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Model 9975 O-Ring Fixture Long-Term Leak Performance (FY2020 Status Report)

Leak testing experiments to monitor the aging performance of Viton GLT and GLT-S O-rings used in the model 9975 shipping package has been ongoing since 2004 at Savannah River National Laboratory. Seventy tests using mock-up 9975 primary containment vessels (PCVs) with GLT O-rings were assembled and heated to temperatures ranging from 200 to 450 °F. In addition, fourteen tests with GLT-S O-rings were initiated in 2008 and heated to temperatures ranging from 200 to 400 °F. The conditioning temperatures are elevated compared to the calculated maximum O-ring temperature in a 9975 package in storage, 158 °F, to accelerate aging and enable observations of O-ring failures in a reasonable time frame. The fixtures are leak tested periodically and all GLT O-ring fixtures aging at 350 °F or above have failed to maintain a leak-tight seal. Eight GLT O-ring fixtures aging at 300 °F have failed after 2.8 to 5.7 years at temperature while the remaining fixtures at 300 °F were retired from testing following more than five years without failure. No failures have yet been observed in GLT O-ring fixtures aging at 200 °F for 12 to 14 years or aging at 270 °F for 8.5 years. All GLT-S O-ring fixtures aging at 300 °F or above have failed their leak test. No failures have yet been observed in GLT-S O-ring fixtures aging at 200 and 250 °F for 10 to 10.5 years. Data from the O-ring fixtures are generally consistent with results from compression stress-relaxation testing, and provide confidence in the predictive models based on those results. However, uncertainty exists in extrapolating these elevated temperature results to the lower temperatures of interest for normal storage in K-Area Complex (KAC). Oxygen consumption testing, which includes results from temperatures near KAC normal storage temperatures, is ongoing to provide further confidence and corroborate these extrapolations. The collective data from these test efforts suggest the minimum O-ring service life at KAC normal storage conditions should be at least 34 years for GLT and GLT-S O-rings. Measurement of compression set in O-rings removed from failed fixtures, compared to that from KAC surveillance O-rings, indicates margin remains for O-rings still in service. Aging and periodic leak testing will continue for the remaining PCV fixtures.

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Depowering of Batteries to Reduce Cost of Ownership

(1) Executive Summary: End of life batteries (EOLBs) present a cost and safety liability for their owners and stakeholders. This is due flammability, energy, and power with EOLBs. Current approaches include cumbersome, expensive packaging, specialized shipping, regulated storage, and they are responsible for over half of the cost of recycling. They all expensively and inadequately address symptoms. OnTo has developed and proven a simple way to resolve the problem systemically, through depowering of lithium-ion batteries (and most any battery other than lead). The low-cost process removes flammability, power, and energy in EOLBs through non-toxic chemical processing. The opportunity for commerce of inert scrap is at least $5 billion greater than the commerce in hazardous scrap, all made possible through OnTo’s technology for efficiency and safety. (2) Depowering Improves Safety and Decreases Cost of Battery Ownership: OnTo’s depowering technology will remove half of the cost of EOLB management and recycling. Without this technology, EOLB recycling will always be a liability. EOLB is hazardous due to inherent flammability of electrolyte and lithium. The shipping and commerce of EOLBs is costly and dangerous all along the chain of custody from owner, dealership/shop, shipper, second-life sorter, (shipper again), and finally to the destination facility recycler. OnTo’s depowering service renders inert most any EOLB packs, modules, and cells. The technology uses a brief, non-toxic treatment applicable to most any chemistry. The industry needs a safe, simple, modular, and inexpensive method to render EOLBs as inert scrap. OnTo’s deactivation system is scalable to the needs of any customer along the EOLB chain of custody. (3) Evidence of Successful Depowering: Untreated batteries will catch fire and explode under abuse conditions such as heat or crush. Slide 2 below shows that untreated batteries will blow-up and expel their internal components with heating, after OnTo’s depowering treatment, the same battery is inert with the same heat treatment (Fig. 7 in the slide). Depowering also removes electrolyte reactivity, eliminating the production of HF and other toxins (Fig 6. in the slide) The depowering process is applicable to large, 26 Ah cells. Fig. 5 in the slide shows the removal of all the electrolyte from whole cells. Removal of flammable material from an EOLB contributes to the inert behavior. OnTo developed this technology through a project supported by the US Department of Energy EERE program, with partners including Seattle King County Metro Transit. While OnTo has generated evidence of successful depowering of batteries, in 2020, a follow-on voucher opportunity for third party analysis of depowered cells and materials was approved through CalTestBed. The expertise of the battery and materials research groups at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory will characterize these depowered cells to provide better understanding of the materials level changes in depowering. (4) Pilot Plant for Depowering EOLBs: Making the spoke work in hub-and-spoke While other companies are marketing the hub-and-spoke approach for recycling EOLBs, they rely on dangerous, expensive shredding methods with flimsy IP protection. OnTo offers the only patented, proven ability to depower EOLBs from most any chemistry – at half of the capital cost required for shredding, while eliminating the liability, danger, and waste streams inherent with shredding. The proposed commercial pilot facility is (5) OnTo Technology LLC Company: OnTo develops advanced battery recycling innovations that produce manufacturing quality electrode materials from recycled batteries. Their patented Cathode-healing™ and Deactivation/Depowering processes improve safety and reduce the cost of recycling. OnTo’s breakthrough technologies produce advanced materials for manufacturing batteries useful in applications from portable power to electric vehicles. Contact: Steve Sloop OnTo Technology LLC, 63221 Service Road, STE F, Bend, OR 97703, ssloop@onto-technology.com , 541-389-7897

deactivation↗

Tracking Radioactive Isotopes in HVAC and Application for Hot Cell Analyses - 20155

