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Advanced Concept Studies for Supersonic Commercial Transports Entering Service in the 2018-2020 Period Phase 2

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company (LM), working in conjunction with General Electric Global Research (GE GR) and Stanford University, executed a 19 month program responsive to the NASA sponsored "N+2 Supersonic Validation: Advanced Concept Studies for Supersonic Commercial Transports Entering Service in the 2018-2020 Period" contract. The key technical objective of this effort was to validate integrated airframe and propulsion technologies and design methodologies necessary to realize a supersonic vehicle capable of meeting the N+2 environmental and performance goals. The N+2 program is aligned with NASA's Supersonic Project and is focused on providing system level solutions capable of overcoming the efficiency, environmental, and performance barriers to practical supersonic flight. The N+2 environmental and performance goals are outlined in the technical paper, AIAA-2014-2138 (Ref. 1) along with the validated N+2 Phase 2 results. Our Phase 2 efforts built upon our Phase 1 studies (Ref. 2) and successfully demonstrated the ability to design and test realistic configurations capable of shaped sonic booms over the width of the sonic boom carpet. Developing a shaped boom configuration capable of meeting the N+2 shaped boom targets is a key goal for the N+2 program. During the LM Phase 1 effort, LM successfully designed and tested a shaped boom trijet configuration (1021) capable of achieving 85 PLdB under track (forward and aft shock) and up to 28 deg off-track at Mach 1.6. In Phase 2 we developed a refined configuration (1044-2) that extended the under 85 PLdB sonic boom level over the entire carpet of 52 deg off-track at a cruise Mach number of 1.7. Further, the loudness level of the configuration throughout operational conditions calculates to an average of 79 PLdB. These calculations rely on propagation employing Burger's (sBOOM) rounding methodology, and there are indications that the configuration average loudness would actually be 75 PLdB. We also added significant fidelity to the design of the configuration in this phase by performing a low speed wind tunnel test at our LTWT facility in Palmdale, by more complete modelling of propulsion effects in our sonic boom analysis, and by refining our configuration packaging and performance assessments. Working with General Electric, LM performed an assessment of the impact of inlet and nozzle effects on the sonic boom signature of the LM N+2 configurations. Our results indicate that inlet/exhaust streamtube boundary conditions are adequate for conceptual design studies, but realistic propulsion modeling at similar stream-tube conditions does have a small but measurable impact on the sonic boom signature. Previous supersonic transport studies have identified aeroelastic effects as one of the major challenges associated with the long, slender vehicles particularly common with shaped boom aircraft (Ref. 3). Under the Phase 2 effort, we have developed a detailed structural analysis model to evaluate the impact of flexibility and structural considerations on the feasibility of future quiet supersonic transports. We looked in particular at dynamic structural modes and flutter as a failure that must be avoided. We found that for our N+2 design in particular, adequate flutter margin existed. Our flutter margin is large enough to cover uncertainties like large increases in engine weight and the margin is relatively easy to increase with additional stiffening mass. The lack of major aeroelastic problems probably derives somewhat from an early design bias. While shaped boom aircraft require long length, they are not required to be thin. We intentionally developed our structural depths to avoid major flexibility problems. So at the end of Phase 2, we have validated that aeroelastic problems are not necessarily endemic to shaped boom designs. Experimental validation of sonic boom design and analysis techniques was the primary objective of the N+2 Supersonic Validations contract; and in this Phase, LM participated in four high speed wind tunnel tests. The first so-called Parametric Test in the Ames 9x7 tunnel did an exhaustive look at variation effects of the parameters: humidity, total pressure, sample time, spatial averaging distance and number of measurement locations, and more. From the results we learned to obtain data faster and more accurately, and made test condition tolerances easy to meet (eliminating earlier 60 percent wasted time when condition tolerances could not be held). The next two tests used different tunnels. The Ames 11 ft tunnel was used to test lower Mach numbers of 1.2 and 1.4. There were several difficulties using this tunnel for the first time for sonic boom including having to shift the measurement Mach numbers to 1.15 and 1.3 to avoid flow problems. It is believed that the 11 ft could be used successfully to measure sonic boom but there are likely to be a number of test condition restrictions. The Glenn 8x6 ft tunnel was used next and the tunnel has a number of desirable features for sonic boom measurement. While the Ames 9x7 can only test Mach 1.55 to 2.55 and the 11 ft can only test Mach 1.3 and lower, the Glenn 8x6 can test continuously from Mach 0.3 to 2.0. Unfortunately test measurement accuracy was compromised by a reference pressure drift. Post-test analysis revealed that the drift occurred when Mach number drifted slightly. Test measurements indicated that if Mach number drift is eliminated, results from the 8x6 would be more accurate, especially at longer distances, than results from the 9x7. The fourth test in the 9x7, called LM4, used everything we learned to comprehensively and accurately measure our new 1044-02 configuration with a full-carpet shaped signature design. Productivity was 8 times greater than our Phase 1 LM3 test. Measurement accuracy and repeatability was excellent out to 42 in. However, measurements at greater distances require the rail in the aft position and become substantially less accurate. Further signature processing or measurement improvements are needed for beyond near-field signature validation.

