Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “std”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9

Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project Verification, Validation, and Credibility (VVandC)

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project supports end user requests by employing the Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) and IMM tools as well as subject matter expertise within the Project. The iMED houses data used by the IMM. The IMM is designed to forecast relative changes for a specified set of crew health and mission success risk metrics by using a probabilistic model based on historical data, cohort data, and subject matter expert opinion. A stochastic approach is taken because deterministic results would not appropriately reflect the uncertainty in the IMM inputs. Once the IMM was conceptualized, a plan was needed to rigorously assess input information, framework and code, and output results of the IMM, and ensure that end user requests and requirements were considered during all stages of model development and implementation, as well as lay the foundation for external review and application. METHODS: In 2008, the Project team developed a comprehensive verification and validation (VV) plan, which specified internal and external review criteria encompassing 1) verification of data and IMM structure to ensure proper implementation of the IMM, 2) several validation techniques to confirm that the simulation capability of the IMM appropriately represents occurrences and consequences of medical conditions during space missions, and 3) credibility processes to develop user confidence in the information derived from the IMM. When the NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was published, the Project team updated their verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) project plan to meet 7009 requirements and include 7009 tools in reporting VVC status of the IMM. Construction of these tools included meeting documentation and evidence requirements sufficient to meet external review success criteria. RESULTS: IMM Project VVC updates are compiled recurrently and include updates to the 7009 Compliance and Credibility matrices. Reporting tools have evolved over the lifetime of the IMM Project to better communicate VVC status. This has included refining original 7009 methodology with augmentation from the HRP NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document working group and the NASA-HDBK-7009 [2]. End user requests and requirements are being satisfied as evidenced by ISS Program acceptance of IMM risk forecasts, transition to an operational model and simulation tool, and completion of service requests from a broad end user consortium including operations, science and technology planning, and exploration planning. IMM v4.0 is slated for operational release in the FY015 and current VVC assessments illustrate the expected VVC status prior to the completion of customer lead external review efforts. CONCLUSIONS: The VVC approach established by the IMM Project of incorporating Project-specific recommended practices and guidelines for implementing the 7009 requirements is comprehensive and includes the involvement of end users at every stage in IMM evolution. Methods and techniques used to quantify the VVC status of the IMM Project represented a critical communication tool in providing clear and concise suitability assessments to IMM customers. These processes have not only received approval from the local NASA community but have also garnered recognition by other federal agencies seeking to develop similar guidelines in the medical modeling community.

Walton, M.↗

Can Simulation Credibility Be Improved Using Sensitivity Analysis to Understand Input Data Effects on Model Outcome?

Model and simulation (MS) credibility is defined as, the quality to elicit belief or trust in MS results. NASA-STD-7009 [1] delineates eight components (Verification, Validation, Input Pedigree, Results Uncertainty, Results Robustness, Use History, MS Management, People Qualifications) that address quantifying model credibility, and provides guidance to the model developers, analysts, and end users for assessing the MS credibility. Of the eight characteristics, input pedigree, or the quality of the data used to develop model input parameters, governing functions, or initial conditions, can vary significantly. These data quality differences have varying consequences across the range of MS application. NASA-STD-7009 requires that the lowest input data quality be used to represent the entire set of input data when scoring the input pedigree credibility of the model. This requirement provides a conservative assessment of model inputs, and maximizes the communication of the potential level of risk of using model outputs. Unfortunately, in practice, this may result in overly pessimistic communication of the MS output, undermining the credibility of simulation predictions to decision makers. This presentation proposes an alternative assessment mechanism, utilizing results parameter robustness, also known as model input sensitivity, to improve the credibility scoring process for specific simulations.

