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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗
NASA NTRS2022

Aggregate Risk Tool for Human Space Flight

This tool utilizes Data fusion capabilities developed from the 2020-2022 Information Fusion (IFDA) IRAD to enhance functionality of a Human Spaceflight (HSF) Aggregate Risk Product developed by the JSC Flight Safety Office. The tool compiles and present risk data from multiple Program and Commercial Provider sources to provide a holistic assessment for Program Managers and Technical Authorities to evaluate residual risk prior to HSF Launches. The aggregation, or coupling of risks from multiple sources (Ex: PRA, variances, anomaly data bases, CRM data, technical review board minutes, Hazard Analysis, etc.) identifies areas of elevated risk in components, systems or mission phases that would otherwise be undetected by non-integrated program risk management tools and possesses. Data is then displayed in an interactive user interface/dashboard that enables users to see potential areas of concern requiring more in-depth analysis.

Patrick M Huckaby↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assessment of Aggregate Risk for JWST

This presentation communicates the aggregate assessment of risk performed for the James Webb Space Telescope prior to shipping the observatory to the launch site.

JWST↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Aggregate Risk Tool for Human Space Flight

This project utilized Data fusion capabilities developed from the 2020-2022 Information Fusion (IFDA) IRAD to enhance functionality of a Human Spaceflight (HSF) Aggregate Risk Product developed by the JSC Flight Safety Office. The tool compiles and presents risk data from multiple Program and Commercial Provider vehicles to provide a holistic assessment of residual risk to Program Managers and Technical Authorities prior to HSF Launches. The aggregation or coupling of risks from multiple sources (Examples: PRA, variances, anomaly data bases, Program Risk Management data bases, technical review board minutes, Hazard Analysis, etc.) when analyzed, identify potential areas of elevated risk in components, systems or mission phases that would otherwise be undetected by nonintegrated program risk management tools and possesses.

Patrick Huckaby↗
NASA NTRS2023

Risk Trade-Space Analysis for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars

We assessed the integrated safety, health, and performance risk to crews on long-duration missions, specifically to Mars. Using a systems approach rather than one focused on individual countermeasures, we examined the trade space around several such risks to identify high-potential risk mitigation strategies and characterize aspects of Mars mission architectures that could lower aggregated risk. Current Mars Design Reference missions would require durations well over two years and would increase crew exposure to radiation and microgravity well beyond ISS levels, likely resulting in significantly reduced performance beyond our current capability to mitigate that could jeopardize mission success. A “fast Mars transit” round-trip mission concept was studied using an innovative flight dynamics approach to quantify the minimum total mission energy required for a Mars transit with total mission duration less than 400 days. This approach holds promise for sending humans to Mars and returning them safely with acceptable, potentially mitigatable, exposure to microgravity and radiation using current or near-term technologies. The fast transit concept would also result in fewer time-driven vehicle failures and enable sustainable deployment of humans and infrastructure to Mars on a regular cadence, allowing steady exploration and colonization of Mars. Finally, we conclude that reliance on the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mission operations paradigm – i.e., one of near-complete real-time dependence on experts at Mission Control to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew – is high risk given the communication delays and limited resupply of any Mars mission, and this risk is not eliminated by the shorter missions durations of fast transit scenarios. Based on historical trends, it is highly likely that the crew will face a high-consequence problem of uncertain origin during Mars transit when ground support will be greatly reduced. While it may be possible to reduce anomaly rates through improved reliability analysis and testing, and to reduce anomaly impacts through added robustness, such mitigations address only known failure modes and known uncertainties. Therefore, a radical shift in the Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) that defines the operational paradigm, systems design, and human-systems interactions is required to improve the risk posture to an acceptable level regardless of mission duration.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
DOE OSTI2020

Burning Embers: Towards more transparent and robust climate change risk assessments

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessments provide policy-relevant insights about climate impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation through a process of peer-reviewed literature assessments underpinned by expert judgement. An iconic output from these assessments is the “burning embers” diagram. Burning embers were first used in the Third Assessment Report to visualize reasons for concern, which aggregate risks from various systems and sectors. In these diagrams, colour transitions show changes in the assessed level of risk to humans and ecosystems as a function of climate change indicated by increasing levels of global mean temperature. Here we review the approach to the construction of burning embers, its evolution across the various IPCC reports, and recent methodological advances in the elicitation process to reduce subjectivity in the expert judgement and improve the transparency of the assessment. We recommend the use of a standardized, transparent process of expert elicitation in the production of burning embers diagrams to enhance their quality, comparability, and credibility.

