NASA Air Mobility Pathfinders (AMP) Project Concepts Workshop
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Consequences of Feeder Delays for the Success of A380 Operations
Due to existing slot and infrastructure constraints at international hub-and-spoke airports, an increase in feeder traffic seems only possible if larger feeder aircraft are used. Using a case study of Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt International Airport, three possible A380 routes (Beijing, Tokyo-Narita, Los Angeles) were examined to assess the extent to which delays of feeder traffic may impact the economic performance of very large aircraft. On the basis of today s delays and anticipated traffic growth in the future, we found that between 9.5% and 13.5% of connecting passengers are unable to transfer to their respective intercontinental flights. In addition, the results demonstrate that a further increase in delays can be detrimental to the profitable operation of very large aircraft, as demonstrated by two out of three simulated routes. We suggest options for airlines operating very large aircraft to counteract the negative impacts of feeder delays.
Ruehle, Jens↗
Trace explosives sampling for security applications (TESSA) study: Evaluation of procedures and methodology for contact sampling efficiency
We report the detection of trace amounts of explosive materials is critical to the security at mass transit centers (e.g., airports and railway stations). In a typical screening process, a trap is used to probe a surface of interest to collect and transfer particulate residue to a detector for analysis. The collection of residues from the surface being probed is widely viewed as the limiting step in this process. A multi-institutional study was performed to establish a methodology for the evaluation of sampling media collection efficiencies. Dry deposited residues of 1,3,5-trinitroperhydro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX), C-4 (an RDX-based explosive), and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) were harvested from acrylonitrile butadiene styrene (ABS) plastic, ballistic nylon (NYL), and uncoated aluminum surfaces using muslin, Texwipe cotton, and stainless-steel mesh traps. Transfer and collection efficiencies of the sample media were calculated based on liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry analysis. Dry transfer efficiencies (DTE%) to all tested surfaces were greater than 75%, with transfer to ABS plastic being the lowest. Collection efficiency (CE%) varied significantly across the traps and the surfaces, yet some conclusions can be drawn; nylon had the lowest CE% for all cases (~10%), and the stainless steel mesh had the lowest CE% for the evaluated traps (~20%). Though the testing parameters have been standardized among the participants to establish a framework for an independent comparison of contact sampling media and surfaces, substantial variations in the DTE% and the CE% were observed, suggesting that other variables can affect contact sampling.
37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
Multiple Hub Network Choice in the Liberalized European Market
A key question that so far has received relatively little attention in the germane literature is that of the changes at various airports as a result of the EU liberalization policies. That is, presently, most major European airports still benefit from the so-called home-carrier phenomenon where the country's publicly or semi-publicly owned carrier uses the country's main airport as its gateway hub and, consequently, the home-carrier is also the principal user of this airport (in terms of proportion of total aircraft movements, number of passengers transported, connections, slots ownership, etc.). The country's main airport has substantially benefited from these monopoly conditions of airline captivity, strongly determined by the bilateral system of international air transport regulation. Therefore, European major airports were used to operate in essentially different markets, compared to the increasingly competitive markets of their home based carriers. This partly explains relative stability of transport volumes and financial results of European major airports compared to the relatively volatile financial results of most European national airlines. However, the liberalization of European aviation is likely to change this situation. Market access is open now to all community carriers, i.e. carriers with majority ownership and effective control in the hands of EU citizens. Ticket prices are free, governments can only intervene in case of dumping or excessive pricing. A community airline can choose its seat in any of the 15 member states. Licensing procedures are harmonized between member states. In the last few months community carriers have had unrestricted route access within the EU. Most probably this development will be extended to countries inside and outside Europe. Last year the European Commission got the mandate to start negotiations with 10 other European countries. In the meantime the EC has also started negotiations with the USA on so-called soft rights. In the meantime, open skies agreements have been concluded between the USA and most of the EU member states to facilitate strategic alliances between airlines of the states involved. As a result of this on-going liberalization the model of the single 'national' carrier using the national home base as its single hub for the designated third, fourth and sixth freedom operations will stepwise disappear. Within the EU the concept of the national carrier has already been replaced by that of the community carrier. State ownership in more and more European carriers is reduced. On the longer run mergers or even bankruptcy will further undermine the "single national carrier - single national hub" model in Europe. In the meantime, strategic alliances between national carriers in Europe will already reduce the airlines' loyalty to a single airport. Profit maximization and accountability to share holders will