Morgenstern, John↗

ADVANTG Shielding Analysis for Closure Operations in an Open-Mode Repository

en-mode repository concepts could require worker entry into access drifts after placement of fuel casks in order to perform activities related to backfill, plug emplacement, routine maintenance, or performance confirmation. An ideal emplacement-drift shielding configuration would minimize dose to workers while maximizing airflow through the emplacement drifts. This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the feasibility and effectiveness of radiation shielding concepts that could be employed to facilitate worker operations in an open-mode repository. The repository model for this study includes pressurized-water reactor fuel assemblies (60 GWd/MTU burnup, 40 year post-irradiation cooldown) in packages of 32 assemblies. The closest fuel packages are 5 meters from dosimetry voxels in the access drift. The unshielded dose to workers in the access drift is 73.7 rem/hour. Prior work suggests that open-mode repository concepts similar to this one would require 15 m3/s of ventilation airflow. Shielding concepts considered here include partial concrete plugs, labyrinthine shields, and stainless steel photon attenuator grids. Maximum dose to workers in the access drift was estimated for each shielding concept using MCNP5 with variance reduction parameters generated by ADVANTG. Because airflow through the shielding is important for open-mode repositories, a semi-empirical estimate of the head loss due to each shielding configuration was also calculated. Airflow and shielding performance vary widely among the proposed shielding configurations. Although the partial plug configuration had the best airflow performance, it allowed dose rates 1500 greater than the specified target. Labyrinthine shielding concepts yield doses on the order of 1 mrem/hour with configurations that impose 3 to 11 J/kg head loss. Adding 1 cm lead lining to the airflow channels of labyrinthine designs further reduces the worker dose by 65% to 95%. Photon-attenuator concepts may reduce worker dose to as low as 29 mrem/hour with head loss on the order of 1.9 J/kg.

advantg↗

Groundwater Transport of Organic Compounds in Old Salvage Yard, Oak Ridge, TN - 12089

