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Vapor Extraction Well Performance and Recommendations for Future Soil Vapor Extraction Activities at the A-014 Outfall

The vadose zone near the A-014 Outfall contains residual volatile organic compounds that serve as a potential source for groundwater contamination. Since 1995 active soil vapor extraction has been an integral part of the corrective actions at this facility. Currently two separate soil vapor extraction systems are being used to remove contamination in the vapor phase from the subsurface. The 782-3M soil vapor extraction unit was deployed in April of 1995 and the A-014 Mobile #3 unit was deployed in January of 2009. The objective of this investigation is to evaluate the performance of individual wells associated with these systems and provide recommendations on possible optimizations to these systems. Options that are considered include continuation of active extraction, transition to a low-energy soil vapor extraction treatment, or abandon nonperforming wells. The scope of the investigation examined the eighteen (18) vadose zone wells that are associated with the ongoing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act corrective action program within A/M Area. During the evaluation process, individual wells were isolated and purged for a standard period using the existing soil vapor extraction system. Following the purge period, vapor samples were collected intermittently over the following 24–72-hour period. The objective of the sampling activity was to collect sufficient data to estimate the mass flow rate of contaminants from the individual extraction wells. Subsequent analysis then evaluated and ranked extraction performance to provide recommendations on the viability, operational scheme, and applicability of low energy soil vapor extraction.

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Phenix Power Plant Decommissioning Project - Removal of Core and Neutron Blanket Components

Phenix is a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor located at the CEA's Rhone Valley Center where it was commissioned in 1974. It has an electric power rating of 250 MW and is operated jointly by the CEA and EDF. Its primary role today is to investigate the transmutation of long-lived radioactive waste into shorter-lived wasteform. Its final shutdown is scheduled for the beginning of 2009 in accordance with the reactor operating program with a mean availability of 80%. In this context the Phenix Power Plant Decommissioning Project was initiated in 2003. It covers the definitive cessation of plant operation and the dismantling (D and D) operations together with the final shutdown preparatory phase. The final shutdown phase corresponds to the initial operations undertaken to remove the maximum of hazardous materials. During this phase, subject to the standard operating methodological procedures, all the fuel in the plant will be removed and most of the other reactor core elements and other removable components (primary pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, control rod mechanisms, etc.) will be also dismantled and packaged in accordance with the available disposition routes. The core elements include fissile and fertile subassemblies, steel reflectors, and lateral neutron shielding rods. About half the lateral neutron shielding rods are accessible using the existing handling equipment; specific development work will be necessary to remove the others. Multiple engineering studies are in progress concerning the removal of the core elements. They address safety concerns taking into account thermal and seismic stresses, waste management including radiological characterization of the objects to be removed and the specification of suitable disposal routes (interim storage or disposal facilities), and scenario studies with the definition of each stage of the waste removal process. All these aspects are discussed in this paper. The feasibility of removing the core elements has been demonstrated with regard to handling and safety. A new handling arm is now being developed to remove the inaccessible core elements. The new earthquake safety calculations completed in 2006 did not reveal any insurmountable difficulties. Major work remains to characterize the core elements and determine the capacity of the disposition routes. The characterization program now in progress will validate the core element activation levels, but must be supplemented by a program to characterize the surface contamination from the primary sodium system. Concerning the disposition routes, several specific containers and shipping casks must be developed; engineering studies are now in progress to obtain the necessary approvals.

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Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

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FY 2022 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. This FY 2022 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan (SSP) was developed to enable and sustain Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear solutions, clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. DOE Order 436.1, “Departmental Sustainability,” provides requirements and assigns responsibilities for managing sustainability within DOE to ensure that DOE missions are carried out in a sustainable manner, to institute wholesale cultural change to factor sustainability into all DOE decisions, and to ensure DOE achieves sustainability goals. DOE Order 436.1 also requires DOE sites to commit appropriate personnel resources, establish a financing plan that prioritizes the use of life-cycle cost effective private-sector financing, optimize the application of appropriations and budgeted funds, and establish specific performance measures and deliverables designed to achieve the listed requirements. The SSP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “FY 2022 DOE Site Sustainability Plan Guidance” document issued in September 2021. The SSP contains strategies and activities that will lead to continual energy, water, and waste reductions that move the INL site toward meeting DOE sustainability goals and requirements. The SSP summarizes energy and available fuel use reporting requirements and references criteria for instituting sustainable design. SSP requirements are integrated into each INL site contractor’s Integrated Safety Management System and Environmental Management System (EMS). Finally, the Sustainability Program directives, based on this SSP, are integrated into INL/LTD-21-62463, Annual Laboratory Plan 2021, and operations and acquisition systems.

