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At least 1,675 records · Page 93

Closeout of CRADA JSA 2012S004: Chapter 5, Integrated Control System, of the document of the ESS Conceptual Design Report, publicly available at https://europeanspallationsource.se/accelerator-documents

The integrated control system (ICS) is responsible for the whole ESS machine and facility: accelerator, target, neutron scattering instruments and conventional facilities. This unified approach keeps the costs of development, maintenance and support relatively low. ESS has selected a standardised, field-proven controls framework, the Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS), which was originally developed jointly by Argonne and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Complementing this selection are best practices and experience from similar facilities regarding platform standardisation, control system development and device integration and commissioning. The components of ICS include the control system core, the control boxes, the BLED database management system, and the human machine interface. The control system core is a set of systems and tools that make it possible for the control system to provide required data, information and services to engineers, operators, physicists and the facility itself. The core components are the timing system that makes possible clock synchronisation across the facility, the machine protection system (MPS) and the personnel protection system (PPS) that prevent damage to the machine and personnel, and a set of control system services. Control boxes are servers that control a collection of equipment (for example a radio frequency cavity). The integrated control system will include many control boxes that can be assigned to one supplier, such as an internal team, a collaborating institute or a commercial vendor. This approach facilitates a clear division of responsibilities and makes integration much easier. A control box is composed of a standardised hardware platform, components, development tools and services. On the top level, it interfaces with the core control system components (timing, MPS, PPS) and with the human-machine interface. At the bottom, it interfaces with the equipment and parts of the facility through a set of analog and digital signals, real-time control loops and other communication buses. The ICS central data management system is named BLED (beam line element databases). BLED is a set of databases, tools and services that is used to store, manage and access data. It holds vital control system configuration and physics-related (lattice) information about the accelerator, target and instruments. It facilitates control system configuration by bringing together direct input-output controller (IOC) con guration and real-time data from proton and neutron beam line models. BLED also simplifies development and speeds up the code-test-debug cycle. The set of tools that access BLED will be tailored to the needs of different categories of users, such as ESS staff physicists, engineers, and operators; external partner laboratories; and visiting experimental instrument users. The human-machine interface is vital to providing a high-quality experience to ICS users. It encompasses a wide array of devices and software tools, from control room screens to engineer terminal windows; from beam physics data tools to post-mortem data analysis tools. It serves users with a wide range of skills from widely varied backgrounds. The Controls Group is developing a set of user profiles to accommodate this diverse range of use-cases and users.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Analysis of leading edge protection application on wind turbine performance through energy and power decomposition approaches

Abstract Wind power production is driven by, and varies with, the stochastic yet uncontrollable wind and environmental inputs. To compare a wind turbine's performance, a direct comparison on power outputs is always confounded by the stochastic effect of weather inputs. It is therefore crucial to control for the weather and environmental influence. Toward that objective, our study proposes an energy decomposition approach. We start with comparing the change in the total energy production and refer to the change in total energy as delta energy. On this delta energy, we apply our decomposition method, which is to separate the portion of energy change due to weather effects from that due to the turbine itself. We derive a set of mathematical relationships allowing us to perform this decomposition and examine the credibility and robustness of the proposed decomposition approach through extensive cross‐validation and case studies. We then apply the decomposition approach to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition data associated with several wind turbines to which leading‐edge protection was carried out. Our study shows that the leading‐edge protection applied on blades may cause a small decline to the power production efficiency in the short term, although we expect the leading‐edge protection to benefit the blade's reliability in the long term.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Architecture of the personnel protection systems for Spallation Neutron Source Second Target Station

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is implementing a major upgrade to the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) facility, encompassing the addition of the Second Target Station (STS). Preliminary design reviews have been conducted on several STS Personnel Protection Systems (PPS). The reviews focused primarily on the integration with the existing SNS PPS, the new proton transport tunnel, and the target areas. Development of the PPS is ongoing, to ensure a coherent safety system with the mission of protecting users and workers from prompt radiation hazards while providing high beam availability to operations. The STS PPS element in the Integrated Control System (ICS) is a facility-wide system composed of multiple safety subsystems, including the Ring to Second Target (RTST) beam transport tunnel, Target, Bunker and Instruments. Personnel working in all these geographic areas are protected by modular reliable PPS solutions. The safety system enforces access controls, radiation monitoring, beam destination control, and application of critical device inhibit upon detection of abnormal condition. It uses well-documented processes, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) safety, pulsed test, and redundancy to achieve the desired Safety Integrity Level (SIL). This paper gives an architectural overview of the STS PPS and a detailed safety plan for the SNS facility, addressing safety solutions and human factors.

