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Age at exposure and attained age variations of cancer risk in the Japanese A-bomb and radiotherapy cohorts

Purpose: Phenomenological risk models for radiation-induced cancer are frequently applied to estimate the risk of radiation-induced cancers at radiotherapy doses. Such models often include the effect modification, of the main risk to radiation dose response, by age at exposure and attained age. The aim of this paper is to compare the patterns in risk effect modification by age, between models obtained from the Japanese atomic-bomb (A-bomb) survivor data and models for cancer risks previously reported for radiotherapy patients. Patterns in risk effect modification by age from the epidemiological studies of radiotherapy patients were also used to refine and extend the risk effect modification by age obtained from the A-bomb survivor data, so that more universal models can be presented here. Methods: Simple log-linear and power functions of age for the risk effect modification applied in models of the A-bomb survivor data are compared to risks from epidemiological studies of second cancers after radiotherapy. These functions of age were also refined and fitted to radiotherapy risks. The resulting age models provide a refined and extended functional dependence of risk with age at exposure and attained age especially beyond 40 and 65 yr, respectively, and provide a better representation than the currently available simple age functions. Results: It was found that the A-bomb models predict risk similarly to the outcomes of testicular cancer survivors. The survivors of Hodgkin’s disease show steeper variations of risk with both age at exposure and attained age. The extended models predict solid cancer risk increase as a function of age at exposure beyond 40 yr and the risk decrease as a function of attained age beyond 65 yr better than the simple models. Conclusions: The standard functions for risk effect modification by age, based on the A-bomb survivor data, predict second cancer risk in radiotherapy patients for ages at exposure prior to 40 yr and attained ages before 55 yr reasonably well. However, for larger ages, the refined and extended models can be applied to predict the risk as a function of age.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Benzyl trichloroacetimidates as derivatizing agents for phosphonic acids related to nerve agents by EI-GC-MS during OPCW proficiency test scenarios

Abstract The use of benzyl trichloroacetimidates for the benzylation of phosphonic acid nerve agent markers under neutral, basic, and slightly acidic conditions is presented. The benzyl-derived phosphonic acids were detected and analyzed by Electron Ionization Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry (EI-GC–MS). The phosphonic acids used in this work included ethyl-, cyclohexyl- and pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid, first pass hydrolysis products from the nerve agents ethyl N -2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (VX), cyclosarin (GF) and soman (GD) respectively. Optimization of reaction parameters for the benzylation included reaction time and solvent, temperature and the effect of the absence or presence of catalytic acid. The optimized conditions for the derivatization of the phosphonic acids specifically for their benzylation, included neutral as well as catalytic acid (< 5 mol%) and benzyl 2,2,2-trichloroacetimidate in excess coupled to heating the mixture to 60 °C in acetonitrile for 4 h. While the neutral conditions for the method proved to be efficient for the preparation of the p -methoxybenzyl esters of the phosphonic acids, the acid-catalyzed process appeared to provide much lower yields of the products relative to its benzyl counterpart. The method’s efficiency was tested in the successful derivatization and identification of pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid (PMPA) as its benzyl ester when present at a concentration of ~ 5 μg/g in a soil matrix featured in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 44th proficiency test (PT). Additionally, the protocol was used in the detection and identification of PMPA when spiked at ~ 10 μg/mL concentration in a fatty acid-rich liquid matrix featured during the 38 th OPCW-PT. The benzyl derivative of PMPA was partially corroborated with the instrument's internal NIST spectral library and the OPCW central analytical database (OCAD v.21_2019) but unambiguously identified through comparison with a synthesized authentic standard. The method’s MDL (LOD) values for the benzyl and the p -methoxybenzyl pinacolyl methylphosphonic acids were determined to be 35 and 63 ng/mL respectively, while the method’s Limit of Quantitation (LOQ) was determined to be 104 and 189 ng/mL respectively in the OPCW-PT soil matrix evaluated.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

