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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2007

Roadside-based communication system and method

A roadside-based communication system providing backup communication between emergency mobile units and emergency command centers. In the event of failure of a primary communication, the mobile units transmit wireless messages to nearby roadside controllers that may take the form of intersection controllers. The intersection controllers receive the wireless messages, convert the messages into standard digital streams, and transmit the digital streams along a citywide network to a destination intersection or command center.

Bachelder, Aaron D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Crew-Aided Autonomous Navigation

A sextant provides manual capability to perform star/planet-limb sightings and offers a cheap, simple, robust backup navigation source for exploration missions independent from the ground. Sextant sightings from spacecraft were first exercised in Gemini and flew as the lost-communication backup for all Apollo missions. This study characterized error sources of navigation-grade sextants for feasibility of taking star and planetary limb sightings from inside a spacecraft. A series of similar studies was performed in the early/mid-1960s in preparation for Apollo missions. This study modernized and updated those findings in addition to showing feasibility using Linear Covariance analysis techniques. The human eyeball is a remarkable piece of optical equipment and provides many advantages over camera-based systems, including dynamic range and detail resolution. This technique utilizes those advantages and provides important autonomy to the crew in the event of lost communication with the ground. It can also provide confidence and verification of low-TRL automated onboard systems. The technique is extremely flexible and is not dependent on any particular vehicle type. The investigation involved procuring navigation-grade sextants and characterizing their performance under a variety of conditions encountered in exploration missions. The JSC optical sensor lab and Orion mockup were the primary testing locations. For the accuracy assessment, a group of test subjects took sextant readings on calibrated targets while instrument/operator precision was measured. The study demonstrated repeatability of star/planet-limb sightings with bias and standard deviation around 10 arcseconds, then used high-fidelity simulations to verify those accuracy levels met the needs for targeting mid-course maneuvers in preparation for Earth reen.

Holt, Greg N.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Crew-Aided Autonomous Navigation Project

Manual capability to perform star/planet-limb sightings provides a cheap, simple, and robust backup navigation source for exploration missions independent from the ground. Sextant sightings from spacecraft were first exercised in Gemini and flew as the loss-of-communications backup for all Apollo missions. This study seeks to procure and characterize error sources of navigation-grade sextants for feasibility of taking star and planetary limb sightings from inside a spacecraft. A series of similar studies was performed in the early/mid-1960s in preparation for Apollo missions, and one goal of this study is to modernize and update those findings. This technique has the potential to deliver significant risk mitigation, validation, and backup to more complex low-TRL automated systems under development involving cameras.

Holt, Greg↗
NASA NTRS2010

IT Challenges for Space Medicine or How do We Protect Medical Information and Still Get Useful Work Done?

Space Medicine provides healthcare services of various types for astronauts throughout their lifetime starting from the time they are selected as astronauts. IT challenges include: protection of private medical information, access from locations both inside and outside NASA, nearly 24x7 access, access during disasters, international partner access, data archiving, off-region backup, secure communication of medical data to people outside the NASA system (e.g. expert consultants), efficient movement of medical record information between locations, search and retrieval of relevant information, and providing all of these services/capabilities within a limited budget. In Space Medicine, we have provided for these in various ways: limit the amount of private medical information stored locally, utilize encryption mechanisms that the international partners can also use, utilize 2-factor authentication, virtualize servers, employ concept-based search, and use of standardized terminologies (SNOMED) and messaging (HL7).

Johnson-Throop, Kathy A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Using Optical Communications Links for Deep-Space Navigation

Abstract—Optical communications systems that are being developed for deep-space missions could also be used to perform deep-space navigation. A two-way optical communications system could be modified to support ranging, and the laser signal emitted by a spacecraft could be tracked against background stars to perform plane-of-sky observables. We have been analyzing a number of deep-space navigation scenarios to understand the advantages and disadvantages of using optical communication systems for navigation. Our objectives were to evaluate the performance achievable with optical systems, and to study under what circumstances these systems could be sufficient to navigate the mission, reducing the requirements for radio systems to perhaps just to be a backup for emergency communications.

