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At least 1,765 records · Page 98

Propellant Densification for Shuttle: The SSME Perspective

The subject of cryogenic propellant densification as a potential upgrade to the Space Shuttle is a subject that has been raised on several occasions over the last decade. Due to advancements in densification technology made as a part of and in parallel to the X-33 project, the subject was raised and studied once again in May 2001. Across the Space Shuttle program people from many disciplines converged to discuss issues and perform trade studies to determine whether densified propellants was worth pursuing. This paper discusses one of these areas, specifically the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The effects of propellant densification on steady state performance are presented along with discussions of potential transient performance issues. Engine component redesign and retrofit issues are discussed as well the high level requirements to modify the ground test stands to accommodate propellant densification hardware and tanks. And finally, the matter of programmatic concerns enters the subject at hand as part of a discussion of SSME recertification requirements. In the end, potential benefits to SSME performance can be demonstrated and, subject to the densification scheme chosen, there does not appear to insurmountable technical obstacles.

Greene, William D.↗

NASA Virtual Glovebox: An Immersive Virtual Desktop Environment for Training Astronauts in Life Science Experiments

The International Space Station will soon provide an unparalleled research facility for studying the near- and longer-term effects of microgravity on living systems. Using the Space Station Glovebox Facility - a compact, fully contained reach-in environment - astronauts will conduct technically challenging life sciences experiments. Virtual environment technologies are being developed at NASA Ames Research Center to help realize the scientific potential of this unique resource by facilitating the experimental hardware and protocol designs and by assisting the astronauts in training. The Virtual GloveboX (VGX) integrates high-fidelity graphics, force-feedback devices and real- time computer simulation engines to achieve an immersive training environment. Here, we describe the prototype VGX system, the distributed processing architecture used in the simulation environment, and modifications to the visualization pipeline required to accommodate the display configuration.

Twombly, I. Alexander↗

Synthesis of Boron Nitride Nanotubes for Engineering Applications

Boron Nitride nanotubes (BNNT) are of interest to the scientific and technical communities for many of the same reasons that carbon nanotubes (CNT) have attracted large amounts of attention. Both materials have potentially unique and significant properties which may have important structural and electronic applications in the future. However of even more interest than their similarities may be the differences between carbon and boron nanotubes. Whilt boron nitride nanotubes possess a very high modulus similaar to CNT, they are also more chemically and thermally inert. Additionally BNNT possess more uniform electronic properties, having a uniform band gap of approximately 5.5 eV while CNT vary from semi-conductin to conductor behavior. Boron Nitride nanotubes have been synthesized by a variety of methods such as chemical vapor deposition, arc discharge and reactive milling. Consistently producing a reliable product has proven difficult. Progress in synthesis of 1-2 gram sized batches of Boron Nitride nanotubes will be discussed as well as potential uses for this unique material.

Hurst, Janet↗

An Effective Health and Medical Technical Authority

The NASA Governance model directed the formation of three Technical Authorities, Engineering; Safety and Mission Assurance; and Health and Medical, to ensure that risks are identified and adjudicated efficiently and transparently in concert with the spaceflight programs and projects. The Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) has been implemented at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and consists of the Chief Medical Office (CMO), the Deputy CMO, and HMTA Delegates. The JSC HMTA achieves the goals of risk identification and adjudication through the discharge of the appropriate technical expertise to human space flight programs and projects and the escalation of issues within program and technical authority boards. The JSC HMTA relies on subject matter experts (SMEs) in the Space Life Sciences Directorate at JSC as well as experts from other Centers to work crew health and performance issues at the technical level, develop requirements, oversee implementation and validation of requirements, and identify risks and non-compliances. Once a risk or potential noncompliance has been identified and reported to the programs or projects, the JSC HMTA begins to track it and closely monitor the program's or project's response. As a risk is developed or a non-compliance negotiated, positions from various levels of decision makers are sought at the program and project control boards. The HMTA may support a program or project position if it is satisfied with the decision making and vetting processes (ex. the subject matter expert voiced his/her concerns and all dissenting opinions were documented) and finds that the position both acknowledges the risk and cost of the mitigation and resolves the issue without changing NASA risk posture. The HMTA may disagree with a program or project position if the NASA risk posture has been elevated or obfuscated. If the HMTA does disagree with the program or project position, it will appeal to successively higher levels of authority so that risk acceptance and risk trades will be acknowledged and sanctioned at the highest appropriate level; this includes Program Managers, Mission Directorate Associate Administrators and the Agency Administrator.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗

