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Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Waste Management: Challenges and the Integrated Waste Strategy - 19160

Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) currently faces various waste management challenges and CNL's Integrated Waste Strategy is adapting to manage them. As Canada's premier nuclear science and technology organization, CNL is a global leader in developing peaceful and innovative applications from nuclear technology through its expertise in the scientific field, including physics, metallurgy, chemistry, biology and engineering. As demands change, CNL is shifting its focus to alpha therapies for cancer treatments and sustainable energy solutions. The next decade will see CNL decommission the sites it manages across Canada, whilst transforming Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) into a new, world-class facility which will have the capability to demonstrate the commercial viability of advanced reactor designs including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). This is being enabled through an accelerated decommissioning program for all CNL operated sites, while renovating CRL, which includes revitalizing essential site infrastructure, and investment in new, world-class science facilities in a modern campus environment. With decommissioning and revitalization occurring simultaneously, the long-term strategy and vision for CNL presents some unique challenges to waste management. Therefore, integrated, collaborative and coordinated waste management is a vital component to ensuring a successful future. The Integrated Waste Strategy coordinates, and provides alignment of, waste management across CNL and: - Includes all CNL operated (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) owned) sites; - Considers all CNL managed waste (including radioactive and non-radioactive operational, decommissioning, legacy and historic waste) for the planned lifetime of the sites; - Defines waste routes using a life cycle approach (from the generation of waste to final disposal) A baseline Integrated Waste Strategy and associated action plan to mitigate identified gaps and issues have been produced. A program of work is underway to close those gaps identified in a consistent, transparent, prioritized and justified manner. One of the key challenges is to ensure that waste management planning is completed effectively and in a timely manner. This will enable the provision of suitable and sufficient waste capability to meet CNL's long-term strategy. The Integrated Waste Strategy has been developed and maintained through engagement at all levels across CNL, ensuring buy-in of proposed solutions. Key process stakeholders include generators of CNL managed waste to ensure integrated consideration of legacy, current and future waste generation; waste management personnel to identify requirements, including processing, storage, transport and disposal; AECL as the client and waste liability owner; and the public to ensure they understand the 'big picture' regarding waste strategy. (author)

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The Port Hope Areas Initiative's Port Granby Project: The Decontamination of Site Equipment from a Low Level Waste Facility - 20330

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is the Government of Canada's response to the community recommended solutions for the remediation and safe, long-term management of historic low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) that was the result of uranium and radium processing operations in the Municipality of Port Hope, Ontario from the 1930's to the 1980's. The Eldorado refinery, on the shores of Lake Ontario, began refining radium-226 from pitchblende ore, later transitioning to the refining of uranium ore. Process residues were deposited at the Welcome Waste Management Facility in Port Hope until the mid-1950's switching to the Port Granby Waste Management Facility (PGWMF), which continued to accept waste until the late 1980's. The Port Granby Project involves the construction of a new, secure long-term waste management facility (LTWMF) and supporting infrastructure, and the excavation and relocation of approximately 1,200,000 m{sup 3} of historic low-level radioactive waste and marginally contaminated soil from the PGWMF to the newly constructed LTWMF. Since the project's inception in 2016, the bulk of the material has since been moved to the final long term storage cell. This has taken over 500,000 person-hours and a large amount of one site heavy equipment to accomplish including excavators, bulldozers, rock trucks, baker tanks and vacuum trucks. While many of the pieces of heavy equipment and water management equipment has further work to do on site, several of the sites larger items have already undergone the decontamination process prior to release from the site. This process has posed a serious challenge as the waste has a caustic nature to it and over the last few years it has had time to work its way into the metallic structures and framework of the equipment. Coupled with the tight work spaces and in some cases confined work areas there have been many issues that needed to be addressed to successfully reach a state where items can be free released to the unrestricted limits of the sites license. This ongoing process has led to a more refined decontamination program at the Port Granby Facility and has had a rather high success rate considering the length of time the equipment has been exposed to the waste materials on site. This paper discusses the varied challenges of decontamination faced at a low-level radioactive waste facility with a focus on the following aspects: - Challenges faced regarding different equipment types and the solutions implemented by Wood to address these challenges; - An examination of various decontamination methods employed throughout the project; and - Lessons learned over three years of remediation work and how they impact the decontamination process. (authors)