In recent years, the surge in the number of isotope production facilities under design has increased the need to analyze isotope migration in facility Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) during normal operations and accident scenarios. These facilities are used to produce isotopes for medical, security, and industrial applications and as such are subject to license and regulatory requirements 10CFR20, 10CFR30, 10CFR50, and 10CFR70. GOTHIC, a general-purpose thermal-hydraulics software package, includes the ability to model isotopic tracers, radioactive decay and isotope migration as well as HEPA and charcoal filters for isotope retention. A GOTHIC model was developed by Zachry Nuclear Engineering (ZNE) to examine the effect of negative room pressure, HEPA filtration, and HVAC fluctuations on radiation areas, hot cells and gloveboxes. Radioactive tracers were used to simulate the concentration of spills within contaminated areas, track the migration of isotopes of interest, and determine the isotopic retention and buildup on facility HEPA filters. A variety of isotopes with concern to dose (e.g., Kr-85, Sr-90, I-131, etc.), including their decay and progeny, are included in the analysis. Negative pressures are maintained in the regions of interest by a representative central HVAC system equipped with a volumetric fan that exhausts to the environment after a series of isolation valves and HEPA filters. GOTHIC is an industry trusted tool for providing engineering solutions for a variety of applications, including fission product tracking, aerosol and particulate transport and ventilation assessments. The software provides an integrated analysis environment that includes a graphical user interface (GUI) for constructing analysis models, a numerical solver that includes parallel processing capabilities and a post-processor for evaluating simulation results. It solves the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy for multicomponent, multi-phase flow in lumped parameter and multi-dimensional geometries (1, 2, or full 3D), including the effects of turbulence, diffusion and buoyancy. It has been developed and maintained under a Quality Assurance program in compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B and applicable portions of ASME NQA-1 since 1995. GOTHIC has been used for assessing both forced and natural convection conditions for a wide range of applications, including: - Tracking concentration of hazardous gases and chemicals for habitability and safety assessments - Determining ventilation and filtration requirements and optimizing location and arrangement of these systems - Room heat-up, including diverse and Flexible coping strategies for Extended Loss of AC Power (FLEX/ELAP) - Equipment Qualification (EQ) A distinctive feature of GOTHIC is the ability to track many different fields/substances in a simulation, including user defined tracer elements, in the liquid, vapor and droplet fields as well as surfaces and filters. This capability allows GOTHIC to model fission product transport and release or the removal of particulates or harmful toxins from exhaust gases using a spray scrubber or other types of filtration systems. GOTHIC also includes models for engineered equipment, such as fans, filters, charcoal filters, dryers/demisters, dampers, etc. The aerosols and other filtered material are removed or accumulated in these components. The range of aerosol and radiological applications that GOTHIC has been used for includes: - Source Term: Primary Coolant (Equilibrium) Activity; Non-Water Coolant Source/Leakage. - Conditions for Iodine Re-evolution: Sump/Suppression Pool Conditions and pH; - RWST Conditions and pH. - Isotope Removal Mechanisms: Containment Sprayed and Unsprayed Region Mixing; Charcoal Filter Heating due to Iodine decay. - Radionuclide Transport and Decay: Post-LOCA Release in containment; Transport between connected Compartments and vent systems; Groundwater transport of radionuclides. - Non-Newtonian Fluid modeling for sludge, waste tanks, etc. ADAMS ML071581053 (titled 'Best Practice Guidelines for the use of CFD in Nuclear Reactor Safety Applications') poses guidelines for applying single phase CFD codes in nuclear reactor safety problems and GOTHIC is listed as a 'tool for 3D flows' and 'dispersal and deposition of radionuclides.' The Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) pedigree of GOTHIC is an important aspect for applications in the nuclear industry. The fundamental tracer models (convective transport, molecular and turbulent diffusion, removal mechanisms, etc.) have been verified using analytical solutions and validated against applicable separate effects tests. Also, GOTHIC has been benchmarked to many integrated effects tests, including Phebus FP (Fission Product). GOTHIC gives good agreement for the buildup and decay of fission products in Phebus Test 3. The model developed by ZNE demonstrates GOTHIC's applicability and acceptability for use in analyzing the migration and retention of radioactive isotopes and their progeny in normal operation and accident scenario analyses for isotope production facilities, hot cells, and gloveboxes. The tracer activities calculated by GOTHIC can then be used in downstream radiation transport and shielding codes like RADTRAD-NAI{sup C}, MCNP{sup R}, and MicroShield{sup R} to determine on-site and of-site doses. (authors)

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Using GIS for Processing, Analysis and Visualization of Hydrological Model Data - 16202

The Applied Research Center at Florida International University (ARC-FIU) is supporting the soil and groundwater remediation efforts of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Savannah River Site (SRS) by developing a surface water model to simulate the hydrology and the fate and transport of contaminants and sediment in the Tims Branch watershed. Advances in ArcGIS software through the development of spatial GIS database (geo-database) technology, coupled with the development of data models such as ArcHydro which possesses a spatial relational database management system (RDMS) schema and relationship structure specific to hydrologic systems, provides modelers with tools and applications to assist in the processing, analysis and visualization of flow and contaminant transport data. In addition, the coupling of this type of geo-database structure with a numerical modeling package such as MIKE SHE/MIKE 11 can serve as an efficient tool that significantly reduces the time needed for data preparation. The MIKE modeling system has a geographic information systems (GIS) user interface built into its system that can directly use GIS data for model inputs. GIS-based hydrologic models can provide a spatial element that other hydrologic models lack. GIS is important for processing and analysis of large spatio-temporal datasets derived from multiple sources that are being used for setting up of models, model calibration and simulation of flow and contaminant fate and transport. GIS-based approaches in hydrological modeling can also provide the benefit of combining different layers of geographic data to create new integrated information which can be quite useful for creating dependent or independent hydrological variables. ARC-FIU has developed an ArcGIS geo-database to support the hydrological modeling work being conducted at SRS. The SRS geo-database was developed based on the ArcHydro and ArcGIS Base Map data models with modifications made for project specific input parameters. The significance of this approach was to ensure its replicability for potential application at other DOE sites. The SRS geo-database assists in the storage and management of GIS and time series data being used for hydrological model development at Savannah River Site. Other GIS tools such as ArcGIS Model Builder coupled with Python scripting have enabled the automation of many of the repetitive geo-processing tasks required for pre- and post-processing of the hydrological modeling data. Automation of many of the data processing tasks has facilitated faster and hence more complex analyses of field test data. The toolbox created is also a scalable and reusable application that can be implemented in other watersheds. This paper describes the use of ArcGIS tools for the pre-processing, spatial delineation and analysis of hydrological model data; for automation of repetitive geo-processing tasks; and for visualization of different hydrological components of the Tims Branch watershed. (authors)