A Comparison of Flow-Through Versus Non-Flow-Through Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell Systems for NASA's Exploration Missions

As part of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) under the auspices of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD), NASA is developing both primary fuel cell power systems and regenerative fuel cell (RFC) energy storage systems within the fuel cell portion of the Energy Storage Project. This effort is being led by the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) in partnership with the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and industrial partners. The development goals are to improve fuel cell and electrolysis stack electrical performance, reduce system mass, volume, and parasitic power requirements, and increase system life and reliability. A major focus of this effort has been the parallel development of both flow-through and non-flow-through proton exchange membrane (PEM) primary fuel cell power systems. The plan has been, at the appropriate time, to select a single primary fuel cell technology for eventual flight hardware development. Ideally, that appropriate time would occur after both technologies have achieved a technology readiness level (TRL) of six, which represents an engineering model fidelity PEM fuel cell system being successfully tested in a relevant environment. Budget constraints in fiscal year 2009 and beyond have prevented NASA from continuing to pursue the parallel development of both primary fuel cell options. Because very limited data exists for either system, a toplevel, qualitative assessment based on engineering judgement was performed expeditiously to provide guidance for a selection. At that time, the non-flow-through technology was selected for continued development because of potentially major advantages in terms of weight, volume, parasitic power, reliability, and life. This author believes that the advantages are significant enough, and the potential benefits great enough, to offset the higher state of technology readiness of flow-through technology. This paper summarizes the technical considerations which helped form the engineering judgement that led to the final decision.

Hoberecht, Mark A.↗

Maximizing Launch Vehicle and Payload Design Via Early Communications

The United States? current fleet of launch vehicles is largely derived from decades-old designs originally made for payloads that no longer exist. They were built primarily for national security or human exploration missions. Today that fleet can be divided roughly into small-, medium-, and large-payload classes based on mass and volume capability. But no vehicle in the U.S. fleet is designed to accommodate modern payloads. It is usually the payloads that must accommodate the capabilities of the launch vehicles. This is perhaps most true of science payloads. It was this paradigm that the organizers of two weekend workshops in 2008 at NASA's Ames Research Center sought to alter. The workshops brought together designers of NASA's Ares V cargo launch vehicle (CLV) with scientists and payload designers in the astronomy and planetary sciences communities. Ares V was still in a pre-concept development phase as part of NASA?s Constellation Program for exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). The space science community was early in a Decadal Survey that would determine future priorities for research areas, observations, and notional missions to make those observations. The primary purpose of the meetings in April and August of 2008, including the novel format, was to bring vehicle designers together with space scientists to discuss the feasibility of using a heavy lift capability to launch large observatories and explore the Solar System. A key question put to the science community was whether this heavy lift capability enabled or enhanced breakthrough science. The meetings also raised the question of whether some trade-off between mass/volume and technical complexity existed that could reduce technical and programmatic risk. By engaging the scientific community early in the vehicle design process, vehicle engineers sought to better understand potential limitations and requirements that could be added to the Ares V from the mission planning community. From the vehicle standpoint, while the human exploration mission could not be compromised to accommodate other payloads, the design might otherwise be tailored to not exclude other payload requirements. This paper summarizes the findings of the workshops and discusses the benefits of bringing together the vehicle design and science communities early in their concept phases

Morris, Bruce↗

International Space Station as a Base Camp for Exploration Beyond Low Earth Orbit