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Innovative Solutions To Solve Complex Radioactive Waste Management Problems In The U.S. - 2017 Richard S. Hodes, M.D. Honor Lecture Award - 17609

Ever since Wilhelm Roentgen, Henri Becquerel, and Marie Curie discovered x-rays, radioactivity, and radium, respectively, at the turn of the nineteenth century, nuclear technologies have continued to evolve and significantly enrich the quality of life for mankind. The evolution of such technologies has enabled our society to diagnose medical illnesses without the need for invasive surgeries, treat cancers, conduct research, develop new kinds of pharmaceuticals, preserve our food supply, and generate over 20% of our nation's electricity from commercial nuclear power plants. While these life-changing technologies have significantly enriched our quality of life and advanced our understanding of the sciences, they also generate radioactive waste that must be managed responsibly in a manner that protects public health. Over the past several decades, decision makers have developed a patchwork of policies to safely manage radioactive wastes-policies that are not necessarily based on the risk posed to public health, but more often on the origins of the waste and the manner in which they are defined in federal legislation. However, in the past several years, much progress has been made to better risk-inform the practices of managing Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) in the United States. In 2012, the nation's first regional commercial facility for disposing of Class A, B, and C LLW since the U.S. Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, as amended in 1985, was opened in Andrews County, Texas. Since then, other innovative LLW management solutions have emerged, ranging from cost-effective disposal options for wastes with very low levels of radioactivity to depleted uranium, and perhaps ultimately, for waste exceeding the concentration-based limits for Class C LLW (i.e., Greater Than Class C LLW) as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), chap. 61.55. Most recently, a license application for a consolidated interim storage facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) is currently under review by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Should the NRC approve the license application, SNF currently located at 12 shutdown and decommissioned nuclear reactors could be placed into interim storage in Texas. Approval of this license application would facilitate the complete decommissioning of nuclear power plants, returning them to green-fields, and allowing the local communities to re-purpose the lands for further economic development. Over the next decade, many of these waste management challenges that once seemed insurmountable may soon be transformed into a reality. As will be discussed at the award lecture, achieving such possibilities clearly aligns with the vision of creating innovative radioactive waste management solutions for our nation that were championed by the late physician and statesman, Dr. Richard S. Hodes. (authors)

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Testing of the dual slab verification detector for attended measurements of the BN-350 dry storage casks

The Dual Slab Verification Detector (DSVD) has been developed and built by Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as part of the dry storage safeguards system for the spent fuel from the BN-350 fast reactor. The detector consists of two rows of {sup 3}He tubes embedded in a slab of polyethylene which has been designed to be placed on the outer surface of the dry storage cask. The DSVD will be used to perform measurements of the neutron flux emanating from inside the dry storage cask at several locations around each cask to establish a neutron 'fingerprint' that is sensitive to the contents of the cask. The sensitivity of the fingerprinting technique to the removal of specific amount of nuclear material from the cask is determined by the characteristics of the detector that is used to perform the measurements, the characteristics of the spent fuel being measured, and systematic uncertainties that are associated with the dry storage scenario. MCNPX calculations of the BN-350 dry storage asks and layout have shown that the neutron fingerprint verification technique using measurements from the DSVD would be sensitive to both the amount and location of material that is present within an individual cask. To confirm the performance of the neutron fingerprint technique in verifying the presence of BN-350 spent fuel in dry storage, an initial series of measurements have been performed to test the performance and characteristics of the DSVD. Results of these measurements will be presented and compared with MCNPX results.

