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NASA NTRS1993

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) provided oversight on the safety aspects of many NASA programs. In addition, ASAP undertook three special studies. At the request of the Administrator, the panel assessed the requirements for an assured crew return vehicle (ACRV) for the space station and reviewed the organization of the safety and mission quality function within NASA. At the behest of Congress, the panel formed an independent, ad hoc working group to examine the safety and reliability of the space shuttle main engine. Section 2 presents findings and recommendations. Section 3 consists of information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendices A, B, C, and D, respectively, cover the panel membership, the NASA response to the findings and recommendations in the March 1992 report, a chronology of the panel's activities during the reporting period, and the entire ACRV study report.

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NASA NTRS1995

Aerospace safety advisory panel

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) monitored NASA's activities and provided feedback to the NASA Administrator, other NASA officials and Congress throughout the year. Particular attention was paid to the Space Shuttle, its launch processing and planned and potential safety improvements. The Panel monitored Space Shuttle processing at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and will continue to follow it as personnel reductions are implemented. There is particular concern that upgrades in hardware, software, and operations with the potential for significant risk reduction not be overlooked due to the extraordinary budget pressures facing the agency. The authorization of all of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Block II components portends future Space Shuttle operations at lower risk levels and with greater margins for handling unplanned ascent events. Throughout the year, the Panel attempted to monitor the safety activities related to the Russian involvement in both space and aeronautics programs. This proved difficult as the working relationships between NASA and the Russians were still being defined as the year unfolded. NASA's concern for the unique safety problems inherent in a multi-national endeavor appears appropriate. Actions are underway or contemplated which should be capable of identifying and rectifying problem areas. The balance of this report presents 'Findings and Recommendations' (Section 2), 'Information in Support of Findings and Recommendations' (Section 3) and Appendices describing Panel membership, the NASA response to the March 1994 ASAP report, and a chronology of the panel's activities during the reporting period (Section 4).

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NASA NTRS1998

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

During 1997, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) continued its safety reviews of NASA's human space flight and aeronautics programs. Efforts were focused on those areas that the Panel believed held the greatest potential to impact safety. Continuing safe Space Shuttle operations and progress in the manufacture and testing of primary components for the International Space Station (ISS) were noteworthy. The Panel has continued to monitor the safety implications of the transition of Space Shuttle operations to the United Space Alliance (USA). One area being watched closely relates to the staffing levels and skill mix in both NASA and USA. Therefore, a section of this report is devoted to personnel and other related issues that are a result of this change in NASA's way of doing business for the Space Shuttle. Attention will continue to be paid to this important topic in subsequent reports. Even though the Panel's activities for 1997 were extensive, fewer specific recommendations were formulated than has been the case in recent years. This is indicative of the current generally good state of safety of NASA programs. The Panel does, however, have several longer term concerns that have yet to develop to the level of a specific recommendation. These are covered in the introductory material for each topic area in Section 11. In another departure from past submissions, this report does not contain individual findings and recommendations for the aeronautics programs. While the Panel devoted its usual efforts to examining NASA's aeronautic centers and programs, no specific recommendations were identified for inclusion in this report. In lieu of recommendations, a summary of the Panel's observations of NASA's safety efforts in aeronautics and future Panel areas of emphasis is provided. With profound sadness the Panel notes the passing of our Chairman, Paul M. Johnstone, on December 17, 1997, and our Staff Assistant, Ms. Patricia M. Harman, on October 5, 1997. Other changes to the Panel composition during the past year were: the resignation of Mr. Dennis E. Fitch as a Consultant; the appointment of Mr. Roger D. Schaufele as a Consultant; and the assignment of Ms. Susan M. Smith as Staff Assistant.

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NASA NTRS1973

Directory of aerospace safety specialized information sources

A directory is presented to make available to the aerospace safety community a handbook of organizations and experts in specific, well-defined areas of safety technology. It is designed for the safety specialist as an aid for locating both information sources and individual points of contact (experts) in engineering related fields. The file covers sources of data in aerospace design, tests, as well as information in hazard and failure cause identification, accident analysis, materials characteristics, and other related subject areas. These 171 organizations and their staff members, hopefully, should provide technical information in the form of documentation, data and consulting expertise. These will be sources that have assembled and collated their information, so that it will be useful in the solution of engineering problems. One of the goals of the project in the United States that have and are willing to share data of value to the aerospace safety community.

Fullerton, E. A.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Aerospace safety advisory panel

This report from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) contains findings, recommendations, and supporting material concerning safety issues with the space station program, the space shuttle program, aeronautics research, and other NASA programs. Section two presents findings and recommendations, section three presents supporting information, and appendices contain data about the panel membership, the NASA response to the March 1993 ASAP report, and a chronology of the panel's activities during the past year.

