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At least 19 records

Safety Basis Development for the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) Demonstration - 19596

The Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system has been installed at Savannah River Site (SRS) to supplement the existing salt waste treatment facilities. The TCCR system is intended to demonstrate the capability of ion exchange (IX) technology to remove Cs-137 from high level liquid waste. Separation is performed by Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) IX media. The media is stored in shielded columns within a small enclosure. Following processing in the TCCR system, decontaminated waste can receive further treatment and be dispositioned at other SRS facilities. The Cesium-laden columns will instead be removed from the enclosure and transported to another location on site for interim storage. Developing the safety basis for the TCCR system and integrating it into the documented safety analysis for existing facilities presented a unique challenge. Most notably, utilizing new methodologies to analyze new hazards resulted in unexpectedly high consequences. The TCCR system therefore required more rigorous controls than had initially been anticipated. However, the integrated control set developed for the TCCR system should have little impact on its operating capabilities and will allow it to begin operating in 2019. This may lay the foundations for future utilization of similar systems at SRS and across the Department of Energy complex. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology. Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development (NEI 18-04)

This guideline presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. This guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Basis for Dose and Reactor Safety Design Criteria for Army Regulation AR 50–7 and DA Pamphlet

This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Security Licensing Basis Framework Development

This report summarizes a technology-inclusive and performance-based method to determine the physical security licensing basis for a commercial nuclear reactor under the proposed 10 CFR 73.100 for Part 53 licensees. The method focuses on the identification of security functions, the contributing security systems and programs to meet those functions, the identification of security events that will provide the foundation for the security licensing basis and includes a risk-informed performance-based defense in depth adequacy method. The method can also be employed to justify performance-based alternative measures to traditional security requirements found in 10 CFR 73.55.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Information basis for developing comprehensive waste management system-US-Japan joint nuclear energy action plan waste management working group phase I report.

The activity of Phase I of the Waste Management Working Group under the United States - Japan Joint Nuclear Energy Action Plan started in 2007. The US-Japan JNEAP is a bilateral collaborative framework to support the global implementation of safe, secure, and sustainable, nuclear fuel cycles (referred to in this document as fuel cycles). The Waste Management Working Group was established by strong interest of both parties, which arise from the recognition that development and optimization of waste management and disposal system(s) are central issues of the present and future nuclear fuel cycles. This report summarizes the activity of the Waste Management Working Group that focused on consolidation of the existing technical basis between the U.S. and Japan and the joint development of a plan for future collaborative activities. Firstly, the political/regulatory frameworks related to nuclear fuel cycles in both countries were reviewed. The various advanced fuel cycle scenarios that have been considered in both countries were then surveyed and summarized. The working group established the working reference scenario for the future cooperative activity that corresponds to a fuel cycle scenario being considered both in Japan and the U.S. This working scenario involves transitioning from a once-through fuel cycle utilizing light water reactors to a one-pass uranium-plutonium fuel recycle in light water reactors to a combination of light water reactors and fast reactors with plutonium, uranium, and minor actinide recycle, ultimately concluding with multiple recycle passes primarily using fast reactors. Considering the scenario, current and future expected waste streams, treatment and inventory were discussed, and the relevant information was summarized. Second, the waste management/disposal system optimization was discussed. Repository system concepts were reviewed, repository design concepts for the various classifications of nuclear waste were summarized, and the factors to consider in repository design and optimization were then discussed. Japan is considering various alternatives and options for the geologic disposal facility and the framework for future analysis of repository concepts was discussed. Regarding the advanced waste and storage form development, waste form technologies developed in both countries were surveyed and compared. Potential collaboration areas and activities were next identified. Disposal system optimization processes and techniques were reviewed, and factors to consider in future repository design optimization activities were also discussed. Then the potential collaboration areas and activities related to the optimization problem were extracted.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Unified Development of Basis Reduction Methods for Rotor Blade Analysis

