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At least 19 records

Investigations on optimization of accident management measures following a station blackout accident in a VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor

The reactor safety issues are of primary importance for preserving the health of the population and ensuring no release of radioactivity and fission products into the environment. A part of the nuclear research focuses on improvement of the safety of existing nuclear power plants. Studies, research and efforts are a continuing process at improving the safety and reliability of existing and newly developed nuclear power plants at prevention of a core melt accident. Station blackout (loss of AC power supply) is one of the dominant accidents taken into consideration at performing accident analysis. In case of multiple failures of safety systems it leads to a severe accident. To prevent an accident to turn into a severe one or to mitigate the consequences, accident management measures must be performed. The present paper outlines possibilities for application and optimization of accident management measures following a station blackout accident. Assessed is the behaviour of the nuclear power plant during a station blackout accident without accident management measures and with application of primary/secondary side oriented accident management measures. Discussed are the possibilities for operators ' intervention and the influence of the performed accident management measures on the course of the accident. Special attention has been paid to the effectiveness of the passive feeding and physical phenomena having an influence on the system behaviour. The performed simulations show that the effectiveness of the secondary side feeding procedure can be limited due to an early evaporation or flashing effects in the feed water system. The analyzed cases show that the effectiveness of the accident management measures strongly depends on the initiation criteria applied for depressurization of the reactor coolant system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A defense in depth approach for nuclear power plant accident management

An initiating event may lead to a severe accident if the plant safety functions have been challenged or operators do not follow the appropriate accident management procedures. Beyond design basis accidents are those corresponding to events of very low occurrence probability but such an accident may lead to significant consequences. The defense in depth approach is important to assure nuclear safety even in a severe accident. Plant Damage States (PDS) can be defined by the combination of the possible values for each of the PDS parameters which are showed on the nuclear power plant simulator. PDS is used to identify what the initiating event is, and can also give the information of safety system's status whether they are bypassed, inoperable or not. Initiating event and safety system's status are used in the construction of Containment Event Tree (CET) to determine containment failure modes by using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technique. Different initiating events will correspond to different CETs. With these CETs, the core melt frequency of an initiating event can be found. The use of Plant Damage States (PDS) is a symptom-oriented approach. On the other hand, the use of Containment Event Tree (CET) is an event-oriented approach. In this study, the Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plants, the Lungmen nuclear power station (LNPS), which is an advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) with fully digitized instrumentation and control (I and C) system is chosen as the target plant. The LNPS full scope engineering simulator is used to generate the testing data for method development. The following common initiating events are considered in this study: loss of coolant accidents (LOCA), total loss of feedwater (TLOFW), loss of offsite power (LOOP), station blackout (SBO). Studies have indicated that the combination of the symptom-oriented approach and the event-oriented approach can be helpful to find mitigation strategies and is useful for the accident management. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Euratom-Rosatom ERCOSAM-SAMARA projects on containment thermal-hydraulics of current and future LWRs for severe accident management

During a postulated severe accident with core degradation, hydrogen would form in the reactor pressure vessel mainly due to high temperatures zirconium-steam reaction and flow together with steam into the containment where it will mix with the containment atmosphere (steam-air). The hydrogen transport into the containment is a safety concern because it can lead to explosive mixtures through the associated phenomena of condensation, mixing and stratification. The ERCOSAM and SAMARA projects, co-financed by the European Union and the Russia, include various experiments addressing accident scenarios scaled down from existing plant calculations to different thermal-hydraulics facilities (TOSQAN, MISTRA, PANDA, SPOT). The tests sequences aim to investigate hydrogen concentration build-up and stratification during a postulated accident and the effect of the activation of Severe Accident Management systems (SAMs), e.g. sprays, coolers and Passive Auto-catalytic Recombiners (PARs). Analytical activities, performed by the project participants, are an essential component of the projects, as they aim to improve and validate various computational methods. They accompany the projects in the various phases; plant calculations, scaling to generic containment and to the different facilities, planning pre-test and post-test simulations are performed. Code benchmark activities on the basis of conceptual near full scale HYMIX facility will finally provide a further opportunity to evaluate the applicability of the various methods to the study of scaling issues. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

New intrinsically smart severe accident instrumentation saves costs and enhances severe accident management - 302

The Severe Accidents (SA) at Fukushima in 2011, identified the need for enhanced I and C to follow the progress of SA. Since SA environments are significantly Beyond DBA conditions, some new advanced Inherently Smart sensors had to be developed and tested. Nuclear plant designers and operators have helped focus the I and C enhancement based upon lessons learned from the Fukushima accidents. The result has been the addition of I and C for direct measurement of SA conditions hydrogen concentration, oxygen concentration, temperature, and pressure that provide unambiguous information for management of Severe Accident scenarios. The benefits are immediate from three important aspects. First, they deliver on the nuclear promise for enhanced safety at reduced costs. These Inherently Smart sensors have no maintenance and replace equipment that has high maintenance costs. Secondly, these sensors provide multiple benefits, such as condition monitoring information all the time and direct measurement of SA conditions if they are needed. Thirdly, and most importantly, simplify operator actions and training for SA. SA scenarios and SA Management can now rely on direct measurements to know such things as, the extent of fuel damage, integrity of the reactor pressure vessel, when corium is on the floor of containment, and conditions upon which to activate the hardened vent. (authors)

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Verification of severe accident management guideline (SAMG) entry condition for OPR1000 - 367

