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A quick look at ballistic missile defense, BMD, from its beginnings in WWII with the Nazi V2 to the proposed hypersonic delivery vehicle is presented. As BMD is one of the most, if not the most difficult of technological challenges, we assess the meager successes and plentiful disappointments.
America's missile defense systems are deployed at home and abroad. This includes the Groundbased Missile Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California, the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe (EPAA), and regional systems in the Middle East and Asia. Unfortunately these systems lack workable architectures, and many of the required elements either don't work or are missing. Major review and reconsideration is needed of all elements of these systems. GMD performance in tests has gotten worse with time, when it ought to be getting better. A lack of political support is not to blame as the DoD spends about $10 billion per year, and proposes to add about $5 billion over the next five years. Russia objects to the EPAA as a threat to its ICBM forces, and to the extensive deployment of U.S. military forces in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, once part of the Soviet Union. Going forward the U.S. should keep working with Russia whose cooperation will be key to diplomatic gains in the Middle East and elsewhere. Meanwhile, America's missile defenses face an enduring set of issues, especially target discrimination in the face of attacks designed to overwhelm the defenses, stage separation debris, chaff, decoys, and stealth. Dealing with target discrimination while also replacing, upgrading, or adding to the many elements of U.S. missiles defenses presents daunting budget priorities. A new look at the threat is warranted, and whether the U.S. needs to consider every nation that possesses even short-range missiles a threat to America. The proliferation of missiles of all sizes around the world is a growing problem, but expecting U.S. missile defenses to deal with all those missiles everywhere is unrealistic, and U.S. missile defenses, effective or not, are justifying more and more offensive missiles.
The Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) system is an R&D effort funded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) underway at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). MDA has described the characteristics needed for a Boost Phase directed energy (DE) weapon to work against ICBM-class threat missiles. In terms of the platform, the mission will require a high altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that can fly in the “quiet” stratosphere and display long endurance – i.e., days on station. In terms of the laser, MDA needs a high power, low size and weight laser that could be carried by such a platform and deliver lethal energy to an ICBM-class threat missile from hundreds of kilometers away. While both the military and industry are pursuing Directed Energy for tactical applications, MDA’s objectives pose a significantly greater challenge than other current efforts in terms of the power needed from the laser, the low size and weight required, and the range, speed, and size of the threat missiles. To that end, MDA is funding two R&D efforts to assess the feasibility of a high power (MWclass) and low SWaP (size, weight and power) laser: a fiber combining laser (FCL) project at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, and LLNL’s Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) system.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.
Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.
The W88 nuclear warhead entered the stockpile in late 1988 and is deployed on the Navy’s Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system, carried onboard Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Deployed now for almost three decades, several updates are required to address aging issues and to maintain its current state of readiness. The W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 program replaces the arming, fuzing, and firing subsystem, adds a lightning arrestor connector, and refreshes the conventional high explosives within the weapon to enhance nuclear safety and support future life extension program options. The W88 Alt 370 program is scheduled to be completed concurrent with planned exchanges of limited-life, or routinely replaced, components, including the gas-transfer system
The detection and tracking of vehicles moving at hypersonic speeds (> Mach 5) at altitudes of ~100 km has been of growing interest due to the ongoing development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) by the U.S., Russia and China. This challenge is notably different from traditional ballistic missile systems whose re-entry vehicles move at hypersonic velocities but at much higher altitudes on a ballistic course. Hypersonic glide vehicles are also designed to be able to make sudden turns along their flight path making prediction of their trajectories difficult. Their ability to maneuver, combined with their high velocity and altitude make them difficult to track. The combination of these characteristics presents a challenge for anyone attempting to defend against a hypersonic glide vehicle attack by generally shortening the time available to react. That reaction can involve moving potential targets or attempting to detect the hypersonic glide vehicle and intercept it before it reaches the intended target. Figure 1 compares the trajectory of hypersonic vehicles compared to that of a traditional ballistic missile.
South Korea is threatened by its troubled relationship with North Korea. North Korea possesses a large cache of missiles as well as chemical and biological weapons, and the future potential to mount nuclear weapons on its missiles. The United States is also challenged because of its defense commitments to Seoul. As a countermeasure, the United States and South Korea decided to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defenses in South Korea. However, China has objected. Chinese scholars believe the THAAD radar would be able to track Chinese inter-continental ballistic missiles, thereby weakening their deterrent. A technical analysis does not support this assertion. But, it is vital for South Korea, given its proximity and economic interdependence, to reassure China. The United States Forces Korea will deploy THAD and that is not a commitment by Seoul to become part of U.S.-led missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific.
This is the second of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper begins with a discussion of the current nuclear force and the plans and procurement programs for the modernization of that force. Current weapon systems and warheads were conceived and built decades ago, and procurement programs have begun for the modernization or replacement of major elements of the nuclear force: the heavy bomber, the air-launched cruise missile, the ICBMs, and the ballistic-missile submarines. In addition, the Nuclear Weapons Council has approved a new framework for nuclear-warhead life extension not fully fleshed out yet that aims to reduce the current number of nuclear explosives from seven to five, the so-called "3+2" vision. This vision includes three interoperable warheads for both ICBMs and SLBMs (thus eliminating one backup weapon) and two warheads for aircraft delivery (one gravity bomb and one cruise-missile, eliminating a second backup gravity bomb). This paper also includes a discussion of the current and near-term nuclear-deterrence mission, both global and regional, and offers some observations on future of the strategic deterrence mission and the challenges of regional and extended nuclear deterrence.
