Results for “Access Repairs”

NASA NTRS1998

X-33/RLV System Health Management/ Vehicle Health Management

To reduce operations cost, the RLV must include the following elements: highly reliable, robust subsystems designed for simple repair access with a simplified servicing infrastructure and incorporating expedited decision making about faults and anomalies. A key component for the Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) RLV System used to meet these objectives is System Health Management (SHM). SHM deals with the vehicle component- Vehicle Health Management (VHM), the ground processing associated with the fleet (GVHM) and the Ground Infrastructure Health Management (GIHM). The objective is to provide an automated collection and paperless health decision, maintenance and logistics system. Many critical technologies are necessary to make the SHM (and more specifically VHM) practical, reliable and cost effective. Sanders is leading the design, development and integration of the SHM system for RLV and X-33 SHM (a sub-scale, sub-orbit Advanced Technology Demonstrator). This paper will present the X-33 SHM design which forms the baseline for RLV SHM. This paper will also discuss other applications of these technologies.

Garbos, Raymond J.↗

NASA NTRS1998

X-33/RLV System Health Management/Vehicle Health Management

To reduce operations costs, Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVS) must include highly reliable robust subsystems which are designed for simple repair access with a simplified servicing infrastructure, and which incorporate expedited decision-making about faults and anomalies. A key component for the Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO) RLV system used to meet these objectives is System Health Management (SHM). SHM incorporates Vehicle Health Management (VHM), ground processing associated with the vehicle fleet (GVHM), and Ground Infrastructure Health Management (GIHM). The primary objective of SHM is to provide an automated and paperless health decision, maintenance, and logistics system. Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company, is leading the design, development, and integration of the SHM system for RLV and for X-33 (a sub-scale, sub-orbit Advanced Technology Demonstrator). Many critical technologies are necessary to make SHM (and more specifically VHM) practical, reliable, and cost effective. This paper will present the X-33 SHM design which forms the baseline for the RLV SHM, and it will discuss applications of advanced technologies to future RLVs. In addition, this paper will describe a Virtual Design Environment (VDE) which is being developed for RLV. This VDE will allow for system design engineering, as well as program management teams, to accurately and efficiently evaluate system designs, analyze the behavior of current systems, and predict the feasibility of making smooth and cost-efficient transitions from older technologies to newer ones. The RLV SHM design methodology will reduce program costs, decrease total program life-cycle time, and ultimately increase mission success.

Mouyos, William↗

NASA NTRS1973

An investigation of a sterile access technique for the repair and adjustment of sterile spacecraft

A description is presented of a unique system for the sterilization and sterile repair of spacecraft and the results of a test program designed to assess the biological integrity and engineering reliability of the system. This trailer-mounted system, designated the model assembly sterilizer for testing (MAST), is capable of the dry-heat sterilization of spacecraft and/or components less than 2.3 meters in diameter at temperatures up to 433 K and the steam sterilization of components less than 0.724 meter in diameter. Sterile access to spacecraft is provided by two tunnel suits, called the bioisolator suit systems (BISS), which are contiguous with the walls of the sterilization chambers. The test program was designed primarily to verify the biological and engineering reliability of the MAST system by processing simulated space hardware. Each test cycle simulated the initial sterilization of a spacecraft, sterile repair of a failed component, removal of the spacecraft from the MAST for mating with the bus, and a sterile recycle repair.

Farmer, F. H.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Space Transportation System Availability Requirements and Its Influencing Attributes Relationships

