A Modular Approach to Trusted System Design for Arms Control Treaty Verification.
Abstract not provided.
Polack, John Kyle↗
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A Modular Approach to Trusted System Design for Arms Control Treaty Verification.
Abstract not provided.
Polack, John Kyle↗
Advanced Portal Monitoring for Arms Control Treaty Verification
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Jennings, Brian↗
Developing an Intrinsically Information Limiting Radiation Detection System for Use in Future Arms Control Treaty Verification
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Alimehri, Farnaz Lyla [Sandia National Laboratorie↗
Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification
In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.
Active neutron interrogation↗
Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena
Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
R&D Outcomes of Surrogate Environmental Swipe Manufacturing Technique Method Development for Arms Control and Treaty Verification Applications
The analysis of environmental samples is a critical component of nuclear compliance verification and safeguards activities. While the associated particle analyses have benefitted from recent advances in the production of actinide-bearing particulates with uniform and well-characterized particle size, material phase, and isotopic ratios to serve as reference materials for calibration and interlaboratory comparisons, there is an outstanding need for surrogate environmental samples, which resemble field-collected samples, with the aforementioned reference particulates to support future nuclear compliance verification exercises and method development. This effort seeks to leverage the recent advances in tailored reference particle production to generate surrogate environmental swipe samples via parallel production techniques (direct and indirect) which are uniquely suited to the hydrothermal and aerosol-based synthesis routes developed at PNNL and SRNL, respectively. PNNL’s hydrothermal particle production method was used to generate surrogate reference particles for the indirect production of test swipes.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation
The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Feasibility study of a compact neutron resonance transmission analysis instrument
Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) uses resonant absorption of neutrons to infer the absolute isotopic composition of a target object, enabling applications in a broad range of fields such as archaeology, enrichment analysis of nuclear fuel, and arms control treaty verification. In the past, NRTA involved large user facilities and complex detector systems. However, recent advances in the intensity of compact neutron sources have made compact neutron imaging designs increasingly feasible. This work describes the Monte Carlo (MC) based design of a compact epithermal NRTA radiographic instrument which uses a moderated, compact deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron source and an epithermal neutron detector. Such an instrument would have a wide range of applications, and would be especially impactful for such scenarios as nuclear inspection and arms control verification exercises, where system complexity and mobility may be of critical importance. The MC simulations presented in this work demonstrate accurate time-of-flight (TOF) reconstructions for transmitted neutron energies, capable of differentiating isotopic compositions of nuclear material with high levels of accuracy. A new generation of miniaturized and increasingly more intense neutron sources will allow this technique to achieve measurements with greater precision and speed, with significant impact on a variety of engineering and societal problems.
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Research and Development (NPAC R&D) [Slides]
NPAC R&D focus areas include: Advancing U.S. capabilities to detect and characterize nuclear weapon development activities globally, including material production, the movement of special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, and the testing or use of nuclear weapons, Supporting the development and testing of policy options and technical capabilities for international nuclear safeguards, arms control / treaty verification, nuclear export controls, and nonproliferation initiatives consistent with U.S. Government goals and objectives to enable monitoring and verification, Utilizing uranium, lithium, and high explosives (HE) materials expertise to support national-level activities in nuclear forensics and nuclear detection technology testing and evaluation, Providing unique training and capacity-building programs, particularly with the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC), and Engaging internationally to promote nonproliferation and arms control norms and best practices through bilateral and multilateral work.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
Open Radiation Monitoring: Histogram Builder Module Design
The Open Radiation Monitoring Project seeks to develop and demonstrate a modular radiation detection architecture designed specifically for use in arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications that will facilitate rapid development of trusted systems to meet the needs of potential future treaties. A modular architecture can be used to reduce more complex systems to a series of single purpose building blocks, thereby facilitating equipment inspection and in turn building trust in the equipment by all treaty parties. Furthermore, a modular architecture can be used to control data flow within the measurement system, reducing the risk of "hidden switches" and constraining the amount of sensitive information that could potentially be inadvertently leaked. This report details the first revision of a prototype circuit that will convert analog pulses directly into a histogrammed data set for further processing. The circuit was designed with both spectroscopy and multiplicity analysis in mind but can, in principle, be used to reduce any raw data stream into a histogram. The number of output channels is limited, and the histogram bin ranges are user configurable to allow for non-uniform and discontinuous bins, which makes it possible to restrict the information being passed down stream if desired. Pulse processing relies entirely on analog circuitry and non- programmable logic, which enables operation without the need for a central processor or other programmable control unit. The circuit remains untested under the Open Radiation Monitoring project due to the closure of the sponsoring program. However, further development and testing is scheduled to take place in support of a purpose-built trusted verification system development effort known as COGNIZANT, which demonstrates the potential benefit of developing a suite of modular trusted system components.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Open Radiation Monitoring: Conceptual System Design
The Open Radiation Monitoring (ORM) Project seeks to develop and demonstrate a modular radiation detection architecture designed specifically for use in arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications that will facilitate rapid development of trusted systems to meet the needs of potential future treaties. Development of trusted systems to support potential future treaties is a complex and costly endeavor that typically results in a purpose-built system designed to perform one specific task. The majority of prior trusted system development efforts have relied on the use of commercial embedded computers or microprocessors to control the system and process the acquired data. These processors are complex, making authentication and certification of measurement systems and collected data challenging and time consuming. We believe that a modular architecture can be used to reduce more complex systems to a series of single-purpose building blocks that could be used to implement a variety of detection modalities with shared functionalities. With proper design, the functionality of individual modules can be confirmed through simple input/output testing, thereby facilitating equipment inspection and in turn building trust in the equipment by all treaty parties. Furthermore, a modular architecture can be used to control data flow within the measurement system, reducing the risk of "hidden switches" and constraining the amount of sensitive information that could potentially be inadvertently leaked. This report documents a conceptual modular system architecture that is designed to facilitate inspection in an effort to reduce overall authentication and certification burden. As of publication, this architecture remains in a conceptual phase and additional funding is required to prove out the utility of a modular architecture and test the assumptions used to rationalize the design.