RLUOB Celebration

Los Alamos National Laboratory's newest facility, the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB), is also its first to achieve both the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) status and LEED Gold certification from the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC). From its robust design to its advanced scientific equipment, RLUOB is essential to the Laboratory's national security mission in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) nuclear weapons program. At more than 200,000 square feet, this building is the only radiological facility within the Department of Energy to have attained LEED Gold, which contributes to NNSA's achievement towards the high performance sustainable building goals outlined in Executive Order 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance. 'As we celebrate RLUOB being completed almost one year ahead of schedule and having achieved LEED certification at the Gold level, we approach our plutonium mission at Los Alamos and NNSA with a great sense of achievement,' said Don Cook, NNSA's deputy administrator for defense programs. 'RLUOB adds a major component to NNSA's plutonium support capability and RLUOB demonstrates our commitment in helping to deliver President Obama's nuclear security agenda which includes ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without testing.' The facility contains laboratories for analytical chemistry and materials characterization of special nuclear material, along with space for offices, training and emergency operations. Its multi-functional purpose makes RLUOB a unique project for which LEED certification was sought. 'LEED certification was a huge goal and one we sought from the very beginning of this project,' said Laboratory Director Charlie McMillan. 'It's an important step forward, allowing us to advance national security science in modern, safer, more efficient infrastructure.' The Laboratory's project team and its contractor partners, especially in coordination with Jacobs Engineering, focused on green design and construction in LEED categories, such as sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation in design. RLUOB's features include: (1) Building envelope design (orientation, materials and insulation) yielded a 20 percent improvement in energy performance; (2) Incorporation of building materials with 24 percent recycled content; (3) Diversion of 72 percent of construction-generated materials through reuse, recycle and salvage; (4) Roofing comprised of 93 percent highly-reflective materials to reduce heat island effects; (5) High efficiency, gas-fired hot water boilers, air-cooled chillers, thermal storage systems and variable frequency drives for compressors, fans and pumps; (6) Energy efficient lighting for interiors, exteriors, process glove boxes and fume hoods; (7) Water efficient fixtures resulting in 30 percent reduction in usage; (8) Low emission paints and carpeting for improved indoor air quality; (9) Landscaping that doesn't require permanent irrigation; (10) Enhanced building system commissioning; and (11) Comprehensive transportation alternatives, including public transportation, bicycle storage and changing rooms, and a refueling station for government vehicles using alternative fuels. 'RLUOB's LEED certification demonstrates tremendous leadership in green building,' says Rick Fedrizzi, president and CEO of USGBC. 'The urgency of our mission has challenged the industry to move faster and reach further than ever before, and RLUOB serves as a prime example of just how much we can accomplish.'

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Performance Assessment of a New Gamma Spectroscopy Toolkit: Peak Doctor and the Spectral Nondestructive Assay Platform (SNAP) - 17397

High resolution gamma spectroscopy (HRGS) is a widely used technique for non-destructive characterization of nuclear materials, and assay of radioactive waste. The ability to accurately evaluate raw spectral data is an important step in producing high-quality results. A spectral analysis application known as Peak Doctor has been developed under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between LANL and Pajarito Scientific Corporation (PSC). The software has undergone several years of testing and validation by the Radioactive Waste Characterization Team of the LANL Waste Management Services Group (WM-SVS). PeakDoctor is designed to work with the Spectral Nondestructive Assay Platform (SNAP{sup TM}) to provide a complete HRGS analysis engine. SNAP{sup TM} performs model specific corrections for attenuation and geometry. These applications are the major components of a new toolkit designed primarily for portable far-field non-destructive assay. Peak Doctor performs a very accurate peak fit analysis with the goal of improving upon the capabilities of existing commercially available routines. It is designed to be user-configurable and can be customized to any given type of detector and any given type of spectrum. Peak Doctor was developed to resolve many of the inherent complexities in gamma ray spectra including overlapping peaks, complex multiplet regions, large step peaks, backscatter regions and Compton edges. Unlike most spectral analysis platforms, Peak Doctor does not rely on the energy calibration and detector resolution parameters that are saved by the operator in the spectrum file. Instead, key parameters are pre-defined for individual detectors. The software fits a continuum using a series of splines between a series of junctions or 'knots'. Fitting techniques are used to join the splines together to create a near-continuous multi-element curve. Optimizing the location of the knots is one of Peak Doctor's most powerful features. The knots are initially configured using a pre-defined list and are removed or added automatically during the fitting process. Knots are also created when new features are identified such as Step Peaks and Compton Edges. The user can also manually specify knots in order to improve the continuum fit. The initial fit is improved on by removing any outlier regions (which are converted to peaks) and the continuum fitting process is repeated. At this stage, an experienced user can work interactively with the fit by manually converting peak regions to continuum or vice versa. The final step is to fit a series of peaks above the continuum based on detector parameters. Single and multiplet peaks are then processed by either the tailing (piecewise) or non-tailing (Gaussian) Levenberg Marquardt non-linear peak fitting routine depending on the user defined selection. Only a rough knowledge of the detector characteristics (energy calibration and resolution) is required for the fitting process to proceed with good accuracy. Any peaks that are missed can be manually added by the user and will also be fitted. Discontinuities in the peak / continuum fit can be rapidly identified by reviewing the 'residuals scale' plot. For waste streams that are well characterized, it is often the case that routinely encountered spectra will have similar peaks and continuum features. For these cases a handy 'One Step' method is available that proceeds in an automated fashion without user interaction. Peak Doctor has been configured with a set of default spectrum types including plutonium / transuranic waste (including Weapons Grade Pu, Heat Source Pu, Am-241, Am-243 and Np-237), depleted or enriched uranium, nuclear power plant / intermediate level waste (with fission and activation products such as Cs-137 and Co-60) as well as Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM). The user can easily add new spectrum types for specific waste streams or other types of radiological / special nuclear materials. The output from PeakDoctor (including net peak area, centroid energy and a list of minimum detectable activity levels at pre-defined regions) is used by SNAP{sup TM} to complete the data analysis process. Isotope activities are calculated using configurable template-driven geometry and attenuation correction methods. The software accounts for matrix and container wall effects, collimator / angular corrections, detector efficiency (based on calibration curves) and stand-off distance. SNAP{sup TM} uses published algorithms incorporating a series of decision points during its operation to allow the analyst to provide logical input to guide the software during the analysis of each unique spectrum. The Peak Doctor / SNAP{sup TM} toolkit has been extensively tested and validated under a variety of conditions using 'benchmark' reference spectra. Test scenarios reported include HPGe-based measurements of well characterized uranium and plutonium standards and radioactive sources with a variety of different geometries and matrix materials including surrogate drums and boxes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Solar-Powered Air Stripping at the Rocky Flats Site, Colorado - 12361

