CAUSES OF IMPACT INJURY IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
Causes of impact injury in automobile accidents
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Causes of impact injury in automobile accidents
Catastrophic accidents caused by fatigue failures often occur in engineering structures. Thus, a fundamental understanding of cyclic-deformation and fatigue-failure mechanisms is critical for the development of fatigue-resistant structural materials. Here we report a high-entropy alloy with enhanced fatigue life by ductile-transformable multicomponent B2 precipitates. Its cyclic-deformation mechanisms are revealed by real-time in-situ neutron diffraction, transmission-electron microscopy, crystal-plasticity modeling, and Monte-Carlo simulations. Multiple cyclic-deformation mechanisms, including dislocation slips, precipitation strengthening, deformation twinning, and reversible martensitic phase transformation, are observed in the studied high-entropy alloy. Its improved fatigue performance at low strain amplitudes, i.e., the high fatigue-crack-initiation resistance, is attributed to the high elasticity, plastic deformability, and martensitic transformation of the B2-strengthening phase. This study shows that fatigue-resistant alloys can be developed by incorporating strengthening ductile-transformable multicomponent intermetallic phases.
Reviewed NTSB reports of the 19 U.S. airline accidents between 1991-2000 attributed primarily to crew error. Asked: Why might any airline crew in situation of accident crew--knowing only what they knew--be vulnerable. Can never know with certainty why accident crew made specific errors but can determine why the population of pilots is vulnerable. Considers variability of expert performance as function of interplay of multiple factors.
Several airline accidents have occurred in recent years as the result of erroneous weight or performance data used to calculate V-speeds, flap/trim settings, required runway lengths, and/or required climb gradients. In this report we consider 4 recent studies of performance data error, report our own study of ASRS-reported incidents, and provide countermeasures that can reduce vulnerability to accidents caused by performance data errors. Performance data are generated through a lengthy process involving several employee groups and computer and/or paper-based systems. Although much of the airline indUStry 's concern has focused on errors pilots make in entering FMS data, we determined that errors occur at every stage of the process and that errors by ground personnel are probably at least as frequent and certainly as consequential as errors by pilots. Most of the errors we examined could in principle have been trapped by effective use of existing procedures or technology; however, the fact that they were not trapped anywhere indicates the need for better countermeasures. Existing procedures are often inadequately designed to mesh with the ways humans process information. Because procedures often do not take into account the ways in which information flows in actual flight ops and time pressures and interruptions experienced by pilots and ground personnel, vulnerability to error is greater. Some aspects of NextGen operations may exacerbate this vulnerability. We identify measures to reduce the number of errors and to help catch the errors that occur.
This seminar describes the process of determining the physical cause of The Shuttle Columbia Accident. The presentation is based on the published CIAB Report, and is based mainly on Appendix F2, Vol IV of the CIAB report by J. O. Arnold, H. E. Goldstein and D. J. Rigalli. As a part of the seminar, I would also indicate how my education in Engineering Physics at the University of Kansas helped prepare me to accept the assignment to serve as an investigator for the CAIB. A similar presentation was given at Purdue in 2005. Presentation charts are attached.
With the interconnectivity of industrial processes in a nuclear integrated energy system (IES) the primary issue becomes the safety of the nuclear power plant (NPP). The industrial processes being supported are assumed to have been in colocation prior to the addition of an NPP. Do the hazards from each process reach beyond the perimeter of the plant to affect the NPP? This paper reviews hazards and accident statistics from processes in an IES as a first step to answer this question. Hazards and accidentology discussed cover hydrogen, ammonia, syngas, methanol, synthetic fuels, and oil refineries. They include mainly fire, explosion, and toxicity in varying degrees. Historical accident statistics are given whenever available, and accident causes are evaluated and ranked based on their frequencies. Lessons learned from previous accidents are presented. Future work will focus on utilizing the data collected for accidentology of the industrial processes to perform Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and analyze the impacts of additional hazards on the colocated existing nuclear power plant or newly built advanced nuclear reactor. The analysis will provide the frequency and consequence of external events that can affect the NPP.
SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a software simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced nuclear reactors. Detailed, mechanistic models of steady-state and transient thermal, hydraulic, kinetic, and mechanical phenomena are employed to describe the response of the reactor core, the reactor primary and secondary coolant loops, the reactor control and protection systems, and the balance-of-plant to accidents caused by changes in coolant flow, loss of heat rejection, or reactivity insertion. The consequences of single and double-fault accidents can be modeled, including fuel and coolant heating, fuel and cladding mechanical behavior, core reactivity feedbacks, coolant loop performance including natural circulation, and decay heat removal. Analyses are typically terminated upon demonstration of reactor and plant shutdown to permanently coolable conditions, or upon violation of design basis margins. The objective of the analysis is to quantify accident consequences as measured by the transient behavior of system performance parameters, such as fuel and cladding temperatures, reactivity, and cladding strain. Originally developed for analysis of sodium cooled reactors with oxide fuel clad by stainless steel, the models were subsequently extended and specialized to metallic fuel clad with advanced alloys and to several other coolant options, including lead, LBE, and water.
The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based on the findings extracted from the investigation, the "lesson learned" becomes a genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today s usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were categorized into 10 groups Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety.
Three aircraft accidents are analyzed to gain an understanding of thunderstorm-related downbursts, or extremely rapid downdrafts, which interfered with takeoff or landing maneuvers in each of the three cases. For the purposes of this study, downbursts are defined as having downward speeds greater than 3.6 m/sec at 91 m altitude, and diameters of 800 m or greater. Few of the strongest downdrafts investigated reach the intensity of a downburst. The downburst cells mature about 5-10 minutes after formation, and are generally no more than 3-4 miles in diameter at maturity. A spearhead echo is found to be associated with each of the downburst-caused accidents.
Radioactive fire following nuclear accidents causes resuspension of radioactive contamination that can spread over large areas. Although many papers focus on particle deposition and resuspension, a limited number of studies model its suppression. Even less data is available for the comparison of emissions across particle size, surface, and mode of resuspension. In this study, cerium dioxide surrogate for internal hazards such as radionuclide particle matter was aerosolized into a large chamber and subsequently resuspended after sedimentation. Resuspension was induced by common modes of human movement including walking, wind, and driving on common surfaces including polyvinyl chloride (PVC), artificial grass (turf), and concrete in a 5.8 m long, 3.7 m wide and 3 m high tent. The resuspension was experimentally measured for two particle sizes (1 and 10 μm) at three different heights (0.3 m, 1.2 m, and 2.4 m) and compared across size, surface, and mode of resuspension. Particle size distribution was measured using an aerodynamic particle sizer and the resuspended particles were collected with the wetted wall cyclone aerosol collector and quantitated using inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. The testing was repeated with the F-500 fire retardant application to study its effect on resuspension. In this study, artificial grass flooring was found to generate the most resuspension, with walking on turf for the 1 μm particle testing yielding the highest factor overall. Concrete had the lowest resuspension, showing variations in the size distribution of aerosol as a function of height from the source resuspension factors. The application of fire retardant was found to significantly reduce surrogate resuspension, regardless of resuspension method or testing surface. Here, the results provide impactful information regarding the different modes of resuspension including human transport (walking and driving) and wind for the resuspension of radionuclide surrogate particles deposited onto common surfaces and the effect of fire retardant application on their resuspension, leading to higher levels of safety for nuclear energy plants and facilities.
The rapid development of autonomous driving poses new research challenges to the on-vehicle computing system. In particular, the execution time of autonomous driving tasks highly depends on the specific driving environment. For instance, the execution time of configurable sensor fusion increases significantly as the scene becomes complex, which leads to end-to-end deadline misses from sensing to control and may cause accidents. Thus, a framework that can effectively utilize the system resources to guarantee the end-to-end deadlines of autonomous driving tasks as well as effectively prioritize the responsiveness and throughput of the control commands is crucial for autonomous driving. In this paper, we propose HCPerf, a performance-directed hierarchical coordination framework that intelligently coordinates the autonomous driving tasks with high execution time variation and complex dependencies according to the driving performance in real-time. Specifically, HCPerf mainly consists of two coordinators. The internal coordinator intelligently schedules the tasks according to the driving performance of the vehicle in order to help them meet the end-to-end deadlines while well prioritizing the responsiveness and throughput of the control commands. At the same time, the external coordinator dynamically tunes the rates of tasks according to the schedulability in order to efficiently utilize the system resource. We conduct extensive experiments on both simulation and hardware testbeds with the representative autonomous driving application. The results show that HCPerf can effectively improve the driving performance by 7.69%-45.94% in different driving scenarios.