Michaelides, Tommy [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000190499869)↗

Risks, designs, and research for fire safety in spacecraft

Current fire protection for spacecraft relies mainly on fire prevention through the use of nonflammable materials and strict storage controls of other materials. The Shuttle also has smoke detectors and fire extinguishers, using technology similar to aircraft practices. While experience has shown that the current fire protection is adequate, future improvements in fire safety technology to meet the challenges of long duration space missions, such as the Space Station Freedom, are essential. All spacecraft fire protection systems, however, must deal with the unusual combustion characteristics and operational problems in the low gravity environment. The features of low gravity combustion that affect spacecraft fire safety, and the issues in fire protection for Freedom that must be addressed eventually to provide effective and conservative fire protection systems are discussed.

Friedman, Robert↗

Re-evaluation of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Passive Institutional Controls Program - Status - 17116

The United States government set forth in 40CFR194.43 requirements for 'Passive Institutional Controls' for nuclear waste repositories. This regulation stated compliance applications for a repository 'shall include detailed descriptions of the measures that will be employed to preserve knowledge about the location, design and contents of the disposal system.' In the early 1990's the U.S. Department of Energy developed and proposed in the Compliance Certification Application of 1996 a robust and complex technical and engineering Passive Institutional Controls Program including such things as records management, large surface markers, salt berms, buried and above-ground information rooms and small subsurface markers/plaques. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Passive Institutional Control program meets the regulatory requirements and is certified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Presently this program is being re-evaluated in light of the Nuclear Energy Agency's, Records Knowledge and Memory initiative, shrinking government budgets, and the ethical/moral considerations of risks versus expenditures. This paper will discuss progress made to date in re-evaluating the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Passive Institutional Controls program and expected plans for the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pterodactyl: Non-Propulsive Control System Designs for Future Planetary Missions

Advances in deployable entry vehicle (DEV) technology, entry guidance, woven thermal protection systems, and affordable launch services make it possible to conceive of entry vehicles that optimize maneuverability, usable payload mass and volume, and operational costs. NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate is currently funding the authors on a project, Pterodactyl, that is using on-the-fly trajectory design and integrated software and hardware development to investigate non-propulsive entry control systems for precision targeting of mechanical DEVs. The authors recently reported developments of these control systems for an asymmetric DEV to track bank commands for a lunar return entry. For this presentation, the authors will highlight key findings from their studies and propose rapid investigations of applications to future Mars missions such as sample return and asset delivery. Pterodactyl entry vehicle designs are suited to handle sensitive payloads and poised to achieve greater payload mass and volume compared to heritage entry vehicles given a particular launch vehicle. Furthermore, these designs could be adapted to launch on less costly launch vehicles as secondary payloads and could enable missions with high-frequency deployment requirements.

Alunni, Antonella↗

Significant electrical control of amorphous oxide thin film transistors by an ultrathin Ti surface polarity modifier

We demonstrate an enhanced electrical stability through a Ti oxide (TiO{sub x}) layer on the amorphous InGaZnO (a-IGZO) back-channel; this layer acts as a surface polarity modifier. Ultrathin Ti deposited on the a-IGZO existed as a TiO{sub x} thin film, resulting in oxygen cross-binding with a-IGZO surface. The electrical properties of a-IGZO thin film transistors (TFTs) with TiO{sub x} depend on the surface polarity change and electronic band structure evolution. This result indicates that TiO{sub x} on the back-channel serves as not only a passivation layer protecting the channel from ambient molecules or process variables but also a control layer of TFT device parameters.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Ligand removal energetics control CO 2 electroreduction selectivity on atomically precise, ligated alloy nanoclusters

Atomically precise, thiolate-protected gold nanoclusters (TPNCs) exhibit remarkable catalytic performance for the electrochemical reduction of carbon dioxide (CO 2 R) to CO. The origin of their high CO 2 R activity and selectivity has been attributed to partial ligand removal from the thiolate-covered surfaces of TPNCs to expose catalytically active sulfur atoms. Recently, heterometal doped (alloy) TPNCs have been shown to exhibit enhanced CO 2 R activity and selectivity compared to their monometallic counterparts. However, systematic studies on the effect of doping (metal type and location on TPNC) on active site exposure and CO 2 R activity are missing in literature. Herein, we apply Density Functional Theory calculations to investigate the effect of heterometal (Pt, Pd, Hg and Cd) doping of Au 25 (SR) 18 TPNC on the active site exposure and CO 2 R activity and selectivity. In this study, we reveal that doping significantly modifies relevant TPNC electronic properties, such as electron affinity, while also altering partial ligand removal and carboxyl (*COOH) intermediate formation energies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that changing the dopant (e.g. Hg) position can change the selectivity of the TPNC towards CO (g) or H 2(g) formation, highlighting the importance of dopant locations in TPNC-based CO 2 R. Most notably, we report a universal (i.e. capturing different dopant types and positions) linear trend between the ligand removal energy and i) the *COOH formation energy, as well as, ii) the hydrogen (*H) formation energy on the different alloy TPNCs. Thus, utilizing the ligand removal energy as a descriptor for CO 2 RR activity and selectivity, our work opens new avenues for accelerated computational screening of different alloy TPNCs for electrocatalytic CO 2 R applications.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

IRAD-MPE Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats (Day 1) [Slides]

