mechanisms, Seasonality and Trends

A 16-year (1998-2013) analysis of trends and seasonal patterns was conducted for the 5 subtropical ocean gyres using chlorophyll-a (Chl-a) retrievals from ocean color satellite data, sea surface temperature (SST) obtained from optimally interpolated Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) data, and sea-level anomaly (SLA) from Aviso multi-sensor altimetry data. Trend analysis was also performed on mixed-layer data derived from gridded temperature and salinity profiles (1998-2010) from the Simple Ocean Data Assimilation (SODA) model. The Chl-a monthly composites were constructed from the Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) and Moderate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) on Aqua using two different algorithms: the standard algorithm (STD) that has been in use since the start of the SeaWiFS mission in 1997, and a more recently developed Ocean Color Index (OCI) algorithm that is purported to provide improved accuracy in low chlorophyll waters such as the oligotrophic regions of the subtropical gyres. Trends were obtained for all gyres using both STD and OCI algorithms, which demonstrated generally consistent results. The North Pacific, Indian Ocean, North Atlantic and South Atlantic gyres showed significant downward trends in Chl-a, while the South Pacific gyre has a much weaker upward trend with no statistical significance. Time series of satellite-derived net primary production (NPP) showed downward trends for all the gyres, while all 5 gyres exhibited positive trends in SST and SLA. The seasonal variability of Chl-a in each gyre is tightly coupled to the variability in mixed layer depth (MLD) with peak values in winter in both hemispheres when vertical mixing is more vigorous, reaching depths approaching the nutricline (ZNO3, here defined as the depth of the 0.2 micron nitrate concentration). On a seasonal basis, Chl-a concentrations increase when the MLD approaches or is deeper than the nutricline depth, in agreement with the concept that vertical mixing is the major driving mechanism for phytoplankton photosynthesis in the interior of the gyres. In addition, MLD and SST seasonal changes are well correlated indicating that SST is a reasonable index of vertical mixing in the gyres. The combination of surface warming trends and biomass reduction over the 16-year period has the potential to reduce atmospheric CO2 uptake by the gyres and therefore influence the global carbon cycle.

Long-term trends↗
NASA NTRS2015

Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project Verification, Validation, and Credibility (VVandC)

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project supports end user requests by employing the Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) and IMM tools as well as subject matter expertise within the Project. The iMED houses data used by the IMM. The IMM is designed to forecast relative changes for a specified set of crew health and mission success risk metrics by using a probabilistic model based on historical data, cohort data, and subject matter expert opinion. A stochastic approach is taken because deterministic results would not appropriately reflect the uncertainty in the IMM inputs. Once the IMM was conceptualized, a plan was needed to rigorously assess input information, framework and code, and output results of the IMM, and ensure that end user requests and requirements were considered during all stages of model development and implementation, as well as lay the foundation for external review and application. METHODS: In 2008, the Project team developed a comprehensive verification and validation (VV) plan, which specified internal and external review criteria encompassing 1) verification of data and IMM structure to ensure proper implementation of the IMM, 2) several validation techniques to confirm that the simulation capability of the IMM appropriately represents occurrences and consequences of medical conditions during space missions, and 3) credibility processes to develop user confidence in the information derived from the IMM. When the NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was published, the Project team updated their verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) project plan to meet 7009 requirements and include 7009 tools in reporting VVC status of the IMM. Construction of these tools included meeting documentation and evidence requirements sufficient to meet external review success criteria. RESULTS: IMM Project VVC updates are compiled recurrently and include updates to the 7009 Compliance and Credibility matrices. Reporting tools have evolved over the lifetime of the IMM Project to better communicate VVC status. This has included refining original 7009 methodology with augmentation from the HRP NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document working group and the NASA-HDBK-7009 [2]. End user requests and requirements are being satisfied as evidenced by ISS Program acceptance of IMM risk forecasts, transition to an operational model and simulation tool, and completion of service requests from a broad end user consortium including operations, science and technology planning, and exploration planning. IMM v4.0 is slated for operational release in the FY015 and current VVC assessments illustrate the expected VVC status prior to the completion of customer lead external review efforts. CONCLUSIONS: The VVC approach established by the IMM Project of incorporating Project-specific recommended practices and guidelines for implementing the 7009 requirements is comprehensive and includes the involvement of end users at every stage in IMM evolution. Methods and techniques used to quantify the VVC status of the IMM Project represented a critical communication tool in providing clear and concise suitability assessments to IMM customers. These processes have not only received approval from the local NASA community but have also garnered recognition by other federal agencies seeking to develop similar guidelines in the medical modeling community.

