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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Arms Control Development Criteria (ACDCs)

The Arms Control Development Criteria (ACDC) have been developed to provide a consistent framework for understanding the readiness of a technology or capability for use in arms control as poten>al components of a verifica>on system. More importantly, they are also intended to serve as a guide for technology developers to beCer address the development needs of a technology from the start of the development process, rather than trying to adapt a technology to arms control aDer it is developed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Future of Arms Control in a Multilateral and Multi-Domain Environment

The crisis of arms control is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

A secure measurement unit for an inspection system used in nuclear arms-control verification

Verification of arms control treaties may require information barriers to protect sensitive data acquired during the verification process. These information barriers are commonly implemented in software, but must store and operate on data that are vulnerable to attack and tampering. Here, we present a new Secure Measurement Unit based on a modified pipeline SAR ADC architecture. The idea is to move the information barrier back into the digitization process so that prohibited data is never created. A prototype 65nm CMOS Secure Measurement Unit (SMU) was tested using U-235, U-238, Co-60, Cs-137 and Am-241 sources. Here, the prototype accurately digitized allowable signals while being immune to side-channel attacks on signals within preset forbidden regions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Arms Control: History & Policy Context [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of key concepts in arms control, a history of nuclear arms control agreements, some of the contemporary challenges and opportunities in the field, a discussion of the process for negotiating arms control agreements, and updates on recent developments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Treaties and Arms Control [Slides]

This presentations provides an overview of arms control including aims and methods of arms control, the treaty process, treaties, new START inspections, and future treaty considerations: strategic vs. nonstrategic.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Active Neutron Interrogation as a Method for Verification of the Absence of Special Nuclear Material in Arms Control Dismantlement

The next step in arms control reductions will deal with both strategic and non-strategic weapons, presenting new and hard challenges for verification. One verification approach that might be used in support of these reductions is the concept of deferred verification, which forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and relies on an inspection regime having access to the open segment of a State's nuclear sector, in "monitored transfer zones." A component of this approach is the anticipated need for an instrument suite capable of detecting well-shielded highly-enriched uranium or plutonium where it isn't supposed to be. This specific need was recently identified by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in an enabling operating concept they call "contain and dispose." At the foundation of this approach is the idea that items declared as "not nuclear" are, by definition, not treaty limited and are thus "fair-game" for inspection and questioning. Active Neutron Interrogation (ANI), using beta-delayed neutron emissions as the signature for special nuclear material (SNM) detection, is a promising method to address this challenge. The method is quick, has high sensitivity and high specificity for detecting shielded SNM, is robust against changing background radiation environments, is robust against the presence of unknown shielding, and avoids the use of gamma-ray spectrometry which may introduce complications due to the potential release of sensitive information. This paper will present recent research activities exploring technical aspects of using ANI as a FAIRGAME verification method and discuss future prospects and research needs

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2018

Annotated Bibliography: "U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Crisis and Collapse or Crossroads?"

Key questions posed for the workshop: 1. Is there an opportunity to renew the bilateral arms control framework in a manner acceptable to both sides and supporting mutually beneficial objectives? If not at present, can one be created? How? 2. What, if anything, does President Putin want out of a re-constructed arms control approach? 3. What new agreements or processes would serve the interests of the United States and its allies and partners? 4. What might be the benefits and risks of a new U.S. proposal for a follow-on to New START? 5. What if traditional arms control collapses? Are there any less formal, other approaches to achieve U.S. objectives? Russian objectives? Center for Global Security Research is hosting eight panels over two days at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The list of readings included provides some overview and background for the topics covered in the workshop. While some references are to books or materials not available online, where possible references include links to accessible versions of articles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Crisis and Collapse or Crossroads? Workshop Summary August 2018

In this context, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to assessing the incentives and disincentives the United States and Russia face in pursuing further arms control agreements as well as the role of arms control in the two countries’ foreign policies and security strategies.On the second day, the workshop participants explored four pathways for a renewal of U.S.-Russian arms control, including:New START extension or a New START follow-on agreement; an agreement which meets Russia at least half way in the strategic space; an agreement addressing challenges to European nuclear stability; and unusual mix-and-match approaches that might be taken. The discussions and their results are summarized here.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Mass Attribute System (UMAS) Study: Evaluation of Options against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria

In this FY19 study, a range of possible measurement systems for confirming a U-235 mass attribute were identified. The systems were reviewed for their applicability in a potential future arms control agreement, and a subset of the eight most plausible systems were selected for further evaluation against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria (ACEC). The evaluation results were then used to identify a primary and secondary recommended measurement system for confirming a U-235 mass attribute on warheads, nuclear components of warheads, and/or materials as part of a hypothetical arms control agreement.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Mass Attribute System (UMAS) Study: Evaluation of Options Against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria

In this study, eleven possible radiation and other non-destructive measurement systems for confirming U-235 mass attribute were identified. The systems were reviewed for their applicability in a potential future arms control agreement, and a subset of the eight most plausible systems were selected for futher evaluation against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria (ACEC). The evaluation results were then used to identify a primary and secondary recommended UMAS for confirming a U-235 mass attribute on warheads, nuclear components of warheads, and/or materials as part of a hypothetical arms control agreement.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Practical Pathways: Assessing Potential Formats for Arms Control with Russia and China

Building off foundational analyses done previously at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, this paper takes on two daunting tasks - to outline the security policy objectives for future strategic arms control agreements and to provide recommendations on the potential form of such an agreement. This is the proper moment for such an undertaking. Arms control faces a doubtful future as a viable national security tool. Many proposals – either gradual modifications of existing regimes or revolutionary departures into new domains – made over the past decade no longer fit today’s security environment, one shaped by China’s massive force expansion and Russia’s war in Ukraine. With the new complexities of the two-peer environment and the complete rupture in U.S.-Russian relations, people have valid questions about arms control’s forms and functions. New thinking is needed, shaped by guidance from the past, an analysis of the impasse, a spectrum of the possible, and a realistic assessment of the feasible. If progress is to be made, either before the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2026 or during the subsequent interregnum, a concrete proposal must be agreed within the U.S. interagency and put in front of allies and negotiating partners to serve as the basis for future work.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Beyond New START: Two Forecasts for Future Russian-US Arms Control

A world without the New START Treaty (NST) or treaty-based strategic arms control cannot simply be categorised as ‘unacceptable’.1 That world is possible. It has been increasing in likelihood for some time and thus it must be both understood and anticipated. Furthermore, the NST will expire on 5 February 2026 and it could disappear much sooner, depending on the actions of either Russia or the United States. No amount of positive thinking on the value of strategic arms control or talking points about the importance of the treaty can change its status as a hostage in the broader bilateral relationship.

Political science↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Research and Development (NPAC R&D) [Slides]

NPAC R&D focus areas include: Advancing U.S. capabilities to detect and characterize nuclear weapon development activities globally, including material production, the movement of special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, and the testing or use of nuclear weapons, Supporting the development and testing of policy options and technical capabilities for international nuclear safeguards, arms control / treaty verification, nuclear export controls, and nonproliferation initiatives consistent with U.S. Government goals and objectives to enable monitoring and verification, Utilizing uranium, lithium, and high explosives (HE) materials expertise to support national-level activities in nuclear forensics and nuclear detection technology testing and evaluation, Providing unique training and capacity-building programs, particularly with the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC), and Engaging internationally to promote nonproliferation and arms control norms and best practices through bilateral and multilateral work.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2024

US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Arms Control Opportunities for Inherently Safe and Secure Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

The Department of Defense Science Board has stated that the United States is "not prepared to defend againsr cyber-attacks and that the military could lose "trust in the information and ability to control U.S. systems and forces [including nuclear forces]." One potential weak spot in cyber-security is storing encryption keys in computer memory. This paper explores the use of hardware devices (so-called Physical Unclonable Functions, or PUFs) to generate, in the nuclear weapon itself, unique encryption keys each time they are needed. Not only do we find that this has the potential to mitigate a number of cyberthreats, but such hardware has the potential to greatly diminish the total uncertainty associated with radiation-based warhead authentication procedures; a procedure many analysts feel will be key to future arms control regimes. After outline the use of PUFs in nuclear command, control, and communications--and indicating some of the areas that still require further research--we discuss their application to arms control and warhead authentication

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Highlights of the Quad Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control Research Initiative LETTERPRESS Simulation

The US, UK, Sweden and Norway have formed the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and have been working together as the ‘Quad’ to ensure non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and nuclear weapon states (NWS) participate to overcome the challenge of nuclear arms control verification. The Quad aims to complement and inform the work of other multinational initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). The initial engagement of the Quad was the development and execution of a role-playing, in-field verification simulation, named LETTERPRESS. A benefit of role-playing events is the capacity they have to allow researchers to engage critically with a challenge from multiple perspectives. This paper will introduce LETTERPRESS and the process the Quad followed to develop and execute the multilateral simulation. The paper will highlight the in-play objectives of the verification regime, the site hosting the on-site inspection, and the verification technologies and their roles with respect to the objectives. The paper will include lessons learned from LETTERPRESS, focusing on the in-play objectives and technologies and their contribution to a successful monitoring result. The paper will conclude by highlighting the in-play success of a multilateral verification body and the ability of both NNWS and NWS to contribute to the verification process within LETTERPRESS.

arms control, Quad, LETTERPRESS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