In 1950's and early 1960's during production of nuclear weapons at the US Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge TN, volatile organic compounds (VOCs) as well as heavy metals, nitrates, and radionuclides were released to the environment. Field investigations revealed that much of this contamination is still present in soil, bedrock, and groundwater. Operational buildings and old disposal facilities at the site have been identified as major sources of contamination. The Old Salvage Yard (OSY) on the western side of the site has long been characterized as the major source of VOC contamination in soil and groundwater. In order to analyze the fate and transport of VOC contamination- including tetrachloroethene (PCE), 1,2- dichloroethene (1,2-DCE), cis-1,2-dichloroethene (cis-1,2-DCE) and vinyl chloride (VC) - in groundwater and soil at the vicinity of OSY, an integrated surface and subsurface flow and transport model has been developed for the Y-12 NSC using the hydrodynamic and transport numerical package, MIKE-SHE. Hydrogeological characteristics of the site such as hydraulic conductivity, and transport parameters such as partitioning coefficients were varied in an effort to delineate subsurface flow and transport pathways, potential downstream impacts on Upper East Fork Poplar Creek, and the potential risk to industrial workers involved in related Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) activities. The simulation results were compared with the analytical modeling results previously performed by McLane Environmental Inc. using SESOIL-AT123D. Specific simulations have been performed to investigate the effect of possible remedial action (removing the contaminated surface soil layers) on the fate and transport of VOCs. The results of the MIKE-SHE reported here can be considered as an upper limit for the predicted concentrations. Based on MIKE-SHE results, PCE, 1,2 DCE, cis-1,2-DCE, and VC are sources in soil with potential to equal or exceed industrial groundwater hazard and risk levels at the vicinity of OSY. VOC contaminants in soil and groundwater will decay below industrial groundwater risk and hazard levels within approximately 20 years. Excavation of surface soil layers at the site will considerably reduce the concentration of VOCs in groundwater and the possibility of migration of VOCs to surface waters. (authors)

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A New Safeguards Technique for Spent Fuel Verification in Dry Storage by Using He-4 Detectors - 18262

It is demanded to find key issues and critical paths for verifying and monitoring a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage with a purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. However, unfortunately there are no reliable methods to verify the containment in a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage. Therefore, research and development (R and D) has been continuously required to develop new and alternative technologies for searching and verifying undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and facilities. Therefore, the present authors have developed a new safeguards technique of passively scanning a spent fuel cask or storage using pressurized He-4 scintillation neutron detectors. A new approach is to quickly verify content in a spent nuclear fuel cask or presence of all special nuclear materials in unknown packages by comparing experimental and computational results. For that, the present authors have developed a new algorithm and user-interface coupled ORIGEN-ARP and MCNP codes, and the prototype safeguards apparatus employing the array of He-4 fast neutron detectors has been designed, built, and tested. The feasibility test of this new apparatus has been performed with Cf-252 neutron sources and the laboratory scale model cask, minimized by a factor of ten compared to the actual dimension of a KN-21 cask. This technique has several advantages over current methods based on neutron and gamma detection; (1) incident neutron energy information is preserved, (2) disturbance of gamma-ray is excellently rejected (discriminated), and (3) much higher neutron counts and operational cost and space-effectiveness are expected since no moderator is required for fast neutrons. The final goal of this study will (1) conduct a prototype instrument and employ it to monitor a nuclear spent fuel cask or storage at a commercial nuclear power reactor facilities, (2) use spectral-specific measurement data to show proof of concept for measurable data successfully converted to quantifiable signatures, such as diversion/removal of fuel, and maintenance of fuel and cask integrity of fuel, and (3) develop a cask imaging capability. (authors)

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ARIES Oxide Production Program Monthly Report – April 2014