The axial foreshortening effect plays a key role in rotor blade dynamics, but approximating it accurately in reduced basis models has long posed a difficult problem for analysts. Recently, though, several methods have been shown to be effective in obtaining accurate,reduced basis models for rotor blades. These methods are the axial elongation method,the mixed finite element method, and the nonlinear normal mode method. The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate the close relationships among these methods, which are seemingly disparate at first glance. First, the difficulties inherent in obtaining reduced basis models of rotor blades are illustrated by examining the modal reduction accuracy of several blade analysis formulations. It is shown that classical, displacement-based finite elements are ill-suited for rotor blade analysis because they can't accurately represent the axial strain in modal space, and that this problem may be solved by employing the axial force as a variable in the analysis. It is shown that the mixed finite element method is a convenient means for accomplishing this, and the derivation of a mixed finite element for rotor blade analysis is outlined. A shortcoming of the mixed finite element method is that is that it increases the number of variables in the analysis. It is demonstrated that this problem may be rectified by solving for the axial displacements in terms of the axial forces and the bending displacements. Effectively, this procedure constitutes a generalization of the widely used axial elongation method to blades of arbitrary topology. The procedure is developed first for a single element, and then extended to an arbitrary assemblage of elements of arbitrary type. Finally, it is shown that the generalized axial elongation method is essentially an approximate solution for an invariant manifold that can be used as the basis for a nonlinear normal mode.

Ruzicka, Gene C.↗

Implementation of Glycolic Acid Flowsheet in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) - 17348

The disposition of high level waste (HLW) into canistered waste forms began at Savannah River Site (SRS) in 1996. For its entire processing history, DWPF has added formic acid as a pretreatment step in producing acceptable melter feed from incoming waste sludges sent from the HLW Tank Farms. While this process has been used to successfully produce more than 4,000 radioactive canisters, the addition of formic acid and its tendency to catalytically decompose in the presence of trace quantities of noble metals adds substantial process complexity in order to safely accommodate hydrogen generation and pH shifting during batch operations. Research efforts have been in progress for several years to identify a chemical surrogate for formic acid which performs the essential process functions without the associated negative consequences. The final analytical work to demonstrate the effectiveness of glycolic acid in the DWPF is nearly complete and a project team has been created to safely integrate the new acid into the chemical process. The project team is currently executing an implementation schedule which addresses safety basis development, revision to operations procedures and training, facility modifications, chemical procurement, and updated process monitoring. Introduction of glycolic acid into DWPF is currently scheduled to take place in early 2017, beginning with a blended flowsheet of glycolic and formic acid and ultimately transitioning to glycolic-only processing. This paper provides an overview of planned glycolic acid flowsheet implementation in the DWPF. This paper discusses several issues related to implementing such a significant change to the chemical process including: 1) Process chemistry differences between the two flowsheets with quantitative comparison for several properties of interest; 2) Technical approach to hazards analysis and safety basis development strategy; 3) Status of project execution for major deliverables; and 4) Path forward for facility modifications related to legacy formic acid support equipment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design - R00

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of cooling accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)], Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components, and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004 design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by U.S. ITER. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design-basis accident:1 a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassettes lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout anddimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction.

Cooling Water↗

Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)]; Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components; and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004-design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by US ITER and AREVA Federal Services, the US ITER A and E Company. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design basis accident: a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassette lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout and dimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

The historical development and basis of human factors guidelines for automated systems in aeronautical operations

In order to derive general design guidelines for automated systems a study was conducted on the utilization and acceptance of existing automated systems as currently employed in several commercial fields. Four principal study area were investigated by means of structured interviews, and in some cases questionnaires. The study areas were aviation, a both scheduled airline and general commercial aviation; process control and factory applications; office automation; and automation in the power industry. The results of over eighty structured interviews were analyzed and responses categoried as various human factors issues for use by both designers and users of automated equipment. These guidelines address such items as general physical features of automated equipment; personnel orientation, acceptance, and training; and both personnel and system reliability.

Ciciora, J. A.↗