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Verification and Validation of START: A Spent Nuclear Fuel Routing and Decision Support Tool

The Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START) is a web-based geospatial decision-support tool being developed by the US Department of Energy’s Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM) to support federal interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and associated transportation. START provides many functions for the IWM program including: serving as a communications tool for conveying geospatial data and information, an options analysis tool for exploring potential transport modes and routes for transporting SNF from nuclear power plants to future federal interim storage facilities, an emergency response planning tool for Tribes and States to identify training needs along potential SNF transport corridors, an environmental analysis tool for estimating potential radiation dose exposure from incident-free and incident-case SNF transport conditions, and a systems analysis support tool providing route-related inputs for system throughput analysis. As part of the START development process, a verification and validation (V&V) effort is being undertaken. In the initial V&V phase, several outputs of the START tool were checked such as the total distance, population and population densities within the buffer zone, and incident free dose. The V&V process is fluid as it will be utilized after each version change to ensure that the core functionalities of the tool are maintained and the results are consistent with the previous versions. Efforts have also been put into developing scripts to aid in the process of automating certain sections of the V&V work. As some of the V&V efforts use Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) tools upon which the START framework is built, the START data were compared against outputs from tools like Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) for buffer zone populations and route lengths to ensure independence of the V&V process. Good agreement was observed between the START results and the independent V&V studies with the majority of the differences falling between 1% and 5% for populations within the buffer zone and route distance. This presentation describes the development and design of the START tool, V&V methods employed for various metrics of interest and their respective results, and future plans.

START, transportation, GIS, V&V↗

Fracture Toughness Evaluation for Spent Nuclear Fuel Clad Systems Using Spiral Notch Torsion Fracture Toughness Test

Many radioactive materials within the nuclear fuel cycle present a significant hazard. Such materials include spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, legacy waste and other nuclear materials. These materials are often held in long-term storage as an interim stage within their lifecycle, including reuse or disposal. Safety and security of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage installations and follow-on SNF transportations to its final repository sites are very important, due to a great concentration of fission products, actinides and activation products. Fracture mechanics approach in applying to SNF system reliability investigation, especially for the high burn up (HBU) SNF, during SNF long term dry storage or SNF transportation is necessary due to the inherited flaws and inhomogeneity structures existed in a SNF system from the reactor operation. For instance, such as hydride and oxide formation, surface flaw induced by SNF assembly contact interactions, or internal flaws induced by pellet-clad mechanical interaction (PCMI). However, none of the existing fracture toughness data deal with fuel cladding specific geometry or SNF material conditions, such as cladding structure with the segment fuel pellets configuration and the PCMI mechanism. Consequently, the application of existing fracture toughness data to SNF system reliability investigation can be error prone; thus, the development of an industry-wide consensus fracture mechanics approach is needed. The objective of this research is to develop an in-situ fracture mechanics testing protocol, including the associated analytical procedure, that is suitable for evaluating the SNF fracture toughness. Fracture toughness data was obtained under quasi-static fracture loading using Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) developed Spiral Notch Torsion Test (SNTT) technology carried out on a biaxial tension/torsion tester. These data will be used to support SNF reliability investigation during long-tern SNF dry storage stage or in the follow-on SNF system transport to the final repository sites. SNTT has been a recent breakthrough in measuring fracture toughness for different materials, including metals, ceramics, concrete and polymers composites. Due to its high geometry constraint and unique loading condition, SNTT can be used to measure the fracture toughness with smaller specimens without concern of size effects. The application of SNTT to brittle materials has been proved to be successful. The micro-cracks induced by original notches in brittle materials could ensure crack growth in SNTT samples. Therefore, no fatigue pre cracks are needed for brittle materials specimens. The application of SNTT to the ductile material to generate valid toughness data will require a test sample with sufficient pre-crack length to increase the sample localized constraint at crack front. Fatigue pre-crack growth techniques with the associated compliance function estimated was developed for estimating the crack penetration depth to monitor the fatigue crack growth evolution. In order to extend SNTT approach to a thin shell cladding structure material, a new testing protocol and the associated analytical procedure for estimating the SNF fracture toughness was developed. The detailed SNTT approach and its estimated fracture toughness for the Zr-4 cladding structure with segment alumina inserts are presented in this report. The SNTT test results indicate that SNTT method is a reliable test approach with good repeatability in applying to Zr-4 cladding material. For the medium and the short crack length, the estimate J Q upon fracture for the baseline Zr-4 cladding is at 285.7 lb/in with 2-sigma uncertainty of 18.59 lb/in., and the associated K Q is at 61.4 Ksi√in. For a long crack length, the crack initialization orientation is apparently deviated from the principle tensile stress contour – 45° spiral crack front (i.e., Mode I + Mode III failure mechanism); and the estimated J Q is at 108 lb/in., the associated K Q is at 37.7 Ksi√in. The estimate Mode I J Q (along the 45° pitch principle tensile stress contour) is at 200 lb/in.; which indicate a significant reduction in the fracture toughness in a tubing structure under mixed mode loading condition, Mode I + Mode III, compared to that of Mode I (tensile stress dominated) alone.