Human Reliability Analysis predicts accidents caused by human errors and is an important factor in Probabilistic Safety Assessment that comprehensively evaluates the safety of nuclear power plants. This study compares and analyzes the human performance of nuclear power plant operators according to the simulator complexity as part of the HRA data collection support method development project conducted by Idaho National Laboratory. This experiment was conducted by setting two types of simulators and scenarios as independent variables. The data collected by conducting the experiments in two different simulators were analyzed using an analysis of variance test and a correlation analysis, and four human performance charts were derived.
Computerized fault tree analyses are used to obtain both qualitative and quantitative information about the safety and reliability of an electrical control system that shuts the reactor down when certain safety criteria are exceeded, in the design of a nuclear plant protection system, and in an investigation of a backup emergency system for reactor shutdown. The fault tree yields the modes by which the system failure or accident will occur, the most critical failure or accident causing areas, detailed failure probabilities, and the response of safety or reliability to design modifications and maintenance schemes.
The incidence of air transport accidents caused by problems in crew communication and coordination was investigated. Communication patterns which are most effective in specific situations were determined. Methods to assess the effectiveness of crew communication patterns were developed. The results lead to the development of new methods training crews in effective communication and provide guidelines for the design of aviation procedures and equipment.
A number of case stories of aircraft accidents caused by pilot stress are related.
The effects of tailplane icing were investigated in a four-year NASA/FAA Tailplane Icing, Program (TIP). This research program was developed to improve the understanding, of iced tailplane aeroperformance and aircraft aerodynamics, and to develop design and training aides to help reduce the number of incidents and accidents caused by tailplane icing. To do this, the TIP was constructed with elements that included icing, wind tunnel testing, dry-air aerodynamic wind tunnel testing, flight tests, and analytical code development. This paper provides an overview of the entire program demonstrating the interconnectivity of the program elements and reports on current accomplishments.
In the 1970's, flight safety professionals became profoundly concerned about the prevalence of crew-caused accidents and incidents, and the role of human error in flight operations. As result, they initiated a change in the flight safety culture which has grown to significant proportions today. At the heart of the evolution were crew concepts such as flightdeck management, crew coordination, and cockpit resource management, concepts which seemed to target critical deficiencies. In themselves, the concepts were not new but their incorporation into training as a direct means of changing the flight safety culture was an untried, almost 'grassroots' approach. The targeted crew concepts and skills were not an integral part of the typical training program; the methods, curriculum, media, and even course content itself, would have to be developed and implemented from the bottom up. A familiar truism in the pilot culture is that you should 'Train the way you fly; Fly the way you train'. In short, training was expected to provide the pilot with practical operational skills that were consistent with the performance standards they were required to maintain and the operational demands they met on a daily basis. In short, one could not simply command crews to use good CRM; one would have to research and define these skills operationally as well as develop and implement a consistent and effective training program. Furthermore, one would need active support and collaboration among the research, industry and government communities in order to ensure acceptance and continued commitment. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.
'..only a fool perseveres in error.' Cicero. Humans will break the most advanced technological devices and override safety and security systems if they are given the latitude. Within the workplace, the operator may be just one of several factors in causing accidents or making risky decisions. Other variables considered for their involvement in the negative and often catastrophic outcomes include the organizational context and culture. Many organizations have constructed and implemented safety programs to be assimilated into their culture to assure employee commitment and understanding of the importance of everyday safety. The purpose of this paper is to examine literature on organizational safety cultures and programs that attempt to combat vulnerability, risk taking behavior and decisions and identify the role of training in attempting to mitigate unsafe acts.