Electrified Powertrain Flight Demonstration (EPFD) Overview and Future
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Electric Aircraft Propulsion↗
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Results for “Barrier Integration Risks”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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NASA EPFD Project's Progress Towards Reducing Barrier EAP Technology and Integration Risks
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TRL↗
MISA Symposium: A Roadmap to Our Sustainable Aviation Future
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Electric Aircraft Propulsion↗
Perceptions of Climate Risk and Use of Climate Risk Information by Natural Resource Conservation Stakeholders Participating in ADVANCE Projects in Asia and Latin America
Integrating climate risk information into resilience-building activities in the field is important to ensure that adaptation is based on the best available science. Despite this, many challenges exist when developing, communicating, and incorporating climate risk information. There are limited resources on how stakeholders perceive risks, use risk information, and what barriers exist to limit knowledge integration. This paper seeks to define the following: 1) What do conservation stakeholders consider to be the most significant climate risks they face now and possibly in the future? 2) What have been the most significant barriers to their using climate risk information? 3) What sources and types of knowledge would be most useful for these managers to overcome these barriers? A survey was conducted among stakeholders (n = 224) associated with World Wildlife Fund projects in tropical and subtropical countries. A very high proportion of stakeholders used climate risk information and yet faced integration-related challenges, which included too much uncertainty and the lack of a relevant scale for planning. The main factors preventing the use of climate risk information in decision-making were unavailability of climate risk information, no or limited financial or human resources available to respond, lack of organizational mandate or support, and no or limited institutional incentives. Comparing perceived current and future risks revealed a decline in concern for some future climate hazards. Survey respondents identified scientific reports, climate scientists, and online sources as the most useful information sources of climate risk information, while (i) maps and illustrations; (ii) scenarios format; and (iii) data tables, graphs, and charts were identified as user-friendly formats.
Climate risk↗
The Electric Aircraft EcoSystem: Performance Potential, Economics and Societal Impact in the Age of Sustainable Air Travel
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Electric Aircraft Propulsion (EAP)↗
Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events
This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.
SLS↗
Progress Towards SiC ASICs for Extreme Temperature and Radiation Environments
This presentation describes development and demonstrations of semiconductor integrated circuits (ICs) and ceramic packaging that are arguably the most environmentally durable transistor electronics ever demonstrated. Silicon carbide (SiC) junction field effect transistor-resistor (JFET-R) ICs fabricated by NASA Glenn Research Center with two-level interconnect have successfully operated for over 1 year in 500 °C air-ambient, 60 days in 460 °C and 9.3 MPa pressure caustic Venus surface environment test chamber, and radiation exposure through 7 Mrad(Si) total ionizing dose (TID) and 86 MeV-cm2/mg heavy ion strikes. Furthermore, these ICs have also demonstrated operation from -190 °C to +812 °C (over 1000 °C temperature span) without significant change in signal (input /output) or power supply voltages. While the operating frequency and functional complexity is far below silicon-based ICs, these SiC application specific ICs (ASICs) are nevertheless becoming capable of providing unique and advantageous harsh-environment circuit functionality without cooling/sheltering overhead. With modest adjustments, the SiC JFET-R fabrication process is compatible with semiconductor mass-production tools and materials. As an initial step towards manufacture, a majority of processing steps to realize the next SiC JFET-R IC prototype wafer run have been outsourced to commercial foundry. It is expected that further upscaling combined with technology transfer to commercial production will lower investment and risk barriers to useful application deployment.
high temperature↗
Towards a Rigorous Basis for Specific Operations Risk Assessment of UAS
The Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) guidance represents the consensus of various national aviation authorities on a common process to identify, qualitatively assess, and manage the safety risk posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), when preparing the safety case required for regulatory approval to conduct certain types of operations. As such, it can be considered a de facto standard, being increasingly adopted by various relevant stakeholders. This paper first gives an overview of the SORA process and associated methods, identifying a number of inconsistencies in risk identification and assessment, also discussing plausible strategies to close the associated gaps. Then, we give a well-founded basis for the applicable concepts, such as barrier integrity, assurance, and robustness, following which we present a preliminary and simple probabilistic formalization of the underpinning barrier-based safety model. We illustrate our overall approach through a worked example, also discussing how a Bayesian framework can facilitate extending and enhancing our initial formalization. We conclude with a discussion of the opportunities afforded by our approach, such as a well-founded basis for barrier selection, whilst addressing the associated challenges. The main objective of this work is to complement the current SORA guidance through a principled, mathematicallybased approach to risk assessment, particularly when it is applied to higher-risk operational concepts that warrant greater rigor in safety assessment and assurance.