The current severe accident prevention and mitigation strategies for OPR 1000 have emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), respectively. The main objective of SAMG is to prevent a release of radioactive materials from releasing into environment and mitigate severe accident phenomena during severe accident. The current SAMG entry condition is met when the core exit temperature (CET) reaches 650 deg. C in OPR 1000. Peak cladding temperature (PCT), which represents core integrity more precisely than CET does, cannot be used since it is not measurable in the main control room (MCR). Current SAMG entry condition for every kind of accident scenarios is not reasonable, since entry condition is determined without considering operator action time. Therefore, SAMG entry condition need to be verified with consider operator action time. Thus, an analysis methodology for SAMG entry condition was developed to verify the SAMG entry condition. A severe accident DB were also developed in order to analyze the SAMG entry condition. The analysis results of DB show that available operator action time from the SAMG entrance to RV fail is shorter than the required time in most cases. As a result, the proper SAMG entry condition was suggested through the results of DB analysis. When the SAMG entry condition is changed from CET to suggested condition, the available action time is increased about 350 to 4300 sec. Also, the suggested entry condition was verified through the simulation which considered operation action time and reflecting the suggested entry condition. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Intelligent Modeling for Nuclear Power Plant Accident Management

This study explores the viability of using counterfactual reasoning for impact analyses when understanding and responding to “beyond-design-basis” nuclear power plant accidents. Currently, when a severe nuclear power plant accident occurs, plant operators rely on Severe Accident Management Guidelines. However, the current guidelines are limited in scope and depth: for certain types of accidents, plant operators would have to work to mitigate the damage with limited experience and guidance for the particular situation. We aim to fill the need for comprehensive accident support by using a dynamic Bayesian network to aid in the diagnosis of a nuclear reactor’s state and to analyze the impact of possible response measures.

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Uncertainty quantification for accident management using ACE surrogates

The alternating conditional expectation (ACE) regression method is used to generate RELAP5 surrogates which are then used to determine the distribution of the peak clad temperature (PCT) during the loss of feedwater accident coupled with a subsequent initiation of the feed and bleed (F and B) operation in the Zion-1 nuclear power plant. The construction of the surrogates assumes conditional independence relations among key reactor parameters. The choice of parameters to model is based on the macroscopic balance statements governing the behavior of the reactor. The peak clad temperature is calculated based on the independent variables that are known to be important in determining the success of the F and B operation. The relationship between these independent variables and the plant parameters such as coolant pressure and temperature is represented by surrogates that are constructed based on 45 RELAP5 cases. The time-dependent PCT for different values of F and B parameters is calculated by sampling the independent variables from their probability distributions and propagating the information through two layers of surrogates. The results of our analysis show that the ACE surrogates are able to satisfactorily reproduce the behavior of the plant parameters even though a quasi-static assumption is primarily used in their construction. The PCT is found to be lower in cases where the F and B operation is initiated, compared to the case without F and B, regardless of the F and B parameters used. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Interim Status Report for Risk Management for SFRs

Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of passive, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the system's design to take advantage of natural phenomena to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a variety of beyond design basis events with the intent of exploring the utility of a Dynamic Bayesian Network to infer the state of the reactor to inform the operator's corrective actions. These inferences also serve to identify the instruments most critical to informing an operator's actions as candidates for hardening against radiation and other extreme environmental conditions that may exist in an accident. This reduction in uncertainty serves to inform ongoing discussions of how small sodium reactors would be licensed and may serve to reduce regulatory risk and cost for such reactors.

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The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000{sup R} during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been designed to be reliable in these conditions. The primary goal of any such actions is to maintain or refill the passive inventory available to cool the core, containment and spent fuel pool in the safety-related and seismically qualified Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). The seismically-qualified, ground-mounted Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank (PCCAWST) is also available for this function as appropriate. The primary effect of these actions would be to increase the coping time for the AP1000 during design basis events, as well as events such as those described above, from 72 hours without operator intervention to 7 days with minimal operator actions. These Operator actions necessary to protect the health and safety of the public are addressed in the Post-72 Hour procedures, as well as some EOPs, AOPs, ARPs and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Should the event continue to become more severe and plant conditions degrade further with indications of inadequate core cooling, the SAMGs provide guidance for strategies to address these hypothetical severe accident conditions. The AP1000 SAMG diagnoses and actions are prioritized to first utilize the AP1000 features that are expected to retain a damaged core inside the reactor vessel. Only one strategy is undertaken at any time. This strategy will be followed and its effectiveness evaluated before other strategies are undertaken. This is a key feature of both the symptom-oriented AP1000 EOPs and the AP1000 SAMGs which maximizes the probability of retaining a damaged core inside the reactor vessel and containment while minimizing the chances for confusion and human errors during implementation. The AP1000 SAMGs are simple and straight-forward and have been developed with considerable input from human factors and plant operations experts. Most importantly, and different from severe accident management strategies for other plants, the AP1000 SAMGs do not require diagnosis of the location of the core (i.e., whether reactor vessel failure has occurred). This is a fundamental consequence of the AP1000 In-Vessel Retention approach, which allows severe accident management to be based on fundamental principles (e.g. provide coolant as close as possible to the core) that do not change during a specific event. This eliminates the need for one of the more difficult diagnostic requirements, since reactor vessel failure does not directly relate to any measurable plant parameter, and differs from other designs in that an engineered failure of the pressure vessel' (e.g. core catcher) is never required. (authors)

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