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Evaluation and Demonstration of Intrusion Detection for Spent Fuel Storage Facilities

The IAEA recommends dual containment and surveillance (C/S) systems for difficult to access or difficult to measure spent fuel storage areas. However, many storage areas have limitations that prevent traditional secondary C/S systems, such as radiation levels too high for inspectors to apply individual Tamper Indicating Devices (TID) or have physical impedances to the use of TIDs. Recent developments in C/S technology include Laser Curtain for Containment (LCCT) technology implemented at Atucha-1 power plant in Argentina. The LCCT is a new approach to perimeter-wide C/S and the IAEA has granted provisional approval for its use as one of two required C/S systems. This proposal focuses on investigating and testing new and evolving completely passive (or ultra-low power) tamper indicating systems that will provide backup C/S to the LCCT even during power outages. An investigation of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technology will be conducted to identify readily available options. Optically Stimulated Luminescence (OSL) fibers will also be investigated. OSL fibers are a passive technology that can measure radiation dose by knocking an electron into a metastable state where it remains until the fiber is interrogated with light. The goal of this project would be to investigate COTS technologies that can be used in low or no power scenarios for radiation detection as well as test and evaluate OSL technology, which can operate passively in no power scenarios. Limitations for each technology will be determined and documented in an effort to determine the best technology for spent fuel storage monitoring.

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Development of Surface Sampling Techniques for the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (FY22 Update)

This report describes the proposed surface sampling techniques and plan for the multi-year Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD). The CDFD is primarily a dust deposition test that will use three commercial 32PTH2 NUHOMS welded stainless steel storage canisters in Advanced Horizontal Storage Modules, with planned exposure testing for up to 10 years at an operating ISFSI site. One canister will be left at ambient condition, unheated; the other two will have heaters to achieve canister surface temperatures that match, to the degree possible, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) loaded canisters with heat loads of 10 kW and 40 kW. Surface sampling campaigns for dust analysis will take place on a yearly or bi-yearly basis. The goal of the planned dust sampling and analysis is to determine important environmental parameters that impact the potential occurrence of stress corrosion cracking on SNF dry storage canisters. Specifically, measured dust deposition rates and deposited particle sizes will improve parameterization of dust deposition models employed to predict the potential occurrence and timing of stress corrosion cracks on the stainless steel SNF canisters. The size, morphology, and composition of the deposited dust and salt particles will be quantified, as well as the soluble salt load per unit area and the rate of deposition, as a function of canister surface temperature, location, time, and orientation. Previously, a preliminary sampling plan was developed, identifying possible sampling locations on the canister surfaces and sampling intervals; possible sampling methods were also described. Further development of the sampling plan has commenced through three different tasks. First, canister surface roughness, a potentially important parameter for air flow and dust deposition, was characterized at several locations on one of the test canisters. Second, corrosion testing to evaluate the potential lifetime and aging of thermocouple wires, spot welds, and attachments was initiated. Third, hand sampling protocols were developed, and initial testing was carried out. The results of those efforts are presented in this report. The information obtained from the CDFD will be critical for ongoing efforts to develop a detailed understanding of the potential for stress corrosion cracking of SNF dry storage canisters.