A summary of the accomplishments, milestones, financial summary, project performance and issues facing the Oxide Production Program for the end of April 2014 is presented in this Executive Summary. PF-4 and ARIES operations remain paused in order to resolve issues and perform an extent-of-condition review for Criticality Safety and Conduct of Operations. On April 28th, Jeff Yarbrough issued a memorandum updating status on the “pause” of PF-4 programmatic operations. He reported that 150 of the procedures that control programmatic operations in PF-4 have successfully resumed. These 150 procedures represent about ½ of the total that will enable us to meet FY14 programmatic commitments. No formal letter of direction will be provided to LANS via the NNSA Field Office contracting officer to address the direction relative to shipments, analytical chemistry sampling and guidance for financial adjustments in FY14 and FY15. LANS will provide a revised plan based on the funding profile included in the President’s Budget Request for the remainder of FY14 and FY15 to include revised FY14 milestones and proposed FY15 milestones. The ARIES Pit Cutter project met the NNSA milestone (Complete Design of Simple Pit Disassembly Equipment [ARIES Pit Cutter] – Due 8/15/14) by completing the fabrication design on 4/3/14, well in advance of the 8/15/14 due date. The project team has started procurement of long-lead items in preparation of the prototype fabrication and cold testing. The fabrication is scheduled to complete in FY14 and the cold testing will begin in FY14 and complete in early FY15. LANL and PNNL met on April 14 to discuss the path forward for PNNL criticality support to the program. The consensus was that PNNL resources can be effectively applied to the generation of detailed CSEs to support the program independent of the current ESS strategy. FY15 program planning is underway. The team is working on planning/drafting the work packages and developing the schedule under the assumption that operations will begin October 1, 2014. A planning schedule has been finalized and the team is meeting regularly to discuss details at the work package and WBS levels. The FY15 PMP is also in the process of being updated. The goal is to have all the drafts reviewed/approved and finalized prior to the start of the FY. MQ personnel have completed ADPSM Management Assessment: Evaluate Quality Roles and Responsibility Agreements between ADPSM and LANL Technical Support Organizations (PFITS 2011-1943). Two findings and four opportunities for improvement were reported. The robotic lathe controller upgrade has entered the construction phase of the project. The controller cabling IWD pre-job meeting was completed. The initial robotic lathe functional test was completed. The existing controller power supply disconnect is scheduled for early May. The NDA Cage project team received notification on 3/28/14 to restart the NDA cage project. Since then the team have been busy with activities that include assigning a planner, getting the construction work package ready for construction and getting the USQ completed. The electrical services installation for the new welding skid for the Inner Can Welder was completed. A gas bottle rack, used to support welding operations, will be installed in early May. The Outer Can Welder design is complete and the IWD is in development to execute construction. Installation materials have been ordered. Work continues on the MD-2 preliminary design. The project engineer is performing a technical evaluation of the Project Management Plan that was submitted by the design agent in response to the LANL Request for Proposal. If all requirements have been captured, LANL procurement will develop a contract and give the design agent notice to proceed on the preliminary design. Estimated completion is scheduled for September 2014. The design for the TA-55 Bldg. 314 warehouse was issued at 90% complete and has begun the last review process. A constructability review is scheduled for early May. The Project Manager has been working with the LANL estimating group to get the class 3 estimate for review. The Oxide Production Cage Upgrade project has kicked-off efforts on the 30% design. Requirements documentation has been drafted. The floor space was walked-down with other project managers and stakeholders and the boundaries were agreed upon.

ARIES↗

Use of tsunami in the validation of scale 6.1 for the Swedish spent fuel repository - 14381

In March 2011 SKB applied to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) for a permit to build a final repository for spent Fuel and an encapsulation plant (Clink). The application contained a criticality safety analysis for the canisters to be used in Clink and the copper canister to be used in the final repository. In 2012 SSM requested several updates to the application. One of SSM's concerns was the validation of the codes. SSM emphasized that SKB must improve the method to select critical experiments to the validation suite. To satisfy this demand, SKB used the tool Tsunami in the Scale 6.1 code package to select experiments from the handbook of criticality experiment (IHECSBE). With help of sensitivity files SKB evaluated almost 700 experiments from the LEU-COMP-THERM library. SKB then picked the experiments that most resembled our safety cases. The sensitivity coefficient, ck, from Tsunami has been used to evaluate the similarity between the experiments and the applications. It has been considered that a ck over 0.8 provides a 'good enough' similarity between the experiment and our evaluated safety cases. For the different safety cases between 50-600 experiments satisfied the 0.8 criteria giving a good base of data for statistical analysis. It is worth noticing that PWR-fuel generally receives a higher ck than BWR fuel. Initial analysis shows that the differences in results between BWR and PWR can be explained by a larger sensitivity for the U{sup 238} n,n' part of the cross section in the PWR cases. To make sure the validation covers all materials and required physical parameters a gap analysis was made using engineering judgement by criticality safety experts. From this exercise additional experiments were added to the suite. This paper will discuss the Tsunami results for different safety cases and the reasons for differences between them. It will also present the final results of the validation and discuss experiments that were excluded from the validation suite. (authors)

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Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly – 24139

