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Cognitive Engineering in Training: Monitoring and Pilot-Automation Coordination in Complex Environments

This paper reports our investigation of flight path monitoring in aviation. We interviewed experienced pilots to understand the knowledge and skills underlying effective monitoring and we developed an example learning environment to improve these skills. We explore how design of pilot training and learning, like the design of interfaces and of the underlying automation, benefits from cognitive engineering methods and perspective. In aviation, monitoring and managing flight path are critical activities. The influences on flight path are complex and come from the autoflight system, from control actions by the pilot, and from external factors, including weather and Air Traffic Control (ATC). Indeed, inadequate flight path monitoring is a current aviation concern as it has been implicated in accidents and incidents. Effective piloting depends on strategies for noticing, understanding, and anticipating these influences to monitor and manage flight path. Lack of such skills reduces pilots' ability to maintain safety margin and resilience. Although flightdeck automation is intended to aid pilot understanding and prediction, the Fight Management Systems (FMS) can mislead as well as aid the pilot's understanding and projection of what will happen. In dynamic conditions, FMS predictions may be based on old or incomplete information. Understanding such vulnerabilities is an important part of pilot-autoflight coordination. The learning environment we developed is designed to help pilots proactively monitor and manage flight path. We consider how a broad cognitive engineering approach might inform the "what" and "how" of learning in dynamic work domains.

pilot-monitoring↗

Resilience Engineering's Potential for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The national airspace (NAS) will rapidly evolve in the next ten to twenty years. Plans for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) during that period envision highly automated airspace management systems and electrically powered vehicles. AAM concepts also anticipate limited human roles. The goal of limiting the human role is to minimize the potential for misadventures, yet how the human role is limited needs to be carefully considered in order to also preserve the potential for human successes. The field of resilience engineering (RE) focuses on how systems can change in order to seize an opportunity or withstand an unforeseen challenge. RE methods rely on the use of empirical data to optimize the ability of any system to adapt. RE studies have shown how individual and team initiatives ensure resilient system performance by creating safety through flexibility. Benefits of the RE approach include improved awareness of operational circumstances and how system elements depend on each other, and the ability to allocate limited resources and prepare for surprise. RE offers the ability to account for and incorporate the human role as an essential element in order to ensure NAS systems’ resilient performance. Data on the human contribution to safe and resilient system performance, which is termed “work as done,” are available but are not being considered as the NAS evolves. We present an approach that describes how use of RE can enable the evolving NAS to adapt, and perform, in a resilient manner.

Aviation Safety↗

Achieving Resilient In-Flight Performance for Advanced Air Mobility through Simplified Vehicle Operations

A research and development (R&D) approach is proposed for developing and validating concepts and technologies to achieve vehicle autonomy goals of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) through Simplified Vehicle Operations (SVO). The approach applies resilience-engineering and human-automation teaming (HAT) principles to a framework for defining vehicle-based functions for the management of missions and flight trajectories, focusing initially on the en route flight domain. To achieve the SVO goal of reducing pilot training requirements and thereby increasing the pilot pool for AAM, while at the same time promoting ever-safer operations, a framework for identifying essential functions is proposed. In this framework, functions are first categorized by high-level functional purpose (mission management, flightpath management, tactical operations, and vehicle control) and then subcategorized by attributes of resilient-performing systems (abilities to monitor, respond, learn, and anticipate). The categorization by functional purpose provides structure within which HAT designs can be holistically explored and total levels of human vs. automation responsibility can be varied. The subcategorization by resilient-system attributes provides a mechanism for capturing safety-critical functions that may not be codified in current operational procedures and training curricula, particularly those where humans proactively enhance safety in currently undocumented ways. An R&D approach consisting of seven strategies is proposed in which automation engineering and human-factors communities can collaborate in the research, development, and design of an SVO roadmap to enable the ambitious objectives of AAM.