Credibility↗

Elaborated Odor Test for Extended Exposure

Concerns were raised when incidental exposure to a proprietary bonding material revealed the material had an irritating odor. The NASA-STD-6001B document describes a supplemental test method option for programs to evaluate materials with odor concerns (Test 6, Odor Assessment). In addition to the supplemental standard odor assessment with less than 10 seconds of exposure, the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) Materials Flight Acceptance Testing section was requested to perform an odor test with an extended duration to evaluate effects of an extended exposure and to more closely simulate realistic exposure scenarios. With approval from the NASA Johnson Space Center Industrial Hygienist, WSTF developed a 15-minute odor test method. WSTF performed this extended-duration odor test to evaluate the odor and physical effects of the bonding material configured between two aluminum plates, after the safety of the gas was verified via toxicity analysis per NASA-STD-6001B Test 7, Determination of Offgassed Products. During extended-duration testing, odor panel members were arranged near the test material in a small room with the air handlers and doors closed to minimize dilution. The odor panel members wafted gas toward themselves and recorded their individual assessments of odor and physical effects at various intervals during the 15-minute exposure and posttest. A posttest interview was conducted to obtain further information. Testing was effective in providing data for comparison and selection of an optimal offgassing and odor containment configuration. The developed test method for extended exposure is proposed as a useful tool for further evaluating materials with identified odors of concern if continued use of the material is anticipated.

Buchanan, Vanessa D.↗

Defining Medical Levels of Care for Exploration Missions

NASA medical care standards establish requirements for providing health and medical programs for crewmembers during all phases of a mission. These requirements are intended to prevent or mitigate negative health consequences of long-duration spaceflight, thereby optimizing crew health and performance over the course of the mission. Current standards are documented in the two volumes of the NASA-STD-3001 Space Flight Human-System Standard document, established by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer. Its purpose is to provide uniform technical standards for the design, selection, and application of medical hardware, software, processes, procedures, practices, and methods for human-rated systems. NASA-STD-3001 Vol. 1 identifies five levels of care for human spaceflight. These levels of care are accompanied by several components that illustrate the type of medical care expected for each. The Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) of the Human Research Program has expanded the context of these provided levels of care and components. This supplemental information includes definitions for each component of care and example actions that describe the type of capabilities that coincide with the definition. This interpretation is necessary in order to fully and systematically define the capabilities required for each level of care in order to define the medical requirements and plan for infrastructure needed for medical systems of future exploration missions, such as one to Mars.

Hailey, M.↗

Vehicle Design Data Format and Process for a Complete TARIS and OLTARIS Radiation Analysis for Designers and Engineers

Protecting astronauts from space radiation is a complex task when it comes to modeling and simulation. This document shows what information is needed from a spacecraft designer using CAD (Computer-Assisted Design) at each phase of the design to enable the engineers to evaluate the design phase against space radiation limits to determine the suitability of the design for space flight. The current personal exposure limits are listed in NASA STD-3001. A proxy to determine the REID (Radiation Exposure Induced Death) in NASA STD-3001 is the whole body effective dose equivalent (E or effective dose). For short-term tissue effects, organ-averaged gray equivalent (G (sub T)) is used. The TARIS (Tool for the Assessment of Radiation In Space - for LaRC (Langley Research Center) engineers) and OLTARIS (On-Line TARIS) - for designers) systems are used to generate these response functions. The E can use ICRP60 or NASA Q-values. A possible space radiation design basis environment for short-term tissue effects is described and used in all analyses. A single space vehicle was designed with three astronaut configurations and two of those configurations were used in a storm shelter thickness perturbation analysis. Conversion of the data from the CAD model to input necessary for TARIS and OLTARIS is also discussed in detail with relevant examples.

Singleterry, Robert C.↗

NASA's Approach to Additive Manufacturing Certification: Methodologies for Qualification of Additively Manufactured Aerospace Hardware

NASA's Approach to Additive Manufacturing Certification: Methodologies for Qualification of Additively Manufactured Aerospace Hardware. This course is intended to provide guidance and practical methodologies on how to establish a qualified process and deliver certifiable hardware per the requirements in MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717. Course Objectives: Reinforce a basic understanding of AM processes; Become familiar with MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717 requirements for metallic spaceflight hardware; Appreciate integrated path to Qualification and Certification; Understand products necessary to get you to Qualification and Certification.