DOE manages over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), many of which are located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in onsite storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the Road-Ready Demonstration will first package Fort St. Vrain SNF currently in dry storage at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters (DOESCs). These DOESCs will in turn be loaded into another containment similar to commercial multi-purpose canisters. This multi-purpose canister will then be compatible with a transportation or storage system, such as a storage cask for interim storage or transportation package for offsite transport. These DOESCs will remain sealed over the course of their storage, transportation, and applicable disposal functions. The closure process for the DOESC will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and, if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussions on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly (LTA), this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOESCs are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds, both of which are performed by remotely operated and semiautomatic welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes the assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld attaches the vent plug to the vent socket via a butt joint. After the second weld is performed, the welds are helium leak tested using an evacuated envelope technique. The LTA was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes the fabrication and performance testing associated with the evacuated envelope technique. INL staff designed, fabricated, and tested the LTA at INL facilities. This testing included establishing technique and system sensitivities in accordance with ASME and American National Standards Institute N14.5 requirements. Forthcoming work will cover such areas as design optimization, process and personnel qualification, and implementation in Road-Ready Demonstration operations.

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Large Volume Airborne Contamination Monitoring To Support Nuclear Processes' Deactivation and Decommissioning

Current D and D operations at Hanford have demonstrated a flaw in the current state of the art capability of defining airborne contamination boundaries - Airborne particulate emissions of Pu-239 from CM2H operations on the Hanford Pu Finishing Plant were detected well beyond areas controlled for airborne Pu, putting numerous workers at risk for radiological assimilations - Current air samplers and CAM systems were surveying insufficient volumes of air to accurately predict where respiratory protection was required - Hanford is located in a high radon environment, making air monitoring for alpha emitting actinides challenging in high alpha radon induced backgrounds. - Inexpensive HEPA based home and industrial air purifiers filter significantly higher volumes of air than commercially available continuous-air monitoring (CAM) systems. - Inexpensive models capable of filtered air volumes exceeding 1000 times that of a CAM. - Detector system can be built to detect x-rays generated from actinide decay. - Branching ratios of x-rays are 4 orders of magnitude more intense from Plutonium decay than its gamma emissions. - Detector system can be a low resolution systems, as x-ray region of interest is not terribly congested. - Detection systems evaluated will be designed based on slabs of NaI or pixelated NaI or CsI panels. - Simple graphical user interface software will be developed to operate the detection system. - Concept is to deploy some of these air-purifying systems in nonradiological areas around SRNL to confirm radon can be rejected with confidence. - Generate some filters contaminated with plutonium via electroplated Pu or lab generated simulated particles. - then deploy units in known airborne radiological environments to establish systems ability to accurately measure actinide based hot particles Lab analyses will follow up the system analyses to ensure hot particles were correctly identified. Analysis by Scintillation: - Application of scintillation media to the surface of the filters is being explored. - Evaluating slabs of ZnS(Ag), application of powdered ZnS(Cu) and spray on Perkin Elmer Enhance. - Scintillation events would then be digitized with a digital camera and quantified. - Comparing against sensitivity of a PMT or SiPD readout. - Currently evaluating a Thorlabs 8 Megapixel Monochrome Scientific CCD Camera, hermetically sealed cooled package with a wide angle lens. - Wide angle lens allows complete view of HEPA filter from 7 inches away. - Images taken of glow in the dark paint, as well as plutonium-induced fluorescence. - Plutonium was flamed mounted on a 1 inch diameter stainless steel planchet, covered with a layer of mylar and a section of scintillating ZnS obtained from Eljon. - Currently working on reducing signal-to-noise levels to boost sensitivity. - Dark box to hold contaminated or electroplated source covered filters under fabrication. Analysis by x-ray Spectroscopy: - Branching ratios for x-ray emissions from Plutonium isotopes are orders of magnitude more intense than gamma-ray emissions. - The nuclear databases are incomplete on the branching ratios of some of the isotopes. - Evaluating some custom built SrI2 x-ray spectrometers vs a conventional windowed NaI detector. - SrI2 detectors are carbon-composite-windowed 51 mm x 51 mm. - MCNP calculations to establish self absorbance of filter media on 17 keV x-ray. Radon Rejection: - Activated charcoal pre-filter acts as a Radon trap. - Adding a time lapse feature to camera to aid in radon rejection. SRS Plutonium Fuel Form D and D Operations: Currently deploying air sampler to D and D operation of Pu-238 facility at SRS to generate some field samples to analyze.