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FY 2023 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. This FY 2022 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan (SSP) was developed to enable and sustain Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear solutions, clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. DOE Order 436.1, “Departmental Sustainability,” provides requirements and assigns responsibilities for managing sustainability within DOE to ensure that DOE missions are carried out in a sustainable manner, to institute wholesale cultural change to factor sustainability into all DOE decisions, and to ensure DOE achieves sustainability goals. DOE Order 436.1 also requires DOE sites to commit appropriate personnel resources, establish a financing plan that prioritizes the use of life-cycle cost effective private-sector financing, optimize the application of appropriations and budgeted funds, and establish specific performance measures and deliverables designed to achieve the listed requirements. The SSP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “FY 2022 DOE Site Sustainability Plan Guidance” document issued in September 2021. The SSP contains strategies and activities that will lead to continual energy, water, and waste reductions that move the INL site toward meeting DOE sustainability goals and requirements. The SSP summarizes energy and available fuel use reporting requirements and references criteria for instituting sustainable design. SSP requirements are integrated into each INL site contractor’s Integrated Safety Management System and Environmental Management System (EMS). Finally, the Sustainability Program directives, based on this SSP, are integrated into INL/LTD-21-62463, Annual Laboratory Plan 2021, and operations and acquisition systems.

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Nuclear Materials Management U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO)

In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America’s nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accurately assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in “green” technology.

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Nuclear Materials Management U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO)

In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America’s nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accurately assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization and improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in “green” technology.

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MEASUREMENT OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM SALTSTONE

SRNL was requested by WSRC Waste Solidification Engineering to characterize the release of ammonia from saltstone curing at 95 C by performing experimental testing. These tests were performed with an MCU-type Tank 50H salt simulant containing 0, 50, and 200 mg/L ammonia. The testing program showed that above saltstone made from the 200 mg/L ammonia simulant, the vapor space ammonia concentration was about 2.7 mg/L vapor at 95 C. An upper 95% confidence value for this concentration was found to be 3.9 mg/L. Testing also showed that ammonia was chemically generated from curing saltstone at 95 C; the amount of ammonia generated was estimated to be equivalent to 121 mg/L additional ammonia in the salt solution feed. Even with chemical generation, the ammonia release from saltstone was found to be lower than its release from salt solution only with 200 mg/L ammonia.

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REDUCTION OF CONSTRAINTS FOR COUPLED OPERATIONS

The homogeneity constraint was implemented in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Product Composition Control System (PCCS) to help ensure that the current durability models would be applicable to the glass compositions being processed during DWPF operations. While the homogeneity constraint is typically an issue at lower waste loadings (WLs), it may impact the operating windows for DWPF operations, where the glass forming systems may be limited to lower waste loadings based on fissile or heat load limits. In the sludge batch 1b (SB1b) variability study, application of the homogeneity constraint at the measurement acceptability region (MAR) limit eliminated much of the potential operating window for DWPF. As a result, Edwards and Brown developed criteria that allowed DWPF to relax the homogeneity constraint from the MAR to the property acceptance region (PAR) criterion, which opened up the operating window for DWPF operations. These criteria are defined as: (1) use the alumina constraint as currently implemented in PCCS (Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} {ge} 3 wt%) and add a sum of alkali constraint with an upper limit of 19.3 wt% ({Sigma}M{sub 2}O < 19.3 wt%), or (2) adjust the lower limit on the Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} constraint to 4 wt% (Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} {ge} 4 wt%). Herman et al. previously demonstrated that these criteria could be used to replace the homogeneity constraint for future sludge-only batches. The compositional region encompassing coupled operations flowsheets could not be bounded as these flowsheets were unknown at the time. With the initiation of coupled operations at DWPF in 2008, the need to revisit the homogeneity constraint was realized. This constraint was specifically addressed through the variability study for SB5 where it was shown that the homogeneity constraint could be ignored if the alumina and alkali constraints were imposed. Additional benefit could be gained if the homogeneity constraint could be replaced by the Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} and sum of alkali constraint for future coupled operations processing based on projections from Revision 14 of the High Level Waste (HLW) System Plan. As with the first phase of testing for sludge-only operations, replacement of the homogeneity constraint with the alumina and sum of alkali constraints will ensure acceptable product durability over the compositional region evaluated. Although these study glasses only provide limited data in a large compositional region, the approach and results are consistent with previous studies that challenged the homogeneity constraint for sludge-only operations. That is, minimal benefit is gained by imposing the homogeneity constraint if the other PCCS constraints are satisfied. The normalized boron releases of all of the glasses are well below the Environmental Assessment (EA) glass results, regardless of thermal history. Although one of the glasses had a normalized boron release of approximately 10 g/L and was not predictable, the glass is still considered acceptable. This particular glass has a low Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} concentration, which may have attributed to the anomalous behavior. Given that poor durability has been previously observed in other glasses with low Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} and Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} concentrations, including the sludge-only reduction of constraints study, further investigations appear to be warranted. Based on the results of this study, it is recommended that the homogeneity constraint (in its entirety with the associated low frit/high frit constraints) be eliminated for coupled operations as defined by Revision 14 of the HLW System Plan with up to 2 wt% TiO{sub 2}. The use of the alumina and sum of alkali constraints should be continued along with the variability study to determine the predictability of the current durability models and/or that the glasses are acceptable with respect to durability. The use of a variability study for each batch is consistent with the glass product control program and it will help to assess new streams or compositional changes. It is also recommended that the influence of alumina and alkali on durability be studied in greater detail. Limited data suggests that there may be a need to adjust the lower Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} limit and/or the upper alkali limit in order to prevent the fabrication of unacceptable glasses. An in-depth evaluation of all previous data as well as any new data would help to better define an alumina and alkali combination that would avoid potential phase separation and ensure glass durability.

