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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1973

Apollo experience report: Command module crew-couch/restraint and load-attenuation systems

The Apollo command module crew-couch/restraint and load-attenuation system was required to support and restrain the crewman during mission phases and to limit the load imposed on the crewman during landing. Component designs evolved when requirements changed and tests were conducted. Advancement in the state of the art for energy-absorbing devices and changes in restraint philosophies for impact protection resulted from the efforts and experiences presented.

Drexel, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Orion Crew Module Aerodynamic Testing

The Apollo-derived Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), part of NASA s now-cancelled Constellation Program, has become the reference design for the new Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The MPCV will serve as the exploration vehicle for all near-term human space missions. A strategic wind-tunnel test program has been executed at numerous facilities throughout the country to support several phases of aerodynamic database development for the Orion spacecraft. This paper presents a summary of the experimental static aerodynamic data collected to-date for the Orion Crew Module (CM) capsule. The test program described herein involved personnel and resources from NASA Langley Research Center, NASA Ames Research Center, NASA Johnson Space Flight Center, Arnold Engineering and Development Center, Lockheed Martin Space Sciences, and Orbital Sciences. Data has been compiled from eight different wind tunnel tests in the CEV Aerosciences Program. Comparisons are made as appropriate to highlight effects of angle of attack, Mach number, Reynolds number, and model support system effects.

Murphy, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Apollo 11 Facts Project [On-Orbit Lunar Module Checkout]

Footage is shown of the crew of Apollo 11 (Commander Neil Armstrong, Lunar Module Pilot Edwin Aldrin Jr., and Command Module Pilot Michael Collins) inside the spacecraft as they fly from the Earth to the Moon. The Moon is seen in its entirety and in close detail. Aldrin gives a brief demonstration on how the astronauts eat in space.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1976

Apollo experience report: Crew station integration. Volume 1: Crew station design and development

An overview of the evolution of the design and development of the Apollo command module and lunar module crew stations is given, with emphasis placed on the period from 1964 to 1969. The organizational planning, engineering techniques, and documentation involved are described, and a detailed chronology of the meetings, reviews, and exercises is presented. Crew station anomalies for the Apollo 7 to 11 missions are discussed, and recommendations for the solution of recurring problems of crew station acoustics, instrument glass failure, and caution and warning system performance are presented. Photographs of the various crew station configurations are also provided.

Allen, L. D.↗
NASA NTRS1970

Apollo 13 LiOH canister breakthrough test

The Apollo 13 lithium hydroxide canister test was conducted to evaluate emergency measures designed to enable the Apollo 13 crew to use command module lithium hydroxide canisters in the lunar module. The test verified the effectiveness of the emergency system and established that the canisters in the command module would provide ample carbon dioxide removal for the return of the Apollo 13 crew. The time interval between canister changes on the flight was also determined in the test. This reduced power demand on the lunar module by eliminating the need for telemetry in determining canister replacement times. Details of the canister modifications were relayed to the flight crew and a replica of the test system was assembled in the flight vehicle. Graphs of the parameters which were measured during the simulation are presented.

Leblanc, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Design/Development of Spacecraft and Module Crew Compartments

This slide presentation reviews the design and development of crew compartments for spacecraft and for modules. The Crew Compartment or Crew Station is defined as the spacecraft interior and all other areas the crewman interfaces inside the cabin, or may potentially interface.It uses examples from all of the human rated spacecraft. It includes information about the process, significant drivers for the design, habitability, definitions of models, mockups, prototypes and trainers, including pictures of each stage in the development from Apollo, pictures of the space shuttle trainers, and International Space Station trainers. It further reviews the size and shape of the Space Shuttle orbiter crew compartment, and the Apollo command module and the lunar module. It also has a chart which reviews the International Space Station (ISS) internal volume by stage. The placement and use of windows is also discussed. Interestingly according to the table presented, the number 1 rated piece of equipment for recreation was viewing windows. The design of crew positions and restraints, crew translation aids and hardware restraints is shown with views of the restraints and handholds used from the Apollo program through the ISS.