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NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents results of activities during calendar year 2001. The year was marked by significant achievements in the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs and encouraging accomplishments by the Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Unfortunately, there were also disquieting mishaps with the X-43, a LearJet, and a wind tunnel. Each mishap was analyzed in an orderly process to ascertain causes and derive lessons learned. Both these accomplishments and the responses to the mishaps led the Panel to conclude that safety and risk management is currently being well served within NASA. NASA's operations evidence high levels of safety consciousness and sincere efforts to place safety foremost. Nevertheless, the Panel's safety concerns have never been greater. This dichotomy has arisen because the focus of most NASA programs has been directed toward program survival rather than effective life cycle planning. Last year's Annual Report focused on the need for NASA to adopt a realistically long planning horizon for the aging Space Shuttle so that safety would not erode. NASA's response to the report concurred with this finding. Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on current operations to the apparent detriment of long-term planning. Budget cutbacks and shifts in priorities have severely limited the resources available to the Space Shuttle and ISS for application to risk-reduction and life-extension efforts. As a result, funds originally intended for long-term safety-related activities have been used for operations. Thus, while safety continues to be well served at present, the basis for future safety has eroded. Section II of this report develops this theme in more detail and presents several important, overarching findings and recommendations that apply to many if not all of NASA's programs. Section III of the report presents other significant findings, recommendations and supporting material applicable to specific program areas. Appendix A presents a list of Panel members. Appendix B contains the reaction of the ASAP to NASA's response to the calendar year 2000 findings and recommendations. In accordance with a practice started last year, this Appendix includes brief narratives as well as classifications of the responses as 'open,' 'closed,' or 'continuing.' Appendix C details the Panel's activities during the reporting period.

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NASA NTRS1996

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report February 1996

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents its annual report covering February through December 1995. Findings and recommendations include the areas of the Space Shuttle Program, the International Space Station, Aeronautics, and Other. Information to support these findings is included in this report. NASA's response to last year's annual report is included as an appendix. With regards to the Space Shuttle Program, the panel addresses the potential for safety problems due to organizational changes by increasing its scrutiny of Space Shuttle operations and planning.

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NASA NTRS1972

A system overview of the Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute data management programs

The NASA Aerospace Safety Information System, is an interactive, generalized data base management system. The on-line retrieval aspects provide for operating from a variety of terminals (or in batch mode). NASIS retrieval enables the user to expand and display (review) the terms of index (cross reference) files, select desired index terms, combine sets of documents corresponding to selected terms and display the resulting records. It also allows the user to print (record) this information on a high speed printer if desired. NASIS also provides the ability to store the strategy of any given session the user has executed. It has a searching and publication ability through generalized linear search and report generating modules which may be performed interactively or in a batch mode. The user may specify formats for the terminal from which he is operating. The system features an interactive user's guide which explains the various commands available and how to use them as well as explanations for all system messages. This explain capability may be extended, without program changes, to include descriptions of the various files in use. Coupled with the ability of NASIS to run in an MTT (multi-terminal task) mode is its automatic accumulation of statistics on each user of the system as well as each file.

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NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

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NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

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NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report presents the results of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) activities during 2002. The format of the report has been modified to capture a long-term perspective. Section II is new and highlights the Panel's view of NASA's safety progress during the year. Section III contains the pivotal safety issues facing NASA in the coming year. Section IV includes the program area findings and recommendations. The Panel has been asked by the Administrator to perform several special studies this year, and the resulting white papers appear in Appendix C. The year has been filled with significant achievements for NASA in both successful Space Shuttle operations and International Space Station (ISS) construction. Throughout the year, safety has been first and foremost in spite of many changes throughout the Agency. The relocation of the Orbiter Major Modifications (OMMs) from California to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) appears very successful. The transition of responsibilities for program management of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs from Johnson Space Center (JSC) to NASA Headquarters went smoothly. The decision to extend the life of the Space Shuttle as the primary NASA vehicle for access to space is viewed by the Panel as a prudent one. With the appropriate investments in safety improvements, in maintenance, in preserving appropriate inventories of spare parts, and in infrastructure, the Space Shuttle can provide safe and reliable support for the ISS for the foreseeable future. Indications of an aging Space Shuttle fleet occurred on more than one occasion this year. Several flaws went undetected in the early prelaunch tests and inspections. In all but one case, the problems were found prior to launch. These incidents were all handled properly and with safety as the guiding principle. Indeed, launches were postponed until the problems were fully understood and mitigating action could be taken. These incidents do, however, indicate the need to analyze the Space Shuttle certification criteria closely. Based on this analysis, NASA can determine the need to receritfy the vehicles and to incorporate more stringent inspections throughout the process to minimize launch schedule impact. A highly skilled and experience workforce will be increasingly important for safe and reliable operations as the Space Shuttle vehicles and infrastructure continue to age.