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Retrieval of High Level Waste for the Cigeo Project - A Practical Retrieval Test Story - 16085

Since the passing of the June 28, 2006 Act, Andra has incorporated in its step-wise design development of the French high level waste (HLW) and intermediate level long lived waste (IL-LLW) deep geological repository (DGR, aka Cigeo) various requirements linked to 'reversibility' at different stages of the repository life cycle (from its construction phase to its final closure). Reversibility is based on a number of practical dispositions including the progressivity of the development and deployment of the facility, the flexibility of the nature of operations being carried out, the adaptability of the facility to future modifications and the possible retrieval of waste. The capacity to retrieve waste from Cigeo, also called 'retrievability', bears specific requirements. On a shorter term, one must demonstrate that the waste container retrieval operations are technically safe and feasible over at least 100 years. The current paper starts with two acceptations: retrievability and reversibility. It details how those two notions are defined and inter-linked. The 'Retrievability Scale' as proposed by OECD/NEA (and adopted by Andra) is also reminded. The needs for demonstration of retrieval operations are also exposed for the two categories of waste containers disposed of in Cigeo (IL-LLW and HLW) within the context of their respective emplacement configurations (in disposal horizontal vaults and micro-tunnels) at different stages of the repository life cycle. The technical part of the paper is then focused on a practical case story: a technological test campaign (still running) of HLW container retrieval out of a steel cased disposal micro-tunnel. On a test bench built on surface to simulate (create) the environmental conditions that may prevail inside a HLW micro-tunnel at time of retrieval, it was possible to check whether the mechanical means developed for the purpose were adequate and sufficient. The test case story is exposed, c/w the problems and challenges encountered (high temperature impairing the retrieval robot's proper functioning, presence of corrosion products...). The trouble-shooting solutions implemented and the results are commented. This article concludes with a critical analysis of the methods and equipment used, the results obtained and provides some perspectives of improvement. The positive outcomes of this technical test campaign pave the way for planning the in situ retrieval tests to be programmed in the 'industrial pilot phase' of Cigeo (to be implemented over the ten first years of operations, including the active and inactive test period and the first years of disposal activities): the industrial pilot phase is presently scheduled around 2026-2036 (provided the Cigeo construction is authorized in 2021, following the licensing request filing scheduled in 2018). The issues of IL-LLW containers retrieval (for which specific solutions are also studied and technical demonstrations engaged or planned) are also briefly presented. (authors)

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Annual Radioactive Waste Tank Inspection Program - 2011