West, Brian↗

History of NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7)

NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7) from materials and assembled articles for spaceflight has evolved since the Apollo program for over 50 years to meet various habitable spacecraft nonmetallic programmatic requirements. Now mandated by NASA STD-6016A, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft, all nonmetallic materials used in habitable flight compartments, with the exception of ceramics, metal oxides, inorganic glasses, and materials used in sealed containers, must meet the offgassing requirements in NASA-STD-6001B Test 7. This manuscript presents the history of Test 7, beginning with the Apollo spacecraft nonmetallic materials selection guidelines and test requirements in 1967, in which tests were performed in mostly oxygen atmospheres. It progresses through Skylab, Space Shuttle, International Space Station nonmetals testing, and acceptance requirements with milder test environments. This review of the history of Test 7 presents the reader with a perspective on the development and changes undergone since inception to the present. Related NASA standard tests (some now former, discontinued, combined, or supplemental) including Test 6, Odor Assessment, Test 16, Determination of Offgassed Products from Assembled Articles, and Test 12, Total Spacecraft Cabin Offgassing, are discussed in context

Greene, Benjamin↗

History of NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7)

NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7) from materials and assembled articles for spaceflight has evolved since the Apollo program for over 50 years to meet various habitable spacecraft non-metallic programmatic requirements. Now mandated by NASA-STD-6016B Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft, all nonmetallic materials used in habitable flight compartments,with the exception of ceramics, metal oxides, inorganic glasses, and materials used in sealed containers must meet the offgassing requirements of in NASA-STD-6001B Test 7. This manuscript presents the history of Test 7 beginning with the Apollo spacecraft nonmetallic materials selection guidelines and test requirements in 1967

Greene, Benjamin↗

NASA’s Plans for Development of Standards for Additive Manufactured Components

There are currently no NASA standards providing specific design and construction requirements for certification of additively manufactured parts. Several international standards organizations are developing standards for additive manufacturing; however, NASA mission schedules preclude the Agency from relying on these organizations to develop standards that are both timely and applicable. NASA and its program partners in manned spaceflight (the Commercial Crew Program, the Space Launch System and the Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle) are actively developing additively manufactured parts for flight as early as 2018. To bridge this gap, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has authored a center-level standard (MSFC-STD-3716)1 to establish standard practices for the Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) process. In its draft form, the MSFC standard has been used as a basis for L-PBF process implementation for each of the manned space flight programs. The development of an Agency-level standard is proposed, which based upon the principles of MSFC-STD-3716, would have application to multiple additive manufacturing processes and be readily adaptable to all NASA programs.

Russell, Richard W.↗

Analysis of Pull Force Test Results for Crimped Connections

Crimped electrical contacts are reliable when strict process controls are followed during manufacturing and accompanied by continuous process verification through pull force testing. Cable and wire harness assemblies’ standards are developed and refined over time to provide the minimum pull force that a crimp contact must meet before it breaks from the wire. However, in practice the failures occur at a much higher tensile strength than the minimum required. The first section of this paper reviewed 780 pull force test results provided by NASA Centers that were collected and analyzed to determine how the data compare to NASA’s pre-existing requirements from the cable/harness standards NASA-STD-8739.4 and IPC/WHMA-A-620B-S. The measured tensile strength of most of the contact/conductor pairs (i.e., Contact/Wires or C/W) exceeded the minimum pull force values of NASA-STD-8739.4 and IPC/WHMA-A-620 standards by at least 100%. The C/W pair samples’ tensile strength values followed a normal distribution with an average tensile strength value that was at least 182% of the minimum requirement, and all the samples analyzed passed the pull force testing. In addition, the 95% confidence interval of the average tensile strength distributions for several C/W pairs was determined and plotted as error bars to show that the C/W pairs will meet and surpass the requirements. The frequency of pull force testing can be problematic for projects because of the cost and availability of spare contacts for the destructive test. It is possible to reduce the frequency of pull force testing if at the beginning of the production run, the conditions of the crimp tool and materials are verified, and the settings of the tool remain unchanged throughout the process. However, the project needs to understand and evaluate the impact to risk from reducing the frequency of testing prior to implementing process changes.

