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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Fusing Edge Computing with Transport Security by Leveraging the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) Unit

Rapid advances in embedded system complexity and capability provides exciting opportunities for transportation security deployment. Manufacturers and developers of these embedded systems continue to provide lower cost and more powerful solutions that can be leveraged by researchers and engineers. Furthermore, deploying these devices at the “edge” of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) infrastructure provides opportunities for highly capable applications in transport security. In an edge computation architecture, the device is co-located at the source of the data in the larger IoT structure – this provides computational capability at the location directly where the data is collected. For shipment transport security, this provides a direct compute node for digestion of data and mitigation actions in real-time. In our application, the vehicle provides a significant amount of this data that can be processed in real-time via the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) edge device. Utilization of a computational node located on the vehicle, such as the C-STAR, capitalizes on previously discussed opportunities of edge architectures. In this paper, we will discuss this security solution’s usability, current deployments, and scalability to further applications in transport security. First, we will cover the supported vehicle platforms that can leverage the C-STAR technology. This will be particularly relevant to medium- and heavy-duty vehicles transporting high-risk shipments. Second, we will speak to current deployments of the C-STAR that are ongoing. Finally, we will discuss additional areas for expansion such as maturing the onboard algorithms through continuing collaborations.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Local-Regional Surface Wave Dispersion Analysis using Ambient Noise Data of the Southern Nevada National Security Site Area

This report details seismic ambient noise analysis to improve seismic velocity estimates of the southeastern Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). We compare two different methods for estimating surface wave dispersion curves from ambient noise cross-correlations: frequency time analysis (FTAN) and Aki’s cross-spectral method (XSpec). We find that XSpec performs better for our local-regional dataset and frequency content. Using phase velocity estimates from XSpec, we build a preliminary phase velocity dispersion dataset, which contains data for 1,054 station pairs and 8,905 discrete phase velocity measurements for periods between 0.5 and 13 s. This phase velocity dataset will be incorporated into an updated local-regional P and S wave velocity model of the southeastern NNSS in the future and is expected to improve upon shallow velocity estimates.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Flex plate with removable inserts and cover

Technologies are described for methods and systems effective for flex plates. The flex plates may comprise a base plate. The base plate may include walls that define an insert location opening in the base plate. The insert location opening in the base plate may be in communication with a securement area. The flex plates may comprise an insert. The insert may include a reservoir region and a crystallization region separated by a wall including channels. The reservoir region and the crystallization region may include a backing. The insert may further include securement tabs. The securement tabs may be configured to secure the insert to the base plate at the securement area.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Flex plate with removable inserts and cover

Technologies are described for methods and systems effective for flex plates. The flex plates may comprise a base plate. The base plate may include walls that define an insert location opening in the base plate. The insert location opening in the base plate may be in communication with a securement area. The flex plates may comprise an insert. The insert may include a reservoir region and a crystallization region separated by a wall including channels. The reservoir region and the crystallization region may include a backing. The insert may further include securement tabs. The securement tabs may be configured to secure the insert to the base plate at the securement area.

Soares, Alexei S.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Nevada National Security Site - Area 5 Waste Received Under Permit SW532

Calendar Year 23 Asbestos Report for Permit SW532 Being resubmitted to address a comment received by NDEP, the weight and volume of two packages on one of the shipments was rounded differently than the quarterly report and we are revising the annual report to match.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Towards Fully Secure 5G Ultra-Low Latency Communications: A Cost-Security Functions Analysis

Future components to enhance the basic, native security of 5G networks are either complex mechanisms whose impact in the requiring 5G communications are not considered, or lightweight solutions adapted to ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) but whose security properties remain under discussion. Although different 5G network slices may have different requirements, in general, both visions seem to fall short at provisioning secure URLLC in the future. In this work we address this challenge, by introducing cost-security functions as a method to evaluate the performance and adequacy of most developed and employed non-native enhanced security mechanisms in 5G networks. We categorize those new security components into different groups according to their purpose and deployment scope. We propose to analyze them in the context of existing 5G architectures using two different approaches. First, using model checking techniques, we will evaluate the probability of an attacker to be successful against each security solution. Second, using analytical models, we will analyze the impact of these security mechanisms in terms of delay, throughput consumption, and reliability. Finally, we will combine both approaches using stochastic cost-security functions and the PRISM model checker to create a global picture. Our results are first evidence of how a 5G network that covers and strengthened all security areas through enhanced, dedicated non-native mechanisms could only guarantee secure URLLC with a probability of ~55%.

