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At least 1,639 records · Page 91

Path Scan Operational Data-Based Test Report

The TTP program is managed by DHS S&T Cyber Division and facilitates the transition of technology from the research lab to the Homeland Security Enterprise. It serves as a connection point for cyber security researchers, the Federal Government, and the private sector. Technologies targeted are those that are likely to transition successfully to the commercial market and expected to have notable impact on the cyber security of our Nation’s networks or systems. The test element of the TTP program aids in the technology transfer process and is not intended to be adversarial. Additional information on the TTP program and the iterative process used can be found in Appendix A - TTP Program Overview.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Review of Existing Characterization Data Interim Report for Southeast Regional Carbon Storage Partnership: Offshore Gulf of Mexico

The goal of this effort is to expand the knowledge base required for commercially viable, secure, long-term, large-scale carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) subsea storage in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GOM), with or without enhanced hydrocarbon recovery. The effort is intended to support DOE’s long-term objective to ensure a comprehensive assessment of the potential to implement offshore CO 2 subsea storage in the GOM. This is being facilitated by expanding the membership of the Southern States Energy Board’s (SSEB) existing Southeast Offshore Storage Resource Assessment (DE-FE0026082) GOM government-industry partnership.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses (2012 Annual Summary Report)

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE 1999a, 2000). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for fiscal year (FY) 2012. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2012 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (RD) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and RD activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2012 include the following: Release of a special analysis for the Area 3 RWMS assessing the continuing validity of the PA and CA; Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through FY 2012; Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis; and Development of version 4.114 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA model. The Area 3 RWMS has been in inactive status since July 1, 2006, with the last shipment received in April 2006. The FY 2012 review of operations, facility design, closure plans, monitoring results, and RD results for the Area 3 RWMS indicates no changes that would impact PA validity. A special analysis using the Area 3 RWMS v2.102 GoldSim PA model was prepared to update the PA results for the Area 3 RWMS in FY 2012. The special analysis concludes that all performance objectives can be met and the Area 3 RWMS PA remains valid. There is no need to the revise the Area 3 RWMS PA. Review of Area 5 RWMS operations, design, closure plans, monitoring results, and RD activities indicates no significant changes other than an increase in the inventory disposed. The FY 2012 PA results, generated with the Area 5 RWMS v4.114 GoldSim PA model, indicate that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives. The results and conclusions of the Area 5 RWMS PA are judged valid, and there is no need to the revise the PA. A review of changes potentially impacting the CAs indicates that no significant changes occurred in FY 2012. The continuing adequacy of the CAs was evaluated with the new models, and no significant changes that would alter CA results or conclusions were found. The revision of the Area 3 RWMS CA, which will include the Underground Test Area source term (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 97), is scheduled for FY 2024, following the completion of the Yucca Flat CAU 97 Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan in FY 2016. Inclusion of the Frenchman Flat CAU 98 results in the Area 5 RWMS CA is scheduled for FY 2016, pending the completion of the CAU 98 closure report in FY 2015. Near-term RD efforts will focus on continuing development of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA and inventory models.

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Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report covers fiscal year 2012 (October 2011–September 2012). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report.

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A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗

Control system devices : architectures and supply channels overview.

This report describes a research project to examine the hardware used in automated control systems like those that control the electric grid. This report provides an overview of the vendors, architectures, and supply channels for a number of control system devices. The research itself represents an attempt to probe more deeply into the area of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) - the specialized digital computers that control individual processes within supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The report (1) provides an overview of control system networks and PLC architecture, (2) furnishes profiles for the top eight vendors in the PLC industry, (3) discusses the communications protocols used in different industries, and (4) analyzes the hardware used in several PLC devices. As part of the project, several PLCs were disassembled to identify constituent components. That information will direct the next step of the research, which will greatly increase our understanding of PLC security in both the hardware and software areas. Such an understanding is vital for discerning the potential national security impact of security flaws in these devices, as well as for developing proactive countermeasures.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

2013 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE 1999a, 2000). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for fiscal year (FY) 2013. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2013 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2013 include the following: • Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through. FY 2013 • Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis. • Development of version 4.115 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA model.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗

Toward Urban Water Security: Broadening the Use of Machine Learning Methods for Mitigating Urban Water Hazards

Due to the complex interactions of human activity and the hydrological cycle, achieving urban water security requires comprehensive planning processes that address urban water hazards using a holistic approach. However, the effective implementation of such an approach requires the collection and curation of large amounts of disparate data, and reliable methods for modeling processes that may be co-evolutionary yet traditionally represented in non-integrable ways. In recent decades, many hydrological studies have utilized advanced machine learning and information technologies to approximate and predict physical processes, yet none have synthesized these methods into a comprehensive urban water security plan. In this paper, we review ways in which advanced machine learning techniques have been applied to specific aspects of the hydrological cycle and discuss their potential applications for addressing challenges in mitigating multiple water hazards over urban areas. We also describe a vision that integrates these machine learning applications into a comprehensive watershed-to-community planning workflow for smart-cities management of urban water resources.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Visual Analytics for Power Grid Contingency Analysis