This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288

The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Gyroless Safehold Control Law Using Angular Momentum as an Inertial Reference Vector

A novel safehold control law was developed for the nadir-pointing Vegetation Canopy Lidar (VCL) spacecraft, necessitated by a challenging combination of constraints. The instrument optics did not have a recloseable cover to protect them form potentially catastrophic damage if they were exposed to direct sunlight. The baseline safehold control law relied on a single-string inertial reference unit. A gyroless safehold law was developed to give a degree of robustness to gyro failures. Typical safehold solutions were not viable; thermal constraints made spin stabilization unsuitable, and an inertial hold based solely on magnetometer measurements wandered unaceptably during eclipse. The novel approach presented here maintains a momentum bias vector not for gyroscopic stiffness, but to use as an inertial reference direction during eclipse. The control law design is presented. The effect on stability of the rank-deficiency of magnetometer-based rate derivation is assessed. The control law's performance is evaluated by simulation.

Stoneking, Eric↗

A Gyroless Safehold Control Law using Angular Momentum as an Inertial Reference Vector

A novel safehold control law was developed for the nadir-pointing Vegetation Canopy Lidar (VCL) spacecraft, necessitated by a challenging combination of constraints. The instrument optics did not have a reclosable cover to protect them from potentially catastrophic damage if they were exposed to direct sunlight. The baseline safehold control law relied on a single-string inertial reference unit. A gyroless safehold law was developed to give a degree of rebustness to gyro failures. Typical safehold solutions were not viable; thermal constraints made spin stabilization unsuitable, and an inertial hold based solely on magnetometer measurements wandered unacceptably during eclipse. The novel approach presented here maintains a momentum bias vector not for gyroscopic stiffness, but to use as an inertial reference direction during eclipse. The control law design is presented. The effect on stability of the rate-deficiency of magnetometer-based rate derivation is assessed. The control law's performance is evaluated by simulation.

Stoneking, Eric↗

Analysis of Long-Term Quality Control Data for a 137 Cs Dosimetry Calibration Source

Strict quality assurance programs are required for many radiological applications, but these seldom exist for verifying dosimetry calibration sources. After initial characterization of a dosimetry calibration facility, quality control procedures are recommended to ensure the early detection of any changes or malfunctions. These also result in refined knowledge about average dose rate and experimental variations in dose delivery. This paper describes the implementation of a phase I quality control protocol for a 137 Cs dosimetry calibration source and includes an analysis of the resulting data collected over a 24-mo period. During this time, substantial data was collected to establish trial control limits. Air kerma rate measurements were obtained using an ion chamber and were adjusted for decay, corrected for ambient temperature, pressure and humidity, and then analyzed using quality control charts. Three variations of rational subgrouping methods were used in order to find assignable causes of error, and Nelson's Rules were followed to detect any non-random statistical variations. Measurements were subgrouped according to same-day measurements in order to detect positional errors as well as atmospheric correction errors. Additionally, measurements were subgrouped according to analogous experimental setups in order to detect failure in equipment or incorrect settings. Both were analyzed using the X-bar and R chart method. Similarly, individuals and moving ranges charts were used to carefully examine each position in order to observe any situational errors that may occur which include timing, positional, or interference errors. Each method was successful in identifying unique out-of-control data points that occurred during the phase I application of forming control limits. Furthermore, over the 24-mo period, enough data points were deemed in-control to establish reliable trial limits. Future experiments will include the phase II application of gaining more reliable measurements in order to fine-tune the limits, as well as performing a designed experiment, where variables are purposefully changed in order to test the variation of the data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Remediation of D-Area Ash Units, Savannah River Site - 18151

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), under the tri-party Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) between the United States Department of Energy (US DOE), United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), agreement was reached to remediate two ash basins, one coal pile runoff basin and one ash landfill as Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Removal Actions within a schedule of five years (2014 - 2019). These removal actions complete the remediation of these basins and the ash landfill which originated from nearly 60 years of powerhouse operations and cover a total area of nearly 40.5 hectares (100 acres). Utilizing proven as well as state of the art technologies and methods, the completed actions culminate in two protective multi-layer cover systems and the conversion of the coal pile runoff basin to an ecological diverse storm water retention basin. Completion of these removal actions has been determined to provide protection of future industrial workers and ecological receptors as well as prevent migration of mobile contaminants found in coal residues (e.g., arsenic) from powerhouse operations, achieving all applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review Facility Design Drawings M3FT-16LA040105011 - Safeguards and Security by Design for Used Fuel Extended Storage: 1.02.04.01.05 FT – 16LA04010501

This work package focuses on developing Best Practices for the design of security for, and domestic safeguarding (e.g. MC&A) of, a pilot-scale independent spent/used fuel storage facility consistent with conceptual design efforts in Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation (NFST) and Used Fuel Disposal (UFD) campaigns. This is a review of the basic design of the facility to determine a candidate list of accounting and control requirements that could be considered for safeguards and security purposes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