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Conceptual Approach For Estimating Potential Air Toxics And Radionuclide Airborne Emissions From A Temporary Exhaust System For The 216-Z-9 Crib Removal Action

The 216-Z-9 Crib, located at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in southeastern Washington State, was the site of a successful mining effort to recover plutonium from the contaminated soils at the disposal site. A CERCLA Action Memorandum (AM) issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requires the removal of the buildings associated with this mining effort to facilitate a remedial action planned for the near future. The decontamination and demolition of the 216 Z-9 Crib facilities is required under a consent order between the DOE, the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology). Removal of the buildings located on and near the concrete cover slab over the 216-Z-9 Crib will require removal of the large soil-packaging glovebox located inside the 216-Z- 9A Building. Prior to cleaning out the glovebox, it will be necessary to provide active filtered ventilation capability to ensure a negative pressure exists between the glovebox and the adjacent airspace while hands-on work proceeds within. The glovebox floor is open to the Z-9 crib cavern environment below. For this reason the crib and glovebox currently share a common airspace. The functional requirements for safely conducting work within the glovebox include provision of a negative pressure in the box of about 0.5 inches of water gage (nominal) less than the interior of the building. In addition, the building surrounding the glovebox will be maintained at a slight negative pressure with respect to outdoor ambient pressure. In order to assess the relevant and appropriate clean air requirements for the new temporary ventilation system and associated emissions monitoring, it was necessary to reliably predict the nature of the exhaust air stream. Factors used to predict the presence and concentrations of certain radionuclide particulates and certain gases considered to be air toxics, included reliability parameters, flow rates, radionuclide content, and off-gas compositions. Radionuclide content includes transuranic isotopes, primarily of plutonium and americium. Air toxics include carbon tetrachloride, butane, methanol, acetone and toluene. Flow rate prediction was based on available design and test data and considered equipment sizes, glovebox negative pressure requirements, and filter flow characteristics. The approach used to predict the off-gas composition from the crib required experience-based predictive analysis combined with crib head space analytical results. Input information for emission estimates included: (1) gas composition sample data obtained from recent samples taken within the crib head space during static conditions, and (2) air in-leakage/dilution estimates based on physical characteristics of both the crib and the new temporary ventilation system. The conceptual approach combined measurement-based data with conservative assumptions, and provides the estimates necessary to determine relevance and appropriateness of substantive requirements under federal and state laws and regulations. (authors)

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Stranded Fuel, Orphan Sites, Dead Plants: Transportation Planning Considerations After the BRC Report - 13393

The author explores transportation, packaging and storage questions related to a primary recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future; i.e., that fuel from shutdown plants be removed to consolidated storage as soon as possible to enable final decommissioning and beneficial re-use of those sites. The paper discusses the recommendations of the BRC, the implications and challenges that implementing those recommendations present, and provides recommended solutions for beginning the multi-year planning, coordination, material acquisition, and communications processes that will be needed to move fuel from shutdown plants when a destination site becomes available. Removal of used nuclear fuel from shutdown reactor sites (which are serving no other purpose other than storing SNF and GTCC, at considerable expense) was a central recommendation of the BRC, for a number of reasons. This recommendation was one of the most widely acclaimed that the Commission put forward. However, there are significant challenges (such as availability of fuel canister overpacks, lack of infrastructure, handling constraints and others) that will need to be addressed, apart from the critically important identification of a suitable and workable storage destination site. Resolving these logistical challenges will need to begin even before a destination site is identified, given the long lead-times required for planning and procurement. Based on information available today, it is possible to make informed predictions about what will be needed to modify existing contractual arrangements with utilities, address equipment and infrastructure needs, and begin working with states, tribes and local governments to start initial preparation needs. If DOE, working with industry and other experienced parties, can begin planning and acquisition activities in the near term, overall schedule risk can be reduced and potential cost avoidance achieved. The most immediate benefit will accrue to the operators of the shutdown plants, but beginning to accept fuel as required under the NWPA will reduce the liability to the federal government, and also offer some assurance to other utilities and the public that DOE (or another entity if one is established) is capable of meeting its obligations under the NWPA. The indirect benefits, therefore, will be quite broad. (authors)

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Uncrewed Lunar Surface Operations and Support Activities