Karimi, Reza R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

The Lunar Laser OCTL Terminal (LLOT)

The NASA owned Optical Communication Telescope Laboratory (OCTL) telescope located at Table Mountain, CA is being readied as a backup ground station for the upcoming Lunar Laser Communications Demonstration (LLCD). The backup ground terminal is called the Lunar Laser OCTL Terminal (LLOT). The 1-m diameter telescope will be configured as a mono-static transceiver for transmitting a laser beacon and receiving downlink at a data-rate of 39 Mb/s. Interfaces to an operations center with near-real time exchange of monitored data at OCTL will also be developed. A system level overview of this backup ground station for LLCD will be presented.

photon-counting receiver↗
NASA NTRS1993

Failure detection and recovery in the assembly/contingency subsystem

The Assembly/Contingency Subsystem (ACS) is the primary communications link on board the Space Station. Any failure in a component of this system or in the external devices through which it communicates with ground-based systems will isolate the Station. The ACS software design includes a failure management capability (ACFM) that provides protocols for failure detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR). The the ACFM design requirements as outlined in the current ACS software requirements specification document are reviewed. The activities carried out in this review include: (1) an informal, but thorough, end-to-end failure mode and effects analysis of the proposed software architecture for the ACFM; and (2) a prototype of the ACFM software, implemented as a C program under the UNIX operating system. The purpose of this review is to evaluate the FDIR protocols specified in the ACS design and the specifications themselves in light of their use in implementing the ACFM. The basis of failure detection in the ACFM is the loss of signal between the ground and the Station, which (under the appropriate circumstances) will initiate recovery to restore communications. This recovery involves the reconfiguration of the ACS to either a backup set of components or to a degraded communications mode. The initiation of recovery depends largely on the criticality of the failure mode, which is defined by tables in the ACFM and can be modified to provide a measure of flexibility in recovery procedures.

Gantenbein, Rex E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗
NASA NTRS1992

Manned testing in a simulated space environment

A view of the facility and operational requirements involved in performing a manned thermal vacuum test is presented. The requirements fall into two major categories. The first category deals with placing the suited crewmen in a hazardous environment and assuring their safety. The second category deals with the constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment. Design areas that deal with man rating a chamber, including fire suppression, emergency repress, emergency power, backups, reliable instrumentation and data systems, communications, television monitoring, biomedical monitoring, material compatibilities, and equipment supporting the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) are discussed. The operational issues that are peculiar to manned testing such as test rules, test procedures, test protocol, emergency drills, availability of hyperbaric facilities, test team training and certification engineering concerns for a safe mechanical and instrumentation buildup, hazard analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis are discussed. The constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment are addressed.

Fender, Donna L.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Long-Range Transhorizon Lunar Surface Radio Wave Propagation in the Presence of a Regolith and a Sparse Exospheric Plasma

Long-range, over-the-horizon (transhorizon) radio wave propagation is considered for the case of the Moon. In the event that relay satellites are not available or otherwise unwarranted for use, transhorizon communication provides for a contingency or backup option for non line-of-sight lunar surface exploration scenarios. Two potential low-frequency propagation mechanisms characteristic of the lunar landscape are the lunar regolith and the photoelectron induced plasma exosphere enveloping the Moon. Although it was hoped that the regolith would provide for a spherical waveguide which could support a trapped surface wave phenomena, it is found that, in most cases, the regolith is deleterious to long range radio wave propagation. However, the presence of the plasma of the lunar exosphere supports wave propagation and, in fact, surpasses the attenuation of the regolith. Given the models of the regolith and exosphere adopted here, it is recommended that a frequency of 1 MHz be considered for low rate data transmission along the lunar surface. It is also recommended that further research be done to capture the descriptive physics of the regolith and the exospheric plasma so that a more complete model can be obtained. This comprehensive theoretical study is based entirely on first principles and the mathematical techniques needed are developed as required; it is self-contained and should not require the use of outside resources for its understanding.

Manning, Robert M.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Satellite Communications for ATM

This presentation is an overview on Satellite Communication for the Aeronautical Telecommunication Management (ATM) research. Satellite Communications are being considered by the FAA and NASA as a possible alternative to the present and future ground systems supporting Air Traffic Communications. The international Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have in place Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) for the Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Services (AMSS) which is mainly derived from the pre-existing Inmarsat service that has been in service since the 1980s. The Working Group A of the Aeronautical Mobile Communication Panel of ICAO has also been investigating SARPS for what is called the Next Generation Satellite Service (NGSS) which conforms less to the Inmarsat based architecture and explores wider options in terms of satellite architectures. Several designs are being proposed by Firms such as Boeing, ESA, NASA that are geared toward full or secondary usage of satellite communications for ATM. Satellite communications for ATM can serve several purposes ranging from primary usage where ground services would play a minimal backup role, to an integrated solution where it will be used to cover services, or areas that are less likely to be supported by the proposed and existing ground infrastructure. Such Integrated roles can include usage of satellite communications for oceanic and remote land areas for example. It also can include relieving the capacity of the ground network by providing broadcast based services of Traffic Information Services messages (TIS-B), or Flight Information Services (FIS-B) which can take a significant portion of the ground system capacity. Additionally, satellite communication can play a backup role to support any needs for ground replacement, or additional needed capacity even after the new digital systems are in place. The additional bandwidth that can be provided via satellite communications can also open the door for many new applications that generally will enhance the standard services provided. All of those possibilities were investigated and comments, as well as descriptions of those analyses are put forward, as well as suggestions for future areas of study.