61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
A secure measurement unit for an inspection system used in nuclear arms-control verification
Verification of arms control treaties may require information barriers to protect sensitive data acquired during the verification process. These information barriers are commonly implemented in software, but must store and operate on data that are vulnerable to attack and tampering. Here, we present a new Secure Measurement Unit based on a modified pipeline SAR ADC architecture. The idea is to move the information barrier back into the digitization process so that prohibited data is never created. A prototype 65nm CMOS Secure Measurement Unit (SMU) was tested using U-235, U-238, Co-60, Cs-137 and Am-241 sources. Here, the prototype accurately digitized allowable signals while being immune to side-channel attacks on signals within preset forbidden regions.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Experimental demonstration and modeling of a robotic neutron detector with spectral and directional sensitivity for treaty verification
International safeguards and arms control agreements often require labor-intensive, intrusive onsite inspections to perform verification tasks. The ability to localize a neutron source and/or characterize a neutron field may be imperative for identifying anomalies. We are interested in the role of autonomous mobile robots, which, if designed properly, may be more effective and efficient and less intrusive than their human counterparts. Toward developing such a capability, we, for this study, have constructed the N-SpecDir Bot, comprised of three boron-coated straw detectors azimuthally-distributed within a cylinder of high-density polyethylene, which is mounted on an omni-directional robotic platform. Our N-SpecDir Bot is specifically designed to provide spectral and directional sensitivity, in addition to gross counts, by utilizing the signals from the three detectors. The detection system has been extensively characterized by MCNP modeling, which has been benchmarked to experiments conducted at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory. We demonstrate the spectral and directional sensitivity experimentally and in simulation, and provide a simple yet robust method for directional measurements.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Remote inspection of adversary-controlled environments
Remotely monitoring the location and enduring presence of valuable items in adversary-controlled environments presents significant challenges. In this article, we demonstrate a monitoring approach that leverages the gigahertz radio-wave scattering and absorption of a room and its contents, including a set of mirrors with random orientations placed inside, to remotely verify the absence of any disturbance over time. Our technique extends to large physical systems the application of physical unclonable functions for integrity protection. Its main applications are scenarios where parties are mutually distrustful and have privacy and security constraints. Examples range from the verification of nuclear arms-control treaties to the securing of currency, artwork, or data centers.
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
Epithermal Neutron Resonance Analysis Using a Compact D-T Generator
Nuclear material identification and isotopic composition analysis are important capabilities for safeguards and the verification of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation treaties. Epithermal neutron resonance imaging has been proposed for spent fuel assay measurements, and the development of a mobile neutron imaging system could provide such a tool for on-site applications. This technique is highly sensitive to isotopes of interest for safeguards applications (e.g. 235,238 U, 238,239,240 Pu) and yields unique transmission spectra for a target containing actinides and some mid- and high-Z elements. Paired with a position-sensitive neutron detector, such a system could provide spatial information of the target isotopic composition. Recent progress in the development of high intensity neutron sources could make mobile epithermal neutron imaging designs increasingly feasible to serve as a tool for nuclear inspectors. In this work, Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were performed to further optimize a previous design for an epithermal neutron resonance-based analysis apparatus using a D-T portable neutron generator. Additionally, experimental work is being performed to test the feasibility of this method. The MC simulations of moderation time distributions for different moderator compositions and thicknesses were measured to provide a multi-group correction for neutron time-of-flight energy reconstruction.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification
Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
The Role of Satellite Earth Observation Data in Monitoring and Verifying International Environmental Treaties
The term verification implies compliance verification in the language of treaty negotiation and implementation, particularly in the fields of disarmament and arms control. The term monitoring on the other hand, in both environmental and arms control treaties, has a much broader interpretation which allows for use of supporting data sources that are not necessarily acceptable or adequate for direct verification. There are many ways that satellite Earth observation (EO) data can support international environmental agreements, from national forest inventories to use in geographic information system (GIs) tools. Though only a few references to satellite EO data and their use exist in the treaties themselves, an expanding list of applications can be considered in support of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). This paper explores the current uses of satellite Earth observation data which support monitoring activities of major environmental treaties and draws conclusions about future missions and their data use. The scope of the study includes all phases of environmental treaty fulfillment - development, monitoring, and enforcement - and includes a multinational perspective on the use of satellite Earth observation data for treaty support.
Johnston, Shaida↗