Contingency analysis is the process of employing different measures to model scenarios, analyze them, and then derive the best response to remove the threats. This application paper focuses on a class of contingency analysis problems found in the power grid management system. A power grid is a geographically distributed interconnected transmission network that transmits and delivers electricity from generators to end users. The power grid contingency analysis problem is increasingly important because of both the growing size of the underlying raw data that need to be analyzed and the urgency to deliver working solutions in an aggressive timeframe. Failure to do so may bring significant financial, economic, and security impacts to all parties involved and the society at large. The paper presents a scalable visual analytics pipeline that transforms about 100 million contingency scenarios to a manageable size and form for grid operators to examine different scenarios and come up with preventive or mitigation strategies to address the problems in a predictive and timely manner. Great attention is given to the computational scalability, information scalability, visual scalability, and display scalability issues surrounding the data analytics pipeline. Most of the large-scale computation requirements of our work are conducted on a Cray XMT multi-threaded parallel computer. The paper demonstrates a number of examples using western North American power grid models and data.

contingency analysis↗

DOE CESER 6 GHz Interference Study

DOE CESER has sponsored Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to conduct an objective and independent study of potential 6 GHz interference from outdoor operation of unlicensed devices in the 6 GHz band on fixed service (FS) microwave communication links operated by electrical sector incumbents in that band. INL is collaborating with University of Notre Dame (UND), Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Lockard & White, Southern Company, and AT&T, to gather data with real-world 6 GHz interference experiments and identify (1) the potential for interference from unlicensed devices and (2) the interference necessary to cause harm to the incumbents. In addition to the functional assessment, a security assessment of the FCC mandated Automatic Frequency Coordination (AFC) System to regulate use of unlicensed 6 GHz standard power devices is also being conducted. A major objective is to create a science-based and defensible methodology used to produce the necessary data and to derive objective conclusions. This proven methodology can then be used to produce objective data and conclusions for other spectrum bands with similar incumbent uses including 4.4 – 4.9 GHz and 7.125 – 7.4 GHz, identified in the reconciliation bill that was adopted on July 4, 2025, as well as the National Spectrum Strategy discussions that are ongoing. This report contains 6 GHz field experiments and findings in the following real-world scenarios with commercial unlicensed standard power (SP) 6 GHz devices regulated by Automated Frequency Coordination (AFC): • University of Notre Dame (UND) Stadium with a capacity of 80,000 spectators, where Wi-Fi operating in 6 GHz has been deployed recently • Southern Company 6 GHz FS microwave link between Columbus and Fortson, Georgia Following are the following key findings from this study. 1. The AFC is under-protective of FS when line-of-sight exists along the path centerline. Data collected at Southern’s 6 GHz fixed link site shows significant erosion of as much as 21.4-24.4 dB of under-protection that can lead to potential service degradation under typical operating conditions. This first key finding is most likely the result of erroneous use of the RF propagation model. INL will collaborate with EPRI and the AFC Functional Requirements Working Group to submit a change request to the WinnForum TS-1014 standard towards correct use of the propagation model by the AFC. 2. There is additive interference effect of about 3 dB from nearly equal power interferers measured from simultaneous operation of two SP AP's operating co-channel with the FS receive from different locations along the path. This second key finding should be used to add the impact of additive interference of operation of multiple APs in the same geographical area, to the next generation of AFCs. INL will collaborate with FCC on the need for the AFC to consider additive interference. We also recommend that additional experiments are conducted on 6 GHz spectrum interference to further improve the AFC operation as the number of outdoor Wi-Fi devices continues to increase. These proposed steps and recommendations will make the co-existence of the incumbents and the 6 GHz outdoor Wi-Fi providers possible without any impact on the incumbents with a win-win outcome for all.