Shamma, Mohammed A.↗
NASA NTRS1976

NASA/ESA CV-990 Spacelab simulation. Appendixes: C, data-handling: Planning and implementation; D, communications; E, mission documentation

Data handling, communications, and documentation aspects of the ASSESS mission are described. Most experiments provided their own data handling equipment, although some used the airborne computer for backup, and one experiment required real-time computations. Communications facilities were set up to simulate those to be provided between Spacelab and the ground, including a downlink TV system. Mission documentation was kept to a minimum and proved sufficient. Examples are given of the basic documents of the mission.

Reller, J. O., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1982

A flight investigation of simulated data-link communications during single-pilot IFR flight. Volume 2: Flight evaluations

Key problems in single pilot instrument flight operations are in the management of flight data and the processing of cockpit information during conditions of heavy workload. A flight data console was developed to allow simulation of a digital data link to replace the current voice communications stem used in air traffic control. This is a human factors evaluation of a data link communications system to determine how such a system might reduce cockpit workload, improve flight proficiency, and be accepted by general aviation pilots. The need for a voice channel as backup to a digital link is examined. The evaluations cover both airport terminal area operations and full mission instrument flight. Results show that general aviation pilots operate well with a digital data link communications system. The findings indicate that a data link system for pilot/ATC communications, with a backup voice channel, is well accepted by general aviation pilots and is considered to be safer, more efficient, and result in less workload than the current voice system.

Parker, J. F., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2010

COMPASS Final Report: Lunar Communications Terminal (LCT)

The Lunar Communications Terminal (LCT) COllaborative Modeling and Parametric Assessment of Space Systems (COMPASS) session designed a terminal to provide communications between lunar South Pole assets, communications relay to/from these assets through an orbiting Lunar Relay Satellite (LRS) and navigation support. The design included a complete master equipment list, power requirement list, configuration design, and brief risk assessment and cost analysis. The Terminal consists of a pallet containing the communications and avionics equipment, surrounded by the thermal control system (radiator), an attached, deployable 10-m tower, upon which were mounted locally broadcasting and receiving modems and a deployable 1 m diameter Ka/S band dish which provides relay communications with the lunar relay satellites and, as a backup, Earth when it is in view. All power was assumed to come from the lunar outpost Habitat. Three LCT design options were explored: a stand-alone LCT servicing the manned outpost, an integrated LCT (into the Habitat or Lunar Lander), and a mini-LCT which provides a reduced level of communication for primarily robotic areas dealing as in situ resource utilization (ISRU) and remote science. Where possible all the designs assumed single fault tolerance. Significant mass savings were found when integrating the LCT into the Habitat or Lander but increases in costs occurred depending upon the level of man rating required for such designs.

Oleson, Steven R.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Co-axial Joint Technology Applied to Antenna Backup Structures

The increasing demand to improve focusing accuracy and to accommodate higher frequencies in space communications and radio astronomy has created significant challenges for improving the capability of the constituent systems in radio antennas and telescopes. One important system is the radio antenna/telescope backup structure connections. The backup structure is a key element in providing a stable, precise and rigid support for the reflective surface. The ideal connection for these types of structures is rigid and concentric resulting in minimal deformation with stress/strain curves that are linear, repeatable and exhibiting no hysteresis over the entire service load range. Conceivably such a connection could be designed so that the stress/strain curve mimics the stress/strain characteristics of the connecting member in both tension and compression. When this is achieved then such joints can be said to be 'invisible' in the global behavior of the backup structure. At that point, overall reflector deflection becomes more linear and highly predictable. In conjunction with this advantage, optimized backup structure geometries, adaptive reflectors and compensating algorithms can best be applied in producing an instrument of unparalleled performance. This paper introduces Co-Axial Joint (CAJ) technology as the practical and economical means to produce an invisible connection.