AAM↗

Automated Target Planning for FUSE Using the SOVA Algorithm

The SOVA algorithm was originally developed under the Resilient Systems and Operations Project of the Engineering for Complex Systems Program from NASA s Aerospace Technology Enterprise as a conceptual framework to support real-time autonomous system mission and contingency management. The algorithm and its software implementation were formulated for generic application to autonomous flight vehicle systems, and its efficacy was demonstrated by simulation within the problem domain of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle autonomous flight management. The approach itself is based upon the precept that autonomous decision making for a very complex system can be made tractable by distillation of the system state to a manageable set of strategic objectives (e.g. maintain power margin, maintain mission timeline, and et cetera), which if attended to, will result in a favorable outcome. From any given starting point, the attainability of the end-states resulting from a set of candidate decisions is assessed by propagating a system model forward in time while qualitatively mapping simulated states into margins on strategic objectives using fuzzy inference systems. The expected return value of each candidate decision is evaluated as the product of the assigned value of the end-state with the assessed attainability of the end-state. The candidate decision yielding the highest expected return value is selected for implementation; thus, the approach provides a software framework for intelligent autonomous risk management. The name adopted for the technique incorporates its essential elements: Strategic Objective Valuation and Attainability (SOVA). Maximum value of the approach is realized for systems where human intervention is unavailable in the timeframe within which critical control decisions must be made. The Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE) satellite, launched in 1999, has been collecting science data for eight years.[1] At its beginning of life, FUSE had six gyros in two IRUs and four reaction wheels. Over time through various failures, the satellite has been left with one reaction wheel on the vehicle skew axis and two gyros. To remain operational, a control scheme has been implemented using the magnetic torque rods and the remaining momentum wheel.[2] As a consequence, there are attitude regions where there is insufficient torque authority to overcome environmental disturbances (e.g. gravity gradient torques). The situation is further complicated by the fact that these attitude regions shift inertially with time as the spacecraft moves through earth s magnetic field during the course of its orbit. Under these conditions, the burden of planning targets and target-to-target slew maneuvers has increased significantly since the beginning of the mission.[3] Individual targets must be selected so that the magnetic field remains roughly aligned with the skew wheel axis to provide enough control authority to the other two orthogonal axes. If the field moves too far away from the skew axis, the lack of control authority allows environmental torques to pull the satellite away from the target and can potentially cause it to tumble. Slew maneuver planning must factor the stability of targets at the beginning and end, and the torque authority at all points along the slew. Due to the time varying magnetic field geometry relative to any two inertial targets, small modifications in slew maneuver timing can make large differences in the achievability of a maneuver.

Heatwole, Scott↗

The Cognitive Challenges of Flying a Remotely Piloted Aircraft

A large variety of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) designs are currently in production or in development. These aircraft range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. The task of flying an RPA in civilian airspace involves challenges common to the operation of other highly-automated systems, but also introduces new considerations for pilot perception, decision-making, and action execution. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. The presentation will focus on issues that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive human factors study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

remote pilot station↗

Creating Formal Characterizations of Routine Contingency Management in Commercial Aviation

The identification, modelling, and analysis of root causes of accidents and incidents dominate conventional safety management approaches. However, the effect of humans’ safety-producing behavior on the overall resilience of the system is often neglected. Additionally, emerging aviation markets are giving rise to concepts of operation, such as urban air mobility and optionally piloted air cargo operations, that are leading to a shift in locus of control between humans and automation. Without an understanding of the human contribution to safety, it is difficult to assess the effects of these novel role allocations on overall system safety. In this work, safety-producing behaviors are identified and abstracted into resilient performance strategies. Production rules that encapsulate these strategies are then generated and classified in the Soar cognitive architecture. The strategies are then applied to a remotely-operated air cargo example to demonstrate how safe learning is facilitated. The learned rules and strategies are then formally verified.

Safety Critical Systems↗

Advancing Aircraft Operations in a Net-Centric Environment with the Incorporation of Increasingly Autonomous Systems and Human Teaming

NextGen has begun the modernization of the nation’s air transportation system, with goals to improve system safety, increase operation efficiency and capacity, provide enhanced predictability, resilience and robustness. With these improvements, NextGen is poised to handle significant increases in air traffic operations, more than twice the number recorded in 2016, by 2025.1 NextGen is evolving toward collaborative decision-making across many agents, including automation, by use of a Net-Centric architecture, which in itself creates a very complex environment in which the navigation and operation of aircraft are to take place. An intricate environment such as this, coupled with the expected upsurge of air traffic operations generates concern respecting the ability of the human-agent to both fly and manage aircraft within. Therefore, it is both necessary and practical to begin the process of increasingly autonomous systems within the cockpit that will act independently to assist the human-agent achieve the overall goal of NextGen. However, the straightforward technological development and implementation of intelligent machines into the cockpit is only part of what is necessary to maintain, at minimum, or improve human-agent functionality, as desired, while operating in NextGen. The full integration of Increasingly Autonomous Systems (IAS) within the cockpit can only be accomplished when the IAS works in concert with the human, formulating trust between the two, thereby establishing a team atmosphere. Imperative to cockpit implementation is ensuring the proper performance of the IAS by the development team and the human-agent with which it will be paired when given a specific piloting, navigation, or observational task. Described in this paper are the steps taken, at NASA Langley Research Center, during the second and third phases of the development of an IAS, the Traffic Data Manager (TDM), its verification and validation by human-agents, and the foundational development of Human Autonomy Teaming (HAT) between the two.