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Win-Win Regulatory Strategies in Idaho - 19241

During the course of any waste management or environmental remediation project, the earliest goals must include the creation and maintenance of mutual trust, respect, and cooperation with regulatory agencies and stakeholders. The heavy equipment and treatment systems remain idled until bounding characterization and risk analysis is complete, technical and functional requirements are identified, required controls and limits are established, and the proper permits and approvals are issued. Once a project receives approval to start up or break ground, the regulatory process has only just begun. Process modifications and improvements, as well as unexpected events, will continue to necessitate further reviews, discussions, and approvals. Building healthy professional relationships with the regulatory community and consistently meeting or exceeding their expectations, while operating within controls, is a cornerstone to jointly finding cost-effective solutions to complex issues, and streamlining the path to success. Navigating the optimal routes to compliance through the myriad regulatory waypoints is essential to avoiding schedule delays, staying within budget, and keeping clients continuously satisfied and delighted. Two complex case studies from the Idaho Cleanup Project Core will examine regulatory communication and integration strategies that have proven effective to date in obtaining timely approvals and maintaining compliance: (1) conducting Decontamination and Decommissioning as non-time critical removal actions (NTCRA) under CERCLA, and (2) preparing the integrated documentation necessary to obtain DOE, EPA, DEQ, and NRC approvals to close calcine storage units at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). (author)

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Effect of chromium on corrosion resistance of Ni-Cr-Mo-Gd alloys in seawater

Neutron absorbing materials are being considered within commercial spent nuclear fuel disposal canisters to maintain nuclear subcriticality in storage. To select candidate alloys for the canisters, both neutron absorption and corrosion resistance should be considered. This work examines corrosion resistance of Ni-Cr-Mo-Gd alloys developed specifically for neutron absorption. The addition of Gd results in a secondary gadolinide phase (Ni 5 Gd) that significantly changes the corrosion properties. Testing was performed primarily in seawater at 30°C. Seawater was selected as the most prevalent terrestrial brine and is characterized by a high chloride concentration. Various electrochemical corrosion techniques were carried out to evaluate Ni-Cr-Mo-Gd alloys with different Cr compositions and investigate the role of Ni 5 Gd phase on corrosion behavior. C22 was included as a benchmark material, due to the similarity in composition and the significant corrosion data available. Here, test results showed a tendency to passivate over time which is attributed to dissolution of surface exposed Ni 5 Gd phase. Cross-sectional analysis indicated that dissolution could penetrate hundreds of micrometers deep under aggressive conditions. It was found that higher Cr variant (21.01%) showed much shallower impact, suggesting Cr prevented primary phase corrosion and thus reduced Ni 5 Gd phase dissolution. Acid pickling of the specimens showed much less dissolution for a higher Cr material and suggested some primary phase dissolution for the low Cr specimen. Acid pickled specimens showed positive shifts in the repassivation potential, suggesting increased surface passivation.

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Development of a new generation of waste form for entrapment and immobilization of highly volatile and soluble radionuclides.