Aqueous radioactive wastes from Savannah River Site (SRS) separations and vitrification processes are contained in large underground carbon steel tanks. Inspections made during 2011 to evaluate these vessels and other waste handling facilities along with evaluations based on data from previous inspections are the subject of this report. The 2011 inspection program revealed that the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of the Savannah River Site waste tanks were maintained. All inspections scheduled per SRR-LWE-2011-00026, HLW Tank Farm Inspection Plan for 2011, were completed. Ultrasonic measurements (UT) performed in 2011 met the requirements of C-ESR-G-00006, In-Service Inspection Program for High Level Waste Tanks, Rev. 3, and WSRC-TR-2002-00061, Rev.6. UT inspections were performed on Tanks 25, 26 and 34 and the findings are documented in SRNL-STI-2011-00495, Tank Inspection NDE Results for Fiscal Year 2011, Waste Tanks 25, 26, 34 and 41. A total of 5813 photographs were made and 835 visual and video inspections were performed during 2011. A potential leaksite was discovered at Tank 4 during routine annual inspections performed in 2011. The new crack, which is above the allowable fill level, resulted in no release to the environment or tank annulus. The location of the crack is documented in C-ESR-G-00003, SRS High Level Waste Tank Leaksite Information, Rev.6.

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Evaluation of the Radiological Characterization for Off-Site Source Recovery Program Waste Streams LA-OS-00-01.001, LA-OS-00-03, and LA-OS-00-04

The purpose of this memorandum is to satisfy the requirements of Section 4.4 of the CCP Acceptable Knowledge Documentation procedure CCP-TP-005 (Ref. 1). This evaluation is updating the previously issued memo NEN3:24-045 issued in August 2024. CCP-TP-005 requires an AK Expert and the OSRP group to evaluate the radionuclide characterization of a waste stream and prepare the NDA Memorandum (letter to CCP Records). This NDA memorandum was written with input from the OSRP group, as required by CCP-TP-005. This memo includes a discussion of the limitations for the radiological characterization and a description of the characterization method.

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Science Road Map for Phase 2 of the Tank-Farm Vadose Zone Program

Phase 1 of the Tank-Farm Vadose Zone Program (TFVZP) developed information on the nature and extent of vadose zone contamination in the tank farms through field studies, laboratory analyses and experiments, and historical data searches; assembled data and performed tank-farm risk analysis; and initiated interim corrective actions to lessen the impacts of tank leak contaminants. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory scientists and external collaborators at universities and U.S. Department of Energy user facilities sampled and analyzed contaminant plumes. These types of activities will continue during Phase 2 of the TFVZP to refine and expand scientific understanding of the subsurface beneath tank farms, especially of water movement, residual waste leaching, and contaminant transport.

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Data Analyst - A Device for Continuous Repeating Real-Time Assay of HPGe, CZT, or Scintillation Gamma Spectra - 18574

There are many situations where a continuous repeating series of quantitative gamma spectral assays is desirable. These include measurements of fluid going through a pipe, of items on a conveyor passing under a detector, a detector aimed at the ground on a moving platform, or a detector in free air as a plume of radioactivity drifts by. While Canberra and many others have built and deployed many of these devices, they have all been custom built for that particular application, and rather expensive. The Data Analyst [DA] is a general purpose device that is designed to fulfill many of these applications without modification, but can be fairly-easily modified if needed. The DA is a small [12 x 18 x 5 cm], low-power [3 W] box that accepts the input from external MCAs, controls the acquisition cycle, analyzes the results, and transmits them to the outside world when needed. The detector-MCAs supported are HPGe with Lynx MCA, NaI or CeBr or LaBr with Osprey MCA, and CZT or CsI with internal MCAs. The DA internal software used for analysis is the full standard Genie analysis software, which is very widely used and well accepted in the industry. This allows exported spectral files to be reviewed and confirmed by Experts, and reanalyzed if needed. The DA hardware is totally autonomous. As soon as power is applied, it starts the pre-programmed sequences of acquisition and analysis. Multiple analysis sequences [called Workflows] can be in operation simultaneously, e.g. with different count times and different nuclide libraries. Only the detector with MCA, and the DA are required in the field. A PC can be connected to the DA locally or remotely via WiFi, USB, or Ethernet. The PC is needed to setup the DA, and to readout the results. The DA also supports [with application-specific programming] external Inputs/Outputs either for recording with the analysis results or for use in the computation of the result, e.g. temperature, flow rate, pressure, ... ]. The DA also has an internal GPS receiver with external antenna. Applications of the DA that are discussed include stack gas effluent activity where a portion of the effluent stream was extracted to flow through a shield with a HPGe detector and Lynx MCA, and measurement of reactor coolant activity where a shielded CZT detector and MCA were aimed at various sections of reactor primary coolant during a maintenance outage. Potential other applications are also described. (author)

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Enhanced Performance Assessment Models for Generic Deep Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel - 16223