Houston, Vincent E.↗

The Human Challenges of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

Hobbs, Alan↗

m:N and Human Autonomy Teaming Concepts for High Density Vertiport Operations

This report focuses on the role of the Fleet Manager (FM) and, in particular, the ways in which automation could support their position as they manage multiple aircraft and operators in a highly dynamic, advanced air mobility (e.g., air taxi) environment, specifically "high-density vertiport" (HDV) regions. Similar to terminal area operations for traditional aviation, operations involving HDVs will need to be highly structured while also remaining resilient to the various contingencies that can happen in that environment. The role of the FM is consistent with an “m:N” architecture, where “m” number of operators cooperatively manage “N” number of vehicles (where “N” is always larger than “m”). In such a paradigm it is critical to provide the operator with the tools and information necessary to manage their fleet safely and navigate the known pitfalls with highly automated, complex systems (e.g., brittleness, insufficient situation awareness, skill degradation). As the field of m:N has expanded as an area of study, a set of higher-level automation concepts have emerged—namely “plays,” “working agreements,” and “human-autonomy teaming” (HAT)—that could support operators in this new role.

human autonomy teaming↗

Cognitive Communications for NASA Space Systems

The growing complexity of spacecraft constellations, communication relay offerings, and mission architectures drives the need for the development of autonomous communication systems. NASA has traditionally launched single spacecraft missions that are served by the Space Communication and Navigation (SCaN) program. Operations on SCaN networks are typically scheduled weeks in advance, and often each asset serves a single user spacecraft at a time. Recent movement towards swarm missions could make the current approach unsustainable. Additionally, the integration of commercial communication service providers will substantially increase the data transfer options available to new missions. NASA science missions have found benefit in launching swarms of spacecraft, allowing coordinated simultaneous observations from different perspectives. Inter-spacecraft communication (mesh networking) is an enabler for this architecture, as are CubeSats that allow cost-effective provisioning of distributed mission assets. As more complex swarm missions launch, one challenge is coordinating communication within the swarm and choosing the appropriate mechanism for telemetry, tracking, control, and data services to and from Earth. Cognitive communications research conducted by SCaN aims to mitigate the increasing communication complexity for mission users by increasing the autonomy of links, networks, and service scheduling. By considering automation techniques including recent advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, cognitive algorithms and related approaches enable increased mission science return, improved resource utilization for service provider networks, and resiliency in unpredictable or unplanned environments. The Cognitive Communications Project at the NASA Glenn Research Center develops applications of data-driven, non-deterministic methods to improve the autonomy of space communication. The project emphasizes development of decentralized space networks with artificial intelligence agents optimizing communication link throughput, data routing, and system-wide asset management. This paper discusses the objectives, approaches, and opportunities of the research to address growing needs of the space communications community.

Chelmins, David↗

Autonomous System Technologies for Resilient Airspace Operations

Increasing autonomous systems within the aircraft cockpit begins with an effort to understand what autonomy is and developing the technology that encompasses it. Autonomy allows an agent, human or machine, to act independently within a circumscribed set of goals; delegating responsibility to the agent(s) to achieve overall system objective(s). Increasingly Autonomous Systems (IAS) are the highly sophisticated progression of current automated systems toward full autonomy. Working in concert with humans, these types of technologies are expected to improve the safety, reliability, costs, and operational efficiency of aviation. IAS implementation is imminent, which makes the development and the proper performance of such technologies, with respect to cockpit operation efficiency, the management of air traffic and data communication information, vital. A prototype IAS agent that attempts to optimize the identification and distribution of "relevant" air traffic data to be utilized by human crews during complex airspace operations has been developed.