The United States is now re-assessing its nuclear waste disposal policy and re-evaluating the option of moving away from the current once-through open fuel cycle to a closed fuel cycle. In a closed fuel cycle, used fuels will be reprocessed and useful components such as uranium or transuranics will be recovered for reuse. During this process, a variety of waste streams will be generated. Immobilizing these waste streams into appropriate waste forms for either interim storage or long-term disposal is technically challenging. Highly volatile or soluble radionuclides such as iodine ({sup 129}I) and technetium ({sup 99}Tc) are particularly problematic, because both have long half-lives and can exist as gaseous or anionic species that are highly soluble and poorly sorbed by natural materials. Under the support of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Laboratory-Directed Research & Development (LDRD), we have developed a suite of inorganic nanocomposite materials (SNL-NCP) that can effectively entrap various radionuclides, especially for {sup 129}I and {sup 99}Tc. In particular, these materials have high sorption capabilities for iodine gas. After the sorption of radionuclides, these materials can be directly converted into nanostructured waste forms. This new generation of waste forms incorporates radionuclides as nano-scale inclusions in a host matrix and thus effectively relaxes the constraint of crystal structure on waste loadings. Therefore, the new waste forms have an unprecedented flexibility to accommodate a wide range of radionuclides with high waste loadings and low leaching rates. Specifically, we have developed a general route for synthesizing nanoporous metal oxides from inexpensive inorganic precursors. More than 300 materials have been synthesized and characterized with x-ray diffraction (XRD), BET surface area measurements, and transmission electron microscope (TEM). The sorption capabilities of the synthesized materials have been quantified by using stable isotopes I and Re as analogs to {sup 129}I and {sup 99}Tc. The results have confirmed our original finding that nanoporous Al oxide and its derivatives have high I sorption capabilities due to the combined effects of surface chemistry and nanopore confinement. We have developed a suite of techniques for the fixation of radionuclides in metal oxide nanopores. The key to this fixation is to chemically convert a target radionuclide into a less volatile or soluble form. We have developed a technique to convert a radionuclide-loaded nanoporous material into a durable glass-ceramic waste form through calcination. We have shown that mixing a radionuclide-loaded getter material with a Na-silicate solution can effectively seal the nanopores in the material, thus enhancing radionuclide retention during waste form formation. Our leaching tests have demonstrated the existence of an optimal vitrification temperature for the enhancement of waste form durability. Our work also indicates that silver may not be needed for I immobilization and encapsulation.

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Alternative Enhanced Chemical Cleaning Basic Studies Results FY09

Due to the need to close waste storage tanks, chemical cleaning methods are needed for the effective removal of the heels. Oxalic acid is the preferred cleaning reagent for sludge heel dissolution, particularly for iron-based sludge, due to the strong complexing strength of the oxalate. However, the large quantity of oxalate added to the tank farm from oxalic acid based chemical cleaning has significant downstream impacts. Optimization of the oxalic acid cleaning process can potentially reduce the downstream impacts from chemical cleaning. To optimize oxalic acid usage, a detailed understanding of the chemistry of oxalic acid based sludge dissolution is required. Additionally, other acid systems may be required for specific waste components with low solubility in oxalic acid and as a means to reduce oxalic acid usage in general. Solubility tests were conducted using non-radioactive, pure metal phases known to be the primary phases present in High Level Waste sludge. The metal phases studied included the aluminum phases gibbsite and boehmite and the iron phases magnetite and hematite. Hematite and boehmite are expected to be the most difficult iron and aluminum phases to dissolve. These mineral phases have been identified in both SRS and Hanford High Level Waste sludge. Acids evaluated for dissolution included oxalic, nitric, and sulfuric acids. The results of the solubility tests indicate that oxalic and sulfuric acids are more effective for the dissolution of the primary sludge phases. For boehmite, elevated temperature will be required to promote effective phase dissolution in the acids studied. Literature reviews, thermodynamic modeling, and experimental results have all confirmed that pH control using a supplemental proton source (additional acid) is critical for minimization of oxalic acid usage during the dissolution of hematite. These results emphasize the importance of pH control in optimizing hematite dissolution in oxalic acid and may explain the somewhat limited success observed during recent attempts to remove sludge heels from SRS Tanks 5F and 6F using oxalic acid. Additionally, based on the results of the solubility tests conducted, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) Hematite dissolution in oxalic acid is a stoichiometric process dependant upon the provision of sufficient oxalate molar equivalents to complex the iron and sufficient H{sup +} to promote the dissolution reaction. (2) The optimal utilization of oxalic acid for hematite dissolution requires an additional proton source, such as nitric acid, and a pH of {le} 1. In the absence of a supplemental proton source, greater than stoichiometric amounts of oxalate are required. (3) Magnetite is generally more soluble than hematite in all acids tested. (4) Gibbsite is generally more soluble than the boehmite form of aluminum in all acids tested. (5) The OLI Thermodynamic Model is a useful tool for the prediction of equilibrium iron concentrations, but predictions must be experimentally verified. The OLI model appears to over-predict the solubility of the iron and aluminum phases studied in mineral acids.