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Progress in Decommissioning the Humboldt Bay Power Plant - 13604

Decommissioning of the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG and E) Company Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 nuclear facility has now, after more than three decades of SAFSTOR and initial decommissioning work, transitioned to full-scale decommissioning. Decommissioning activities to date have been well orchestrated and executed in spite of an extremely small work site with space constricted even more by other concurrent on-site major construction projects including the demolition of four fossil units, construction of a new generating station and 60 KV switchyard upgrade. Full-scale decommissioning activities - now transitioning from Plant Systems Removal (PG and E self-perform) to Civil Works Projects (contractor performed) - are proceeding in a safe, timely, and cost effective manner. As a result of the successful decommissioning work to date (approximately fifty percent completed) and the intense planning and preparations for the remaining work, there is a high level of confidence for completion of all HBPP Unit 3 decommissions activities in 2018. Strategic planning and preparations to transition into full-scale decommissioning was carried out in 2008 by a small, highly focused project team. This planning was conducted concurrent with other critical planning requirements such as the loading of spent nuclear fuel into dry storage at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) finishing December 2008. Over the past four years, 2009 through 2012, the majority of decommissioning work has been installation of site infrastructure and removal of systems and components, known as the Plant System Removal Phase, where work scope was dynamic with significant uncertainty, and it was self-performed by PG and E. As HBPP Decommissioning transitions from the Plant System Removal Phase to the Civil Works Projects Phase, where work scope is well defined, a contracting plan similar to that used for Fossil Decommissioning will be implemented. Award of five major work scopes in various stages of development are planned as they include: Turbine Building Demolition, Nuclear Facilities Demolition and Excavation, Intake and Discharge Canal Remediation, Office Facility Demobilization, and Final Site Restoration. Benefits realized by transitioning to the Civil Works Projects Phase with predominant firm fixed-price/fixed unit price contracting include single civil works contractor who can coordinate concrete shaving, liner removal, structural removal, and other demolition activities; streamline financial control; reduce PG and E overhead staffing; and provide a specialized Bidder Team with experience from other similar projects. (authors)

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Compton Dry-Cask Imaging System

The Compton-Dry Cask Imaging Scanner is a system that verifies and documents the presence of spent nuclear fuel rods in dry-cask storage and determines their isotopic composition without moving or opening the cask. For more information about this project, visit http://www.inl.gov/rd100/2011/compton-dry-cask-imaging-system/

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Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

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An Alternative to the Continued Accumulation of Separated Plutonium in Japan: Dry Cask Storage of Spent Fuel

As of the end of 2017, Japan had a stockpile of 48 tons of separated plutonium. It will take more than a decade for Japan to convert most of that plutonium into “mixed-oxide” (MOX) fuel and load it into power reactors licensed to use such fuel. This is a very costly program. Including the cost of reprocessing, MOX fuel costs about ten times more than the low-enriched-uranium fuel that otherwise would be used by these reactors. Yet Japan has a policy to start separating more plutonium from spent reactor fuel as soon as the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant can be put into operation – currently projected for 2021 after 24 years of delay due to a variety of technical problems and upgrades in safety requirements. Japan’s government remains committed to this costly and troubled program primarily because, pending the availability of additional spent-fuel storage space on or off site, reprocessing is seen as the only way to get spent fuel out of reactor pools that are getting full. Because of concerns about the safety of dense-packed spent-fuel pools, however, the prefectures and towns hosting Japan’s power reactors are beginning to accept on-site storage of spent fuel in dry casks. This is the option the United States and many other countries chose after they cancelled their reprocessing programs and their powerplant pools filled up. Its increasing availability in Japan, if backed by a determined policy to accelerate its introduction, should make it possible to cancel reprocessing in Japan as well.