Zommers, Zinta↗
NASA NTRS2022

How NASA decided Webb was ready: Inside the risk assessment

Every do-it-yourselfer knows how hard it can be to declare a project complete. Will another turn of the bolt or brushstroke make things better or worse? That was roughly the choice NASA faced a year before the Dec. 25 launch of the James Webb Space Telescope. Would more testing close more technical risks in the nearly $10 billion project or create new ones? In the end, NASA decided against more testing. NASA’s Jesse Leitner and Tupper Hyde describe the assessment they performed.

JWST↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
DOE OSTI2021

Quantifying uncertainty in aggregated climate change risk assessments

High-level assessments of climate change impacts aggregate multiple perils into a common framework. This requires incorporating multiple dimensions of uncertainty. Here we propose a methodology to transparently assess these uncertainties within the ‘Reasons for Concern’ framework, using extreme heat as a case study. We quantitatively discriminate multiple dimensions of uncertainty, including future vulnerability and exposure to changing climate hazards. High risks from extreme heat materialise after 1.5–2 °C and very high risks between 2–3.5 °C of warming. Risks emerge earlier if global assessments were based on national risk thresholds, underscoring the need for stringent mitigation to limit future extreme heat risks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Radiation Heart Disease Risk Estimates for Lunar and Mars Missions

The NASA Space Radiation Program performs research on the risks of late effects from space radiation for cancer, neurological disorders, cataracts, and heart disease. For mortality risks, an aggregate over all risks should be considered as well as projection of the life loss per radiation induced death. We report on a triple detriment life-table approach to combine cancer and heart disease risks. Epidemiology results show extensive heterogeneity between populations for distinct components of the overall heart disease risks including hypertension, ischaemic heart disease, stroke, and cerebrovascular diseases. We report on an update to our previous heart disease estimates for Heart disease (ICD9 390-429) and Stroke (ICD9 430-438), and other sub-groups using recent meta-analysis results for various exposed radiation cohorts to low LET radiation. Results for multiplicative and additive risk transfer models are considered using baseline rates for US males and female. Uncertainty analysis indicated heart mortality risks as low as zero, assuming a threshold dose for deterministic effects, and projections approaching one-third of the overall cancer risk. Medan life-loss per death estimates were significantly less than that of solid cancer and leukemias. Critical research questions to improve risks estimates for heart disease are distinctions in mechanisms at high doses (>2 Gy) and low to moderate doses (<2 Gy), and data and basic understanding of radiation doserate and quality effects, and individual sensitivity.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Induced seismicity red-light thresholds for enhanced geothermal prospects in the Netherlands

Prospects for geothermal energy in the Netherlands have renewed concerns around induced earthquakes. Risks from induced earthquakes are managed by traffic light protocols (TLPs), where the red-light is chosen as the stop-point before exceeding a tolerance to risk. Here, we simulate post-shut-in earthquake scenarios based on realistic information for the Netherlands. We focus on three risk metrics: aggregates like nuisance and damage impacts and also local personal risk (LPR) – a likelihood of building collapse fatality for an individual. Our results show that the severity of these risks varies spatially by orders of magnitude. Prior induced seismicity (e.g., the 2012 Huizinge event) provides a reference baseline to calibrate the Dutch earthquake risk tolerances. We find that these calibrated risk tolerances are similar to those observed in North America, suggesting an underlying sociological ‘license to operate.’ Furthermore, the use of calibrated risk tolerances results in nuisance concerns completely eclipsing the other two metrics. We compare our results to a hypothetical Groningen geothermal operation and find that our approach sets red-light thresholds approximately one magnitude unit below the ML 3.6 Huizinge event. Overall, our results provide a first-order recommendation for red-light thresholds and proactive management of Dutch enhanced geothermal induced seismicity.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Aggregation bias and its drivers in large‐scale flood loss estimation: A Massachusetts case study

Abstract Large‐scale estimations of flood losses are often based on spatially aggregated inputs. This makes risk assessments vulnerable to aggregation bias, a well‐studied, sometimes substantial outcome in analyses that model fine‐grained spatial phenomena at coarse spatial units. To evaluate this potential in the context of large‐scale flood risk assessments, we use data from a high‐resolution flood hazard model and structure inventory for over 1.3 million properties in Massachusetts and examine how prominent data aggregation approaches affect the magnitude and spatial distribution of flood loss estimates. All considered aggregation approaches rely on aggregate structure inventories but differ in whether flood hazard is also aggregated. We find that aggregating only structure inventories slightly underestimates overall losses (−10% bias), and when flood hazard data is spatially aggregated to even relatively small spatial units (census block), statewide aggregation bias can reach +366%. All aggregation‐based procedures fail to capture the spatial covariation of inputs distributions in the upper tails that disproportionately generate total expected losses. Our findings are robust to several key assumptions, add important context to published risk assessments and highlight opportunities to improve flood loss estimation uncertainty quantification.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Increasing extreme hourly precipitation risk for New York City after Hurricane Ida