6 GHz↗

Idaho National Laboratory Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Intrusion Detection System (SCADA IDS)

Current Intrusion Detection System (IDS) technology is not suited to be widely deployed inside a Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) environment. Anomaly- and signature-based IDS technologies have developed methods to cover information technology-based networks activity and protocols effectively. However, these IDS technologies do not include the fine protocol granularity required to ensure network security inside an environment with weak protocols lacking authentication and encryption. By implementing a more specific and more intelligent packet inspection mechanism, tailored traffic flow analysis, and unique packet tampering detection, IDS technology developed specifically for SCADA environments can be deployed with confidence in detecting malicious activity.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Coincidence/Multiplicity Photofission Measurements

An series of experiments using the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) photonuclear inspection system and a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)-supplied, list-mode data acquisition method have shown enhanced performance utilizing pulsed photofission-induced, neutron coincidence counting between pulses of an up-to-10-MeV electron accelerator for nuclear material detection and identification. The enhanced inspection methodology has applicability to homeland security, treaty-related support, and weapon dismantlement applications. For the latter, this technology can directly support of Department of Energy/NA241 programmatic mission objectives relative to future Rocky Ridge-type testing campaigns for active inspection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Effects of high count rate and gain shift on isotope identification algorithms

Spectroscopic gamma-ray detectors are used for many research, industrial, and homeland- security applications. Thallium-doped sodium iodide, (NaI(Tl)), scintillation crystals coupled to photomultiplier tubes provide medium-resolution spectral data about the surrounding environment. NaI(Tl)-based detectors, paired with spectral identification algorithms, are often effective for identifying gamma-ray sources by isotope. However, intrinsic limitations for NaI(Tl) systems exist, including gain shifts and spectral marring (e.g., loss of resolution and count-rate saturation) at high count rates. These effects are hardware dependent and have strong effects on the radioisotopic identification capability of NaI(Tl)-based systems. In this work, the effects of high count rate on the response of isotope-identification algorithms are explored. It is shown that a small gain shift of a few tens of keV is sufficient to disturb identification. The onset of this and other spectral effects is estimated for NaI(Tl) crystals, and a mechanism for mitigating these effects by estimating and correcting for them is implemented and evaluated.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

MCNPX-PoliMi for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

In the past few years, efforts to develop new measurement systems to support nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security have increased substantially. Monte Carlo radiation transport is one of the simulation methods of choice for the analysis of data from existing systems and for the design of new measurement systems; it allows for accurate description of geometries, detailed modeling of particle-nucleus interactions, and event-by-event detection analysis. This paper describes the use of the Monte Carlo code MCNPX-PoliMi for nuclear-nonproliferation applications, with particular emphasis on the simulation of spontaneous and neutron-induced nuclear fission. In fact, of all possible neutron-nucleus interactions, neutron-induced fission is the most defining characteristic of special nuclear material (such as U-235 and Pu-239), which is the material of interest in nuclear-nonproliferation applications. The MCNP-PoliMi code was originally released from the Radiation Safety Shielding Center (RSSIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2003 [1]; the MCNPX-PoliMi code contains many enhancements and is based on MCNPX ver. 2.7.0. MCNPX-PoliMi ver. 2.0 was released through RSICC in 2012 as a patch to MCNPX ver. 2.7.0 and as an executable [2].

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

VAST 2009 Challenge: An Insider Threat

The 4th year of the VAST Challenge offered participating teams the opportunity to analyze three mini challenges and to combine the data and analyses and enter the Grand challenge. In this paper we provide a description of the data collections used, the overall scenario and the specific questions asked in the mini challenges. We also discuss the infrastructure developed to evaluate accuracy measures in this year’s social network mini challenge. We provide a few examples of visualizations that merited awards. As in previous year, The VAST 2009 Challenge was held in conjunction with the 2009 IEEE VAST Symposium.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Visual Analytic Platform for Interactive Validation of Human Mobility Simulations

Human mobility insights guide domain experts in an array of decisions, including critical infrastructure design, disaster response, epidemic modeling, national security, and policy making. Due to the inherent noise and privacy concerns in real-world individual-level mobility data, it is often preferred to leverage simulators that generate synthetic mobility data instead. However, it is critical to inspect and validate the output of such simulators to ensure the synthetic data is aligned with the characteristics of the population and the area of interest known to domain experts. While there exist many quantitative approaches for validating synthetic data, we argue it is also important to also validate such data qualitatively to capture aspects that are known to domain experts but difficult to quantify. In this work, we demonstrate a visual analytic platform that empowers domain experts to interact with their simulation outputs along spatial and temporal dimensions. By augmenting automated techniques and human skills, our visual analytic platform is a step towards interactive capabilities for model steering and quality control of mobility simulators.

Monadjemi, Shayan↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, Closure in Place with Administrative Controls is the preferred CAA for the 92-Acre Area. Closure activities will include the following: (1) Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the 92-Acre Area; (2) Installing use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; (3) Establishing vegetation on the cover; (4) Implementing a UR; and (5) Implementing post-closure inspections and monitoring. The Closure in Place with Administrative Controls alternative meets all requirements for the technical components evaluated, fulfills all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site, and will minimize potential future exposure pathways to the buried waste at the site.

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