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FIRST INTERIM STATUS REPORT: MODEL 9975 LIFE EXTENSION PACKAGE TESTING

Three 9975 packages have been instrumented and exposed to bounding storage conditions to help identify the extent to which laboratory test results for fiberboard, O-rings and other components apply within a full-scale package. To date, changes observed in the fiberboard overpack and Oring seals are generally consistent with the behavior of laboratory samples. The lead shield within each package has developed a corrosion layer of lead carbonate, consistent with other 9975 packages. However, the morphology of the corrosion layer is different within these packages, possibly as a result of the severity of the conditioning environments beyond normal service conditions. Conditioning of the second package, LE2, has been discontinued due to the degree of degradation of the fiberboard, and its components have received a final examination. Additional testing will be performed on samples removed from the fiberboard assembly to verify its final condition. The other two packages will continue in test. This is an interim status report for experiments carried out per Task Technical Plan WSRC-TR-2005-00014 [1], which is part of the comprehensive 9975 package surveillance program [2]. The primary goal of this task is to validate aging models currently under development based on lab scale testing of the fiberboard overpack and containment vessel O-rings. A secondary goal is to examine the behavior of the lead shielding under bounding conditions. This task provides an integrated assessment of the package response to environmental extremes, and demonstrates the extent to which data from small samples scale up to a full package. Three 9975 packages have been modified to provide instrumentation for monitoring package response and performance to environmental aging. Each package has a different environmental exposure history.

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SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT ENGINEERED CONTAINER RETRIEVAL AND TRANSFER SYSTEM PRELMINARY DESIGN HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

This Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study addresses the Sludge Treatment Project (STP) Engineered Container Retrieval and Transfer System (ECRTS) preliminary design for retrieving sludge from underwater engineered containers located in the 105-K West (KW) Basin, transferring the sludge as a sludge-water slurry (hereafter referred to as 'slurry') to a Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC) located in a Modified KW Basin Annex, and preparing the STSC for transport to T Plant using the Sludge Transport System (STS). There are six, underwater engineered containers located in the KW Basin that, at the time of sludge retrieval, will contain an estimated volume of 5.2 m{sup 3} of KW Basin floor and pit sludge, 18.4 m{sup 3} of 105-K East (KE) Basin floor, pit, and canister sludge, and 3.5 m{sup 3} of settler tank sludge. The KE and KW Basin sludge consists of fuel corrosion products (including metallic uranium, and fission and activation products), small fuel fragments, iron and aluminum oxide, sand, dirt, operational debris, and biological debris. The settler tank sludge consists of sludge generated by the washing of KE and KW Basin fuel in the Primary Clean Machine. A detailed description of the origin of sludge and its chemical and physical characteristics can be found in HNF-41051, Preliminary STP Container and Settler Sludge Process System Description and Material Balance. In summary, the ECRTS retrieves sludge from the engineered containers and hydraulically transfers it as a slurry into an STSC positioned within a trailer-mounted STS cask located in a Modified KW Basin Annex. The slurry is allowed to settle within the STSC to concentrate the solids and clarify the supernate. After a prescribed settling period the supernate is decanted. The decanted supernate is filtered through a sand filter and returned to the basin. Subsequent batches of slurry are added to the STSC, settled, and excess supernate removed until the prescribed quantity of sludge is collected. The sand filter is then backwashed into the STSC. The STSC and STS cask are then inerted and transported to T Plant.

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ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES FROM TANK 6F CHEMICAL CLEANING