Development of an enhanced performance assessment (PA) capability for geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste has been ongoing for several years in the U.S. repository program. The new Generic Disposal System Analysis (GDSA) modeling and software framework is intended to be flexible enough to evolve through the various phases of repository activities, beginning with generic PA activities in the current Concept Evaluation phase to site-specific PA modeling in the Repository Development phase. The GDSA Framework utilizes modern software and hardware capabilities by being based on open-source software architecture and being configured to run in a massively parallel, high-performance computing (HPC) environment. It consists of two main components, the open-source Dakota uncertainty sampling and analysis software and the PFLOTRAN reactive multi-phase flow and transport simulator. Reference cases or 'generic repositories' have been, and are being developed, based on typical properties for potential salt, clay, and granite host-rock formations and corresponding engineered design concepts for each medium. Past simulations have focused on a generic repository in bedded-salt host rock, while the most recent research has focused on a reference case for a typical clay/shale host rock. A variety of single-realization (i.e., deterministic) and multi-realization (probabilistic) results for the new clay reference case are presented, including an analysis of the effects of heat generation on repository performance, assuming a 100-year out-of-reactor commercial SNF waste form. Order-of-magnitude differences between predicted radionuclide concentrations in thermal versus isothermal simulations imply that mechanistic, coupled-process modeling in three-dimensional (3-D) domains can be important for building confidence in post-closure performance assessments. (authors)

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Evaluation of a Material Balance Only and Material Balance with Real-Time In-line Monitoring Approaches for DFLAW Processing

The Assistant Manager, WTP chartered an Integrated Technical Team (ITT), which includes personnel from the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), from the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Bechtel National, Inc., and DOE-ORP, to evaluate the capability and potential benefits of replacing sample collection/analyses requirements with real-time, in-line monitoring. The initial focus of the ITT is the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) Program. This work scope is being performed in multiple phases. The Phase 2 work scope contains tasks to evaluate a materials balance only approach as well as continuing scoping evaluations for instruments that could be used for Real-Time In-Line Monitoring (RTIM). The Phase 2 work scope for evaluation of a materials balance approach was completed by both SRNL and PNNL and is documented in this report. The material balance evaluation included a review of the WTP Low Activity Waste (LAW) vitrification process as well as the WTP Effluent Management Facility (EMF) process. Sampling requirements and unit operations were reviewed to determine which sample requirements could be met with a material balance without significantly increasing processing or reporting uncertainties.

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Relationship Between the Marginal Probability of Failure for a CPP Test and the Recommended Corrosion Control Requirements for Hanford Double Shell Waste Tanks

The Hanford Site in Washington State currently stores millions of gallons of radioactive waste in underground, carbon steel, double shell tanks (DSTs) that were constructed between 1968 and 1986. A chemistry control and monitoring program has been established mitigate corrosion in order to extend the service life for the DSTs. The current waste temperatures in the DSTs are at historical lows (i.e., typically less than 50 °C). The previous chemistry control requirements were determined for conditions at temperatures significantly higher. SRNL undertook a statistically based investigation of the role of nitrate and halide ion (i.e., chloride and fluoride) induced pitting corrosion. The objective was to develop a comprehensive waste chemistry envelope for the simultaneous minimization of the pitting and SCC risks caused by halide and nitrate ions at the lower temperature conditions. On the basis of these tests, new chemistry control requirements were proposed and have since been implemented for pitting corrosion control.

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Control of the Reduction/Oxidation State of the High Level Waste Form in the Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site - 12451

The Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site treats and immobilizes High Level Waste into a durable borosilicate glass for safe, permanent storage. Among the parameters important to the overall process is the reduction/oxidation state of the glass. Control strategies for the reduction/oxidation state of the glass have been developed and evolved over the last 20 years to provide a current strategy which is both accurate and robust. A description of the methodologies implemented to control, evaluate, and validate the reduction/oxidation state of the glass is discussed along with the impact of future facility changes (made to pursue a more aggressive program to empty High Level Waste tanks at the Savannah River Site) on the reduction/oxidation state of glass. The reduction/oxidation state of the glass is an important parameter to the operation of the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Control, evaluation, and validation of the reduction/oxidation state of the glass is of particular importance for melter operation. Melter feed which is too oxidizing can negatively impact production, while feed which is too reducing can result in catastrophic failure of the melter. Control strategies for the reduction/oxidation state of the glass have been developed and evolved over the last 20 years to provide a current strategy which is both accurate and robust. (authors)

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