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Low Cost Electrochromic Film on Plastic for Net-Zero Energy Buildings

Over 4 Quads of energy are lost through windows annually. Passive coatings reduce wasted energy, but energy lost through windows would remain over 2 Quads with complete replacement of Low-E glass. Active control of transmitted light and solar heating with electrochromic (EC) windows can transform the efficiency of energy use within buildings, thereby reducing energy footprints and corresponding greenhouse emissions. High production, integration, and distribution cost limits adoption of current EC products. ITN aimed to utilize its proven heritage of efficiently transitioning technologies from rigid to flexible substrates employing roll-to-roll manufacturing to capture the emerging EC window market opportunity. The project focused on three main efforts (1) Transition Small Scale Prototypes To Limited 0.5 Meter Wide, Web Coater Production, (2) Satisfy Market Driven EC Performance Metrics on Plastic Substrates, and (3) Product Development and Commercialization. The overall goal was to substantially reduce investor risk to motivate private investment in a production facility to further transition and scale this promising technology. A 0.5 meter roll-to-roll web coater was designed, constructed, and commissioned at ITN to support EC development effort. With this tool, we were able to establish the feasibility of roll-to-roll production of EC devices. Individually layers were continuously produced at lengths up to 3 meters with good uniformity, both down web and cross web. Solid state devices were produced, and device performance was being enhanced through hardware modifications underway at the close of the project. When deployed in composite device structures, we were able to verify that individual layers were able to achieve a transmission range of 3-70% transmission average over the visible portion of the spectrum. Initial development of intelligent process controls led to verification of a 2-state controller employed during deposition of the electrochromic layer. The project also successfully increased device performance in line with market needs. Improved device materials provided increased transmission range to a 5-65% transmission over the visible spectrum and faster switching times for both small area batch parts and large area composite materials. We were able to demonstrate durable cycling over 10,000-20,000 cycles in a variety of architectures including suspended films in an IGU and films laminated to glass tested in open air representative of retrofit applications. Robust packaging techniques were identified and samples proved durable even in 40C and 100% relative humidity outside the IGU environment.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Fire-Induced Pressure Response and Failure Characterization of PCV/SCV/3013 Containers - Phase 1

This report discusses the test series performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to test the response of Primary Containment Vessels (PCVs) under a hypothetical fire scenario. The PCV is the innermost container in a 9975 shipping package (NRC, 2014). This test series was the first of three phases aiming to characterize the PCV/SCV/3013 system, and it will be referred to as Phase 1. The purpose of these tests was to characterize the response of the PCV wall when filled with a bounding payload and exposed to an ASTM-E1529 (ASTM, 2014) standard fire environment. In particular, the goal was to test a working hypothesis for these PCVs: that, during a scenario where the PCV is exposed to an ASTM-E1529 standard fire environment, the accumulated internal pressure (resulting from the expansion of gases and vaporization of moisture/plastics during heat exposure) relieves through the O-ring segment of the PCV before PCV wall failure (rupture). Bounding internal and external conditions were purposefully established for this Phase 1 testing in order to maximize pressurization in the container. Specifically, this Phase 1 test series is designed to determine the worst case thermal stress conditions by exposing five SRNS PCVs with identical payloads to the severe ASTM-E1529 fire conditions in five different configurations with increasing potential to result in a release of the internal contents (i.e. failure). All five tests were successfully executed, and the failure modes were characterized for each test. This report discusses the details of the five tests performed in this phase, their outcomes, and their implications.