It is essential that management and engineering understand the need for an availability requirement for the customer's space transportation system as it enables the meeting of his needs, goal, and objectives. There are three types of availability, e.g., operational availability, achieved availability, or inherent availability. The basic definition of availability is equal to the mean uptime divided by the sum of the mean uptime plus the mean downtime. The major difference is the inclusiveness of the functions within the mean downtime and the mean uptime. This paper will address tIe inherent availability which only addresses the mean downtime as that mean time to repair or the time to determine the failed article, remove it, install a replacement article and verify the functionality of the repaired system. The definitions of operational availability include the replacement hardware supply or maintenance delays and other non-design factors in the mean downtime. Also with inherent availability the mean uptime will only consider the mean time between failures (other availability definitions consider this as mean time between maintenance - preventive and corrective maintenance) that requires the repair of the system to be functional. It is also essential that management and engineering understand all influencing attributes relationships to each other and to the resultant inherent availability requirement. This visibility will provide the decision makers with the understanding necessary to place constraints on the design definition for the major drivers that will determine the inherent availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system provided the customer. This inherent availability requirement may be driven by the need to use a multiple launch approach to placing humans on the moon or the desire to control the number of spare parts required to support long stays in either orbit or on the surface of the moon or mars. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability, but also provide the capability to bound the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution. An example of this visibility will be the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions to allow control of the total parts count of the space transportation system. Also the relationship visibility of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given inherent availability requirement or accepting a larger parts count with the resulting higher reliability requirement. This paper will provide an understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (mean downtime) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and the system inherent availability. Having an understanding of these relationships and resulting requirements before starting the architectural design concept definition will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

Rhodes, Russel E.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Lower Level Repair Can Easily Fail Due to High Complexity

The International Space Station (ISS) uses Orbital Replacement Units (ORU’s) to repair failures on orbit. Using ORU’s reduces the crew time required to repair failures, but several copies of each ORU must be stored on ISS to ensure system availability. A typical ORU contains many components and has significant mass, but each ORU can repair only a single component failure. A full set of the ORU internal components could repair many different failures. Lower level assembly or component repair should reduce total spares mass. Successful electronics repair experiments were conducted on ISS. However, implementing component level repair would require a significant effort. The systems must be designed so they can be repaired during a mission, considering component layout and accessibility. The repair procedures must be developed and repair facilities, tools, and diagnostic and test instruments provided. Tracing a fault to a component is much more difficult than isolating it to an ORU. Replacing a component is much more difficult than replacing an ORU. Some problems with lower level repair are discussed. The mass savings of lower level repair will not save as much launch cost as before since launch cost has recently been reduced by an order of magnitude. Most system failures are not component failures that can be fixed by replacing a component but are due to system level problems. Repair and maintenance should be planned as part of an overall maintainability design. The risk that a lower level repair will fail is considerably greater than when using ORUs. With modern high reliability packaged systems, failure diagnosis and repair has become a lost art. However, diagnosis and repair data from the 1960’s show that increasing complexity often causes much longer diagnosis and repair times and may prevent successful repair. Increasing complexity by using lower level repair directly increases system cost, failure rate, crew time for repair, and the risk of an unrepairable system failure.

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRS2008

Space Transportation System Availability Requirement and Its Influencing Attributes Relationships

It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

Rhodes, Russell E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Space Transportation System Availability Requirements and Its Influencing Attributes Relationships

It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

Rhodes, Russell E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Space Transportation System Availability Requirement and Its Influencing Attributes Relationships

It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

reliability↗

NASA NTRS2005

Orbiter Repair Maneuver Contingency Separation Methods and Analysis

Repairing damaged thermal protection system tile requires the Space Shuttle to be oriented such that repair platform access from the International Space Station (ISS) is possible. To do this, the Space Shuttle uses the Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM), which utilizes the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) to rotate the Space Shuttle in relation to the ISS, for extended periods of time. These positions cause difficulties and challenges to performing a safe separation (no collision or thruster plume damage to sensitive ISS structures) should an inadvertent release occur or a contingency procedure require it. To help protect for an SRMS failure or other failures, a method for separating without collision and the ability to redock to ISS from the ORM configuration was needed. The contingency ORM separation solution elegantly takes advantage of orbital mechanics between ISS and the separating Space Shuttle. By pitching the ISS down approximately 45 degrees, in a majority of the ORM repair positions, the altitude difference between the ISS and Space Shuttle center of gravity is maximized. This altitude difference results in different orbital energies (orbital periods) causing objects to separate from each other without requiring translational firings. Using this method, a safe contingency ORM separation is made possible in many odd positions even though some separation positions point high powered thrusters directly at fragile ISS and Soyuz solar arrays. Documented in this paper are the development simulations and procedures of the contingency ORM separation and the challenges encountered with large constraints to work around. Lastly, a method of returning to redock with the ISS to pick up the stranded crew members (or transfer the final crew members) is explained as well as the thruster and ISS loads analysis.