Sustained human presence on the surface of the Moon and future missions to Mars require increased independence from surface crews and Earth-based mission control to operate efficiently, safely, and reliably. The time for surface crews to perform tasks will be limited. Extravehicular activities by surface personnel are burdensome and time-consuming, even when a continuous human presence on the surface occurs. Identifying and balancing human/automation roles and tasks and infusing automation and autonomy practices early in a system’s lifecycle will be essential to achieve mission objectives. Among these objectives are attaining a sustained human presence, improving performance and mission effectiveness, reducing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, and ensuring operations that are robust to communication delays. To achieve these objectives, an operational shift toward increased automation and autonomy with less reliance on humans is needed. Uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities occur when surface crews are not present or are independent of surface crew timeline activities requiring no surface crew oversight or intervention. These uncrewed surface opportunities can also be planned to minimize crew workload that avoids routine maintenance and support tasks, thus maximizing crew exploration time. Uncrewed preparations such as staging and prepositioning equipment and materials before the crew arrives could improve crew task efficiency. Additional opportunities exist to conduct uncrewed science, exploration, and utilization. Uncrewed surface architecture functions can include science and exploration; habitation; launch and landing support; surface communication and navigation; surface power generation and distribution; human surface mobility; lifting, handling, manipulating; excavation, construction, and site preparation; logistics management; maintenance and repair; surface resource utilization; integrated site operations and shared support services (e.g., site scheduling/prioritization, dust mitigation/contamination control, and surface safety). Early robotic lunar surface campaigns will provide information on the availability of resources, such as oxygen and water, and demonstrate surface-based technologies. After the Artemis III human lunar return mission, a series of landers will deliver surface systems, cargo, supplies, science packages, spare parts, and commodities. A balance of crewed and uncrewed surface operations will enable a sustained lunar surface presence at the South Pole of the Moon at a site that will be known as the Artemis Base Camp (ABC). It is envisioned that base camp operations on and around the Moon will then help prepare for the mission durations and activities needed to support the first human mission to Mars. Before long-duration crew missions to the base camp can occur, the necessary surface infrastructure will be pre-deployed and verified operational. Surface assets will be teleoperated and remotely managed from Earth. Additionally, robotic and short-duration crewed missions to the ABC will ensure the site’s merit to achieve long-term science objectives, availability of usable resources, and that terrain, seasonal variations, and illumination conditions are acceptable. ABC will consist of different areas where specific functions and services are rendered, including: • Launch and Landing Area • Habitation Area • Power Production Area • Resource Areas Launch and Landing Area—The launch and landing area will support associated functions for the arrival and departure of vehicles, such as crewed landing and ascent and uncrewed cargo deliveries and offloading. It will evolve from an unimproved site at the beginning of the exploration campaign to a more sustainable landing and launch area that can support repeated arrivals and departures. Initial uncrewed Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) surface operations may include emplacement of navigation beacons and communication equipment, real-time video and photography of landing/liftoff events, and element repositioning, such as portable utility power (PUP) (applicable for other landed assets at other areas). Site preparations, such as surface leveling, soil compaction, and berm/path construction, may be needed for a more sustainable launch and landing area capable of accommodating vehicles that are increasingly more reusable and reduce the effects of plume surface interactions and ejecta impacts on nearby surface assets. During the ABC missions, cargo and logistics will be delivered to the lunar surface via robotic cargo landers before the crew arrives. These shipments, which can arrive in pressurized logistics carriers, will deliver the logistics necessary to support a crewed mission and include items such as food, water, equipment spares, etc. Providing the capability to retrieve, offload, and transport the logistics closer to the ABC site before the arrival of the crew will increase the overall efficiency of crew operations once they arrive. In the sustained phase of exploration, other supporting services may be needed, such as lander propellant servicing, surface power services, commodity refreshes, and additional inspection, maintenance, and repair capabilities, to sustain a cadence of extended personnel stays and cargo arrivals and departures. Habitation Area—Uncrewed support to surface habitation could involve supporting activation and pre-entry operations of the habitat while the crew is in orbit at the Gateway outpost preparing for a surface landing. Surface Habitat (SH) uncrewed operations may include bringing the cabin environment to a habitable temperature and air mix and activating other critical crew support systems. Potential crop production uncrewed tasks in the SH could also include autonomous watering and tending. Additionally, when the crew departs, the SH enters dormancy for the long period of uncrewed operation. A logistical staging area could also be collocated near the SH. If so, staging operations for crew supplies, waste re-location, and recycling operations may be opportunities for uncrewed operations. Power Production Area—The Fission Surface Power (FSP) element and its supporting distribution equipment provide power to surface elements as needed across the ABC to supplement day-to-day operations and survive lunar nights. Uncrewed support of this power system includes any initial LTV-assisted deployments of cables and other distributed equipment, associated electrical connections, and system testing and activation operations. Robotically performing some inspections, maintenance, or repair tasks on the power distribution equipment could reduce the surface crew workload. Resource Area— Uncrewed resource prospecting, mapping, and characterizing possible resource sites is likely to be time-consuming and represents an opportunity for uncrewed operations between crewed missions. Uncrewed mobile equipment operations will be needed in the extreme environments of permanently shadowed locations where resource extractions occur. As In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) pilot plant operations begin, uncrewed surface support activities with available mobile and portable assets (LTV, PUP, etc.) will better support these operations. Any produced commodities can be stored at a centralized storage location for future use. Also associated with these operations is the use of mobile robotic excavators for resource acquisition and robotic/autonomous regolith processing. The waste tailings generated during excavation and regolith processing would also need to be transported and deposited at a dedicated location. Surface assets will continue operating between crew visits to maintain surface capabilities, conduct lunar surface science, technology demonstrations, and public outreach opportunities. Additionally, certain sustaining tasks that would consume valuable crew time could be performed before crew arrival, or after their departure. This capability may offer more affordable options to construct, activate, test, and maintain a broad set of surface assets. Telerobotically operated human surface mobility systems, such as the LTV and Pressurized Rover (PR), can be utilized for various tasks. Surface environmental conditions pose a distinct challenge for all these activities. Surface illumination and localized shadows are one such factor. Night-survival operations could consist of thermal management, battery pre-charging, and load shedding. Some surface systems may hibernate through the night and then awake and continue nominal operations. Uncrewed mobile assets may use a more adaptive approach to optimize their power and operations; one method is to follow the sunlight. Night-survival operations may be initiated remotely by teleoperation, automated, or accomplished by supervised autonomous operation. The ability to pre-deploy and control remote assets in orbit or on Mars before the arrival of the mission crew is a key capability that can be simulated on the moon. The base camp provides a venue where these advanced operational concepts, technologies, and autonomous methods and techniques, including the incorporation of time delays to simulate Earth-Mars latency can be replicated to help buy down future Mars mission risks. This paper will examine the evolution of uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities. It will also discuss the lunar surface environmental conditions (thermal, lighting, terrain, topography, communications) along with the challenges they pose on uncrewed surface operations, and the performance of these activities with limited to minimal human interaction and/or teleoperation. Since lunar missions include Mars mission analogs, such investigation provides the framework for future uncrewed Mars mission support.

