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At least 19 records

Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Capabilities in Support of Advanced Reactor Development [Slides]

A primary mission of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This is an overview of ATR irradiation capabilities in support of advanced reactor development. Topics include an overview of the ATR facility and reactor, experiment design overview, thermal and fast spectrum testing, as well as advanced material testing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Four Design Demonstration Elments (DDEs) to be irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) and the Belgian Reactor 2 (BR2)

The U.S. High Performance Research Reactor Conversion fuel qualification team is focused on developing and qualifying plate type uranium-molybdenum (U-Mo) monolithic and uranium silicide (U3Si4) fuel. Several irradiations of mini-plates and full-size plate irradiations will demonstrate the fuel’s behavior. Along with qualifying fuel, larger tests are planned to support licensing fuel elements. These tests are referred to as DDEs. As a result of a scoping study performed in 2018, a decision was made to irradiate two DDEs in ATR at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and two other DDEs in BR2 in Belgium. The objective is to demonstrate successful irradiation of each DDE to support the licensing submittal of that specific reactor. Neutronics analysis is being performed to match the power density distribution of the represented elements. Test train hardware design are being done to ensure all the target conditions are being met for the two DDEs to be irradiated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ADVANCED TEST REACTOR (ATR) CONVERSION TO LOW ENRICHED URANIUM (LEU) FUEL

The United States Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (MMM) is working to convert research reactors globally from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. MMM and its predecessor programs have converted or verified the shutdown of 88 HEU research reactors and isotope production facilities, using LEU fuel developed in the 1980s. However, there is a small set of high performance research reactors which require a new high density LEU fuel for conversion, including six U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRRs), which include the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) and the ATR Critical (ATRC) Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) near Idaho Falls, ID; University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) at Columbia, MO; Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) at MIT in Cambridge, MA; High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) near Oak Ridge, TN; and National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) in Gaithersburg, MA. These reactors will share the same uranium-molybdenum (U-Mo) fuel plate design. The U-Mo fuel meat foil will have a zirconium (Zr) diffusion barrier with aluminum cladding. Three different application methods for the Zr diffusion barrier layer are being pursued – co-rolled, electroplating and plasma spraying. Fabrication of the higher density LEU U-Mo fuel has presented several challenges. Because the U-Mo fuel fabrication process uses the existing stockpile of 93% highly enriched uranium (HEU) to be blended with molybdenum and depleted uranium (DU) to form 19.75% LEU, cost benefits of enriching to 19.75% will not be realized. Homogeneity of the U-235 and molybdenum in the metal foil is a challenge due to U-Mo casting process results in variations between adjacent cast U-Mo plates. LEU will not require less U-235 as previously believed due to self-shielding properties of U-238 requiring additional U-235 to be loaded in each fuel element. Although the overall dimensions of the ATR fuel element remain unchanged, the weight of the LEU ATR fuel element is 72% greater than a HEU ATR fuel element. During waste recovery and recycling efforts, separation of aluminum cladding from the HEU fuel meat is a relatively simple chemical dissolution, however, separation of the Zr diffusion barrier from the U-Mo fuel meat is significantly more challenging.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Reuse Permit I-161-02 Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) for Required Environmental and Process Monitoring Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex Cold Waste Ponds

The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued Reuse Permit No. I-161-02 (hereafter permit) for the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex Cold Waste Ponds (CWP) on November 20, 2014, with minor Modification 1 effective March 7, 2017. Permit Section 3 compliance activity (CA), CA-161-02, requires the permittee to prepare and implement a Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) within 6 months of permit issuance. This QAPP is prepared in accordance with CA-161-02 using a template provided by DEQ.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Advanced Test Reactor (ATR)

Training slide deck covering the basics of the advanced test reactor, as well as the basic scientific theory behind its operation.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Restructuring and Optimizing Reactor Building Lifting Processes & Designing a Solution for an Overhead Door Handling Forklift Attachment