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FY24 Progress Report: Disposition of Cracks & Features Observed in the Inner Can Closure Weld Region (ICCWR) of the 3013 Package

The long-term integrity of the 3013 containers is of interest for the safe storage of Pu materials. Although the 3013 standard embodies multiple barrier concept, the integrity of the inner container is considered to be crucial since it protects the Safety Class outer container from its contents. The container is designed to withstand high pressures that could result from the complete radiolysis of the maximum water content permissible by the 3013 standard. Shelf-life studies and destructive examination have not found high gas pressures but have found that corrosive gases are generated. Pitting and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) are considered to be critical corrosion modes for the performance of the inner container and have been observed during destructive examinations. Considerable research has been conducted on the possibility of aqueous electrolytes condensing on the inner container that can promote SCC. These studies indicate the uncertainties surrounding the formation of corrosive environments and the corrosion behavior of container materials. In this initial report, a Bayesian network (BN) model is described that can consider the uncertainties and the causal connections between various factors influencing the corrosion modes of the inner container. The BN model is preliminary and provides an initial framework to identify the necessary information. The report also provides initial experimental results on the electrochemical behavior of stainless steels in anticipated condensed environments from gas phase migration of acidic gases. The experimental results are consistent with the corrosion model. Recommendation for further work on the BN model include assembling an expert group to provide input to the BN structure and quantification of the conditional probability matrix, experimental studies to characterize the microstructure of the container, electrochemical studies to identify critical potentials for localized corrosion and SCC, and crack growth rate studies

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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2020

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Five surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018, and one in 2019. This 2020 update documents what was actually done in 2019 and what is planned for 2020. Deviations from the 2019 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination. The goal of the surveillance program is to provide data to: evaluate container component performance over time against the initial baseline qualification; validate the current SAVY container design life; provide data for future design life extensions of components as indicated; identify indications of container degradation early and identify similar containers and/or contents that may need remediation; maintain and continuously improve the surveillance information system that documents the complete life cycle of the containers including the initial production baseline, usage history, surveillance, and disposition; identify container issues related to wear and tear that could indicate the need for a maintenance program for in-service containers prior to the end of the design life.

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30 cm Drop Modeling

This report documents modeling and analysis of the 30 cm cask drop scenario for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) casks. The 30 cm drop is an important hypothetical dynamic loading scenario for SNF because 10 CFR 71.71 defines testing requirements for normal conditions of transport (NCT) of SNF packages, and free drop (of 30 cm for the heaviest packages) tests are required. Other NCT conditions specified in 10 CFR 71.71 include vibration normally incident to transport, and DOE’s multimodal transportation test (MMTT) and related analysis concluded that mechanical shock and vibration incident to transportation is negligible for SNF structural integrity because the loads are so small. The SNF cask 30 cm drop has a lot more potential to cause damage to SNF because the kinetic energy and momentum of the system is stopped abruptly during the cask impact event. Test data and model predictions both agree that the SNF assemblies are subjected to significantly higher loads in a cask drop event than normal transportation shock and vibration, but currently there is no reason to expect gross structural damage of the fuel assembly or widespread SNF cladding failure as a result of a 30 cm cask drop. The ultimate goal of this work is to close the knowledge gap of stress profiles on SNF rods and fuel assembly components during NCT, and this report describes the progress toward reaching that goal as well as a plan for finishing this work over the next year or two. Key remaining tasks include refining the fuel assembly model, calculating a selection of specific fuel assembly cases to populate the damage model, and finally running the damage model to predict the full general response range of 30 cm drop loads on SNF.