Mark E Lewis↗

Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.

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Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package (Midterm Report)

With regards to the planned contents for the 9982, three sets of radionuclides have been analyzed. A set of percentages by weight for plutonium from 3013 canisters, training sources sent in 9977’s, and americium standards from 9978’s were used as the bases for realistic contents that could be shipped in a 9982 package. Using the tables and limits located in G-BDR-A-00001 Rev. E, the calculations began by determining the mass limits for the radionuclides in each source. These mass limits were then used alongside the mass of the radionuclides in the sum-of-the-fractions methodology present in the content description. If this summation is less than or equal to one, the contents are allowed for shipment in the 9982. For the aforementioned sets, the listed radionuclides could be shipped as-is; however, the goal of the calculations is to determine the maximum content mass allowed. To do so, the percentages of weight were used to find where the summations would equal one rather than simply satisfy the inequality. By solving for the content mass when the inequality equals one, the maximum content mass is calculated, which can then be multiplied by each percent weight to get each radionuclide’s mass. The MCNP input files have also been compared to find differences between the oxide and metals forms of the radionuclides. While there are several differences present that make sense, such as oxides have more mass and a lower density due to the presence of oxygen in the oxide forms, there are other differences that are possibly unintentional. With the input files for the metals, both with and without a shielding pig, neutrons are being used in the photon models, seen by “imp:n” being present within the file instead of “imp:p”, where “imp” stands for the importance of a region for either neutrons or photons. Effectively, this results in the dose due to photons being modelled with neutrons instead, potentially resulting in the calculated dose rates being incorrect. As MCNP is proprietary, I do not have access to it here and must consult with the person handling the shielding calculations to discuss what these differences may affect and how to change them. If he remains out of the office or if fixing these files takes longer than expected, the final report may focus more on the contents while discussing these differences; however, it could potentially lack discussion on finalizing the planned contents due to the mass limits still needing to be calculated.

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Reversible Bending Fatigue Test System for Investigating Vibration Integrity of Spent Nuclear Fuel during Transportation

Transportation packages for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) must meet safety requirements under normal and accident conditions as specified by federal regulations. During transportation, SNF experiences unique conditions and challenges to cladding integrity due to the vibrational and impact loading during road or rail shipment. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been developing testing capabilities that can be used to improve the understanding of the impacts on SNF integrity due to vibration loading, especially for high burn-up SNF in normal transportation operation conditions. This information can be used to meet the nuclear industry and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs in the area of safety and security of spent nuclear fuel storage and transport operations. The ORNL developed test system can perform reversible-bending fatigue testing to evaluate both the static and dynamic mechanical response of SNF rods under simulated loads. The testing apparatus is also designed to meet the challenges of hot-cell operation, including remote installation and detachment of the SNF test specimen, in-situ test specimen deformation measurement, and implementation of a driving system suitable for use in a hot cell. The system contains a U-frame set-up equipped with uniquely designed grip rigs, to protect SNF rod and to ensure valid test results, and use of 3 specially designed LVDTs to obtain the in-situ curvature measurement. A variety of surrogate test rods have been used to develop and calibrate the test system as well as in performing a series of systematic cyclic fatigue tests. The surrogate rods include stainless steel (SS) cladding, SS cladding with cast epoxy, and SS cladding with alumina pellets inserts simulating fuel pellets. Testing to date has shown that the interface bonding between the SS cladding and the alumina pellets has a significant impact on the bending response of the test rods as well as their fatigue strength. The failure behaviors observed from tested surrogate rods provides a fundamental understanding of the underlying failure mechanisms of the SNF surrogate rod under vibration which has not been achieved previously. The newly developed device is scheduled to be installed in the hot-cell in summer 2013 to test high burnup SNF.

high burn-up spent fuel↗

Modeling DOE Standard Canister Configurations with Updated Surface Chemistry

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. These models have coupled the temperature conditions to both the gas phase radiolysis chemistry and the surface chemistry associated with the oxyhydroxide layer. Continued experimental work has identified trends for aluminum surrogate samples with oxyhydroxide layers for tests done at higher dose rates. At low initial doses a fast generation rate of hydrogen occurs which starts to roll over to a lower generation rate as the total dose applied in increased. A previous study created a small-scale chemical model was built to replicate a mini-canister surrogate system at SRNL as well as for the smaller capsule tests performed at INL. The previous iteration of the model utilized step function for its G-values for the hydrogen generation over a 200-year period. This model makes an update to the surface chemistry to account for theorized surface chemistry reactions allowing for oxygen to remain bounded to the oxyhydroxide layer. As additional experiments continue, the kinetic fits may be adjusted to adapt to new data. Three canister configurations are modeled – the base 18-inch, 15-foot DOR standard canister with 30 ATR fuel elements, an 18-inch, 10-foot DOE standard canister with 32 ATR fuel elements and a 24-inch, 10-foot DOE standard canister with 40 ATR fuel elements. In previous reports, the primary sensitivity of the canister conditions was identified as the decay heat of the fuel and the dried condition of the fuel. Only these parameters are studied in the report. For the nominal case with dried fuel, the hydrogen generation is only about 2%, so it is even less than the flammability limit if it were exposed to oxygen. For the densely packed 18-inch case the total hydrogen concentration is only around 4% with the nominal decay heat. For the densely packed 24-inch case the total hydrogen concentration is only 2.5%, roughly 20% higher than the original packing design, and still under flammability conditions if exposed to oxygen.