Houston, Vincent E.↗

Pilot Critical Incident Reports as a Means to Identify Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Pilots participated willingly and enthusiastically in the study, and generally had little difficulty recalling critical incidents. The results suggest that pilot interviews can be a productive method of gathering information on incidents that might not otherwise be reported. Some of the issues described in the reports have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. In other cases, incident reports involved human factors that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

Risk of Performance Decrements and Adverse Health Outcomes Resulting from Sleep Loss, Circadian Desynchronization, and Work Overload

Sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, and work overload occur to some extent for ground and flight crews, prior to and during spaceflight missions. Ground evidence indicates that such risk factors may lead to performance decrements and adverse health outcomes, which could potentially compromise mission objectives. Efforts are needed to identify the environmental and mission conditions that interfere with sleep and circadian alignment, as well as individual differences in vulnerability and resiliency to sleep loss and circadian desynchronization. Specifically, this report highlights a collection of new evidence to better characterize the risk and reveals new gaps in this risk as follows: Sleep loss is apparent during spaceflight. Astronauts consistently average less sleep during spaceflight relative to on the ground. The causes of this sleep loss remain unknown, however ground-based evidence suggests that the sleep duration of astronauts is likely to lead to performance impairment and short and long-term health consequences. Further research is needed in this area in order to develop screening tools to assess individual astronaut sleep need in order to quantify the magnitude of sleep loss during spaceflight; current and planned efforts in BHP's research portfolio address this need. In addition, it is still unclear whether the conditions of spaceflight environment lead to sleep loss or whether other factors, such as work overload lead to the reduced sleep duration. Future data mining efforts and continued data collection on the ISS will help to further characterize factors contributing to sleep loss. Sleep inertia has not been evaluated during spaceflight. Ground-based studies confirm that it takes two to four hours to achieve optimal performance after waking from a sleep episode. Sleep inertia has been associated with increased accidents and reduced performance in operational environments. Sleep inertia poses considerable risk during spaceflight when emergency situations necessitate that crewmembers wake from sleep and make quick decisions. A recently completed BHP investigation assesses the effects of sleep inertia upon abrupt awakening, with and without hypnotics currently used in spaceflight; results from this investigation will help to inform strategies relative to sleep inertia effects on performance. Circadian desynchrony has been observed during spaceflight. Circadian desynchrony during spaceflight develops due to schedule constraints requiring non-24 operations or 'slam-shifts' and due to insufficient or mis-timed light exposure. In addition, circadian misalignment has been associated with reduced sleep duration and increased medication use. In ground-based studies, circadian desynchrony has been associated with significant performance impairment and increased risk of accidents when operations coincide with the circadian nadir. There is a great deal of information available on how to manage circadian misalignment, however, there are currently no easily collected biomarkers that can be used during spaceflight to determine circadian phase. Current research efforts are addressing this gap. Work overload has been documented during current spaceflight operations. NASA has established work hour guidelines that limit shift duration, however, schedule creep, where duty requirements necessitate working beyond scheduled work hours, has been reported. This observation warrants the documentation of actual work hours in order to improve planning and in order to ensure that astronauts receive adequate down time. In addition to concerns about work overload, ground based evidence suggests that work underload may be a concern during deep space missions, where torpor may develop and physically demanding workload will be exchanged for monitoring of autonomous systems. Given that increased automation is anticipated for exploration vehicles, fatigue effects in the context of such systems needs to be further understood. Performance metrics are needed to evaluate fitness-for-duty during spaceflight. Although ground-based evidence supports the notion that sleep loss, circadian desynchronization and work overload lead to performance impairment, inconsistency in the measures used to evaluate performance during spaceflight make it difficult to evaluate the magnitude of performance impairment during spaceflight. Work is underway to standardize measures of performance evaluation during spaceflight. Once established, such performance indicators need to be correlated with operational performance. Individual differences in sleep need and circadian preference, phase shifting ability and period have been documented in ground-based studies. Individual differences in response to sleep loss and circadian misalignment have also been documented and are presumed to be associated with genetic polymorphisms. No studies have systematically reported individual differences in sleep or circadian-related outcomes during spaceflight. More work is needed in this area in order to identify genetic or phenotypic biomarkers that predict resilience or vulnerability to sleep loss in order to personalize countermeasure strategies and mitigate performance impairment during spaceflight. Two laboratory and field investigations specific to this topic are currently ongoing; additional efforts, including an effort to mine existing biological data from spaceflight relative to sleep and circadian outcomes, are planned. Sex differences in sleep need and circadian period and phase have been reported in ground-based studies. The impact of these sex differences on performance is unclear. Sex differences in sleep need and circadian rhythms have not been systematically studied during spaceflight, presumably due to the small number of women that have flown in space. More research is needed in this area to evaluate whether any of the observed sex differences in physiology lead to altered performance in spaceflight and on the ground.