Alejandra Constante↗

Evaluation of Multiple Methods for Calculating Gray Equivalent

The assessment of different algorithms to determine the Gray-Equivalent as defined in NASA-STD-3001 from a source of space radiation has been evaluated in this paper. The Gray-Equivalent applies an RBE (Relative Biological Effectiveness) to the dose seen at the organ of interest in a human phantom. The current design basis solar particle event was used in the assessments along with the August 1972 event modeled by J.H. King and with idealized spheres and two vehicle designs. Three different algorithms were used and compared. One of the algorithms was the current OLTARIS algorithm. This algorithm is astronaut orientation averaged, which is not what happens in a storm shelter during a solar particle event. Two other algorithms were proposed to eliminate this issue. It is clear that either algorithm will be adequate to satisfy NASA-STD-3001 requirements. This work recommends the algorithm which applies the RBEs to the phantom points instead of at the surface of the phantom as with the current OLTARIS algorithm.

Gray Equivalent↗

Guidebook for the Design and Analysis of a NASA Standard Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Probability of Detection (POD) Study

Purpose: This document provides guidance on the design and analysis of a NASA Standard nondestructive evaluation (NDE) probability of detection (POD) study. A Standard NDE flaw size is considered to be conservative such that most inspectors, trained and certified in the specific NDE method, are expected to provide at least 90/95 POD for that flaw size to inspect fracture-critical hardware. Scope: This document is specifically applicable to NASA Technical Standards that establish the NDE requirements for any NASA system or component, flight or ground, where fracture control and a quantitative demonstration of POD is a requirement, including NASA-STD-5009B, Nondestructive Evaluation Requirements for Fracture-Critical Metallic Components, and NASA-STD-5019A,Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware.

Probability of Detection↗

Advancing Dust Tolerant Mechanisms for a Sustained Exploration of the Moon

Introduction: “I think dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon. I think we can overcome other physio-logical or physical or mechanical problems except dust.”– Gene Cernan, Apollo 17 Technical Debrief The Apollo missions revealed the impact of lu-nar dust on mechanisms. Lunar dust particles are jagged and electrostatically charged, giving them the ability to bind or damage mechanisms and alter thermal properties. Reports documented clogged equipment and jammed mechanisms in every mission, regardless of surface duration, as well as clogged mechanisms in the Extravehicular Mobility Suit (EMS), including zippers, wrist and hose locks, faceplates, and sunshades [1-2]. Several astronauts remarked they could not have sustained surface activity much longer because clogged joints would have frozen up completely [2]. Effective dust mitigation strategies are need-ed to support longer duration stays on the lunar surface [3-4]. State of the Art: Technology for mechanisms able to operate in dusty enviroments is advancing rapidly due to the needs of both Mars rovers and the Artemis program. Vacuum-tight connectors are essential for spacesuits and habitats, and their performance can be dependent on cleaning technologies, which have proven difficult on the lunar surface. Several TRL 3-5 technologies are undergoing tests with the expectation to reach TRL 6 within 1-2 years. Some mechanisms will be infused and tested on the VIPER (Volatiles Inves-tigating Polar Exploration Rover) mission planned for mid-2020s. NASA Funded Efforts: NASA has recognized the need for dust tolerant mechanisms, and has partnered with industry to advance the state-of-the-art. At NASA GRC, KSC, and JSC, the Dust Tolerant Mechanisms Project is working to devel-op advanced actuator seals for rotary joints and rotary bearing technologies for long-term sus-tained operation in lunar dust environments. An-other NASA project at NASA GRC, partnered with GSFC, JPL, and KSC is Motors for Dusty & Ex-treme Cold Environments (MDECE). MDECE is developing an unheated magnetically-geared mo-tor that can operate continuously for a long dura-tion at an ambient temperature of -243 ºC (33 K). NASA GRC has the capability to characterize the effects of dust on seals, mechanisms, and other mating surfaces and components under lunar conditions [5]. Through the SBIR/STTR program, NASA has funded several companies to advance dust toler-ant mechanisms via the Dust Tolerant Mecha-nisms sub-topic with applications in surface mobil-ity, spacesuits, connectors, joints, and more. LSIC and Community Efforts: The Lunar Surface Innovation Consortium (LSIC) Dust Miti-gation focus group has fostered collaborations across NASA, industry, and academia to develop solutions that minimizes the impact of lunar dust on robotic and human systems. Community ef-forts have included topical meetings on dust tol-erant mechanisms, featured technology presenta-tions, and feedback to NASA on potential gaps and needs. Testing: In 2021, NASA released NASA-STD-1008 [6]. This NASA Technical Standard estab-lishes minimum requirements and provides guid-ance for testing systems and hardware to be ex-posed to dust in planetary environments. The standard has specific sections dedicated to Mechanisms Testing (e.g. bearings, gears) as well as Seals and Mating Surfaces Testing (e.g. hatches, docking systems). Gaps and Needs: NASA is tracking dust tol-erant mechanisms as a gap in a cross-directorate analysis of capability areas needed to enable fu-ture human space-flight architectures. Two high-priority gap areas include additional facilities for testing mechanisms in lunar-surface conditions, and a better understanding of vulnerabilities to the smallest, nanometer-scale dust particles. Conclusion: Understanding and mitigating lu-nar dust is critical to successful, sustained opera-tions on the lunar surface – whether autonomous or otherwise. This presentation will discuss both the state-of-the-art and open needs in lunar dust tolerant mechanisms, technology impacts, mitiga-tion approaches, testing, LSIC community efforts, and more. References: [1] Gaier, J. R. (2020). The Im-pact of Dust on Lunar Surface Equipment During Apollo. Lunar Dust 2020. [2] GRC, & Gaier, J. R. (2005). The Effects of Lunar Dust on EVA Sys-tems During the Apollo Missions. [3] Johansen, M. R. (2020). An Update on NASA’s Lunar Dust Mitigation Strategy. Lunar Dust 2020. [4] ASI, CSA, ESA, JAXA, & NASA. (2016). Dust Mitiga-tion Gap Assessment Report. [5] Jimenez, N. et al (2022), LPSC Abstract 2572. [6] NASA-STD-1008, 2021.