This poster presents two innovative projects aimed at enhancing operational efficiency and safety at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex. The first project focuses on restructuring the existing lift book used for hoisting operations within the ATR Reactor Building. The current lift book, a cumbersome 150+ page document, is being transformed into a more efficient format using charts that allow for quick identification of maximum lift heights based on object footprint and weight. This new method also considers various parameters such as floor integrity and reactor status, dividing entries into four distinct charts to improve usability and safety during lifts. The second project involves designing a specialized forklift attachment for handling an overhead door at the ATR Reactor Building. The attachment is engineered to securely lift and lower a 1200lb, 14ft long door, ensuring safe replacement operations. The design process included research on forklift attachment codes, modeling in Autodesk Inventor, and testing through Finite Element Analysis (FEA) and hand calculations to confirm the attachment's structural integrity. Future work includes completing detailed drawings and an Engineering Calculations Analysis and Review (ECAR) document to proceed with manufacturing and assembly. Together, these projects demonstrate a commitment to optimizing reactor building operations through innovative engineering solutions and safety considerations.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Radiation Effects Related to Repaired BWR Core Shrouds

The material properties of the core shroud and supporting tie rod components are important factors for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) life extension considerations. Given the variability of nickel and boron content found in 304 stainless steel shroud plates, and XM-19 and Inconel X-750 tie rod materials, this paper combines the latest spectral information in the vicinity of the core shroud to calculate hydrogen and helium gas production limits as well as atomic displacement damage spanning 80 full-power years (FPY) using the SPECTER code. Results indicate that, whereas boron has little effect on the atomic displacement damage, helium production from boron can be important and must be included in weldability assessments. Since the boron concentration is uncertain, helium generation is calculated assuming a composition range based on specifications and reported measurements. The results show that helium production caused by transmutations in the 304 SS shroud material are dominated by the concentration of boron and will have a significant impact on weldability after only a few years of service. For tie rods, the susceptibility to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) has been assessed by determining helium production in Inconel X-750 IASCC specimens irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) reactor and correlating with the helium produced in a BWR. As a tie rod material in a high thermal neutron flux environment, Inconel X-750 is more likely to be IASCC sensitive during service in a BWR due to helium than the XM-19 stainless steel alloy because of a greater nickel content and boron concentration. Weldability of the core shroud plate material, IASCC of the tie rod materials, and the gamma photon contribution to radiation damage are discussed.

radiation damage in materials, BWR↗

Nuclear Requalification of the ATR Core

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) creates a unique, high neutron flux materials testing environment that subsequently causes neutron embrittlement damage to its beryllium reflector. The reflector is eventually required to be replaced during a reactor Outage. Concurrently, a piece-for-piece core replacement is conducted to maintain reactor functionality called a core internals changeout (CIC). Once changeout is complete, ATR Reactor Engineering utilizes previous CIC data, notably 1977-1994 CIC data, to conduct predictive criticality analysis on the new, unirradiated core. However, CIC data has been inconsistently reported over the years making it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to utilize. These inconsistencies arise in various forms of not using correct units, inconsistent diagram usage, and not portraying the same kind of data similarly across the reports. To work around this inconsistency issue, Reactor Engineering is implementing the use of several new neutronic modeling codes that utilize modern computation speeds and methods to model the new core in different criticality environments. Further validation is then conducted by nuclear testing and bringing the reactor critical and conducting various irradiation tests. Upon completion and certification that the reactor passed all testing requirements, ATR can once again re-start normal operations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Depletion benchmark for a high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel experiment in the advanced test reactor

Reactor physics depletion benchmarks for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel are limited in number. In particular, there is limited data for HALEU benchmarks for U-10Mo (uranium-10% molybdenum) plate fuel that is being developed for use in the United States’ high performance research reactors including the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATR-C), High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR), National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR). These six reactors currently operate with highly enriched uranium dispersed fuel in an aluminum matrix. In support of conversion to a HALEU fuel, qualification of U-10Mo formed into a monolithic foil is being performed. Fuel qualification involves irradiating fuel specimens in the ATR. The irradiation tests provide an opportunity to benchmark depletion capabilities of reactor physics codes in support of the ATR operation, as well as develop benchmarks that can be used by other institutions to benchmark other reactor physics codes. This paper documents the development of a benchmark model of the irradiation of the ATR Full-size plate In center flux trap Position 7 (AFIP-7) experiment using the depletion codes MC21 and Advanced Dimensional Depletion for Engineering of Reactors (ADDER).