5G networks↗
DOE OSTI2020

Establishing a sustainable regulatory framework for the security of radioactive sources through harmonization with a safety regulatory framework

In order to establish and maintain sustainable nuclear security regulatory infrastructures for radioactive sources, it is important for States to develop nuclear security regulations with regulatory requirements and relevant criteria for security, which are consistent and well integrated with those for radiation safety. In establishing national regulations, experts worldwide follow the international recommendations on safety and security of radioactive sources published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within the IAEA publications on safety and security of radioactive sources, some international recommendations are identical or very similar for both safety and security, for example, the requirement for the establishment of a national registry of radioactive sources. However, some other international recommendations are unique to the security area, such as the recommendation to examine the trustworthiness of employees, or to the safety area, such as the need to establish public exposure controls. Additionally, many international recommendations fall somewhere in between, such as the need for effective authorization of facilities and activities, a regulatory inspection and enforcement regime and the graded approach to establish and apply regulatory requirements. This paper examines how the IAEA international recommendations for establishing regulatory frameworks for safety and security relate to one another.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

System Administrator Training Item #25928

External and internal cyber-attacks pose an extreme risk to government, businesses and individuals. System attacks, resulting in compromised information are occurring more frequently and the threat to the Laboratory has never been higher. This training has been developed to help you better understand your role as a System Administrator and recognize your responsibilities within the Laboratory’s Information Security (Cyber) Program and has been revised to address newly implemented ACD 470.6 restrictions for mobile devices in secure areas.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

New Jersey Transit Grid Distributed Generation Program. Cybersecurity Design Assurance Assessment

Superstorm Sandy caused a major disruption to passenger-rail and other commuter systems throughout New York and New Jersey. To address this issue, New Jersey Transit (NJT) established the NJ TRANSITGRID project, an effort designed to power bus, ferry, and limited passenger-rail service during natural or man-made disasters. Given the importance of these transportation systems, NJT partnered with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) to assess the cyber-resilience of the information systems that monitor and control the electrical systems within the microgrid. The Sandia “tabletop” assessment is based on the most recent 20% design packages. From this assessment, the Sandia team identified several security areas that were undefined or did not implement industry best practices. Finally, the Sandia team presented possible follow-on assessment activities and recommended investigating multiple hardening technologies. Addressing these findings and adding state-of-the-art detection and mitigation technologies will help ensure the NJ TRANSITGRID is built with more comprehensive cyber-resilience features.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

CY2020 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2020–December 2020, Revision 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat (FF), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (Figure 1-1). This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]); and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water use. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (NNSA/NFO, 2016) and its ensuing Records of Technical Change (ROTCs).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

CY2019 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2019–December 2019), Revision 1

Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2019. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. Tritium concentrations in both of these wells, RNM-2S and UE-5n, remain above the Safe Drinking Water Act maximum contaminant level of 20,000 picocuries per liter but declined in 2019 as compared to measurements in 2018. All other contaminants of concern are below the minimum detection level plus analytical error. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2019 is generally consistent with recent measurements for all wells. Many wells continue to exhibit a long-term downward trend in water level, though changes from 2018 to 2019 are minimal. The sharp 2016 decline in water level in Well ER-5-3-2 remains unexplained, with the lower level persisting through 2019. Rising water-level trends continue to be observed in Well ER-5-3 deep piezometer and former water supply Well WW-5A. Water supply Well WW-5B experienced a rise in water level as a result of an absence of pumping in the first part of the year (due to a mechanical problem), whereas water levels declined in WW-4 and WW-4A in response to greater pumping in 2019. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in FY 2020 by DOE/EM Nevada Program UGTA Activity at CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine at the Nevada National Security Site. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates); and verification of use restrictions, institutional controls, and water use.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