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Sensitivity study of coupled chemical-CFD simulations for analyzing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel storage in sealed canisters

We report the United States Department of Energy (DOE) manages over 50 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel. One main source for DOE’s Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) inventory is the advanced test reactor (ATR) at the INL site, which makes this fuel of particular interest for storage scenarios. Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the ATR fuel dictates storage within helium-backfilled, sealed DOE standard canisters. The conditions within these sealed canisters for extended (greater than50 year dry) storage is of interest. To further this goal, a three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model is developed of the sealed DOE standard canisters. This 3D CFD model is one-way coupled with bulk gas radiolysis reactions considering sealed canisters with inert gas and possible trace amounts of air and water vapor. This study looks at the evolution of the thermal history of the canisters over a 50 year time period with a coupling to the chemical reactions occurring from radiolytic breakdown of residual water. A sensitivity study is then carried out over the parameters of the model including the fuel decay heat, residual water content, sealed pressure, canister external temperature, and canister emissivity. In pure helium, hydrogen generation rates are low, under 10 ppm, but hydrogen generation rates are affected greatly by the presence of even 1% residual air, increasing by 50-plus-fold, and nitric acid generation with residual air also occurs ranging from 500 to 4000 ppm after 50 years. The fuel decay heat and the residual water content show the most importance in the generation of hydrogen gas in pure air, and for nitric acid with a residual air condition. External temperature, canister emissivity and sealed pressure all show minor sensitivity effects to the generation of potentially harmful species.

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Central Plateau Cleanup at DOE's Hanford Site - 12504

The discussion of Hanford's Central Plateau includes significant work in and around the center of the Hanford Site - located about 7 miles from the Columbia River. The Central Plateau is the area to which operations will be shrunk in 2015 when River Corridor cleanup is complete. This work includes retrieval and disposal of buried waste from miles of trenches; the cleanup and closure of massive processing canyons; the clean-out and demolition to 'slab on grade' of the high-hazard Plutonium Finishing Plant; installation of key groundwater treatment facilities to contain and shrink plumes of contaminated groundwater; demolition of all other unneeded facilities; and the completion of decisions about remaining Central Plateau waste sites. A stated goal of EM has been to shrink the footprint of active cleanup to less than 10 square miles by 2020. By the end of FY2011, Hanford will have reduced the active footprint of cleanup by 64 percent exceeding the goal of 49 percent. By 2015, Hanford will reduce the active footprint of cleanup by more than 90 percent. The remaining footprint reduction will occur between 2015 and 2020. The Central Plateau is a 75-square-mile region near the center of the Hanford Site including the area designated in the Hanford Comprehensive Land Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1999) and Record of Decision (64 FR 61615) as the Industrial-Exclusive Area, a rectangular area of about 20 square miles in the center of the Central Plateau. The Industrial-Exclusive Area contains the 200 East and 200 West Areas that have been used primarily for Hanford's nuclear fuel processing and waste management and disposal activities. The Central Plateau also encompasses the 200 Area CERCLA National Priorities List site. The Central Plateau has a large physical inventory of chemical processing and support facilities, tank systems, liquid and solid waste disposal and storage facilities, utility systems, administrative facilities, and groundwater monitoring wells. As a companion to the Hanford Site Cleanup Completion Framework document, DOE issued its draft Central Plateau Cleanup Completion Strategy in September 2009 to provide an outline of DOE's vision for completion of cleanup activities across the Central Plateau. As major elements of the Hanford cleanup along the Columbia River Corridor near completion, DOE believed it appropriate to articulate the agency vision for the remainder of the cleanup mission. The Central Plateau Cleanup Completion Strategy and the Hanford Site Cleanup Completion Framework were provided to the regulatory community, the Tribal Nations, political leaders, the public, and Hanford stakeholders to promote dialogue on Hanford's future. The Central Plateau Cleanup Completion Strategy describes DOE's vision for completion of Central Plateau cleanup and outlines the decisions needed to achieve the vision. The Central Plateau strategy involves steps to: (1) contain and remediate contaminated groundwater, (2) implement a geographic cleanup approach that guides remedy selection from a plateau-wide perspective, (3) evaluate and deploy viable treatment methods for deep vadose contamination to provide long-term protection of the groundwater, and (4) conduct essential waste management operations in coordination with cleanup actions. The strategy will also help optimize Central Plateau readiness to use funding when it is available upon completion of River Corridor cleanup projects. One aspect of the Central Plateau strategy is to put in place the process to identify the final footprint for permanent waste management and containment of residual contamination within the 20-square-mile Industrial-Exclusive Area. The final footprint identified for permanent waste management and containment of residual contamination should be as small as practical and remain under federal ownership and control for as long as a potential hazard exists. Outside the final footprint, the remainder of the Central Plateau will be available for other uses consistent with the Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan (DOE 1999), while maintained under federal ownership and control. (author)