J I Nunez↗

Operational Implications from Field Test Results: Sensorimotor Guidelines for Exploration Missions

Two key sensorimotor objectives of the joint NASA-Russian Field Test (FT) study were (1) to quantify functional performance on long duration crewmembers as close to landing as possible, and (2) to develop a recovery timeline back to preflight baseline. The purpose of this presentation is to provide an overview of the FT results and discuss the operational implications for future exploration missions. The NASA and Russian teams conducted a total of 48 Field Tests, including 18 using a reduced Pilot FT (PFT) protocol. The combined PFT/FT cohort included 14 first-time fliers, 4F, and nine cosmonauts who repeated FT during a second mission. The mission durations were 185 ± 42 days, mean ± std. Nominally, the initial postflight session was performed in the medical test at the Soyuz landing site or at the nearby airport (R+2.2 ± 1.3 hrs, mean ± std), and then repeated multiple times throughout the postflight recovery. The common tasks performed across PFT and full FT protocols included sit-to-stand, recovery from fall (prone to stand) and tandem walk, performed in that order of increasing difficulty. The full FT protocol also included seated tasks (eccentric gaze, dysmetria finger to nose, eye-hand coordination on a tablet, grip force discrimination), a standing posture test with an upper body perturbation, a timed up and go mobility test with obstacles, and a dynamic visual acuity task during vertical oscillations. While there was considerable variability in the postflight outcome measures across crewmembers, the level of vestibular/cerebellar and sensorimotor impairment was greater than previously observed during shorter spaceflight missions. Most striking was the higher incidence of motion sickness even without constraining the standard medical interventions. Motion sensitivity prevented some crewmembers from attempting and/or completing the early testing. The recovery timeline varied with task complexity, generally taking longer when either the basis of support was limited (e.g., tandem walk) or visual cues were deprived (eyes closed). Based on this evidence, mission planners need to expect a range of response across individuals and tasks following G-transitions. Individual health assessments are recommended along with development of pre-worked, prioritized content and timelines, with the ability to change roles depending on crew readiness. Handholds and balance aids are recommended to help stabilize the crewmembers to perform specific tasks (e.g., touch screen selection) or to allow the crewmember the ability to rest with onset of symptoms. Based on anecdotal reports and performance on computerized dynamic posturography, multiple testing on landing day appeared to be beneficial for some participants, while others may have pushed beyond their motion tolerance limit in an effort to complete more FT objectives. Instead of delaying planetary surface operations to allow for recovery, our results suggest that early mobility may be important. Early active self-administered retraining, individualized based on the level of initial impairment and motion sensitivity, will enable a more efficient motor learning and enhance crew performance.