The idea for using the International Space Station (ISS) as platform for exploration has matured in the past year and the concept continues to gain momentum. ISS provides a robust infrastructure which can be used to test systems and capabilities needed for missions to the Moon, Mars, asteroids and other potential destinations. International cooperation is a critical enabler and ISS has already demonstrated successful management of a large multi-national technical endeavor. Systems and resources needed for expeditions can be aggregated and thoroughly tested at ISS before departure thus providing wide operational flexibility and the best assurance of mission success. A small part of ISS called an Exploration Platform (ISS-EP) can be placed at Earth-Moon Libration point 1 (EML1) providing immediate benefits and flexibility for future exploration missions. We will show how ISS and the ISS-EP can be used to reduce risk and improve the operational flexibility for missions beyond low earth orbit. Life support systems and other technology developed for ISS can be evolved and adapted to the ISS-EP and other exploration spacecraft. New technology, such as electric propulsion and advanced life support systems can be tested and proven at ISS as part of an incremental development program. Commercial companies who are introducing transportation and other services will benefit with opportunities to contribute to the mission since ISS will serve as a focal point for the commercialization of low earth orbit services. Finally, we will show how use of ISS provides immediate benefits to the scientific community because its capabilities are available today and certain critical aspects of exploration missions can be simulated.

Raftery, Michael↗

Challenges and Opportunities For Ensuring Entry System Technology Readiness For Ice Giants Probe Missions

The Ice Giants represent a distinct class of planets within our solar system, and appear to be similar to most exoplanets that have been detected thus far. Exploring Ice Giants in our Solar System would allow us to better understand their formation and evolution processes, and thus help establish scientific links to exoplanets. In situ exploration using probes similar to Galileo, along with an orbiter or a relay spacecraft, will require entry followed by deployment of the descent probe containing science instruments into Uranus or Neptune atmosphere. The challenge is not in the deployment of the probe, but in the atmospheric entry prior to deployment. The entry system has to have a capable, robust and efficient ablative thermal protection system (TPS) designed to protect the descent probe from the thermal and mechanical entry loads. Although entries into Ice Giants may not be as demanding as the Galileo entry at Jupiter, the entry environments will be more severe than environments for Mars, Sample Return missions, and Venus, and will therefore require robust TPS. While Galileo Probe’s success, nearly 25 years ago, should give us confidence, the recession data from the Galileo entry informs us that the entry environment was under predicted and the design thickness was barely adequate. The lesson learned from Galileo probe for future Ice Giant missions will require us to be cautious and demand a more robust design. The TPS technology used on Galileo entry system no longer exists due to atrophy of manufacturing processes. Instead of attempting to revive Galileo-legacy TPS technology, NASA invested in a new and innovative TPS called HEEET (Heat-shield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology). HEEET has been matured, and is now ready to support future missions not only to the Ice Giants but also for Venus, high-speed sample return, and Saturn probe missions. This lead talk, intended for the technology section of the workshop, will cover entry, descent, and deployment (EDD), with an emphasis on entry. A brief history of the TPS challenges for extreme entry missions will be given along with a quick overview of the concept of operations for EDD. The development and maturation of HEEET system capability will be described. Data gathered in ground-test facilities in the US will be highlighted to show that the technology is mature and ready for Ice Giant missions. All thermal protection systems carry some risk as a result of ground test limitations and Ice Giant missions present some unique challenges. These challenges are not only technical, but also due to limitations in the currently established manufacturing and integration. In addition, the concerns that arise due to potential for atrophy for future Ice Giant mission a decade or more from now will be analyzed. Plausible avenues for mitigation will be presented. There are two companion planned presentations by Dr. Prabhu and Dr. Hwang will dive deeper in the challenges and opportunities. This intended talk will set the stage for their presentations.

Venkatapathy, Ethiraj↗

Surviving Night at the Lunar South Pole: Exploring Viability of Radioisotope Power Systems for a Crewed Rover

Spacecraft thermal environments tend to be extreme, and the lunar surface is no exception. Future lunar missions aim to explore the lunar south pole region, focusing on permanently shadowed region (PSRs) that may act as cold traps for volatile elements such as hydrogen. By careful selection of landing sites, the longest continuous period devoid of insolation near these PSRs can be reduced significantly from the maximum of 354 hours. Future NASA missions aim to allow exploration of PSRs with a crewed lunar rover. Program architectures may impose a requirement that the vehicle be able to survive repeated lunar nights. Surface temperatures at southern latitudes can be lower than 100K during night, causing significant energy demands heating components above keep-alive temperatures. This adversely affects lunar programs which are heavily mass-constrained. A technical exploration of various radioisotope power systems and their viability, benefits, and drawbacks was completed. An analysis was also performed examining potential vehicular mass reduction and increased lunar night survivability due to the inclusion of radioisotope power sources. The results of this analysis were compared to a baseline non-nuclear vehicle utilizing only batteries and solar arrays for energy storage.