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Heat-Iabile Foams 2021 (Project Report)

Foamable materials which can be readily decomposed to yield inert gas in a precise and moderate temperature range are desirable for applications in nuclear waste storage and securement during transportation. In the proposed work, promising lead candidates for such foams were identified from extant peer-reviewed literature, and initial samples synthesized and characterized.

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Final Technical Report: Imaging a Dry Storage Cask with Cosmic Ray Muons

The goal of this project is to build a scaled prototype system for monitoring used nuclear fuel (UNF) dry storage casks (DSCs) through cosmic ray muon imaging. Such a system will have the capability of verifying the content inside a DSC without opening it. Because of the growth of the nuclear power industry in the U.S. and the policy decision to ban reprocessing of commercial UNF, the used fuel inventory at commercial reactor sites has been increasing. Currently, UNF needs to be moved to independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), as its inventory approaches the limit on capacity of on-site wet storage. Thereafter, the fuel will be placed in shipping containers to be transferred to a final disposal site. The ISFSIs were initially licensed as temporary facilities for ~20-yr periods. Given the cancellation of the Yucca mountain project and no clear path forward, extended dry-cask storage (~100 yr.) at ISFSIs is very likely. From the point of view of nuclear material protection, accountability and control technologies (MPACT) campaign, it is important to ensure that special nuclear material (SNM) in UNF is not stolen or diverted from civilian facilities for other use during the extended storage.

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Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Task 5: Oxide Layer Response to Drying Experiment Test Plan

This document presents a test plan developed to assess the fundamental effectiveness of two widely accepted processes for drying spent nuclear fuel: vacuum drying and helium forced-gas drying. The experimental activities planned for Task 5 follow from the “Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Long Term Dry Storage Technical Issues Action Plan.” The objectives are to evaluate the response of the oxide corrosion layer on aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), processed at temperatures above 100°C, to understand and compare the behavior of oxide corrosion layer compositions resulting from a range of credible procedural variations during the transition of ASNF from wet storage to dry storage.

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Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Task 5: Oxide Layer Response to Drying Experiment Test Plan

This document presents a test plan developed to assess the fundamental effectiveness of two widely accepted processes for drying spent nuclear fuel: vacuum drying and helium forced-gas drying. The experimental activities planned for Task 5 follow from the “Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Long Term Dry Storage Technical Issues Action Plan.”[Connolly, INL/EXT-17-43908] The objectives are to evaluate the response of the oxide corrosion layer on aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), processed at temperatures above 100°C, to understand and compare the behavior of oxide corrosion layer compositions resulting from a range of credible procedural variations during the transition of ASNF from wet storage to dry storage.

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Initial Site-Specific De-Inventory Report for Crystal River

This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Crystal River 3 Nuclear Power Plant (CR-3) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.

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Initial Site-Specific De-Inventory Report for La Crosse

This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.

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Initial Site-Specific De-Inventory Report for Yankee Rowe

This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station (YR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.

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Initial Site-Specific De-Inventory Report for Zion

This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Zion Nuclear Power Station (Zion) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.

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