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Modeling of ATR fuel in DOE Standard Canisters with Helium Backfilled Condition

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. These sealed canisters are intended for extened (>50 year) dry storage). The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 ATR elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water from the surface. As testing to the effectiveness of the drying procedure is still underway, this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In previous modeling efforts, the G-value for the production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers was assumed to be in argon environments as measured by Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution. Previous experimental testing showed differences in the hydrogen generated based on the gaseous environment. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values are 28% and 58% higher than values for argon. In addition, a change to the modeling of the oxyhydroxide radiolysis has been made from previous reports. This change assumes the dependency of the dose rate on the overall reaction rate is applied to the total weight of the sample, rather than to just the weight of the oxyhydroxide layer. This decreases the dependency of the radiolytic reaction on the thickness of the oxyhydroxide layer. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, assuming the chemi-/physio- sorbed water have been fully removed, the internal canister pressure increases to 1.61 atm over a 50 year period, with a hydrogen mole percentage of 21%. As in previous modeling, any oxygen present is in negligible amounts (<1 ppt). If a small amount residual air is present, nitric acid can form up to 1300 ppm. For a scenario with high fuel decay heat, the model shows internal pressure increasing to 2.1 atm, with 39.3 mole percentage of hydrogen. In a scenario where significant chemi-/physio- sorbed water is present within the corrosion layer, the nominal scenario shows a pressure increase to 2.54 atm, with 21.1 mole percent hydrogen. The high decay heat case shows a pressure increase to 3.18 atm with 39.9 mole percent hydrogen.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Modeling Summary of ASNF in DOE Sealed Standard Canisters

A pathway for road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ANSF) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 advance test reactor (ATR) elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water bound to the surface. The results of this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In addition, fuels that are currently stored at the Savannah River Site were also studied for their potential for hydrogen and pressure build up. These two additional fuels modeled were the Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel, which is packaged in the same configuration as the ATR, but with a 10-foot-tall DOE standard canister. This was selected due to its relatively high decay heat compared to other DOE-managed ASNF. The second additional fuel studied with the modeling effort was the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel. This fuel is modeled as two separate DOE canisters with the inner and outer annulus split for storage. The HFIR was selected for study due to its high aluminum cladding surface area. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values were 2.92 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 50% relative humidity and 4.12 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 100% relative humidity. These values are lower than the value for Argon that was used in prior modeling results. In addition, prior modeling results have been completed with the G-value applied to just the mass of the corrosion layer, and this has been updated to apply the G-value for hydrogen generation to the full mass of the fuel. These two effects combine to show much smaller pressure and hydrogen build up for the sealed canister model. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, after 50 years the model results give a 1.36 atm total pressure, 7% mole percent hydrogen, for the upper decay heat, 1.51 atm total pressure, 16% mole percent hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel 2.6 atm total pressure, 15% mole percent hydrogen. For the MURR nominal case, the model results give 1.34 atm and 6% hydrogen, for upper decay heat this gives 1.41 atm total pressure with 10.8 % hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel, this gives 2.38 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen. The nominal scenario for HFIR fuel gives 1.39 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen, the upper decay heat case gives 1.43 atm with 12.1% hydrogen, and the upper decay heat with undried fuel gives 2.17 atm total pressure with 11.9% hydrogen. These results confirm the ATR scenario bounds the other intact ASNF modeled here. No case modeled yields significant oxygen, and the lower decay heat cases for all fuels modeled have hydrogen concentrations that are under the 4% flammability limit after 50 years of storage. In addition, the modeled pressures for all cases are all significantly below the 500-psi limit for the DOE standard sealed canister.

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Transportation Package Seal Performance in Beyond Design Basis Thermal Exposures - 12472

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) technical report, NUREG/CR-6886, 'Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario', describes, in detail, an evaluation of the potential for a theoretical release of radioactive material from three different spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation packages, had they been exposed to the Baltimore tunnel fire that occurred in July of 2001. This evaluation determined the temperatures of various components of the packages, including the seals, using temperatures resulting from models of the Baltimore tunnel fire (as boundary conditions) and finite element models of the SNF packages. For two of the packages evaluated, the analyses indicated that the seals used would have exceeded their continuous-use rated service temperatures, meaning the release of radioactive material could not be ruled out with available information; However, for both of the packages evaluated, the analysis determined, by a bounding calculation, that the maximum potential release was well below the regulatory requirements for releases from a SNF package during the hypothetical accident condition (HAC) sequence of events in 10CFR Part 71. The NRC is investigating the performance of seals in SNF transportation packages exposed to fires that could exceed the HAC fire described in 10CFR Part 71, such as the Baltimore Tunnel Fire that occurred in 2001. The performance of package seals is important for determining the potential release of radioactive material from a package during a beyond-design-basis accident. The seals have lower temperature limits than other package components and are the containment barrier between the environment and the cask contents. The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research contracted the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct small-scale thermal testing to obtain experimental data of the performance of seals during extreme temperature exposures. The experimental testing consisted of several small-scale pressure vessels fabricated with a modified ASME flange design and tested metallic and elastomeric seals, similar to those that might be used on an actual SNF transportation package. The vessels were heated in an electrical oven to temperatures as high as 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), exceeding the rated temperatures of the seals in question. This paper will provide a summary of the testing conducted and present test results and conclusions. Fifteen metallic and elastomeric seal performance tests including two shakedowns were performed under beyond-design-basis thermal exposure conditions; twelve tests used metallic seals, two used ethylene-propylene seals, and one used a Teflon seal. Of the five repeat metallic-seal tests (Tests No.2, 3, 4, 8, and 9), leakage (decreasing vessel pressure) was observed in three of the tests (Tests No.3, 4, and 8) during the 9 h 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F) exposure. The times when the leakage occurred (the vessel pressure started to decrease) varied in the three tests performed. The two shakedown tests were conducted using a 30 min and 4 h exposure to 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), respectively, and the seal appeared to hold vessel pressure. No leakage (unchanged vessel pressure within the pressure measurement uncertainty) was also observed in the two metallic seal tests that used 100 deg. C incremental heating from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 627 deg. C (1160 deg. F) and from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 727 deg. C (1340 deg. F), respectively, with at least 9 h exposure to each temperature increment. Three repeat metallic seal tests were also conducted at the seal maximum operating temperature of 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) for 9 h. The seal maintained vessel pressure within the measurement of the pressure transducer in all three tests. No leakage was observed in one ethylene-propylene seal tested at 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) for more than 20 hours; however, leakage was found in another ethylene-propylene seal tested at 450 deg. C (842 deg. F) for more than 20 hours (Test No.15). Leakage was also observed in the test (Test No.12) that used a TFE seal subject to 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) exposure. In these fifteen tests the temperature and time exposure variables were changed to map the performance of the metallic and polymeric seals at elevated temperatures beyond the rated operating temperatures. Both the metallic and polymeric seals were able to hold pressure even after leaks were detected and no catastrophic seal failure (i.e., a rapid release of pressure to atmospheric) occurred. Further testing on the polymeric seals would need to be performed to confirm the results in these tests.(authors)