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EM Program Expectations on Implementation of DOE O 458: Radiation Protection of Public/Environment - 19553

DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, was issued in 2011. DOE sites were given 18 months to implement. The revised Order promulgates requirements for property clearance actions and independent verification. DOE Order 458.1 allows for preapproved authorized limits for the clearance of property. However, when property with the potential to contain residual radioactive material does not meet preapproved authorized limits, an authorized limits package must be developed. The Order contains a range of requirements for demonstrating with reasonable assurance that dose constraints are met for any actual or likely future use of the property to be released. EM has developed a draft guidance document that provides the elements of an authorized limits package. These elements are used to review all authorized limits packages that are submitted to EM. Expected elements include property description and process knowledge documentation, current and likely future use, the conceptual site model, dose modeling methodologies, specific authorized limits, dose- or concentration-based constraints, collective dose estimate to the potentially exposed population, stakeholder communications, description of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) analysis, implementation plan, evaluation of difficult to assess surfaces, and independent verification plan. The draft guidance document also provides further explanation of the desired elements of an independent verification (IV) plan. An IV plan should describe the planning phase, implementation phase, assessment phase, and decision phase of an activity. The planning phase includes scope and cost, concurrent with cleanup contractor procurement, and review and approval of site radiological survey clearance program and IV program plans. The implementation phase assures sufficient collection of data and adjustment can be made as necessary. During the assessment phase, data and reports are reviewed, and coordination between the clean-up contractor and IV personnel occurs. A decision of whether or not the clearance actions need to be altered occurs during the decision phase. IV certification that the clearance action is complete also occurs during the decision phase. Issuance of the final guidance document is meant to improve the consultation process and minimize iterative interactions with EM. Standardizing and formalizing property clearance and IV actions also helps assure that cleanup actions are transparent and sustainable for future scrutiny. (authors)

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Sensitivity study of coupled chemical-CFD simulations for analyzing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel storage in sealed canisters

We report the United States Department of Energy (DOE) manages over 50 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel. One main source for DOE’s Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) inventory is the advanced test reactor (ATR) at the INL site, which makes this fuel of particular interest for storage scenarios. Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the ATR fuel dictates storage within helium-backfilled, sealed DOE standard canisters. The conditions within these sealed canisters for extended (greater than50 year dry) storage is of interest. To further this goal, a three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model is developed of the sealed DOE standard canisters. This 3D CFD model is one-way coupled with bulk gas radiolysis reactions considering sealed canisters with inert gas and possible trace amounts of air and water vapor. This study looks at the evolution of the thermal history of the canisters over a 50 year time period with a coupling to the chemical reactions occurring from radiolytic breakdown of residual water. A sensitivity study is then carried out over the parameters of the model including the fuel decay heat, residual water content, sealed pressure, canister external temperature, and canister emissivity. In pure helium, hydrogen generation rates are low, under 10 ppm, but hydrogen generation rates are affected greatly by the presence of even 1% residual air, increasing by 50-plus-fold, and nitric acid generation with residual air also occurs ranging from 500 to 4000 ppm after 50 years. The fuel decay heat and the residual water content show the most importance in the generation of hydrogen gas in pure air, and for nitric acid with a residual air condition. External temperature, canister emissivity and sealed pressure all show minor sensitivity effects to the generation of potentially harmful species.

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Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

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Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

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Key results from examinations of seven high burnup pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel rods

At present, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies discharged from US commercial power plants are placed into dry storage following a short cooling time (<10 years) in the plant’s spent fuel pool. The process of packaging the spent fuel into dry-storage canisters includes a drying step to remove residual water from the canister. During the drying process, the fuel rod cladding may reach temperatures as high as 400°C. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) SNF rods to address knowledge and data gaps related to extended interim storage and eventual transportation for disposal. The rods examined include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin (LT) Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. Three rods were subjected to a thermal transient to assess the effects of decay-heat-driven high temperatures expected during vacuum drying of the fuel as it is prepared for interim dry storage. The examinations focus on the composite fuel rod performance, as compared with the performance of defueled rod cladding, and establish the baseline mechanical properties of a fuel rod before interim dry storage. The key results of these examinations are presented, including the measured mechanical and fatigue properties, observations of cladding hydrogen pickup and hydride reorientation effects on rod performance, effects of the simulated drying temperatures on rod performance, and general conclusions of SNF performance in extended interim dry storage and transport. The rods were found to be strong and durable in the expected loading conditions, even considering the formation of radial hydrides associated with vacuum drying. The combined testing provides a broad body of data supporting extended interim storage and transportation performance of HBU spent fuel.

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