Flynn-Evans, Erin↗

Looking to the Future: A Call to Action for Advanced GNC Algorithm Verification and Validation

Future space systems will rely on autonomous Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) functions to efficiently manage safe and precise self-directed operations in uncertain complex environments. Fundamentally, the GNC system plays a key role in mission performance and safety because it computes the ideal trajectory (Guidance), determines the actual trajectory (Navigation), and executes the ideal trajectory (Control) of a vehicle’s position and attitude. Our current GNC systems are highly automated and already have a high degree of complexity. As missions become more ambitious, GNC systems for launch vehicles and space platforms (e.g., spacecraft, probes, and landers) will require higher levels of performance and autonomous operation than previously encountered, for example, this includes GNC for optimizing aerodynamic and/or propulsion performance during planetary entry. This GNC Verification and Validation (V&V) paper highlights concerns with what undoubtedly will be a trend towards increased complexity as fully autonomous GNC systems are developed for future space missions. Clearly, complex GNC systems pose challenges in the prelaunch V&V phase, which is a relatively expensive part of a mission’s life cycle. Essentially the V&V phase is focused on checking that the system effectively meets all the design and operational requirements for the mission. The authors of this paper (i.e., the Inter-Agency Working Group of GNC subject matter experts) focused on this fundamental question over the past few years: Will the GNC engineering community of practice be sufficiently prepared to perform the necessary V&V on evolving GNC architectures that are driven by very demanding requirements for autonomy, resiliency, reconfigurability, adaptability, and mission cost-benefit balance? It is the viewpoint of our Inter-Agency team that the GNC V&V approaches and processes needed to address the next generation of complex GNC systems, which likely will employ various forms of modern GNC technology, are not currently established to the level the community will need in the future. While researchers and practitioners have made some progress in developing new GNC V&V methods for modern GNC systems, a good deal of work remains to be done to codify such methods in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Thus, the Inter-Agency team’s partner organizations [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA), the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES), the German Aerospace Center (DLR), the French Aerospace Lab (ONERA), and ISAE-SUPAERO] have conducted preliminary investigations into advancing GNC V&V techniques, which resulted in the identification of the need for education, new V&V tools, and benchmark problems for the GNC community. The necessary proactive steps to be taken to meet the challenges and fill the gaps in GNC V&V are summarized in this paper. The first steps include identifying advanced analysis tools, developing a GNC V&V roadmap, and expanding education and training programs for GNC practitioners. This paper is a call to action and proposes a comprehensive set of recommended actions for all our stakeholders: space agencies, researchers, and industry.

Samir Bennani↗

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗

Deriving Severe Hail Likelihood from Satellite Observations and Model Reanalysis Parameters using a Deep Neural Network

Geostationary satellite imagers, such as those of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) series, have been observing severe convection at 15–60-minute intervals for over 40 years. When properly assessed, such a data record can be valuable in efforts of estimating severe storm risk throughout the diurnal cycle based on automated detection of patterns consistently found atop severe storms. Furthermore, environmental conditions favorable for severe weather are well-known and are thought to be represented well by modern reanalysis products. Promoting resilience against such hazards on local and global scales is a chief goal the NASA Disasters program, which seeks to encourage use of satellite observations to mitigate risk. For instance, hail is the costliest severe weather hazard across the globe in terms of insured loss, but reporting inconsistencies for hail events globally make it difficult to develop models that can quantify the risk. Satellite observation and model reanalysis taken together have the potential to, with reasonable skill and specificity, characterize environmental conditions that are favorable for hazardous weather, and thereby enable creation of hazard climatologie. Such climatologies are particularly useful over regions without extensive radar networks or storm reporting. By mapping the multivariate combination of observed cloud features and reanalysis environmental parameters/indices to United States Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) radar-estimated Maximum Expected Size of Hail (MESH) by way of a deep neural network (DNN), estimates of likelihood for potentially severe hail can be produced. Such estimates are of greater complexity and efficiency than could be performed with previous multivariate or logistic regression analyses for observed points within convective systems. Statistical distributions of convective parameters from satellite and reanalysis are shown to highlight non-severe/severe class separation for well-known hailstorm predictors, e.g., overshooting cloud top characteristics, deep-layer wind shear, mid-level stability, helicity, and convective inhibition. These complex, multivariate predictor relationships are exploited within a DNN, which can efficiently produce a quantitative hail risk metric with better than 70% detection rate and under 30% false alarms. These hail classifications can then be aggregated across the satellite record to yield a hazard climatology for hail frequency and severity – knowledge of which is of particular interest to those who manage risk (e.g., insurers) and are seeking opportunities to identify hail-prone regions, particularly in developing nations. This NASA study uses satellite observations and model parameters in a DNN to perform climatological hailstorm analysis in support of catastrophe model development, with the hope of promoting risk resilience particularly in regions without adequate weather radar coverage.

