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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,657 records · Page 92

Simulation-based Study of Single-Event Burnout in 4H-SiC High-Voltage Vertical Superjunction DMOSFET: Physical Failure Mechanism and Robustness vs. Performance Tradeoffs

We explore and elucidate physical failure mechanisms in a 4H-SiC, high voltage, superjunction (SJ) vertical DMOSFET from a single heavy ion strike using three-dimensional electro-thermal transient simulations. The single-event burnout (SEB) failure is thermal runaway from second breakdown, initiated by impact ionization and terminated with mesoplasma formation, at the center of the P-pillar/N+ substrate interface. We also demonstrate that the SEB performance of this SiC SJ DMOSFET is insensitive to the pillar width but sensitive to the strike location with ion strike at the P-pillar causing SEB at a lower blocking voltage than at the N-pillar. Compared to commercially available 1.2 kV blocking-rated non-SJ DMOSFETs, which have been demonstrated to survive SEB up to 525 V, the SJ DMOSFET increases SEB survival threshold voltage (VSEB) by a factor of 2.2, making it close to 1200 V, while the on-resistance is increased by only 11%. Using our recently developed figure of merit (FoM), which considers the trade-off between VSEB and on-state performance, we find that the SiC SJ DMOSFET achieves a FoM that is 14 times better, making it superior to conventional 1.2 kV SiC DMOSFETs for long-term radiation-tolerant operation in space applications.

Silicon Carbide↗

Failure is the Mother of Innovation

Space is hard. Innovation littered with failures. We learn from trial and error and the cycle of fly learn re-fly is important. This talk provides a brief history of Mars exploration and the lessons we learned from the failures and successes exploring the red planet.

Mars Exploration↗

TPS Certification by Analysis: Model-Driven Characterization of Properties and Failure in Woven Thermal Protection Systems

Woven, ablative thermal protection system (TPS) materials provide a robust option for aggressive (re)entries and thus have been baselined for the upcoming Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission's Earth Entry System (EES). The reliability requirements for MSR-EES necessitate understanding of material property variability, which could be significant given the complex structure and anisotropic nature of properties in TPS weaves, as well as the response to potential impact with micrometeoroids or orbital debris during the EES re-entry. The TPS Certification by Analysis effort within the Entry Systems Modeling project seeks to provide computational models and analyses that support the certification against such material-based risks. For the present talk, focus will be given to the characterization of baseline woven TPS material properties and mechanical failure limits, which entails (1) use of computational techniques (e.g., machine learning) to interpret computed tomography images of the weave to generate representative structural models and (2) application of multiscale material modeling approaches to characterize thermomechanical and failure properties.

thermal protection systems↗

TPS Certification by Analysis: Model-Driven Characterization of Properties and Failure in Woven Thermal Protection Systems

Woven, ablative thermal protection system (TPS) materials provide a robust option for aggressive (re)entries and thus have been baselined for the upcoming Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission’s Earth Entry System (EES). The reliability requirements for MSR-EES necessitate understanding of material property variability, which could be significant given the complex structure and anisotropic nature of properties in TPS weaves, as well as the response to potential impact with micrometeoroids or orbital debris during the EES re-entry. The TPS Certification by Analysis effort within the Entry Systems Modeling project seeks to provide computational models and analyses that support the certification against such material-based risks. For the present talk, focus will be given to the characterization of baseline woven TPS material properties and mechanical failure limits, which entails (1) use of computational techniques (e.g., machine learning) to interpret computed tomography images of the weave to generate representative structural models and (2) application of multiscale material modeling approaches to characterize thermomechanical and failure properties.

Justin B. Haskins↗

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗

Overview of recent studies and modifications being made to RHIC to mitigate the effects of a potential failure to the helium distribution system

In order to cool the superconducting magnets in RHIC, its helium refrigerator distributes 4.5 K helium throughout the tunnel along with helium distribution for the magnet line recoolers, the heat shield, and the associated return lines. The worse case for failure would be a release from the magnet distribution line which operates at 3.5 to 4.5 atmospheres and contains the energized magnet but with a potential energy of 70 MJoules should the insulation system fail or an electrical connection opens. Studies were done to determine release rate of the helium and the resultant reduction in O{sub 2} concentration in the RHIC tunnel and service buildings. Equipment and components were also reviewed for design and reliability and modifications were made to reduce the likelihood of failure and to reduce the volume of helium that could be released.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Helium release rates and ODH calculations from RHIC magnet cooling line failure