trusses↗
NASA NTRS2012

Tools Ensure Reliability of Critical Software

In November 2006, after attempting to make a routine maneuver, NASA's Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) reported unexpected errors. The onboard software switched to backup resources, and a 2-day lapse in communication took place between the spacecraft and Earth. When a signal was finally received, it indicated that MGS had entered safe mode, a state of restricted activity in which the computer awaits instructions from Earth. After more than 9 years of successful operation gathering data and snapping pictures of Mars to characterize the planet's land and weather communication between MGS and Earth suddenly stopped. Months later, a report from NASA's internal review board found the spacecraft's battery failed due to an unfortunate sequence of events. Updates to the spacecraft's software, which had taken place months earlier, were written to the wrong memory address in the spacecraft's computer. In short, the mission ended because of a software defect. Over the last decade, spacecraft have become increasingly reliant on software to carry out mission operations. In fact, the next mission to Mars, the Mars Science Laboratory, will rely on more software than all earlier missions to Mars combined. According to Gerard Holzmann, manager at the Laboratory for Reliable Software (LaRS) at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), even the fault protection systems on a spacecraft are mostly software-based. For reasons like these, well-functioning software is critical for NASA. In the same year as the failure of MGS, Holzmann presented a new approach to critical software development to help reduce risk and provide consistency. He proposed The Power of 10: Rules for Developing Safety-Critical Code, which is a small set of rules that can easily be remembered, clearly relate to risk, and allow compliance to be verified. The reaction at JPL was positive, and developers in the private sector embraced Holzmann's ideas.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1992

Tradeoffs in implementing primary-backup protocols

One way to implement a fault-tolerant service is by using multiple servers that fail independently. The state of the service is replicated and distributed among these servers, and updates are coordinated so that even when a subset of the servers fail, the service remains available. A common approach to structuring such replicated services is to designate one server as the primary and all the others as backups. Clients make requests by sending messages only to the primary. If the primary fails, then a failover occurs and one of the backups takes over. This service architecture is commonly called the primary-backup or the primary-copy approach. In most such primary-backup protocols, when the primary receives a client request, it informs the backups about the request, and then responds to the client. Informally, this primary-backup protocol is non-blocking if the primary does not wait for an acknowledgement from the backups before it sends the response; otherwise, it is blocking. Most of the existing protocols are blocking as non-blocking protocols cannot be constructed for some kinds of failures. However, it is shown that non-blocking protocols can be constructed for most of the process and communication failures that are expected to occur in the primary-backup systems of the future. Since non-blocking protocols can theoretically achieve the smallest possible response time, this paper analyzes these protocols under various system parameters. Two kinds of non-blocking protocols are analyzed: one in which the processes use point-to-point communication to exchange messages, and the other in which processes use hardware broadcasts.

Budhiraja, Navin↗
NASA NTRS2002

Low Power Transceiver

One of the FREESTAR experiments, the Low Power Transceiver (LPT) experiment is a low-power, lightweight software programmable transceiver prototype technology demonstration that is being developed by NASA as a low-cost S-band spacecraft navigation and communication device. The LPT prototype receives Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite signals for spacecraft navigation support and provides both forward and return, low-rate data communications links to the Merritt Island (MILA) and Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRC) ground stations and to the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). The experiment is designed to demonstrate the system's ability to do simultaneous communications and navigation, as well as multi-mode communications and reconfiguration. LPT is managed by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and sponsored by NASA/HQ Code M. The LPT experiment consists of one thermally conductive box containing the electronics stack, three S-band antennas and one L-band antenna. The LPT payload uses general Orbiter services, including power control, command, and telemetry provided through the HHC avionics. On-orbit, the LPT payload will be primarily operated via direct communications between LPT and ground stations (MILA, WLPS, or DFRC) and/or TDRSS, with backup command and telemetry capability provided via the hitchhiker avionics and remote Payload Operations Control Center. During operations, LPT will utilize high Sband frequencies for communications. The LPT TDRSS (and GN) forward link (uplink) frequency is 2106.40625 MHz and their TDRSS (and GN) return link (downlink) frequency is 2287.5 MHz (utilizing Left-handed Circular Polarization to work with the TDRSS MA system). Two standard switch panel switches will be utilized to prohibit inadvertent operation of the antenna. An additional inhibit will be provided through the HH avionics power relay to the LPT.

Source record↗