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is preparing Tank 6F for closure. The first step in preparing the tank for closure is mechanical sludge removal. In mechanical sludge removal, personnel add liquid (e.g., inhibited water or supernate salt solution) to the tank to form a slurry. They mix the liquid and sludge with pumps, and transfer the slurry to another tank for further processing. Mechanical sludge removal effectively removes the bulk of the sludge from a tank, but is not able to remove all of the sludge. In Tank 6F, SRR estimated a sludge heel of 5,984 gallons remained after mechanical sludge removal. To remove this sludge heel, SRR performed chemical cleaning. The chemical cleaning included two oxalic acid strikes, a spray wash, and a water wash. SRR conducted the first oxalic acid strike as follows. Personnel added 110,830 gallons of 8 wt % oxalic acid to Tank 6F and mixed the contents of Tank 6F with two submersible mixer pumps (SMPs) for approximately four days. Following the mixing, they transferred 115,903 gallons of Tank 6F material to Tank 7F. The SMPs were operating when the transfer started and were shut down approximately five hours after the transfer started. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted it to SRNL for analysis. Mapping of the tank following the transfer indicated that 2,400 gallons of solids remained in the tank. SRR conducted the second oxalic acid strike as follows. Personnel added 28,881 gallons of 8 wt % oxalic acid to Tank 6F. Following the acid addition, they visually inspected the tank and transferred 32,247 gallons of Tank 6F material to Tank 7F. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted it to SRNL for analysis. Mapping of the tank following the transfer indicated that 3,248 gallons of solids remained in the tank. Following the oxalic acid strikes, SRR performed Spray Washing with oxalic acid to remove waste collected on internal structures, cooling coils, tank top internals, and tank walls. The Acid Spray Wash was followed by a Water Spray Wash to remove oxalic acid from the tank internals. SRR conducted the Spray Wash as follows. Personnel added 4,802 gallons of 8 wt % oxalic acid to Tank 6F through the spray mast installed in Riser 2, added 4,875 gallons of oxalic acid through Riser 7, added 5,000 gallons of deionized water into the tank via Riser 2, and 5,000 gallons of deionized water into the tank via Riser 7. Following the Spray Wash, they visually inspected the tank and transferred 22,430 gallons of Tank 6F material to Tank 7F. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted it to SRNL for analysis. Following the Spray Wash and transfer, Savannah River Site (SRS) added 113,935 gallons of well water to Tank 6F. They mixed the tank contents with a single SMP and transferred 112,699 gallons from Tank 6F to Tank 7F. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted to SRNL for analysis. Mapping of the tank following the transfer indicated that 3,488 gallons of solids remained in the tank. Following the Water Wash, SRR personnel collected a solid sample and submitted it to SRNL for analysis to assess the effectiveness of the chemical cleaning and to provide a preliminary indication of the composition of the material remaining in the tank.

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SLUDGE BATCH 7B QUALIFICATION ACTIVITIES WITH SRS TANK FARM SLUDGE

Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) has requested that characterization and a radioactive demonstration of the next batch of sludge slurry - Sludge Batch 7b (SB7b) - be completed in the Shielded Cells Facility of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) via a Technical Task Request (TTR). This characterization and demonstration, or sludge batch qualification process, is required prior to transfer of the sludge from Tank 51 to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) feed tank (Tank 40). The current WSE practice is to prepare sludge batches in Tank 51 by transferring sludge from other tanks. Discharges of nuclear materials from H Canyon are often added to Tank 51 during sludge batch preparation. The sludge is washed and transferred to Tank 40, the current DWPF feed tank. Prior to transfer of Tank 51 to Tank 40, SRNL typically simulates the Tank Farm and DWPF processes with a Tank 51 sample (referred to as the qualification sample). With the tight schedule constraints for SB7b and the potential need for caustic addition to allow for an acceptable glass processing window, the qualification for SB7b was approached differently than past batches. For SB7b, SRNL prepared a Tank 51 and a Tank 40 sample for qualification. SRNL did not receive the qualification sample from Tank 51 nor did it simulate all of the Tank Farm washing and decanting operations. Instead, SRNL prepared a Tank 51 SB7b sample from samples of Tank 7 and Tank 51, along with a wash solution to adjust the supernatant composition to the final SB7b Tank 51 Tank Farm projections. SRNL then prepared a sample to represent SB7b in Tank 40 by combining portions of the SRNL-prepared Tank 51 SB7b sample and a Tank 40 Sludge Batch 7a (SB7a) sample. The blended sample was 71% Tank 40 (SB7a) and 29% Tank 7/Tank 51 on an insoluble solids basis. This sample is referred to as the SB7b Qualification Sample. The blend represented the highest projected Tank 40 heel (as of May 25, 2011), and thus, the highest projected noble metals content for SB7b. Characterization was performed on the Tank 51 SB7b samples and SRNL performed DWPF simulations using the Tank 40 SB7b material. This report documents: (1) The preparation and characterization of the Tank 51 SB7b and Tank 40 SB7b samples. (2) The performance of a DWPF Chemical Process Cell (CPC) simulation using the SB7b Tank 40 sample. The simulation included a Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) cycle, where acid was added to the sludge to destroy nitrite and reduce mercury, and a Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) cycle, where glass frit was added to the sludge in preparation for vitrification. The SME cycle also included replication of five canister decontamination additions and concentrations. Processing parameters were based on work with a nonradioactive simulant. (3) Vitrification of a portion of the SME product and characterization and durability testing (as measured by the Product Consistency Test (PCT)) of the resulting glass. (4) Rheology measurements of the SRAT receipt, SRAT product, and SME product. This program was controlled by a Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP), and analyses were guided by an Analytical Study Plan. This work is Technical Baseline Research and Development (R&D) for the DWPF. It should be noted that much of the data in this document has been published in interoffice memoranda. The intent of this technical report is bring all of the SB7b related data together in a single permanent record and to discuss the overall aspects of SB7b processing.