Goodman, Jerry R.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Rocketdyne - Lunar Ascent Engine

The ascent engine was the last one from the moon, and I want to focus on the idea of redundancy and teams in regard to the engine. By teams, I mean teamwork - not just within Rocketdyne. It was teamwork within Rocketdyne; it was teamwork within Grumman; it was teamwork within NASA. These were all important elements leading to the successful development of the lunar excursion module (LEM) engine. Communication, rapid response, and cooperation were all important. Another aspect that went into the development of the ascent engine was the integration of technology and of lessons learned. We pushed all the above, plus technology and lessons learned, into a program, and that led to a successful result. One of the things that I like to think about - again in retrospect - is how it is very "in" now to have integrated product and process teams. These are buzzwords for teamwork in all program phases. That s where you combine a lot of groups into a single organization to get a job done. The ascent engine program epitomized that kind of integration and focus, and because this was the mid- to late-1960s; this was new ground for Rocketdyne, Grumman, and NASA. Redundancy was really a major hallmark of the Apollo Program. Everything was redundant. Once you got the rocket going, you could even lose one of the big F-1 engines, and it would still make it to orbit. And once the first stage separated from the rest of the vehicle, the second stage could do without an engine and still make a mission. This redundancy was demonstrated when an early Apollo launch shut down a J-2 second-stage engine. Actually, they shut down two J-2 engines on that flight. Even the third stage, with its single J-2 engine, was backed up because the first two stages could toss it into a recoverable orbit. If the third stage didn't work, you were circling the earth, and you had time to recover the command module and crew. Remember how on the Apollo 13 flight, there was sufficient system redundancy even when we lost the service module. That was a magnificent effort. TRW Inc. really ought to be proud of their engine for that. (See Slide 2, Appendix I) We had planned for redundancy; we had landed on the moon. However, weight restrictions in the architecture said, "You can t have redundancy for ascent from the moon. You've got one engine. It s got to work. There is no second chance. If that ascent engine doesn't work, you re stuck there." It would not have looked good for NASA. It wouldn't have looked good for the country. There was a letter written that President Richard Nixon would read if the astronauts got stuck on the moon, expressing how sorry we were and so forth. It was a scary letter, really. The ascent engine was an engine that had to work. (See Slide 3, Appendix I).

Harmon, Tim↗
NASA NTRS1991

Post landing design and testing of an ACRV model

Consideration is given to a 1990-1991 program concentrated on the design, building, and testing of a one-fifth scale model of the egress and stabilization systems for an Apollo Command Module (ACM)-based assured crew return vehicle (ACRV). The program is aimed at determining the feasibility of 1) stabilizing the ACRV out of the range of motions which cause space sickness and 2) the safe and rapid removaling of a sick or injured crewmember from the ACRV. Research have been conducted in the following areas: ACRV model construction, water test facility identification, and stabilization control systems. The fidelity of the model has been established from geometric and dynamic characteristic tests performed on the model.

Hosterman, Kenneth C.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Apollo Soyuz mission report

A complete report on the goals and results of the Apollo-Soyuz mission is presented. Descriptions of the docking module, command and service modules and crew stations are provided. The overall performance of the Apollo spacecraft and of ground support and biomedical operations is evaluated. The pilot's report is presented, together with launch phase and anomaly summaries.

Lee, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Apollo Soyuz, mission evaluation report

The Apollo Soyuz mission was the first manned space flight to be conducted jointly by two nations - the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The primary purpose of the mission was to test systems for rendezvous and docking of manned spacecraft that would be suitable for use as a standard international system, and to demonstrate crew transfer between spacecraft. The secondary purpose was to conduct a program of scientific and applications experimentation. With minor modifications, the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft were like those flown on previous missions. However, a new module was built specifically for this mission - the docking module. It served as an airlock for crew transfer and as a structural base for the docking mechanism that interfaced with a similar mechanism on the Soyuz orbital module. The postflight evaluation of the performance of the docking system and docking module, as well as the overall performance of the Apollo spacecraft and experiments is presented. In addition, the mission is evaluated from the viewpoints of the flight crew, ground support operations, and biomedical operations. Descriptions of the docking mechanism, docking module, crew equipment and experiment hardware are given.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2011

Evaluation of Drogue Parachute Damping Effects Utilizing the Apollo Legacy Parachute Model

Drogue parachute damping is required to dampen the Orion Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) crew module (CM) oscillations prior to deployment of the main parachutes. During the Apollo program, drogue parachute damping was modeled on the premise that the drogue parachute force vector aligns with the resultant velocity of the parachute attach point on the CM. Equivalent Cm(sub q) and Cm(sub alpha) equations for drogue parachute damping resulting from the Apollo legacy parachute damping model premise have recently been developed. The MPCV computer simulations ANTARES and Osiris have implemented high fidelity two-body parachute damping models. However, high-fidelity model-based damping motion predictions do not match the damping observed during wind tunnel and full-scale free-flight oscillatory motion. This paper will present the methodology for comparing and contrasting the Apollo legacy parachute damping model with full-scale free-flight oscillatory motion. The analysis shows an agreement between the Apollo legacy parachute damping model and full-scale free-flight oscillatory motion.

Currin, Kelly M.↗