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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

Remote Monitor Alarm System

A remote monitor alarm system monitors discrete alarm and analog power supply voltage conditions at remotely located communications terminal equipment. A central monitoring unit (CMU) is connected via serial data links to each of a plurality of remote terminal units (RTUS) that monitor the alarm and power supply conditions of the remote terminal equipment. Each RTU can monitor and store condition information of both discrete alarm points and analog power supply voltage points in its associated communications terminal equipment. The stored alarm information is periodically transmitted to the CMU in response to sequential polling of the RTUS. The number of monitored alarm inputs and permissible voltage ranges for the analog inputs can be remotely configured at the CMU and downloaded into programmable memory at each RTU. The CMU includes a video display, a hard disk memory, a line printer and an audio alarm for communicating and storing the alarm information received from each RTU.

Stute, Robert A.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Next ALarM System

NALMS is an alarm system application designed for availability, integrability, and extensibility. The NALMS development was driven by SLAC's efforts to replace the Alarm Handler, due for deprecation as a Motif-based application, and to introduce process improvements addressing hierarchy implementation overhead, limited operator engagement, and operator display integration.

Garrahan, Jacqueline↗
NASA NTRS2009

Recent Results on "Approximations to Optimal Alarm Systems for Anomaly Detection"

An optimal alarm system and its approximations may use Kalman filtering for univariate linear dynamic systems driven by Gaussian noise to provide a layer of predictive capability. Predicted Kalman filter future process values and a fixed critical threshold can be used to construct a candidate level-crossing event over a predetermined prediction window. An optimal alarm system can be designed to elicit the fewest false alarms for a fixed detection probability in this particular scenario.

Martin, Rodney Alexander↗
DOE OSTI2019

Report for 2.2.1 Task 5: Develop and Document a State-Based Alarm System for a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Using Machine Learning. Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program report

In legacy control rooms the operators might have 20 to 30 alarms to deal with on 12 control boards, during a reactor trip. The new digital alarm system in the upgraded control room will display between 150 and 200 alarm points on a single screen. This overload of information prevents the operators from identifying any abnormal alarms quickly without having to scroll through the alarm list looking for the abnormal alarms. One way to tackle this problem could be to attempt to create a state-based alarm system which would identify plant states and would identify which alarms are expected in those states and suppress them from the alarm screen so that any unexpected alarms would be displayed and easily identified to the operators. This can be done today but is very labor intensive in that an operator or training instructor would be required to run scenarios and log the alarms to be suppressed. The hope is that Machine Learning (ML) can provide an alternative solution with less manual effort required.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Plan for IER-443 Testing of the Y-12 and AWE Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor

This document provides the scope and details of the “Plan for Testing the Y-12 and AWE Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor”. Due to the relative simplicity of the testing goals, scope, and methodology, the NCSP Manager approved execution of the test when ready. No preliminary CED-1 or final design CED-2 reports were required or issued. The test will subject Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) detectors supplied by Y- 12 and AWE to very intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields. The goals of the test will be to (1) substantiate functionality, for both existing and newly acquired Y- 12 CAAS detectors, and (2) the ability of the AWE detectors to provide quality temporal dose information after a hypothetical criticality accident. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 states that the “system shall be sufficiently robust as to actuate an alarm signal when exposed to the maximum radiation expected”, which has been defined at Y-12, in Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs), to be a dose rate of 10 Rad/s. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 further states that “alarm actuation shall occur as a result of a minimum duration transient” which may be assumed to be 1 msec. The pulse widths and dose rates which will be achieved in this test will exceed these requirements. Pulsed radiation fields will be produced by the Godiva IV fast metal burst reactor at the National Criticality Experimental Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The magnitude of the pulses and the relative distances to the detectors will be varied to afford a wide range of radiation fluence and pulse widths. The magnitude of the neutron and gamma fields will be determined by reactor temperature rise to fluence and dose conversions which have been previously established through extensive measurements performed under IER-147. The requirements for CAAS systems to detect and alarm under a “minimum accident of concern” as well as other functional requirements specified in ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997, are not included in the test. Routine and periodic maintenance and calibrations performed at Y-12 and AWE are intended to provide adequate confirmation for meeting these requirements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development of a Smart Alarm System for the CEBAF Injector

RadiaSoft and Jefferson Laboratory are working together to develop a machine-learning-based smart alarm system for the CEBAF injector. Because of the injector’s large number of parameters and possible fault scenarios, it is highly desirable to have an autonomous alarm system that can quickly identify and diagnose unusual machine states. We present our work on artificial neural networks designed to identify such undesirable machine states. In particular, we test both auto-encoders and inverse models as possible tools for differentiating between normal and abnormal states. These models are being developed using both supervised and unsupervised learning techniques, and are being trained using CEBAF injector data collected during dedicated machine studies as well as during regular operations. Lastly, we discuss tradeoffs between the two types of models.