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Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

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Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients and Radiological and Toxicological Exposure Methodology for Use in Tank Farms

This report presents the atmospheric dispersion coefficients used in Tank Farms safety analysis. The basis equations for calculating radiological and toxicological exposures are also included. In this revision, the time averaging for toxicological consequence evaluations is clarified based on a review of DOE complex guidance and a review of tank farm chemicals.

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Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Safety Factors: Computer modeling of complex processes needs old-fashioned experiments to stay in touch with reality

Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is recognized as a powerful engineering tool. That is, CFD has advanced over the years to the point where it can now give us deep insight into the analysis of very complex processes. There is a danger, though, that an engineer can place too much confidence in a simulation. If a user is not careful, it is easy to believe that if you plug in the numbers, the answer comes out, and you are done. This assumption can lead to significant errors. As we discovered in the course of a study on behalf of the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site in South Carolina, CFD models fail to capture some of the large variations inherent in complex processes. These variations, or scatter, in experimental data emerge from physical tests and are inadequately captured or expressed by calculated mean values for a process. This anomaly between experiment and theory can lead to serious errors in engineering analysis and design unless a correction factor, or safety factor, is experimentally validated. For this study, blending times for the mixing of salt solutions in large storage tanks were the process of concern under investigation. This study focused on the blending processes needed to mix salt solutions to ensure homogeneity within waste tanks, where homogeneity is required to control radioactivity levels during subsequent processing. Two of the requirements for this task were to determine the minimum number of submerged, centrifugal pumps required to blend the salt mixtures in a full-scale tank in half a day or less, and to recommend reasonable blending times to achieve nearly homogeneous salt mixtures. A full-scale, low-flow pump with a total discharge flow rate of 500 to 800 gpm was recommended with two opposing 2.27-inch diameter nozzles. To make this recommendation, both experimental and CFD modeling were performed. Lab researchers found that, although CFD provided good estimates of an average blending time, experimental blending times varied significantly from the average.

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APS Science 2020 (Vol. 2)

The U.S. Department of Energy's Advanced Photn Source (APS) is one of the world’s most productive x-ray light source facilities. Each year, the APS provides high-brightness x-ray beams to a diverse community of more than 5,000 researchers in materials science, chemistry, condensed matter physics, the life and environmental sciences, and applied research. Researchers using the APS produce over 2,000 publications each year detailing impactful discoveries, and solve more vital biological protein structures than users of any other x-ray light source research facility. APS x-rays are ideally suited for explorations of materials and biological structures; elemental distribution; chemical, magnetic, electronic states; and a wide range of technologically important engineering systems from batteries to fuel injector sprays, all of which are the foundations of our nation’s economic, technological, and physical well-being. The APS occupies an 80-acre site on the Argonne campus, about 25 miles from downtown Chicago, Illinois. It shares a site with the Center for Nanoscale Materials and the Advanced Protein Characterization Facility.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