A catastrophic failure of the magnet cooling lines, similar to the LHC superconducting bus failure incident, could discharge cold helium into the RHIC tunnel and cause an Oxygen Deficiency Hazard (ODH) problem. A SINDA/FLUINT{reg_sign} model, which simulated the 4.5K/4 atm helium flowing through the magnet cooling system distribution lines, then through a line break into the insulating vacuum volumes and discharging via the reliefs into the RHIC tunnel, had been developed. Arc flash energy deposition and heat load from the ambient temperature cryostat surfaces are included in the simulations. Three typical areas: the sextant arc, the Triplet/DX/D0 magnets, and the injection area, had been analyzed. Results, including helium discharge rates, helium inventory loss, and the resulting oxygen concentration in the RHIC tunnel area, are reported. Good agreement had been achieved when comparing the simulation results, a RHIC sector depressurization test measurement, and some simple analytical calculations.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Heartbeat Model for Component Failure in Simulation of Plant Behavior

As part of the Department of Energy’s “Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program” (LWRSP), tools and methodology for risk-informed characterization of safety margin are being developed for use in supporting decision-making on plant life extension after the first license renewal. Beginning with the traditional discussion of “margin” in terms of a “load” (a physical challenge to system or component function) and a “capacity” (the capability of that system or component to accommodate the challenge), we are developing the capability to characterize realistic probabilistic load and capacity spectra, reflecting both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in system behavior. This way of thinking about margin comports with work done in the last 10 years. However, current capabilities to model in this way are limited: it is currently possible, but difficult, to validly simulate enough time histories to support quantification in realistic problems, and the treatment of environmental influences on reliability is relatively artificial in many existing applications. The INL is working on a next-generation safety analysis capability (widely referred to as “R7”) that will enable a much better integration of reliability-related and phenomenology-related aspects of margin. In this paper, we show how to implement cumulative damage (“heartbeat”) models for component reliability that lend themselves naturally to being included as part of the phenomenology simulation. Implementation of this modeling approach relies on the way in which the phenomenology simulation implements its dynamic time step management. Within this approach, component failures influence the phenomenology, and the phenomenology influences the component failures.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Beam losses due to abrupt crab cavity failures in the LHC

A major concern for the implementation of crab crossing in a future High-Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is machine protection in an event of a fast crab-cavity failure. Certain types of abrupt crab-cavity amplitude and phase changes are simulated to characterize the effect of failures on the beam and the resulting particle-loss signatures. The time-dependent beam loss distributions around the ring and particle trajectories obtained from the simulations allow for a first assessment of the resulting beam impact on LHC collimators and on sensitive components around the ring. Results for the nominal LHC lattice is presented.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

A stress-state modified strain based failure criterion for evaluating the structural integrity of an inner eutectic barrier.

A slight modification of a package to transport solid metal contents requires inclusion of a thin titanium liner to protect against possible eutectic formation in 10 CFR 71.74 regulatory fire accident conditions. Under severe transport regulatory impact conditions, the package contents could impart high localized loading of the liner, momentarily pinching it between the contents and the thick containment vessel, and inducing some plasticity near the contact point. Actuator and drop table testing of simulated contents impacts against liner/containment vessel structures nearly bounded the potential plastic strain and stress triaxiality conditions, without any ductile tearing of the eutectic barrier. Additional bounding was necessary in some cases beyond the capability of the actuator and drop table tests, and in these cases a stress-modified evolution integral over the plastic strain history was successfully used as a failure criterion to demonstrate that structural integrity was maintained. The Heaviside brackets only allow the evolution integral to accumulate value when the maximum principal stress is positive, since failure is never observed under pure hydrostatic pressure, where the maximum principal stress is negative. Detailed finite element analyses of myriad possible impact orientations and locations between package contents and the thin eutectic barrier under regulatory impact conditions have shown that not even the initiation of a ductile tear occurs. Although localized plasticity does occur in the eutectic barrier, it is not the primary containment boundary and is thus not subject to ASME stress allowables from NRC Regulatory Guide 7.6. These analyses were used to successfully demonstrate that structural integrity of the eutectic barrier was maintained in all 10 CFR 71.73 and 71.74 regulatory accident conditions. The NRC is currently reviewing the Safety Analysis Report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Case Study of the Failure of two 13.8kV Control & Metering Transformers that caused significant Equipment Damage

