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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume Four

Volume IV of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in Volume I. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The documents are compiled in this volume in the interest of establishing a complete record, but they do not necessarily represent the views of the Board. Volume I contains the Board's findings, analysis, and recommendations. The documents in Volume III through V are also contained in their original color format on the DVD disc in the back of Volume II. Volumes II – VI contain a number of conclusions and recommendations, several of which were adopted by the Board in Volume I. The other conclusions and recommendations drawn in Volumes II – VI do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Board, but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Volume I takes precedence.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB↗
NASA NTRS1989

NASA flight cell and battery issues

The author presents the important battery and cell problems, encompassing both test failures and accidents, which were encountered during the past year. Practical issues facing programs, which have to be considered in the development of a battery program strategy, are addressed. The problems of one program, the GRO (Gamma Ray Observatory), during the past year are focused on to illustrate the fundamental types of battery problems that occur. Problems encountered by other programs are briefly mentioned to complete the accounting. Two major categories of issues are defined, namely, whose which are quality and design related, i.e., problems having inherent manufacturing-process-related aspects with an impact on cell reliability, and these which are accident triggered or man induced, i.e., those operational issues having an impact on battery and cell reliability.

Schulze, N. R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Biocybernetic Closed-Loop System for Mitigating Hazardous States of Awareness

The past century of passenger flight has seen continuous improvement in aviation safety by the aerospace industry. However, while commercial aviation accident rates have continued to decline, human error-related incident and accident rates remain remarkably constant across all types of aviation (Shappell, et al., 2007). Unfortunately, this level of human error is unacceptable when considering projections for increased traffic volume (FAA, 2009), and is likely to yield more incidents and accidents unless a more complete understanding of operator error is achieved and remediations are implemented. One area of interest highlighted by researchers is Hazardous States of Awareness (HSAs) that can result from deficiencies in the design and inappropriate use of human-machine interfaces. Identifying and mitigating HSAs is critical for reducing operator errors. One promising approach uses psychophysiological measures which enable automated systems to adapt to the operator?s state and modify modes of operation to support optimal human performance (Scerbo, 2007). This paper will survey previous research and describe future directions for the application of psychophysiological measures of operators derived from cortical and autonomic assessment to perform real-time adaptive modulation of human-automation task mode mixes. The authors will present a summary of previous work done at NASA LaRC and Old Dominion University using a Psychophysiologically Adaptive System (PAS) in which the level of automation of the NASA Multi-Attribute Task Battery was modulated based on Engagement Indices derived from the users? electroencephalogram (Pope, Bogart, & Bartolome, 1995; for review see, Scerbo, Freeman, & Mikulka, 2003). Future theoretical and methodological directions for this type of closed-loop research will be discussed. Specifically, the capacity for this type of PAS to maintain effective operator state and to enable validation of candidate physiological indices will be described. Consideration will also be given to critical system characteristics (e.g., engagement indices, methods for invoking changes among system states, individual differences among users, etc.) that have been or still need to be studied. The potential of the PAS approach for interactive system design and prototyping will also be described. Examples of adaptive automation flight deck concepts in recent experiments will be highlighted and discussed.

Chad L Stephens↗
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Launch and Recovery

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring this talk to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talk. Retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented this talk. Mr. Thurston brings a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video presentation with a run time of 36 min. 20 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned

On February 25, 2026, two NASA Talks were held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson and retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented these talks. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. Mr. Thurston brought a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. These talks were timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team.

Space Shuttle Columbia↗
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes and Key Takeaways

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson presented this talk. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video with a run time of 32 min. 31 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗
NASA NTRS2005

Chapter 9 - Pre-Flight Tests

Pre-flight testing is critical to the success of any flight test program. Pre-flight tests are performed to measure and evaluate the characteristics of an aircraft in a non-flying environment and to verify that these characteristics are as desired. Since aircraft systems are becoming more and more complex, conducting proper pre-flight testing to help identify system characteristics and deficiencies prior to flight is more important now than ever before. Much flight test time has been lost fixing problems that should have been found and corrected prior to flight. Accidents have occurred because pre-flight tests and verification procedures were not conducted thoroughly enough to identify the aircraft's characteristics properly or to find system discrepancies. Proper pre-flight testing helps ensure that the aircraft is ready to fly and contributes toward an efficient, productive, and safe flight test program. The reader should be aware that this Section is dedicated to the testing that should take place prior to the first flight. There are other "pre-flight" tests that take place prior to each individual flight. These latter tests are not discussed in this Section. The following paragraphs of this Section describe significant tests that are usually accomplished prior to flying a new or highly modified aircraft. Test objectives, descriptions, products, and requirements are provided in the following subsections: 9.1 Wind tunnel tests 9.2 Simulation tests 9.3 Propulsion tests 9.4 Weight and balance tests 9.5 Ground vibration tests 9.6 Structural loads tests 9.7 Gain margin tests 9.8 Verification and calibration tests 9.9 Taxi tests The specific examples given and the test facilities mentioned in this Section will illustrate the approach taken and the techniques used by the US Air Force; however, they are typical of those used by other test organizations.

Paul W Kirsten↗
NASA NTRS1982

NiCd battery failure analysis

The failure of a nickel cadmium battery undergoing tests is discussed. Reasons for the complete destruction of the battery while undergoing preparation for thermal vacuum testing are given.

Sense, K. A.↗
NASA NTRS1989

An analysis of digital phase-locked loops

This report focuses on second-order digital phase-locked loops (DPLLs) with uniformly sampled input, an amplitude-insenstive phase extractor and a conventional loop filter.

Thomas, J. B.↗