radioisotope↗

2023 Artemis Crew Health and Performance System Model Development

While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper

Systems engineering↗

2023 Artemis Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Model Development

While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper

Systems engineering↗

Transportation Package Seal Performance in Beyond Design Basis Thermal Exposures - 12472

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) technical report, NUREG/CR-6886, 'Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario', describes, in detail, an evaluation of the potential for a theoretical release of radioactive material from three different spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation packages, had they been exposed to the Baltimore tunnel fire that occurred in July of 2001. This evaluation determined the temperatures of various components of the packages, including the seals, using temperatures resulting from models of the Baltimore tunnel fire (as boundary conditions) and finite element models of the SNF packages. For two of the packages evaluated, the analyses indicated that the seals used would have exceeded their continuous-use rated service temperatures, meaning the release of radioactive material could not be ruled out with available information; However, for both of the packages evaluated, the analysis determined, by a bounding calculation, that the maximum potential release was well below the regulatory requirements for releases from a SNF package during the hypothetical accident condition (HAC) sequence of events in 10CFR Part 71. The NRC is investigating the performance of seals in SNF transportation packages exposed to fires that could exceed the HAC fire described in 10CFR Part 71, such as the Baltimore Tunnel Fire that occurred in 2001. The performance of package seals is important for determining the potential release of radioactive material from a package during a beyond-design-basis accident. The seals have lower temperature limits than other package components and are the containment barrier between the environment and the cask contents. The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research contracted the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct small-scale thermal testing to obtain experimental data of the performance of seals during extreme temperature exposures. The experimental testing consisted of several small-scale pressure vessels fabricated with a modified ASME flange design and tested metallic and elastomeric seals, similar to those that might be used on an actual SNF transportation package. The vessels were heated in an electrical oven to temperatures as high as 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), exceeding the rated temperatures of the seals in question. This paper will provide a summary of the testing conducted and present test results and conclusions. Fifteen metallic and elastomeric seal performance tests including two shakedowns were performed under beyond-design-basis thermal exposure conditions; twelve tests used metallic seals, two used ethylene-propylene seals, and one used a Teflon seal. Of the five repeat metallic-seal tests (Tests No.2, 3, 4, 8, and 9), leakage (decreasing vessel pressure) was observed in three of the tests (Tests No.3, 4, and 8) during the 9 h 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F) exposure. The times when the leakage occurred (the vessel pressure started to decrease) varied in the three tests performed. The two shakedown tests were conducted using a 30 min and 4 h exposure to 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), respectively, and the seal appeared to hold vessel pressure. No leakage (unchanged vessel pressure within the pressure measurement uncertainty) was also observed in the two metallic seal tests that used 100 deg. C incremental heating from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 627 deg. C (1160 deg. F) and from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 727 deg. C (1340 deg. F), respectively, with at least 9 h exposure to each temperature increment. Three repeat metallic seal tests were also conducted at the seal maximum operating temperature of 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) for 9 h. The seal maintained vessel pressure within the measurement of the pressure transducer in all three tests. No leakage was observed in one ethylene-propylene seal tested at 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) for more than 20 hours; however, leakage was found in another ethylene-propylene seal tested at 450 deg. C (842 deg. F) for more than 20 hours (Test No.15). Leakage was also observed in the test (Test No.12) that used a TFE seal subject to 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) exposure. In these fifteen tests the temperature and time exposure variables were changed to map the performance of the metallic and polymeric seals at elevated temperatures beyond the rated operating temperatures. Both the metallic and polymeric seals were able to hold pressure even after leaks were detected and no catastrophic seal failure (i.e., a rapid release of pressure to atmospheric) occurred. Further testing on the polymeric seals would need to be performed to confirm the results in these tests.(authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Breaking Through Historical Biases in Performance Assessments - 18056