The degradation and failure of cast-coil epoxy windings within 13.8kV control power transformers and metering potential transformers has been shown to be dangerous to both equipment and personnel, even though best industrial design practices were followed. Accident scenes will be examined for two events at a U.S. Department of Energy laboratory. Failure modes will be explained and current design practices discussed with changes suggested to prevent a recurrence and to minimize future risk. New maintenance philosophies utilizing partial discharge testing of the transformers as a prediction of end-of-life will be examined.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Summary of Post Irradiation Examination Results of the AFIP-6 Failure

The AFIP-6 test assembly was irradiated for one cycle in the Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho National Laboratory. The experiment was designed to test two monolithic fuel plates at power and burn-ups which bounded the operating conditions of both ATR and HFIR driver fuel. Both plates contain a solid U-Mo fuel foil with a zirconium diffusion barrier between 6061-aluminum cladding plates bonded by hot isostatic pressing. The experiment was designed with an orifice to restrict the coolant flow in order to obtain prototypic coolant temperature conditions. While these coolant temperatures were obtained, flow restriction resulted in low heat transfer coefficients and the failure of the fuel plates. The results from the post irradiation examinations and some observations of the failure mechanisms are outlined herein.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Examination of the damage and failure response of tantalum and copper under varied shock loading conditions

A number of plate impact experiments have been conducted on high purity polycrystalline tantalum and copper samples using graded flyer plate configurations to alter the loading profile. These experiments are designed in a way so that a broad range of damage regimes are probed. The results show that the nucleation of damage primarily occurs at the grain boundaries of the materials. This affords us the opportunity to propose a porosity damage nucleation criterion which begins to account for the length scales of the microstructure (grain size distribution) and the mechanical response of the grain boundary regions (failure stress distribution). This is done in the context of a G-T-N type model for the ductile damage and failure response of both the materials examined. The role of micro-inertial effects on the porosity growth process is also considered.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Failure Mode Effects Analysis for an Accelerator Control System

Failure mode effects analysis (FMEA) has been used in industry for design, manufacturing and assembly process quality control. It describes a formal approach for categorizing how a process may fail and for prioritizing failures based on their severity, frequency and likelihood of detection. Experience conducting a partial FMEA of an accelerator subsystem and its related control system will be reviewed. The applicability of the FMEA process to an operational accelerator control system will be discussed.

Hartman, Steven M↗

Tables for Trials and Failures with PD for Designated Confidence Level

Two attachments are provided for performance testing of sensors and other Physical Protection System (PPS) components. The first attachment is a table of Trials and Failures, giving Probability of Detection (PD) for a designated confidence level and sorted by trials. The second attachment contains the same data, sorted by failures.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Rate based failure detection

This disclosure describes, in part, a system management component and failure detection component for use in a power grid data network to identify anomalies within the network and systematically adjust the quality of service of data published by publishers and subscribed to by subscribers within the network. In one implementation, subscribers may identify a desired data rate, a minimum acceptable data rate, desired latency, minimum acceptable latency and a priority for each subscription. The failure detection component may identify an anomaly within the network and a source of the anomaly. Based on the identified anomaly, data rates and or data paths may be adjusted in real-time to ensure that the power grid data network does not become overloaded and/or fail.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Failure Mechanisms in Fored, Layered, and Additive Manufactured Titanium due to Hypervelocity Impact: Experiments and Simulations

This article presents a study of dynamic failure events in forged, layered, and additive manufactured (AM) titanium alloy subject to hypervelocity impact. Experiments were conducted using a two stage light-gas gun, 0.22-caliber Lexan projectiles, and different types of titanium target plates. A four-channel Photonic Doppler Velocimetry (PDV) system was used to study the free surface velocities to provide an understanding of the different failure mechanisms in these materials. The experimental measurements were used to validate computational simulations, which describe the behavior of these materials under shock. It was determined that AM, forged titanium, and multi-layered stacks produce similar velocity profiles during the early stage of impact, with the AM targets exhibiting spall at lower velocities and the multi-layered stacks exhibiting vibrations between plates. Simulations of solid and layered forged materials provide a good match to experimental data.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Forewarning of Bridge Failure Without Algorithm Training

Forewarning of bridge failure without algorithm training uses Griffith's criterion for failure with crack growth induced by structural defamations under load in combination with a statistical criterion for forewarning under cyclic loading.

Abercrombie, Robert↗