Abell, D. T.↗
DOE OSTI2020

CS-Studio Alarm System Based on Kafka

The CS-Studio alarm system was originally based on a relational database and the Apache ActiveMQ message service. The former was necessary to store configuration and state, while the latter communicated state updates and user actions. In a recent update, the combination of relational database and ActiveMQ have been replaced by Apache Kafka. We present how this simplified the implementation while at the same time improving performance.

Kasemir, Kay↗
DOE OSTI2018

Qualification of Y-12 Legacy Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors

The Y-12 National Security Complex has had a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) capable to detect a criticality accident since 1945. With the exception of Y-12’s new High-enriched Uranium Materials Storage facility (HEUMF), the system installed in Y-12’s existing facilities dates to 1957. This legacy system has received many upgrades since installation and detector stations have been removed and relocated as enriched uranium operations have evolved, but the basic design and electronic configuration of the system is the same as that in 1957.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Criticality Acccident Alarm System (CAAS) CSG-UM Hybrid Example

Criticality Accident Alarm System calculations combine methods needed for both criticality and shielding calculations. UM may be used for facility details, allowing import of existing facility drawing. CSG used for criticality cells.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Criticality Accident Alarm System Modeling for the Uranium Processing Facility

The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) provides coverage for two primary processing facilities. For UPF, detailed documentation and drawings of the design are readily available. While this design information allows for some CAAS modeling features to match the actual design with a high level of accuracy, assumptions and simplifications are necessary as it is unrealistic and unnecessary to replicate many aspects of the design. A set of modeling guidelines and techniques were used to develop consistency between the MCNP6 models. While ensuring conservatism, overly conservative choices must be avoided to demonstrate the minimum accident of concern can be detected. To ensure proper modeling choices were made for the final models, a group of parametric studies were performed to evaluate the impact on the dose rates detected at the individual detectors. Some of these modeling choices and/or associated parametric studies include: - Modeling the grid steel area above the detectors as homogeneous stainless steel and determining the impact on detectability with an increasing density. - Modeling the presence of equipment in close proximity to the CAAS detectors. - Determining an appropriate material density to represent miscellaneous items not specifically modeled. - Evaluating the impact of sprinkler activation. The results of UPF CAAS analyses show that the modeling assumptions made based on the detailed design and parametric studies are appropriate and demonstrate accurate yet conservative models have been developed for detecting minimum accident of concern within the UPF.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Criticality Alarm Systems at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) has a number of criticality alarm systems (CAS) in the various facilities. The complexity of the plant creates some unique CAS problems. A detailed review of the CAS has been made to determine the level of compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. A major CAS upgrade project is currently in the design stage which will expand coverage and bring all CAS monitoring unshielded areas into full compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. Because DOE Orders do not contain an exclusion that exempts the need for CAS coverage in shielded areas as provided in ANSI 8.3-1986, a future CAS upgrade project is in the planning stage which will also upgrade the CAS coverage in shielded portions of the plant.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Technical Basis for the Uranium Processing Facility Criticality Accident Alarm System

The technical basis for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) 90% design has been completed. The CAAS design was evaluated for two primary processing facilities, the Main Processing Building (MPB) and the Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB), and for connected facilities known as the Personnel Support Building (PSB) and the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials facility (HEUMF) Connector (HCON), which connects UPF to existing Y-12 facilities. The evaluation focused on three primary areas to address requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.3: (1) detectability of the minimum accident of concern; (2) determination of areas where total dose could exceed 12 rad for the maximum anticipated accident yield; and (3) evaluation of the radiation tolerance of the detectors and associated control cabinets. The design was based on extensive analyses performed in MCNP6.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
NASA NTRS1987

Visual display and alarm system for wind tunnel static and dynamic loads

A wind tunnel balance monitor and alarm system developed at NASA Ames Research Center will produce several beneficial results. The costs of wind tunnel delays because of inadvertent balance damage and the costs of balance repair or replacement can be greatly reduced or eliminated with better real-time information on the balance static and dynamic loading. The wind tunnel itself will have enhanced utility with the elimination of overly cautious limits on test conditions. The microprocessor-based system features automatic scaling and 16 multicolored LED bargraphs to indicate both static and dynamic components of the signals from eight individual channels. Five individually programmable alarm levels are available with relay closures for internal or external visual and audible warning devices and other functions such as automatic activation of external recording devices, model positioning mechanisms, or tunnel shutdown.

Hanly, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Visual display and alarm system for wind tunnel static and dynamic loads

A wind tunnel balance monitor and alarm system developed at NASA Ames Research Center will produce several beneficial results. The costs of wind tunnel delays because of inadvertent balance damage and the costs of balance repair or replacement can be greatly reduced or eliminated with better real-time information on the balance static and dynamic loading. The wind tunnel itself will have enhanced utility with the elimination of overly cautious limits on test conditions. The microprocessor-based system features automatic scaling and 16 multicolored LED bargraphs to indicate both static and dynamic components of the signals from eight individual channels. Five individually programmable alarm levels are available with relay closures for internal or external visual and audible warning devices and other functions such as automatic activation of external recording devices, model positioning mechanism, or tunnel shutdown.

Hanly, Richard D.↗