The U.S. Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Site (the Site), near Denver, Colorado, is a former nuclear weapons facility that was constructed beginning in 1951. With the end of the Cold War, the Site was cleaned up and closed in 2005. Four gravity-driven groundwater treatment systems were installed during cleanup, and their continued operation was incorporated into the final remedy for the Site. All utilities, including electrical power, were removed as part of this closure, so all Site electrical power needs are now met with small solar-powered systems. The Mound Site Plume Treatment System (MSPTS) was installed in 1998 as an innovative system based on zero-valent iron (ZVI). Groundwater flow from the Mound source area containing elevated concentrations of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), primarily in the tetrachloroethene (PCE)-trichloroethene (TCE) family of chlorinated solvents, is intercepted by a collection trench and routed to twin ZVI treatment cells. Later, in 2005, remediation of VOC-contaminated soils at a second up-gradient source area included adding an electron donor to the backfill to help stimulate biodegradation. This reduced concentrations of primary constituents but caused down-gradient groundwater to contain elevated levels of recalcitrant degradation byproducts, particularly cis-1,2-dichloroethene and vinyl chloride. A gravel drain installed as part of the 2005 remediation directs contaminated groundwater from this second source area to the MSPTS for treatment. This additional contaminant load, coupled with correspondingly reduced residence time within the ZVI media due to the increased flow rate, resulted in reduced treatment effectiveness. Elevated concentrations of VOCs were then detected in MSPTS effluent, as well as in surface water at the downstream performance monitoring location for the MSPTS. Subsequent consultations with the Site regulators led to the decision to add a polishing component to reduce residual VOCs in MSPTS effluent. Initially, several alternatives such as commercial air strippers and cascade aerators were evaluated; resulting cost estimates exceeded $100,000. After several simpler alternatives were considered and prototype testing was conducted, the existing effluent metering manhole was converted to house a spray-nozzle based, solar-powered air stripper, at a cost of approximately $20,000. About two-thirds of this cost was for the solar power system, which was initially designed to only provide power for 12 hours per day. Performance data are being collected and adjustments made to optimize the design, determine maintenance requirements, and establish power needs for continuous operation. Analytical data confirm the air stripper is sharply reducing concentrations of residual contaminants. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2009

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NTS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected, then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2009, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.69 mrem/yr, well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NTS, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000044 mrem/yr, 230,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2009

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NTS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected, then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2009, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.69 mrem/yr, well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NTS, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000044 mrem/yr, 230,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) at PNNL

Nuclear research is one of the core components of PNNL's mission. The centerpiece of PNNL's nuclear research is the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL), a Category 2 nuclear facility with state-of-the-art instrumentation, scientific expertise, and specialized capabilities that enable research with significant quantities of fissionable materials and other radionuclides—from tritium to plutonium. High impact radiological research has been conducted in the RPL since the 1950's, when nuclear weapons and energy production at Hanford were at the forefront of national defense. Since then, significant investments have been made in the RPL to maintain it as a premier nuclear science research facility supporting multiple programs. Most recently, PNNL is developing a world-class analytical electron microscopy facility dedicated to the characterization of radiological materials.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