Nielsen, Joseph W. [Idaho National Laboratory (INL↗

Depletion Benchmark of the AFIP-7 Experiment in the Advanced Test Reactor

Reactor physics depletion benchmarks for low-enriched uranium fuel are limited in number. In particular, there is very limited data for LEU benchmarks for U-10Mo (Uranium-10% Molybdenum) plate fuel developed for use in U.S. high-performance research reactors (USHPRR). USHPRR includes the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATR-C), High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR), Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) at the National Institute of Science and Technology. These reactors are fueled with high-enriched uranium dispersed fuel in a silicon/aluminum matrix. In support of conversion to a HALEU fuel, qualification of U-10Mo formed into a monolithic foil is being performed. Fuel qualification involves irradiated fueled specimens in the ATR. The irradiation tests provide an opportunity to benchmark depletion capabilities of reactor physics codes in support of the ATR operation, as well as develop benchmarks that can be used by other institutions to benchmark other reactor physics codes. This report documents the development of a benchmark model of the irradiation of the ATR Full -size plate In center flux trap Position 7 (AFIP-7) experiment.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Requalification of the New ATR Core

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) creates a unique high neutron flux materials testing environment that subsequently causes neutron embrittlement damage to its beryllium reflector eventually requiring a replacement during a reactor Outage. Concurrently, a piece-for-piece core replacement is conducted to maintain reactor functionality called a core internals changeout (CIC). Once changeout is complete, ATR Reactor Engineering utilizes previous CIC data to model and predict criticality scenarios for the new unirradiated core. However, CIC data has been inconsistently reported over the years making it difficult to find data trends that could be useful for the modeling and prediction process. So nuclear requalification testing is conducted using different flux and irradiation tests to accurately verify the models and to recalibrate nuclear monitoring instrumentation in the ATR core allowing for safe re-start of normal operations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Predicting Safety Rod Reactivity Insertion in the Advanced Test Reactor

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and complimentary zero-power ATR Critical (ATRC) reactor, located at Idaho National Labs (INL), are undergoing conversion from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Both have a variety of testing locations that can receive large variations in flux due to its unique serpentine design, consisting of five lobes surrounding nine flux traps (see Figure 1). Initial criticality and power distribution throughout the core are controlled by core-external outer shim control cylinders (OSCCs). Distinct test loops allow for testing at specific temperatures, pressures, and irradiation conditions such as flux and fission density. The ATR is one of the key nuclear engineering research and testing facilities within the DOE National Laboratory Complex, and the ATRC supports its operation [1]. Currently, the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) within the National Nuclear Security Administration of the DOE is working to convert the remaining research reactors, including the ATR, from 93% HEU fuel to 19.75% LEU fuel (LEU) to support non-proliferation [2]. Extensive materials testing at INL and internationally has demonstrated that a high-density uranium molybdenum (U 10Mo) alloy can meet the performance requirements of the remaining high powered research reactors. The current LEU fuel element design is named the LOWE element. However, there are many technical challenges to address before the conversion to LEU can be successful, including the accurate characterization of the reactor core physics with LEU fuel. To ensure safe operation of the ATR, reactor engineers prepare a CSAP (Core Safety Assurance Package) before each cycle. The purpose of the CSAP is to verify the reactor performance calculation used to determine if the selected fuel loading meets operational, experimental, and safety criteria. Many of the criteria in the CSAP are limits on reactivity insertion in various accident scenarios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Safety Considerations for Advanced Material Irradiation at the ATR

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a light water reactor with aluminum-clad driver fuel. A primary mission of the ATR is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This support necessarily requires irradiation of advanced materials such as sodium, fuel salts, and metal eutectics. Irradiation of advanced materials in the ATR environment presents a challenge when completing accident analyses and demonstrating compliance to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Many advanced materials have the possibility to react with the ATR protective barriers such as the cladding or primary coolant system (PCS) boundary during postulated accident scenarios. Further, molten fuel experiments fall outside of the standard regulatory framework for dose consequence analyses. ATR is currently developing new safety analysis methods to support irradiation of advanced materials. The primary considerations for this development are 1) experiment containment design requirements, 2) primary coolant system response to an experiment containment failure, and 3) dose analyses for molten fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dry Cask Shipments of ATR Spent Nuclear Fuel at INL