The remnants of Hurricane Ida caused major damage and death in the United States on September 1st, 2021, and 11 people drowned in flooded basement apartments within New York City (NYC). It was catastrophic because the maximum hourly precipitation intensity, recorded as 3.47 inches (88.1 mm) per hour at Central Park, was unprecedentedly high for the NYC region. The stormwater infrastructure in NYC is built for 1.75 inches (44.5 mm) per hour, and so understanding the dynamic risk associated with Ida can inform city planning efforts for climate change’s impact on short duration extreme precipitation events. We contextualize this storm’s record-breaking hourly intensity within the historical record as well as project its risk in the near- to medium-term future using nonstationary stochastic models. These models are conditioned on average temperature (T avg ) and cooling degree day (CDD) projections from three climate models as a covariate, each with a SSP 126 and SSP 370 scenario. The likelihood of such a storm was slowly increasing even before Ida happened, but the projected aggregate reoccurrence risk of an event of Ida’s magnitude over time from the non-stationary models ranges from 4 to 52 times higher than the risk given by the stationary model. Using CDD as a covariate resulted in risks that were more than twice the magnitude than when using T avg . Presenting both covariates provides a broader envelope of uncertainty, which highlights the importance and nuances in the choice of a regionally appropriate covariate for non-stationary risk analysis.

Mossel, Carolien↗
DOE OSTI2025

Accounting for Sustainability and Performance: Contrasting Effects of PET-Derived Modifiers on Asphalt Durability

The valorization of waste plastics in roadway infrastructure requires careful balance between sustainability and performance, as ineffective modifiers may incur both environmental and financial costs. This study shows that two modifiers derived from the same waste plastic source (PET)-DOTP (N1,N4-(dioctyl)terephthalamide) and HETP (N1,N4-Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)terephthalamide)-exhibit opposite effects on asphalt properties, despite having nearly the same carbon footprint. DOTP improves elastic recovery in multiple creep recovery tests (MCRT), while HETP increases strain accumulation and reduces elasticity. Density functional theory (DFT) shows that DOTP's molecular structure can disperse well in bitumen mixtures by binding to both polar and non-polar components. In contrast, HETP binds only to the binder's polar sites, lacking adequate dispersion. This increases the risk of aggregation of polar compounds in the bitumen mixture, resulting in a more deformation-prone binder. A techno-economic analysis highlights trade-offs between sustainability and performance in industrial-scale synthesis. This study advocates for applying first-principles thinking in material design, coupled with experimental validation, to engineer plastic waste-derived additives that achieve both performance and sustainability goals.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Building Load Control Using Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Programs with Right-Hand Side Uncertainty and the Risk-Adjustable Variants

Aggregation of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) loads can provide reserves to absorb volatile renewable energy, especially solar photo-voltaic (PV) generation. In this paper, we decide HVAC control schedules under uncertain PV generation, using a distributionally robust chance-constrained (DRCC) building load control model under two typical ambiguity sets: the moment-based and Wasserstein ambiguity sets. We derive mixed integer linear programming (MILP) reformulations for DRCC problems under both sets. Especially, for the Wasserstein ambiguity set, we use the right-hand side (RHS) uncertainty to derive a more compact MILP reformulation than the commonly known MILP reformulations with big-M constants. All the results also apply to general individual chance constraints with RHS uncertainty. Furthermore, we propose an adjustable chance-constrained variant to achieve tradeoff between the operational risk and costs. We derive MILP reformulations under the Wasserstein ambiguity set and second-order conic programming (SOCP) reformulations under the moment-based set. Using real-world data, we conduct computational studies to demonstrate the efficiency of the solution approaches and the effectiveness of the solutions. Summary of Contribution: The problem studied in this paper is motivated by a building load control problem that uses the aggregation of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) loads as flexible reserves to absorb uncertain solar photovoltaic (PV) generation. The problem is formulated as distributionally robust chance-constrained (DRCC) programs with right-hand side (RHS) uncertainty. In addition, we propose a risk-adjustable variant of the DRCC programs, where the risk level, instead of being predetermined, is treated as a decision variable. The paper aims to provide tractable reformulations and solution algorithms for both the (general) DRCC and the (general) adjustable DRCC models with RHS uncertainty.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