Machula, Michael↗

NASA NTRS1986

Repairing Hard-to-Reach Cracks in Heat-Exchanger Tubes

Inaccessible leaks repaired from accessible side of tube. Fish-Mouth insert placed in cut in leaky heat-exchanger tube. Insert welded or brazed to tube, and remaining open area of cut patched. Method developed for repairing leaks in nozzle coolant tubes of Space Shuttle main engine. Method also used on other types of tubular heat exchangers.

Mills, R. C., Sr.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Characteristics and performance of the ESTEC large space simulator cryogenic system

The final concept and performance characteristics of the Large Space Simulator (LSS) at ESTEC, The Netherlands are discussed. The LSS cryogenics system has proven its operational capabilities under simulated heat load conditions and provides sufficient margin for future elevated requirements. The acceptance test proved that nominal operating pressures can be lower than the design parameters, providing increased system safety and reliability. The ease of access for repair and the incorporated redundancy will limit system downtime. Finally, the system design resulted in a low consumption of LN sub 2, which is an important factor in keeping the operational costs at a low level.

Amlinger, H.↗

NASA NTRS2003

PEM-INST-001: Instructions for Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit (PEM) Selection, Screening, and Qualification

Potential users of plastic encapsulated microcircuits (PEMs) need to be reminded that unlike the military system of producing robust high-reliability microcircuits that are designed to perform acceptably in a variety of harsh environments, PEMs are primarily designed for use in benign environments where equipment is easily accessed for repair or replacement. The methods of analysis applied to military products to demonstrate high reliability cannot always be applied to PEMs. This makes it difficult for users to characterize PEMs for two reasons: 1. Due to the major differences in design and construction, the standard test practices used to ensure that military devices are robust and have high reliability often cannot be applied to PEMs that have a smaller operating temperature range and are typically more frail and susceptible to moisture absorption. In contrast, high-reliability military microcircuits usually utilize large, robust, high-temperature packages that are hermetically sealed. 2. Unlike the military high-reliability system, users of PEMs have little visibility into commercial manufacturers proprietary design, materials, die traceability, and production processes and procedures. There is no central authority that monitors PEM commercial product for quality, and there are no controls in place that can be imposed across all commercial manufacturers to provide confidence to high-reliability users that a common acceptable level of quality exists for all PEMs manufacturers. Consequently, there is no guaranteed control over the type of reliability that is built into commercial product, and there is no guarantee that different lots from the same manufacturer are equally acceptable. And regarding application, there is no guarantee that commercial products intended for use in benign environments will provide acceptable performance and reliability in harsh space environments. The qualification and screening processes contained in this document are intended to detect poor-quality lots and screen out early random failures from use in space flight hardware. However, since it cannot be guaranteed that quality was designed and built into PEMs that are appropriate for space applications, users cannot screen in quality that may not exist. It must be understood that due to the variety of materials, processes, and technologies used to design and produce PEMs, this test process may not accelerate and detect all failure mechanisms. While the tests herein will increase user confidence that PEMs with otherwise unknown reliability can be used in space environments, such testing may not guarantee the same level of reliability offered by military microcircuits. PEMs should only be used where due to performance needs there are no alternatives in the military high-reliability market, and projects are willing to accept higher risk.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

NASA NTRS2005

Meeting the Challenges of Exploration Systems: Health Management Technologies for Aerospace Systems With Emphasis on Propulsion

The constraints of future Exploration Missions will require unique Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) capabilities throughout the mission. An ambitious launch schedule, human-rating requirements, long quiescent periods, limited human access for repair or replacement, and long communication delays all require an ISHM system that can span distinct yet interdependent vehicle subsystems, anticipate failure states, provide autonomous remediation, and support the Exploration Mission from beginning to end. NASA Glenn Research Center has developed and applied health management system technologies to aerospace propulsion systems for almost two decades. Lessons learned from past activities help define the approach to proper ISHM development: sensor selection- identifies sensor sets required for accurate health assessment; data qualification and validation-ensures the integrity of measurement data from sensor to data system; fault detection and isolation-uses measurements in a component/subsystem context to detect faults and identify their point of origin; information fusion and diagnostic decision criteria-aligns data from similar and disparate sources in time and use that data to perform higher-level system diagnosis; and verification and validation-uses data, real or simulated, to provide variable exposure to the diagnostic system for faults that may only manifest themselves in actual implementation, as well as faults that are detectable via hardware testing. This presentation describes a framework for developing health management systems and highlights the health management research activities performed by the Controls and Dynamics Branch at the NASA Glenn Research Center. It illustrates how those activities contribute to the development of solutions for Integrated System Health Management.