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3013/9975 Surveillance Program Interim Summary Report

The K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requires a surveillance program to monitor the safety performance of 3013 containers and 9975 shipping packages stored in KAMS. The SRS surveillance program [Reference 1] outlines activities for field surveillance and laboratory tests that demonstrate the packages meet the functional performance requirements described in the DSA. The SRS program also supports the complexwide Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) [Reference 2] for 3013 containers. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the SRS portion of the surveillance program activities through fiscal year 2010 (FY10) and formally communicate the interpretation of these results by the Surveillance Program Authority (SPA). Surveillance for the initial 3013 container random sampling of the Innocuous bin and the Pressure bin has been completed and there has been no indication of corrosion or significant pressurization. The maximum pressure observed was less than 50 psig, which is well below the design pressure of 699 psig for the 3013 container [Reference 3]. The data collected during surveillance of these bins has been evaluated by the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Working Group and no additional surveillance is necessary for these bins at least through FY13. A decision will be made whether additional surveillance of these bins is needed during future years of storage and as additional containers are generated. Based on the data collected to date, the SPA concludes that 3013 containers in these bins can continue to be safely stored in KAMS. This year, 13 destructive examinations (DE) were performed on random samples from the Pressure & Corrosion bin. To date, DE has been completed for approximately 30% of the random samples from the Pressure & Corrosion bin. In addition, DE has been performed on 6 engineering judgment (EJ) containers, for a total of 17 to date. This includes one container that exceeded the 3013 Standard moisture limit which was opened at LANL. The container pieces and an oxide sample were sent to SRNL for examination in FY11. No significant pressurization has been observed for the Pressure & Corrosion bin containers. Relatively minor corrosion has been observed on some convenience containers and the inside of two inner containers. While the limited extent of corrosion does not jeopardize the integrity of the outer 3013 containers, it does highlight the importance of continuing to perform DE and the Shelf Life program to assure that the corrosion rate is not accelerating or changing to a different corrosion mechanism (e.g., stress corrosion cracking). Statistical sampling is currently scheduled to be completed in FY17, but there is a proposed reduction of the number of DE's per year for FY11 and beyond which may delay the completion date. Since 3013 containers are stored inside 9975 containers, surveillances of 9975 containers are performed in conjunction with 3013 container surveillances. Results of 9975 container nondestructive examinations (NDEs) and DEs indicate that the containers will provide adequate protection of the 3013 containers in K-Area storage for at least 15 years [Reference 4].

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CFD-Chemical Model of One-Third Scale Demonstration of DOE Sealed Canister with ATR Fuel

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. A demonstration case for these DOE sealed canisters will be eventually performed with a one-third scale mockup that has been instrumented with thermocouples and gas concentration probes. This study seeks to model the planned canister for validation of the previously developed model, such that confidence in its long-term prediction can be increased. The deployment of the instrumented lid for online monitoring in intended for a period of 10+ years based on previous monitoring of commercial fuel storage; however, the model is still run for the previously used 50-year storage periods. This case is modeled with a G-value using a bi-linear function such that it decreases at higher dose rates to be consistent with experiments. Validation efforts of the model would likely revolve around the results for the 1st year, so the results of this timeframe are also highlighted. For dried fuel of the nominal decay heat (18W), the predicted hydrogen concentration is 0.19% after 1 year, 0.91% after 10 years, and 2.8% after 50 years, with a maximum pressure of 1.26 atm. Consistent with previous modeling, the decay heat of the fuel is the main factor that influences the results. For undried fuel in pure helium, the hydrogen concentration ranges from 0.23 to 1.2% after 1 year, 1.25-6.2% after 10 years and 8.8 to 18.84% after 50 years. For dried fuel in pure helium the hydrogen concentration ranges from 0.06% to 0.34% after 1 year, 0.35-2.11% after 10 years and 0.95 to 6.6% after 50 years. While long-term results in the presence of residual air are mostly the same, early reactions with O 2 can delay significant production of H 2 until it is consumed to form more water vapor, lowering the range to 0.14 to 1.0% after 1 year. The maximum absolute pressure that is reached across any scenario is 2.06 atm. In the event of residual air, the presence of nitric acid is possible in the range of 18-131 ppm after 1 year, 174-1180 ppm after 10 years, and 586-3500 ppm after 50 years. As long as the fuel is sufficiently dried, or of nominal decay heat, a 4% lower flammability limit of hydrogen will not be reached within a 10-year monitoring period.