Walton, M.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Can Simulation Credibility Be Improved Using Sensitivity Analysis to Understand Input Data Effects on Model Outcome?

Model and simulation (MS) credibility is defined as, the quality to elicit belief or trust in MS results. NASA-STD-7009 [1] delineates eight components (Verification, Validation, Input Pedigree, Results Uncertainty, Results Robustness, Use History, MS Management, People Qualifications) that address quantifying model credibility, and provides guidance to the model developers, analysts, and end users for assessing the MS credibility. Of the eight characteristics, input pedigree, or the quality of the data used to develop model input parameters, governing functions, or initial conditions, can vary significantly. These data quality differences have varying consequences across the range of MS application. NASA-STD-7009 requires that the lowest input data quality be used to represent the entire set of input data when scoring the input pedigree credibility of the model. This requirement provides a conservative assessment of model inputs, and maximizes the communication of the potential level of risk of using model outputs. Unfortunately, in practice, this may result in overly pessimistic communication of the MS output, undermining the credibility of simulation predictions to decision makers. This presentation proposes an alternative assessment mechanism, utilizing results parameter robustness, also known as model input sensitivity, to improve the credibility scoring process for specific simulations.

Credibility↗
NASA NTRS2016

Elaborated Odor Test for Extended Exposure

Concerns were raised when incidental exposure to a proprietary bonding material revealed the material had an irritating odor. The NASA-STD-6001B document describes a supplemental test method option for programs to evaluate materials with odor concerns (Test 6, Odor Assessment). In addition to the supplemental standard odor assessment with less than 10 seconds of exposure, the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) Materials Flight Acceptance Testing section was requested to perform an odor test with an extended duration to evaluate effects of an extended exposure and to more closely simulate realistic exposure scenarios. With approval from the NASA Johnson Space Center Industrial Hygienist, WSTF developed a 15-minute odor test method. WSTF performed this extended-duration odor test to evaluate the odor and physical effects of the bonding material configured between two aluminum plates, after the safety of the gas was verified via toxicity analysis per NASA-STD-6001B Test 7, Determination of Offgassed Products. During extended-duration testing, odor panel members were arranged near the test material in a small room with the air handlers and doors closed to minimize dilution. The odor panel members wafted gas toward themselves and recorded their individual assessments of odor and physical effects at various intervals during the 15-minute exposure and posttest. A posttest interview was conducted to obtain further information. Testing was effective in providing data for comparison and selection of an optimal offgassing and odor containment configuration. The developed test method for extended exposure is proposed as a useful tool for further evaluating materials with identified odors of concern if continued use of the material is anticipated.

Buchanan, Vanessa D.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Defining Medical Levels of Care for Exploration Missions

NASA medical care standards establish requirements for providing health and medical programs for crewmembers during all phases of a mission. These requirements are intended to prevent or mitigate negative health consequences of long-duration spaceflight, thereby optimizing crew health and performance over the course of the mission. Current standards are documented in the two volumes of the NASA-STD-3001 Space Flight Human-System Standard document, established by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer. Its purpose is to provide uniform technical standards for the design, selection, and application of medical hardware, software, processes, procedures, practices, and methods for human-rated systems. NASA-STD-3001 Vol. 1 identifies five levels of care for human spaceflight. These levels of care are accompanied by several components that illustrate the type of medical care expected for each. The Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) of the Human Research Program has expanded the context of these provided levels of care and components. This supplemental information includes definitions for each component of care and example actions that describe the type of capabilities that coincide with the definition. This interpretation is necessary in order to fully and systematically define the capabilities required for each level of care in order to define the medical requirements and plan for infrastructure needed for medical systems of future exploration missions, such as one to Mars.

Hailey, M.↗