Safety Cases↗
Planetary Science Technology Infusion Study: Findings and Recommendations Status
The Planetary Science Division (PSD) within the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) Science Mission Directorate (SMD) at NASA Headquarters sought to understand how to better realize a scientific return on spacecraft system technology investments currently being funded. In order to achieve this objective, a team at NASA Glenn Research Center was tasked with surveying the science and mission communities to collect their insight on technology infusion and additionally sought inputs from industry, universities, and other organizations involved with proposing for future PSD missions. This survey was undertaken by issuing a Request for Information (RFI) activity that requested input from the proposing community on present technology infusion efforts. The Technology Infusion Study was initiated in March 2013 with the release of the RFI request. The evaluation team compiled and assessed this input in order to provide PSD with recommendations on how to effectively infuse new spacecraft systems technologies that it develops into future competed missions enabling increased scientific discoveries, lower mission cost, or both. This team is comprised of personnel from the Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) Program and the In-Space Propulsion Technology (ISPT) Program staff.The RFI survey covered two aspects of technology infusion: 1) General Insight, including: their assessment of barriers to technology infusion as related to infusion approach; technology readiness; information and documentation products; communication; integration considerations; interaction with technology development areas; cost-capped mission areas; risk considerations; system level impacts and implementation; and mission pull. 2) Specific technologies from the most recent PSD Announcements of Opportunities (AOs): The Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG), aerocapture and aeroshell hardware technologies, the NASA Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) ion propulsion system, and the Advanced Materials Bi-propellant Rocket (AMBR) engine.This report will present the teams Findings from the RFI inputs and the recommendations that arose from these findings. Methodologies on the findings and recommendations development are discussed.
technology infusion↗
In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) Concept of Operations
Emerging operations involving Urban Air Mobility (UAM) poses a challenge to safety assurance and accessibility to the NAS. In particular, the public has a low tolerance for risk in aviation and the current NAS tends to be labor-intensive with limited ability to scale up for UAM. In response to this landscape, NASA is collaborating with industry to define an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) for a scalable UAM along with a service-oriented architecture. This architecture would better focus safety investments for technological solutions that overcome safety related barriers for emerging operations. By working with industry, consensus can be reached on desirable system traits that are based on integration of data and leverage increasingly autonomous and automated systems. These complex systems can identify anomalies, precursors, and trends that together enable more proactive management of operational risks.
Ellis, Kyle↗
In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) Concept of Operations and Design Considerations for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)
Emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), pose a challenge to safety assurance and to accessibility within the National Airspace System (NAS).In particular, the public has a low tolerance for risk in aviation and the current NAS tends to be labor-intensive with limited ability to scale up for UAM. In response to this landscape, NASA is collaborating with industry to define a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) for scalable UAM involving a service-oriented architecture. This architecture focuses safety investments for technological solutions that can overcome safety related barriers for emerging operations. By working with industry, consensus can be reached on desirable system traits that are based on integration and fusion of data and leverage increasingly autonomous and automated systems. These complex systems can identify anomalies, precursors, and trends that together enable more proactive management of operational risks. AAM and UAM elevate the need for risk management in relation to increasing density and heterogeneity of vehicles and operations. Whereas safety in today’s NAS is built on a history of programs and technologies that react to incidents and accidents, AAM presents an opportunity to leverage that experience and its implications and proactively integrate safety into the earliest designs of vehicles and systems. In a perfect world AAM and UAM would not be inherently dangerous but until then ensuring the highest quality of safety requirements is the bridge to mitigating risks.
In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance↗
Progress Towards Prolonged Deployment of SiC JFET-R ICs Into Previously Inaccessible Hostile Environments
This invited presentation describes demonstration of semiconductor integrated circuits (ICs) and ceramic packaging that are arguably the most environmentally durable transistor electronics ever demonstrated. SiC junction field effect transistor-resistor (JFET-R) ICs with two-level interconnect have successfully operated for over 1 year in 500 °C air-ambient [1], 60 days in 460 °C and 9.3 MPa pressure caustic Venus surface environment test chamber [2], and radiation exposure through 7 Mrad(Si) total ionizing dose (TID) and 86 MeV-cm2/mg heavy ion strikes [3]. Furthermore, these ICs have also demonstrated operation from -190 °C to +812 °C (over 1000 °C T-span) without significant change in signal (input /output) or power supply voltages [4]. With modest adjustments, the SiC JFET-R fabrication process is compatible with semiconductor mass-production tools and materials. As an initial step towards this end, the processing that forms the SiC JFETs and resistors (without interconnect) for the NASA Glenn “Generation 12” design prototype JFET-R ICs was conducted at GE Research. Once the COVID-delayed IC interconnect and bond pad fabrication processing on these wafers is completed at NASA Glenn, the resulting chips will be packaged and oven-tested [5]. It is expected that further technology transfer to complete commercial production will lower investment and risk barriers to useful application deployment. For NASA, an initial high-value deployment is opening the Venus surface to extended missions for robotic scientific exploration.