The High Load Charger (HLC) cask will be replacing the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) spent fuel transfer cask that has been used at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to wet-transfer spent ATR fuel elements from ATR to Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) in order to support future plans at both facilities. INTEC intends to discontinue use of the CPP-666 storage pools in compliance with the Idaho Settlement Agreement and the basins will no longer be available to store spent ATR fuel elements. In order to support the core-internals change out in 2021 for ATR, spent ATR fuel elements must be removed from the canal and shipped to INTEC. INL contractors will use the HLC cask for safe, dry transfer of spent Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel elements between the ATR Complex managed by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) managed by Fluor Idaho, LLC. The HLC cask (also known as the High Load Charging Cask or High Load Charger) is a lead-shielded, stainless steel transfer container originally designed in 1954 by the Idaho Nuclear Corporation to meet the radiation and contamination controls requirements of the time for shipment of spent nuclear fuel. The cask has been modified over the years and is currently used for wet-to-dry transfers at INTEC. It is approved only for out-of-commerce transfers. The cask will arrive at the ATR where eight spent ATR fuel elements will be loaded into two, newly-designed buckets. Each bucket is a quarter section, right-cylinder shape that has four compartments. The cask will be lifted out of the ATR canal allowing most of the water to drain from the cask. Processing the 12,500 kg cask will be completed in ATR and then transported on a tractor trailer to INTEC where the loaded buckets will be removed from the cask. The loaded buckets will undergo a drying process before placing the four buckets into a canister for long-term storage in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at INTEC. A new transportation plan that was submitted to, and approved by, the U.S. Department of Energy to provide the cask safety basis, which describes the hazard analysis and accident analysis for the cask during transport. Supporting accident analysis include criticality, thermal, dose, and drop analyses. Of particular interest for this cask was the drop analysis from which was derived the speed limit for the transport. The drop analysis addressed drops in air onto an unyielding surface and in water onto an energy-absorbing pad for the cask in the ATR facility. These analyses are typically applied as the bounding drop scenarios during transport; however, this resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 12.9 kph. In order to more accurately represent the in-transit accident scenario, LS-DYNA software was procured and the model was updated to more closely represent the potential drop heights and impact surfaces of asphalt and soil for the cask while in transit. This analysis resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 48 kph. This safety basis speed limit is more practical to implement and control.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Local Power Impact Experiment Design for a New Fuel Type for use in the Advanced Test Reactor

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and complimentary zero-power ATR Critical (ATRC) reactor, located at Idaho National Labs (INL), are undergoing conversion from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Both have a variety of testing locations that can receive large variations in flux due to its unique serpentine design, consisting of five lobes (see Figure 1). Initial criticality and power distribution throughout the core are controlled by core-external outer shim control cylinders (OSCCs). Distinct test loops allow for testing at specific temperatures, pressures, and irradiation conditions. The ATR is one of the key nuclear engineering research and testing facilities within the DOE National Laboratory Complex, and the ATRC supports its operation [1]. Currently, the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) within the National Nuclear Security Administration of the DOE is working to convert the remaining research reactors, including the ATR, from 93% HEU fuel to 19.75% LEU fuel (LEU) to support non-proliferation [2]. Extensive materials testing at INL and internationally has demonstrated that a high-density uranium molybdenum (U 10Mo) alloy can meet the performance requirements of the remaining high powered research reactors. However, there are many technical challenges to address before the conversion to LEU can be successful, including the accurate characterization of the reactor core physics with LEU fuel. Reactor physics safety evaluations currently use Monte Carlo for the 21st Century (MC21), a continuous-energy Monte Carlo radiation transport code [3]. Existing MC21 models of the ATR and ATRC cores have a validation basis for use in neutronics analyses with HEU fuel. The models are used to support safety analyses that include comparisons to the safety requirements for the reactors. However, the use of the LOWE element in the ATR and ATRC is not currently covered by the current model validation basis. To deploy the new fuel type, extensive computational reactor physics support is necessary to support the use of LOWE in the ATR and ATRC. Therefore, LOWE requires a rigorous validation basis, aligned with that of HEU fuel, that takes advantage of the existing software tools and processes currently used for the ATR and ATRC. The experiment to validate of the MC21 models for determining power, the Power Impact Validation Experiment, will consist of two flux runs in the ATRC, one with fully HEU loading and one with a single LOWE element. Both flux runs will be instrumented with 20 sets of azimuthal fission wires and 3 sets of axial fission wires, as shown in Figure 4. Standard flux run methodology will be used [4]. Power Impact Validation Experiment data will be compared against MC21 calculated data, both for absolute fission rate accuracy and to determine the relative change in fission rates between the two runs. The results of the Power Impact Validation Experiment and subsequent evaluations will provide the validation basis for MC21 for use with LOWE elements. Key features of the Power Impact Validation Experiment include: (1) Two flux runs to allow for LOWE perturbed measurements to be compared to already validated measurements taken from a full core of HEU fuel, (2) Optimization of instrumentation to balance analytical needs with practical considerations (e.g., limited time window to count beta particles from fission products), and (3) Standard ATRC core loading, including both driver positions and flux traps, to minimize cost while remaining representative of typical ATR core loading.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cross-Section Comparison for Pu-238 Production in the Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho National Laboratory