supersede the loyalty of these newly emerging alliances, probably looking for the opportunities of a multiple hub network to adequately cover the whole European market. As a consequence, some European airports might see a substantial decline in arriving, departing and transfer traffic, thus in revenues and financial solvency, as well as in their connection to other inter-continental and intra-European destinations. At the same time, other airports might realize a significant increase in traffic as they will be sought after by the profit maximizing airlines as their major gateway hubs. Which will be the losing airports and which will be the winning ones? Can airports anticipate the actions of airlines in deregulated markets and utilize policies which will improve their relative position? If so, what should be these anticipatory policies? These questions become the more urgent, since an increasing number of major European airports will be privatized in the near future. Although increasing airport congestion in Europe will also be reflected in a growing demand pressure for airport slots, this is not a guarantee for a stable transport volume growth of individual airports. The more volatile the market is, the more vulnerable privatized airports become. Therefore, the main issue of this study is the analysis of the opportunities of major European airports to become a central hub as a result of the network choices made by the new European airlines in a completely liberalized market. In a previous study (Berechman and de Wit, 1996), we already explored the potential of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol of becoming the major West-European hub, once European aviation markets are deregulated. A major hindrance of that study was the use of a single hub-and-spoke network. For example that model could not analyze the viability of different combinations of European hubs within a multiple hub network of alternative airline alliances. In this study, we have formulated the model of a multi-hub network where two West-European airports are used for inter-continental and intra-European travel to enable a more realistic analysis of hub choice. Like the previous one also this multi-hub model is primarily used to assess the potential ability of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol for becoming a major West-European hub. Thus, in particular, the policy tests focus on this airport in a double hub network.
Berechman, Joseph↗
Delay Banking for Managing Air Traffic
Delay banking has been invented to enhance air-traffic management in a way that would increase the degree of fairness in assigning arrival, departure, and en-route delays and trajectory deviations to aircraft impacted by congestion in the national airspace system. In delay banking, an aircraft operator (airline, military, general aviation, etc.) would be assigned a numerical credit when any of their flights are delayed because of an air-traffic flow restriction. The operator could subsequently bid against other operators competing for access to congested airspace to utilize part or all of its accumulated credit. Operators utilize credits to obtain higher priority for the same flight, or other flights operating at the same time, or later, in the same airspace, or elsewhere. Operators could also trade delay credits, according to market rules that would be determined by stakeholders in the national airspace system. Delay banking would be administered by an independent third party who would use delay banking automation to continually monitor flights, allocate delay credits, maintain accounts of delay credits for participating airlines, mediate bidding and the consumption of credits of winning bidders, analyze potential transfers of credits within and between operators, implement accepted transfers, and ensure fair treatment of all participating operators. A flow restriction can manifest itself in the form of a delay in assigned takeoff time, a reduction in assigned airspeed, a change in the position for the aircraft in a queue of all aircraft in a common stream of traffic (e.g., similar route), a change in the planned altitude profile for an aircraft, or change in the planned route for the aircraft. Flow restrictions are typically imposed to mitigate traffic congestion at an airport or in a region of airspace, particularly congestion due to inclement weather, or the unavailability of a runway or region of airspace. A delay credit would be allocated to an operator of a flight that has accepted, or upon which was imposed, a flow restriction. The amount of the credit would increase with the amount of delay caused by the flow restriction, the exact amount depending on which of several candidate formulas is eventually chosen. For example, according to one formula, there would be no credit for a delay smaller than some threshold value (e.g., 30 seconds) and the amount of the credit for a longer delay would be set at the amount of the delay minus the threshold value. Optionally, the value of a delay credit could be made to decay with time according to a suitable formula (e.g., an exponential decay). Also, optionally, a transaction charge could be assessed against the value of a delay credit that an operator used on a flight different from the one for which the delay originated or that was traded with a different operator. The delay credits accumulated by a given airline could be utilized in various ways. For example, an operator could enter a bid for priority handling in a new flow restriction that impacts one or more of the operator s flights; if the bid were unsuccessful, all or a portion of the credit would be returned to the bidder. If the bid pertained to a single aircraft that was in a queue, delay credits could be consumed in moving the aircraft to an earlier position within the queue. In the case of a flow restriction involving a choice of alternate routes, planned altitude profile, aircraft spacing, or other non-queue flow restrictions, delay credits could be used to bid for an alternative assignment.
Green, Steve↗