FY12 Quarter 3 Computing Utilization Report – LANL

DSW continues to dominate the capacity workload, with a focus in Q3 on common model baselining runs in preparation for the Annual Assessment Review (AAR) of the weapon systems. There remains unmet demand for higher fidelity simulations, and for increased throughput of simulations. Common model baselining activities would benefit from doubling the resolution of the models and running twice as many simulations. Capacity systems were also utilized during the quarter to prepare for upcoming Level 2 milestones. Other notable DSW activities include validation of new physics models and safety studies. The safety team used the capacity resources extensively for projects involving 3D computer simulations for the Furrow series of experiments at DARHT (a Level 2 milestone), fragment impact, surety theme, PANTEX assessments, and the 120-day study. With the more than tripling of classified capacity computing resources with the addition of the Luna system and the safety team's imminent access to the Cielo system, demand has been met for current needs. The safety team has performed successful scaling studies on Luna up to 16K PE size-jobs with linear scaling, running the large 3D simulations required for the analysis of Furrow. They will be investigating scaling studies on the Cielo system with the Lustre file system in Q4. Overall average capacity utilization was impacted by negative effects of the LANL Voluntary Separation Program (VSP) at the beginning of Q3, in which programmatic staffing was reduced by 6%, with further losses due to management backfills and attrition, resulting in about 10% fewer users. All classified systems were impacted in April by a planned 2 day red network outage. ASC capacity workload continues to focus on code development, regression testing, and verification and validation (V&V) studies. Significant capacity cycles were used in preparation for a JOWOG in May and several upcoming L2 milestones due in Q4. A network transition has been underway on the unclassified networks to increase access of all ASC users to the unclassified systems through the Yellow Turquoise Integration (YeTI) project. This will help to alleviate the longstanding shortage of resources for ASC unclassified code development and regression testing, and also make a broader palette of machines available to unclassified ASC users, including PSAAP Alliance users. The Moonlight system will be the first capacity resource to be made available through the YETI project, and will make available a significant increase in cycles, as well as GPGPU accelerator technology. The Turing and Lobo machines will be decommissioned in the next quarter. ASC projects running on Cielo as part of the CCC-3 include turbulence, hydrodynamics, burn, asteroids, polycrystals, capability and runtime performance improvements, and materials including carbon and silicone.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

2019↗

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions, Calendar Year 2010

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR, 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as those from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. Because this report is intended to discuss radioactive air emissions during calendar year 2010, data on radionuclides in air from the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant releases are not presented but will be included in the report for calendar year 2011. The NNSS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE, 1995). This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001(EPA, 2001a) and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR, 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2010, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000032 mrem/yr, more than 300,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Biosecurity through Public Health System Design.

We applied modeling and simulation to examine the real-world tradeoffs between developingcountry public-health improvement and the need to improve the identification, tracking, and security of agents with bio-weapons potential. Traditionally, the international community has applied facility-focused strategies for improving biosecurity and biosafety. This work examines how system-level assessments and improvements can foster biosecurity and biosafety. We modeled medical laboratory resources and capabilities to identify scenarios where biosurveillance goals are transparently aligned with public health needs, and resource are distributed in a way that maximizes their ability to serve patients while minimizing security a nd safety risks. Our modeling platform simulates key processes involved in healthcare system operation, such as sample collection, transport, and analysis at medical laboratories. The research reported here extends the prior art by provided two key compone nts for comparative performance assessment: a model of patient interaction dynamics, and the capability to perform uncertainty quantification. In addition, we have outlined a process for incorporating quantitative biosecurity and biosafety risk measures. Two test problems were used to exercise these research products examine (a) Systemic effects of technological innovation and (b) Right -sizing of laboratory networks.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2017

Report submitted to regulators (State of Nevada and EPA Region IV). Required to document compliance with 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since nuclear testing ended in 1992, radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2017, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 5.7% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2017 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the adjacent U.S. Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range; this individual received a dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.0000098 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2013

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitations to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2013, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 10.1% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 9 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of the value measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000011 mrem/yr, more than 900,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Nature of Scatter at the DARHT Facility and Suggestions for Improved Modeling of DARHT Facility

The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program [1] is designed to sustain and evaluate the nuclear weapons stockpile while foregoing underground nuclear tests. The maintenance of a smaller, aging U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing requires complex computer calculations [14]. These calculations in turn need to be verified and benchmarked [14]. A wide range of research facilities have been used to test and evaluate nuclear weapons while respecting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) [2]. Some of these facilities include the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories, and the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This research will focus largely on DARHT (although some information from Cygnus and the Los Alamos Microtron may be used in this research) by modeling it and comparing to experimental data. DARHT is an electron accelerator that employs high-energy flash x-ray sources for imaging hydro-tests. This research proposes to address some of the issues crucial to understanding DARHT Axis II and the analysis of the radiographic images produced. Primarily, the nature of scatter at DARHT will be modeled and verified with experimental data. It will then be shown that certain design decisions can be made to optimize the scatter field for hydrotest experiments. Spectral effects will be briefly explored to determine if there is any considerable effect on the density reconstruction caused by changes in the energy spectrum caused by target changes. Finally, a generalized scatter model will be made using results from MCNP that can be convolved with the direct transmission of an object to simulate the scatter of that object at the detector plane. The region in which with this scatter model is appropriate will be explored.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