Silicon Carbide↗
Spacecraft Testing Programs: Adding Value to the Systems Engineering Process
Testing has long been recognized as a critical component of spacecraft development activities - yet many major systems failures may have been prevented with more rigorous testing programs. The question is why is more testing not being conducted? Given unlimited resources, more testing would likely be included in a spacecraft development program. Striking the right balance between too much testing and not enough has been a long-term challenge for many industries. The objective of this paper is to discuss some of the barriers, enablers, and best practices for developing and sustaining a strong test program and testing team. This paper will also explore the testing decision factors used by managers; the varying attitudes toward testing; methods to develop strong test engineers; and the influence of behavior, culture and processes on testing programs. KEY WORDS: Risk, Integration and Test, Validation, Verification, Test Program Development
Britton, Keith J.↗
Applying Costs, Risks and Values Evaluation (CRAVE) methodology to Engineering Support Request (ESR) prioritization
Given limited budget, the problem of prioritization among Engineering Support Requests (ESR's) with varied sizes, shapes, and colors is a difficult one. At the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), the recently developed 4-Matrix (4-M) method represents a step in the right direction as it attempts to combine the traditional criteria of technical merits only with the new concern for cost-effectiveness. However, the 4-M method was not adequately successful in the actual prioritization of ESRs for the fiscal year 1995 (FY95). This research identifies a number of design issues that should help us to develop better methods. It emphasizes that given the variety and diversity of ESR's one should not expect that a single method could help in the assessment of all ESR's. One conclusion is that a methodology such as Costs, Risks, and Values Evaluation (CRAVE) should be adopted. It also is clear that the development of methods such as 4-M requires input not only from engineers with technical expertise in ESR's but also from personnel with adequate background in the theory and practice of cost-effectiveness analysis. At KSC, ESR prioritization is one part of the Ground Support Working Teams (GSWT) Integration Process. It was discovered that the more important barriers to the incorporation of cost-effectiveness considerations in ESR prioritization lie in this process. The culture of integration, and the corresponding structure of review by a committee of peers, is not conducive to the analysis and confrontation necessary in the assessment and prioritization of ESR's. Without assistance from appropriately trained analysts charged with the responsibility to analyze and be confrontational about each ESR, the GSWT steering committee will continue to make its decisions based on incomplete understanding, inconsistent numbers, and at times, colored facts. The current organizational separation of the prioritization and the funding processes is also identified as an important barrier to the pursuit of cost-effectiveness. Perhaps the greatest barrier is that, at the working level, KSC's culture is so preoccupied with technical concerns that it seems almost oblivious to any cost concerns, let alone cost-effectiveness concerns. It is recommended that we must urgently begin to change that culture and seek a better balance between these two concerns.
Joglekar, Prafulla N.↗
Reusable TPS Materials Development Activities at NASA Ames
Recent developments in low-cost access to low-earth orbit (LEO) and hypersonic flight are driving renewed demand in reusable thermal protection systems (RTPS) that have not had broad application since the Space Shuttle era. Modern systems will need to consider full cycle cost (lower cost raw materials, manufacturing, integration, and refurbishment) in addition to improved performance to enable this new generation of space flight. NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) has a long history of RTPS development including modern state-of-the-art materials like Alumina Enhanced Thermal Barrier (AETB), and multi-component systems like Toughened Uni-piece Fibrous Reinforced Oxidation-resistant Composite (TUFROC). Now, ARC is supporting the growing commercial space field through internal research and development efforts for high-risk low TRL materials and collaboration with commercial partners including technology transfer. This talk will discuss the current development efforts at ARC that span updating legacy insulating systems with modern raw materials and processes to totally novel designs for heat pipes with various low-TRL activities in between. It will also discuss Ames’ recent re-investment in experimental capabilities to enable characterization and material testing.