Performance assessments (referred to as safety assessments internationally), which include mathematical modeling of natural and engineered systems for many hundreds and thousands of years, play an important role in decision-making for disposal of radioactive waste and cleanup of sites and facilities contaminated with radioactive material. These decisions can involve options costing hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. Thus, it is critical to understand the underlying assumptions behind regulatory and technical aspects of these assessments to better understand and communicate the basis for decisions. Policy and technical biases deliberately built into early assessment approaches allowed safety margin to account for uncertainties known to be present, but not quantitatively assessed. Many of these biases (e.g., regulatory standards, human habits, effectiveness of waste forms, inadvertent intrusion assumptions, etc.) continue to exist in spite of advances in technical approaches and knowledge. These built-in biases, often not effectively communicated, can lead to misleading interpretation of results and potentially influence public confidence and costly regulatory decisions regarding the safety of a disposal facility or a closure action. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Inflation by alignment

Pseudo-Goldstone bosons (pGBs) can provide technically natural inflatons, as has been comparatively well-explored in the simplest axion examples. Although inflationary success requires trans-Planckian decay constants, f≳M{sub p}, several mechanisms have been proposed to obtain this, relying on (mis-)alignments between potential and kinetic energies in multiple-field models. We extend these mechanisms to a broader class of inflationary models, including in particular the exponential potentials that arise for pGB potentials based on noncompact groups (and so which might apply to moduli in an extra-dimensional setting). The resulting potentials provide natural large-field inflationary models and can predict a larger primordial tensor signal than is true for simpler single-field versions of these models. In so doing we provide a unified treatment of several alignment mechanisms, showing how each emerges as a limit of the more general setup.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Potential feedstock sources for ethanol production in Florida

This study presents information on the potential feedstock sources that may be used for ethanol production in Florida. Several potential feedstocks for fuel ethanol production in Florida are discussed, such as, sugarcane, corn, citrus byproducts and sweet sorghum. Other probable impacts need to be analyzed for sugarcane to ethanol production as alternative uses of sugarcane may affect the quantity of sugar production in Florida. While citrus molasses is converted to ethanol as an established process, the cost of ethanol is higher, and the total amount of citrus molasses per year is insignificant. Sorghum cultivars have the potential for ethanol production. However, the agricultural practices for growing sweet sorghum for ethanol have not been established, and the conversion process must be tested and developed at a more expanded level. So far, only corn shipped from other states to Florida has been considered for ethanol production on a commercial scale. The economic feasibility of each of these crops requires further data and technical analysis.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

EVA tools and equipment reference book

This document contains a mixture of tools and equipment used throughout the space shuttle-based extravehicular activity (EVA) program. Promising items which have reached the prototype stage of development are also included, but should not be considered certified ready for flight. Each item is described with a photo, a written discussion, technical specifications, dimensional drawings, and points of contact for additional information. Numbers on the upper left-hand corner of each photo may be used to order specific pictures from NASA and contractor photo libraries. Points of contact were classified as either operational or technical. An operational contact is an engineer from JSC Mission Operations Directorate who is familiar with the basic function and on-orbit use of the tool. A technical contact would be the best source of detailed technical specifications and is typically the NASA subsystem manager. The technical information table for each item uses the following terms to describe the availability or status of each hardware item: Standard - Flown on every mission as standard manifest; Flight specific - Potentially available for flight, not flown every mission (flight certification cannot be guaranteed and recertification may be required); Reference only - Item no longer in active inventory or not recommended for future use, some items may be too application-specific for general use; and Developmental - In the prototype stage only and not yet available for flight. The current availability and certification of any flight-specific tool should be verified with the technical point of contact. Those tools built and fit checked for Hubble Space Telescope maintenance are program dedicated and are not available to other customers. Other customers may have identical tools built from the existing, already certified designs as an optional service.

Fullerton, R. K.↗

AMMT-Regulatory Development Collaboration Scoping Project

This project was initiated by the Regulatory Development (RD) Program to identify potential collaborations in work scope between the Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) Program and the Regulatory Development Program. During Fiscal Year 2025, RD Program staff met with members of the AMMT Program, including the national technical director and multiple technical area leads to discuss ongoing work and areas where regulatory interactions with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would increase the efficiency to get new materials and manufacturing technologies approved for industry use. RD staff would like to thank the AMMT staff for their participation in these interactions to identify areas of potential collaboration.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