Hypersonic flight is not new. The V-2 rocket and the vast majority of the ballistic missiles that it inspired achieved hypersonic speeds (i.e., speeds faster than the speed of sound or Mach 5+) as they fell from the sky, as did crewed aircraft like the rocket-powered X-15. Rather than speed, today’s renewed attention to hypersonic weapons owes to developments that enable controlled flight. These new systems have two sub-varieties: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Glide vehicles are the cousins of ballistic warheads: they are lofted on high velocity boosters, separate, then use momentum and control surfaces to skip and glide through the upper atmosphere before crashing onto their targets. The cruise missiles use an advanced propulsion system (a SCRAMJET) for powered flight. While the descriptions are straightforward, the engineering needed to accomplish the guidance and maneuvering (not to mention survivability) of these weapons is far from clear.
In early 2017 the United States should have taken up the Chinese and Russian-backed proposal to suspend United States – South Korean joint military exercises in exchange for suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile tests. South Korea was signaling that it would support this proposal. That was before North Korea tested inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), capable of reaching anywhere in the U.S., and an advanced nuclear explosive, some ten times more powerful than those the U.S. used against Japan in WWII. The Trump administration brushed aside that original international proposal. The Singapore Summit, however, has put just such a suspension-for-suspension agreement in place. A little late, but much better than never.
The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.
Cosmic ray muon imaging has been studied for the past several years as a possible technique for nuclear warhead inspection and verification as part of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Los Alamos team has studied two different muon imaging methods for this application, using detectors on two sides and one side of the object of interest. In this report we present results obtained on single sided imaging of configurations aimed at demonstrating the potential of this technique for counting nuclear warheads in place with detectors above the closed hatch of a ballistic missile submarine.
The BREN (Bare Reactor Experiment, Nevada) Tower Complex is significant for its role in the history of nuclear testing, radiation dosimetry studies, and early field testing of the Strategic Missile Defense System designs. At the time it was built in 1962, the 1,527 ft (465 m) BREN Tower was the tallest structure west of the Mississippi River and exceeded the height of the Empire State Building by 55 ft (17 m). It remains the tallest ever erected specifically for scientific purposes and was designed and built to facilitate the experimental dosimetry studies necessary for the development of accurate radiation dose rates for the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The tower was a key component of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission’s (ABCC) mission to predict the health effects of radiation exposure. Moved to its current location in 1966, the crucial dosimetry studies continued with Operation HENRE (High Energy Neutron Reactions Experiment). These experiments and the data they generated became the basis for a dosimetry system called the Tentative 1965 Dose or more commonly the T65D model. Used to estimate radiation doses received by individuals, the T65D model was applied until the mid-1980s when it was replaced by a new dosimetry system known as DS86 based on the Monte Carlo method of dose rate calculation. However, the BREN Tower data are still used for verification of the validity of the DS86 model. In addition to its importance in radiation heath effects research, the BREN Tower Complex is also significant for its role in the Brilliant Pebbles research project, a major component of the Strategic Defense Initiative popularly known as the “Star Wars” Initiative. Instigated under the Reagan Administration, the program’s purpose was to develop a system to shield the United States and allies from a ballistic missile attack. The centerpiece of the Strategic Defense System was space-based, kinetic-kill vehicles. In 1991, BREN Tower was used for the tether tests of the Brilliant Pebbles prototype vehicle at the earth’s surface prior to the more costly space testing program. The success of these tests established the Brilliant Pebbles program as an essential component of America’s space-based missile defense system even after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Data from the Brilliant Pebbles research program continues to inspire current missile defense system research (Independent Working Group 2009).
China is significantly expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear forces. Over the summer of 2021, researchers using satellite imagery discovered three separate fields of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos under construction in the deserts of north-central China. If each silo is eventually equipped with a missile, the Chinese nuclear arsenal capable of striking the continental US could triple in size. Furthermore, the US government estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal could number 1000 warheads by 2030, with at least 200 deployed on long-range platforms.
Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: 1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities;” and 2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.
This is the first of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of the elimination of The INF-range Pershing II ballistic missile and Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), deployed by NATO under a dual-track strategy to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles while pursuing negotiations to limit or eliminate all of these missiles. The Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which was actually a family of missiles including SRAM A, SRAM B (never deployed), and SRAM II and SRAM T, these last two cancelled during an over-budget/behind-schedule development phase as part of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992. The nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), first limited to shore-based storage by the PNIs, and finally eliminated in deliberations surrounding the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. The Missile-X (MX), or Peacekeeper, a heavy MIRVed ICBM, deployed in fixed silos, rather than in an originally proposed mobile mode. Peacekeeper was likely intended as a bargaining chip to facilitate elimination of Russian heavy missiles. The plan failed when START II did not enter into force, and the missiles were eliminated at the end of their intended service life. The Small ICBM (SICBM), or Midgetman, a road-mobile, single-warhead missile for which per-unit costs were climbing when it was eliminated under the PNIs. Although there were liabilities associated with each of these systems, there were also unique capabilities; this paper lays out the pros and cons for each. Further, we articulate the capabilities that were eliminated with these systems.