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EFFECTS OF TRITIUM GAS EXPOSURE ON ELECTRICALLY CONDUCTING POLYMERS

Effects of beta (tritium) and gamma irradiation on the surface electrical conductivity of two types of conducting polymer films are documented to determine their potential use as a sensing and surveillance device for the tritium facility. It was shown that surface conductivity was significantly reduced by irradiation with both gamma and tritium gas. In order to compare the results from the two radiation sources, an approximate dose equivalence was calculated. The materials were also sensitive to small radiation doses (<10{sup 5} rad), showing that there is a measurable response to relatively small total doses of tritium gas. Spectroscopy was also used to confirm the mechanism by which this sensing device would operate in order to calibrate this sensor for potential use. It was determined that one material (polyaniline) was very sensitive to oxidation while the other material (PEDOT-PSS) was not. However, polyaniline provided the best response as a sensing material, and it is suggested that an oxygen-impermeable, radiation-transparent coating be applied to this material for future device prototype fabrication. A great deal of interest has developed in recent years in the area of conducting polymers due to the high levels of conductivity that can be achieved, some comparable to that of metals [Gerard 2002]. Additionally, the desirable physical and chemical properties of a polymer are retained and can be exploited for various applications, including light emitting diodes (LED), anti-static packaging, electronic coatings, and sensors. The electron transfer mechanism is generally accepted as one of electron 'hopping' through delocalized electrons in the conjugated backbone, although other mechanisms have been proposed based on the type of polymer and dopant [Inzelt 2000, Gerard 2002]. The conducting polymer polyaniline (PANi) is of particular interest because there are extensive studies on the modulation of the conductivity by changing either the oxidation state of the main backbone chain, or by protonation of the imine groups [de Acevedo, 1999]. There are several types of radiation sensors commercially available, including ionization chambers, geiger counters, proportional counters, scintillators and solid state detectors. Each type has advantages, although many of these sensors require expensive electronics for signal amplification, are large and bulky, have limited battery life or require expensive materials for fabrication. A radiation sensor constructed of a polymeric material could be flexible, light, and the geometry designed to suit the application. Very simple and inexpensive electronics would be necessary to measure the change in conductivity with exposure to radiation and provide an alarm system when a set change of conductivity occurs in the sensor that corresponds to a predetermined radiation dose having been absorbed by the polymer. The advantages of using a polymeric sensor of this type rather than those currently in use are the flexibility of sensor geometry and relatively low cost. It is anticipated that these sensors can be made small enough for glovebox applications or have the ability to monitor the air tritium levels in places where a traditional monitor cannot be placed. There have been a few studies on the changes in conductivity of polyaniline specifically for radiation detection [de Acevedo, 1999; Lima Pacheco, 2003], but there have been no reports on the effects of tritium (beta radiation) on conducting polymers, such as polyaniline or polythiophene. The direct implementation of conducting polymers as radiation sensor materials has not yet been commercialized due to differing responses with total dose, dose rate, etc. Some have reported a large increase in the surface conductivity with radiation dose while others report a marked decrease in conductive properties; these differing observations may reflect the competing mechanisms of chain scission and cross-linking. However, it is clear that the radiation dose effects on conducting polymers must be fully understood before these materials can be used as sensing devices. This report presents the results of irradiations of two conductive polymers: polyaniline and polythiophene. Samples of doped polyaniline and polythiophene were coated onto polyester (polyethyleneterephalate, PET) substrates and were exposed to both tritium gas (beta irradiation) and {sup 60}Co gamma irradiation. The samples were subsequently characterized after various total doses. Infrared spectroscopy was utilized to characterize the gamma-exposed samples post-irradiation. Although the sources of radiation are different in kind (charged particle versus photon) and their energies differ, there will be great value in using noncontaminating gamma irradiation to model the effects of tritium beta radiation.

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Development of K-Basin High-Strength Homogeneous Sludge Simulants and Correlations Between Unconfined Compressive Strength and Shear Strength

K-Basin sludge will be stored in the Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSCs) at an interim storage location on Central Plateau before being treated and packaged for disposal. During the storage period, sludge in the STSCs may consolidate/agglomerate, potentially resulting in high-shear-strength material. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) plans to use water jets to retrieve K-Basin sludge after the interim storage. STP has identified shear strength to be a key parameter that should be bounded to verify the operability and performance of sludge retrieval systems. Determining the range of sludge shear strength is important to gain high confidence that a water-jet retrieval system can mobilize stored K-Basin sludge from the STSCs. The shear strength measurements will provide a basis for bounding sludge properties for mobilization and erosion. Thus, it is also important to develop potential simulants to investigate these phenomena. Long-term sludge storage tests conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) show that high-uranium-content K-Basin sludge can self-cement and form a strong sludge with a bulk shear strength of up to 65 kPa. Some of this sludge has 'paste' and 'chunks' with shear strengths of approximately 3-5 kPa and 380-770 kPa, respectively. High-uranium-content sludge samples subjected to hydrothermal testing (e.g., 185 C, 10 hours) have been observed to form agglomerates with a shear strength up to 170 kPa. These high values were estimated by measured unconfined compressive strength (UCS) obtained with a pocket penetrometer. Due to its ease of use, it is anticipated that a pocket penetrometer will be used to acquire additional shear strength data from archived K-Basin sludge samples stored at the PNNL Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) hot cells. It is uncertain whether the pocket penetrometer provides accurate shear strength measurements of the material. To assess the bounding material strength and potential for erosion, it is important to compare the measured shear strength to penetrometer measurements and to develop a correlation (or correlations) between UCS measured by a pocket penetrometer and direct shear strength measurements for various homogeneous and heterogeneous simulants. This study developed 11 homogeneous simulants, whose shear strengths vary from 4 to 170 kPa. With these simulants, we developed correlations between UCS measured by a Geotest E-280 pocket penetrometer and shear strength values measured by a Geonor H-60 hand-held vane tester and a more sophisticated bench-top unit, the Haake M5 rheometer. This was achieved with side-by-side measurements of the shear strength and UCS of the homogeneous simulants. The homogeneous simulants developed under this study consist of kaolin clay, plaster of Paris, and amorphous alumina CP-5 with water. The simulants also include modeling clay. The shear strength of most of these simulants is sensitive to various factors, including the simulant size, the intensity of mixing, and the curing time, even with given concentrations of simulant components. Table S.1 summarizes these 11 simulants and their shear strengths.

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