Adam Caldwell↗
Human Research Program Human Health Countermeasures Element Cardiovascular Risks Standing Review Panel (SRP)
The Cardiovascular Risk Standing Review Panel (SRP) evaluated several cardiovascular risks associated with space flight along with the ongoing and emerging plans to study these issues and potentially propose and/or develop countermeasures. The areas of focus included: 1) The risk of cardiac rhythm problems during prolonged space flight, and 2) Issues related to the risk of orthostatic intolerance during re-exposure to gravity. An emerging area of concern is radiation associated vascular injury. The risk of cardiac rhythm disturbances has emerged based on case reports only. No systematic study of this risk has been published. However, concerns about this risk are heightened by the age range of astronauts, the structural changes in the heart that occur during space flight, and the potential shifts in fluids and electrolytes. The current plan is to use prolonged Holter monitor EKG records made as part of the "Integrated Cardiovascular SMO" in space to determine more about the frequency and magnitude of this problem and to link this data to complementary data from the nutrition group on electrolytes. The SRP was supportive of this approach. The SRP also felt that any data related to cardiovascular risk in space should be better coordinated with the medical screening data that all astronauts undergo at regular intervals. Additionally, while there are potential privacy issues related to this suggestion, many of the current barriers to better coordination of experimental and clinical data appear to reflect longstanding cultural traditions at NASA that need rethinking. The risk of orthostatic intolerance during re-exposure to gravity was seen by the SRP as an area supported by a wealth of published physiological evidence. The SRP also felt that moving forward with the planned approach to countermeasures was reasonable and that extensive additional hypothesis testing on the physiology of orthostatic intolerance was not needed at this time. There was support for developing ground based models of limited (e.g. 1/6 th) G environments on Earth that generated a number of ideas for consideration by NASA investigators.
Joyner, Michael↗
Treatment of Solid Rocket Motors that Complies with Established Protocols to Ensure Planetary Protection
This presentation discusses recent work being conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to evaluate various methods that could be employed to provide for planetary protection of those solar system bodies that are candidates for extraterrestrial life, thus preventing contamination of such bodies. MSFC is presently involved in the development phase of the Europa Lander De-Orbital Stage (DOS) braking motor. In order to prevent bio-contamination of this Jovian satellite, three paths are currently being considered. The first is (1) Bio-Reduction of those microscopic organisms in or on the vehicle (in this case a solid rocket motor (SRM)) that might otherwise be transported during the mission. Possible methods being investigated include heat sterilization, application or incorporation of biocide materials, and irradiation. While each method can be made to work, effects on the SRM's components (propellant, liner, insulation, etc.) could well prove deleterious. A second path would be use of (2) Bio-Barrier material(s). So long as such barrier(s) can maintain their integrity, planetary protection should be afforded. Under the harsh conditions encountered during extended spaceflight (vacuum, temperature extremes, radiation), however, such barrier(s) could well experience a breach. Finally, a third path would be to perform (3) Pyrotechnic Sterilization of the SRM during its end-of-mission phase. Multiple pyrotechnic units would be triggered to ensure activation of such an event and provide for a final sterilization before vehicle impact. In light of Europa's stringent bio-reduction targets, the final and best choice to minimize risk will probably be some combination of the above.
Stefanski, Philip L.↗
Strategies to Mitigate Ammonia Release on the International Space Station
International Space Station (ISS) is crucial to its continuous operation. Off-nominal situations can arise from virtually any aspect of ISS operations. One situation of particular concern is the inadvertent release of a chemical into the ISS atmosphere. In sufficient quantities, a chemical release can render the ISS uninhabitable regardless of the chemical s toxicity as a result of its effect on the hardware used to maintain the environment. This is certainly true with system chemicals which are integral components to the function and purpose of the system. Safeguards, such as design for minimum risk, multiple containment, hazard assessments, rigorous safety reviews, and others, are in place to minimize the probability of a chemical release to the ISS environment thereby allowing the benefits of system chemicals to outweigh the risks associated with them. The thermal control system is an example of such a system. Heat generated within the ISS is transferred from the internal thermal control system (ITCS) to the external thermal control system (ETCS) via two, single-barrier interface heat exchangers (IFHX). The ITCS and ETCS are closed-loop systems which utilize water and anhydrous ammonia, respectively, as heat-transfer fluids. There is approximately 1200 lbs. (208 gallons) of anhydrous ammonia in the ETCS circulating through the two heat exchangers, transferring heat from the ITCS water lines. At the amounts present in the ETCS, anhydrous ammonia is one system chemical that can easily overwhelm the station atmosphere scrubbing capabilities and render the ISS uninhabitable in the event of a catastrophic rupture. Although safeguards have certainly minimized the risk of an ammonia release into the Station atmosphere, credible release scenarios and controls to manage these scenarios are examined.
Macatangay, Ariel V.↗