Melcher, Kevin J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Propulsion Health Management System Development for Affordable and Reliable Operation of Space Exploration Systems

The constraints of future Exploration Missions will require unique integrated system health management capabilities throughout the mission. An ambitious launch schedule, human-rating requirements, long quiescent periods, limited human access for repair or replacement, and long communication delays, all require an integrated approach to health management that can span distinct, yet interdependent vehicle subsystems, anticipate failure states, provide autonomous remediation and support the Exploration Mission from beginning to end. Propulsion is a critical part of any space exploration mission, and monitoring the health of the propulsion system is an integral part of assuring mission safety and success. Health management is a somewhat ubiquitous technology that encompasses a large spectrum of physical components and logical processes. For this reason, it is essential to develop a systematic plan for propulsion health management system development. This paper provides a high-level perspective of propulsion health management systems, and describes a logical approach for the future planning and early development that are crucial to planned space exploration programs. It also presents an overall approach, or roadmap, for propulsion health management system development and a discussion of the associated roadblocks and challenges.

Melcher, Kevin J.↗

DOE OSTI2022

DOE-ID-INL-21-183

DOE-ID-INL-21-183 for INL-21-183.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Structural basis for $\mathrm{APE1}$ processing $\mathrm{DNA}$ damage in the nucleosome

Genomic DNA is continually exposed to endogenous and exogenous factors that promote DNA damage. Eukaryotic genomic DNA is packaged into nucleosomes, which present a barrier to accessing and effectively repairing DNA damage. The mechanisms by which DNA repair proteins overcome this barrier to repair DNA damage in the nucleosome and protect genomic stability is unknown. Here, we determine how the base excision repair (BER) endonuclease AP-endonuclease 1 (APE1) recognizes and cleaves DNA damage in the nucleosome. Kinetic assays determine that APE1 cleaves solvent-exposed AP sites in the nucleosome with 3-6 orders of magnitude higher efficiency than occluded AP sites. A cryo-electron microscopy structure of APE1 bound to a nucleosome containing a solvent-exposed AP site reveal that APE1 uses a DNA sculpting mechanism for AP site recognition, where APE1 bends the nucleosomal DNA to access the AP site. Notably, additional biochemical and structural characterization of occluded AP sites identify contacts between the nucleosomal DNA and histone octamer that prevent efficient processing of the AP site by APE1. These findings provide a rationale for the position-dependent activity of BER proteins in the nucleosome and suggests the ability of BER proteins to sculpt nucleosomal DNA drives efficient BER in chromatin.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1991

DART: Delta Advanced Reusable Transport. An alternate manned space system proposal

The Delta Advanced Reusable Transport (DART) craft is being developed to add, multiple, rapid, and cost effective space access to the U.S. capability and to further the efforts towards a permanent space presence. The DART craft provides an augmentative and an alternative system to the Shuttle. As a supplement launch vehicle, the DART adds low cost and easily accessible transport of crew and cargo to specific space destinations to the U.S. program. This adds significant opportunities for manned rated missions that do not require Shuttle capabilities. In its alternative role, the DART can provide emergency space access and satellite repair, the continuation of scientific research, and the furthering of U.S. manned efforts in the event of Shuttle incapabilities. In addition, the DART is being designed for Space Station Freedom compatibility, including its use as a 'lifeboat' emergency reentry craft for Freedom astronauts, as well as the transport of crew and cargo for station resupply.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2010

Recent Advances in Thermoplastic Puncture-Healing Polymers

The motivation for this work is to develop self-healing polymeric materials to enable damage tolerant systems, and to tailor puncture healing for use temperatures and applications. This will be a benefit in environments and conditions where access for manual repair is limited or impossible, or where damage may not be detected.

Bogert, Philip B.↗