Qualification of Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) positions for Pu-238 production has been ongoing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The ATR qualifications have stretched over multiple years during which new techniques have been developed and made available for ATR experiment neutronic analysis. As part of the transition to newer codes, new cross-section libraries have been evaluated for use in the Pu-238 production experiment analysis. A comparative study was done using the MCNP ORGIEN Activation Analysis (MOAA) tool between ENDF/B-VII.0 and ENDF/B-VIII.0 cross sections to capture the impact of the change in cross-sections on the analysis needed to qualify Pu-238 production targets. All comparisons were done assuming the ATR GEN-I targets were located in the south flux trap of the ATR. Finally, an overview of how this qualification and potential irradiation fits into Pu-238 is discussed.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Operational Experience and Development of a Reliability Model for the ATR Demineralizer System (Slides)

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a light water reactor with aluminum clad driver fuel. Strict limits are implemented on pH, conductivity, and filterable solids to assure the performance of the driver fuel limit corrosion of the primary coolant system (PCS) pressure boundary components. A bypass demineralizer system is used to maintain PCS coolant within allowable bands for each of the aforementioned variables. Unlike many other reactors, the ATR does not have a filtration system. As such, failure of ion exchange resin in the bypass demineralizer can defeat the purpose of the system and result in high filterable solids in the PCS. Power operations with high filterable solids is prohibited by a technical safety requirement. This paper discusses recent failures of the ATR bypass demineralizer system. The testing and analysis done to deduce the cause of the failures is covered, as well as short term mitigative steps that were taken. To prevent the likelihood of future issues, historical data from the ATR and industry is used to develop a reliability model of the ATR bypass demineralizer system. Evidence of radiolytic decomposition of ion exchange resin was found in the cause investigation. As such, special attention is given to ion exchange resin failure due to high radiation environments. The reliability model is used to develop the ATR testing and maintenance program. Specifically, limits on resin service life are discussed.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Development of Waste Disposal Strategy for RH LLW Stored in the ATR Canal - 19453

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is 250 megawatt research reactor designed and operated for the United States Department of Energy for irradiation testing of advanced nuclear fuels and material samples. The pressurized light-water moderated and cooled reactor achieved criticality in 1967. It is designed to allow high neutron flux irradiation of structural materials and nuclear fuels to replicate long-term exposure of materials in traditional lower-flux reactor cores. The ATR also produces rare isotopes for the use in the medical and other industries. The ATR is one of only four reactors in the world with this high-flux irradiation capability. Adjacent to the ATR is a water-filled canal which is used to handle casks, prepare experiments, perform irradiation experiments, and store irradiated components generated from reactor operations. The canal is used to store irradiated (activated) metals that are subsequently determined to be waste. In many instances, these items are too radioactive to remove from the canal and remain in temporary storage until a sufficient decay period has elapsed to where they can be safely removed. The more highly-radioactive remote-handled (RH) waste items requiring hundreds of years to decay have been in storage in the canal since the first ATR core internal changeout (CIC) which was conducted in the 1970's. The INL has recently completed construction and startup of a new Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility, which will serve as the final disposal capability for legacy RH (greater than 200 mR/hr on contact) metal waste currently stored in the canal. The ATR will need to develop a method for packaging, characterizing, removing, and shipping this material to the new disposal facility. Based on the configuration of the new disposal cells at the RH LLW Disposal Facility, the ATR must produce an entire new process for handing and packaging the legacy RH waste and preparing it for transport and final disposal. The ATR Canal RH LLW Cleanup Project scope is to develop the processes, tools, and equipment for safely sizing, packaging, and removing RH LLW from the canal. This paper presents highlights and challenges the project faces to develop and implement this capability: - Designing new tools, fabricating new equipment, and implementing new processes at an active Hazard Category-I nuclear facility. - Ensuring new equipment and tools are compatible with the existing equipment and processes at both the generator and the disposal facilities. - Sizing legacy waste under water using remote tools and equipment to minimize void space in waste disposal canisters while ensuring as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) goals are met. - Loading waste containers underwater and preparing them to meet the liquid-free criteria of the disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC). - Providing a new shielded transport container to transfer waste from ATR to the new on-site RH LLW Disposal Facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