Passive Remote Sensing↗

Designing for Advanced Aerial Mobility: Human-Autonomy Teaming and In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance

The continued growth of aviation shall require new innovative technologies and operational concepts to meet the ever-increasing demands on air transportation. The NASA Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) project focuses on emerging aviation markets, such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is defined as “...a safe and efficient system for air passenger and cargo transportation within an urban area. It is inclusive of small package delivery and other urban unmanned aerial system services and supports a mix of onboard/ground-piloted and increasingly autonomous operations” ([1]). The AAM project emphasizes technology development and validating system-level concepts and solutions in coordination with other NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) projects to enable UAM metro- and micro-plex vertiport and airspace concepts of operations. The NASA AAM research portfolio includes the concepts of Remote Supervisor-in-Command (RSC) and Fleet and Airspace Manager (FAM) as possible human roles for consumer fleet providers. NASA research in RSC is focused on development of guidelines and standards for remote pilots/operators passively and actively controlling a large fleet of autonomous aircraft. For FAM, flight and ground system concepts and technologies to enable high density homogeneous operations at increased scale from vertiport(s), and coordination with other humans in the systems (e.g., UAM urban airspace manager, Air Traffic Control) are key research areas. The envisioned UAM operations are posited to require autonomous systems to enable functions ranging from fleet and resource management to vehicle control. Although automation has become increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous in civil aviation, autonomy represents a significant evolution in automation, which has generally been limited in functional scope and capability. As autonomy takes on increasing responsibilities, humans and machines will be required to work together in new and different ways [2], rather than traditional design approaches focused on how machines (i.e., autonomy) can do the work of people. The emerging field of human-autonomy teaming (HAT) represents a comprehensive and prioritized research-driven approach to enable the success of future emerging aviation market applications through capabilities and principles that facilitate humans and machine working and thinking better together. The NASA Transformational Tools and Technologies (TTT) Autonomous System (AS) Sub-project was created to assist with the transition into higher levels of autonomy to enable new modes of air transportation, such as UAM. TTT-AS has identified HAT as a key research need to enable UAM while maintaining today’s ultra-safe aviation system safety levels. The latter challenge has been taken up by the NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project, which recognizes that aviation safety, as it evolves, shall require new ways of thinking about safety to include integration of a wide-range of existing and new safety systems and practices, enhanced tools and technologies, increased access to data and data fusion, improved data analysis capabilities, enhanced in-time risk monitoring and detection, hazard prioritization and mitigation, safety assurance decision-support, and in-time integrated system analytics [3].The operational concept of UAM represents a variety of work that has been termed, “work-as-imagined” to characterize the idea that how people think that work is done and how work is actually done are often not the same [4]. To ensure design success and system safety, looking at “work-as-done” provides a comparative approach toward UAM concept and technology design through examination of corresponding analogs found today in aviation (e.g., on-demand operations) and other transportation domains (e.g., port operations). The paper shall discuss various alternative applications with specific focus on airline operation center (AOC) operations, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) command-and-control to inform scaled-versions of FAM and RSC, respectively, and with consideration of the national airspace system contextual environment. The tenets and principles of the HAT field and current NASA research efforts under the TTT-AS sub-project shall also be described. Finally, the SWS sub-project efforts to develop In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-Time Safety Management Systems (IASMS) are discussed in terms of how “in-time” safety assurance may be conceptualized for the on-demand mobility air taxi “work-as-imagined” operational concept [5]. As part of this effort, concepts from the emerging field of resilience engineering, are being studied. Traditional approaches to aviation safety have focused on what can go wrong and how to prevent it. Another approach to thinking about system safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” (protective safety) but also “ensuring that things go right” (productive safety), that enables a system to exhibit the resilient performance [6] necessary for the success of the future aviation system emerging concepts of operations. The paper shall describe efforts focused on how productive safety and resilience may enable a more complete approach to system safety thinking and design of ISSA and IASMS for UAM. Future directions and research needs shall also be discussed.

resilience↗