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NASA NTRS2001

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This annual report is based on the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in calendar year 2000. During this year, the construction of the International Space Station (ISS) moved into high gear. The launch of the Russian Service Module was followed by three Space Shuttle construction and logistics flights and the deployment of the Expedition One crew. Continuous habitation of the ISS has begun. To date, both the ISS and Space Shuttle programs have met or exceeded most of their flight objectives. In spite of the intensity of these efforts, it is clear that safety was always placed ahead of cost and schedule. This safety consciousness permitted the Panel to devote more of its efforts to examining the long-term picture. With ISS construction accelerating, demands on the Space Shuttle will increase. While Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft will make some flights, the Space Shuttle remains the primary vehicle to sustain the ISS and all other U.S. activities that require humans in space. Development of a next generation, human-rated vehicle has slowed due to a variety of technological problems and the absence of an approach that can accomplish the task significantly better than the Space Shuttle. Moreover, even if a viable design were currently available, the realities of funding and development cycles suggest that it would take many years to bring it to fruition. Thus, it is inescapable that for the foreseeable future the Space Shuttle will be the only human-rated vehicle available to the U.S. space program for support of the ISS and other missions requiring humans. Use of the Space Shuttle will extend well beyond current planning, and is likely to continue for the life of the ISS.

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NASA NTRS2004

ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This is the First Quarterly Report for the newly reconstituted Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). The NASA Administrator rechartered the Panel on November 18,2003, to provide an independent, vigilant, and long-term oversight of NASA's safety policies and programs well beyond Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle. The charter was revised to be consistent with the original intent of Congress in enacting the statute establishing ASAP in 1967 to focus on NASA's safety and quality systems, including industrial and systems safety, risk-management and trend analysis, and the management of these activities.The charter also was revised to provide more timely feedback to NASA by requiring quarterly rather than annual reports, and by requiring ASAP to perform special assessments with immediate feedback to NASA. ASAP was positioned to help institutionalize the safety culture of NASA in the post- Stafford-Covey Return to Flight environment.

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NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel report to the NASA acting administrator

The level of activity of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel was increased smewhat during 1985 in concert with the increased mission rate of the National Space Transportation System, the evolutionary changes in management and operation of that program, and the preparation of the Vandenberg Launch Site; the implementation of the Program Definition Phase of the Space Station Program; and the actual flight testing of the X-29 research aircraft. Impending payload STS missions and NASA's overall aircraft operations are reviewed. The safety aspects of the LEASAT salvage mission were assessed. The findings and recommendation of the committee are summerized.

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NASA NTRS1976

Vocabulary of aerospace safety terms pertaining to cryogenic safety, fires, explosions, and structure failure

This vocabulary listing characterizes the contents of over 10,000 documents of the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute's (ASRDI) safety engineering collection. The ASRDI collection is now one of the series accessible on the NASA RECON data base. There are approximately 6,300 postable terms that describe literature in the areas of cryogenic fluid safety, specifically hydrogen, oxygen, liquified natural gas; fire and explosion technology; and the mechanics of structural failure. To facilitate the proper selection of information nonpostable, related and array terms have been included in this listing.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report provides findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding the National Space Transportation System (NSTS), the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), aeronautical projects and other areas of NASA activities. The main focus of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) during 1988 has been monitoring and advising NASA and its contractors on the Space Transportation System (STS) recovery program. NASA efforts have restored the flight program with a much better management organization, safety and quality assurance organizations, and management communication system. The NASA National Space Transportation System (NSTS) organization in conjunction with its prime contractors should be encouraged to continue development and incorporation of appropriate design and operational improvements which will further reduce risk. The data from each Shuttle flight should be used to determine if affordable design and/or operational improvements could further increase safety. The review of Critical Items (CILs), Failure Mode Effects and Analyses (FMEAs) and Hazard Analyses (HAs) after the Challenger accident has given the program a massive data base with which to establish a formal program with prioritized changes.

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NASA NTRS1976

Directory of aerospace safety specialized information sources, volume 2

A handbook of organizations and experts in specific and well-defined areas of safety technology is presented. It is designed for the safety specialist as an aid for locating both information sources and individual points of contact (experts) in engineering related fields. The file covers sources of data in aerospace design, tests, and operations, as well as information on hazard and failure cause identification, accident analysis, and materials characteristics. Other related areas include the handling and transportation of hazardous chemicals, radioactive isotopes, and liquified natural gases.

Rubinstein, R. I.↗