S J Wood↗

Analysis of Pull Force Test Results for Crimped Connections

Crimped electrical contacts are reliable when strict process controls are followed during manufacturing and accompanied by continuous process verification through pull force testing. Cable and wire harness assemblies’ standards are developed and refined over time to provide the minimum pull force that a crimp contact must meet before it breaks from the wire. However, in practice the failures occur at a much higher tensile strength than the minimum required. The first section of this paper reviewed 780 pull force test results provided by NASA Centers were collected and analyzed to determine how the data compares to NASA’s pre-existing requirements from the cable/harness standards NASA-STD-8739.4 and IPC/WHMA-A-620B-S. The measured tensile strength of most of the contact/conductor pairs (i.e. Contact/Wires or C/W) exceeded the minimum pull force values of NASA-STD-8739.4 and IPC/WHMA-A-620 standards by at least 100 %. The tensile strength samples of the C/W pairs values followed a normal distribution with an average tensile strength value that was at least 182 % of the minimum requirement, and all the samples analyzed passed the pull force testing. In addition, the 95 % confidence interval of the average tensile strength distributions for several C/W pairs was determined and plotted as error bars to show that there is good likelihood to observe C/W pair normal distribution with a 95 % confidence interval that will meet and surpass the standard requirements. The frequency of pull force testing can be problematic for projects because of the cost and availability of spare contacts for the destructive test. It could be possible to reduce the frequency of pull force testing if at the beginning of the production run, the conditions of the crimp tool and materials are verified, and the settings of the tool remain unchanged throughout the process. However, the project must evaluate the impact to risk from reducing the frequency of testing.

Crimped connections↗

Guidelines for Mapping Reliably Detectable Dye Penetrant Crack Size at External Corners with Fillet Radii

The technical memorandum addresses some concerns with dye penetrant crack sizes stated in Table 1 (and Table 2) of NASA-STD-5009B. Table 1 corner crack size of a = 0.100” and c = 0.150” is reasoned to be larger than it should be based on the original Standard dye penetrant qualification. In the original Standard dye penetrant qualification, surface crack size with depth a = 0.075” x length 2c = 0.150” was qualified with minimum 90% Probability of Detection (POD) with 95% confidence (conf.). No corner crack size was qualified by direct POD testing in original dye penetrant qualification. Standard dye penetrant detectable crack size for radiused corner is not addressed in NASA-STD-5009B.

Dye Penetrant Testing↗

2023 Artemis Crew Health and Performance System Model Development

While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper

Systems engineering↗

Development of NASA Standards for Enabling Certification of Additively Manufactured Parts

There are currently no NASA standards providing specific design and construction requirements for certification of additively manufactured parts. Several international standards organizations are developing standards for additive manufacturing; however, NASA mission schedules preclude the Agency from relying on these organizations to develop standards that are both timely and applicable. NASA and its partners in human spaceflight (Commercial Crew, Space Launch System, and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Programs) are actively developing additively manufactured parts for flight as early as 2018. To bridge this gap, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is authoring a Center-level standard (MSFC-STD-3716) 1 to establish standard practices for the Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) process. In its draft form, the MSFC standard has been used as a basis for L-PBF process implementation for each of the human spaceflight programs. The development of an Agency-level standard is proposed, based upon the principles of MSFC-STD-3716, which would have application to multiple additive manufacturing processes and be readily adaptable to all NASA programs.

NASA Standards↗