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At least 19 records

Safety Basis Development for the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) Demonstration - 19596

The Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system has been installed at Savannah River Site (SRS) to supplement the existing salt waste treatment facilities. The TCCR system is intended to demonstrate the capability of ion exchange (IX) technology to remove Cs-137 from high level liquid waste. Separation is performed by Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) IX media. The media is stored in shielded columns within a small enclosure. Following processing in the TCCR system, decontaminated waste can receive further treatment and be dispositioned at other SRS facilities. The Cesium-laden columns will instead be removed from the enclosure and transported to another location on site for interim storage. Developing the safety basis for the TCCR system and integrating it into the documented safety analysis for existing facilities presented a unique challenge. Most notably, utilizing new methodologies to analyze new hazards resulted in unexpectedly high consequences. The TCCR system therefore required more rigorous controls than had initially been anticipated. However, the integrated control set developed for the TCCR system should have little impact on its operating capabilities and will allow it to begin operating in 2019. This may lay the foundations for future utilization of similar systems at SRS and across the Department of Energy complex. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology. Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development (NEI 18-04)

This guideline presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. This guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Basis for Dose and Reactor Safety Design Criteria for Army Regulation AR 50–7 and DA Pamphlet

This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Security Licensing Basis Framework Development

This report summarizes a technology-inclusive and performance-based method to determine the physical security licensing basis for a commercial nuclear reactor under the proposed 10 CFR 73.100 for Part 53 licensees. The method focuses on the identification of security functions, the contributing security systems and programs to meet those functions, the identification of security events that will provide the foundation for the security licensing basis and includes a risk-informed performance-based defense in depth adequacy method. The method can also be employed to justify performance-based alternative measures to traditional security requirements found in 10 CFR 73.55.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Information basis for developing comprehensive waste management system-US-Japan joint nuclear energy action plan waste management working group phase I report.

The activity of Phase I of the Waste Management Working Group under the United States - Japan Joint Nuclear Energy Action Plan started in 2007. The US-Japan JNEAP is a bilateral collaborative framework to support the global implementation of safe, secure, and sustainable, nuclear fuel cycles (referred to in this document as fuel cycles). The Waste Management Working Group was established by strong interest of both parties, which arise from the recognition that development and optimization of waste management and disposal system(s) are central issues of the present and future nuclear fuel cycles. This report summarizes the activity of the Waste Management Working Group that focused on consolidation of the existing technical basis between the U.S. and Japan and the joint development of a plan for future collaborative activities. Firstly, the political/regulatory frameworks related to nuclear fuel cycles in both countries were reviewed. The various advanced fuel cycle scenarios that have been considered in both countries were then surveyed and summarized. The working group established the working reference scenario for the future cooperative activity that corresponds to a fuel cycle scenario being considered both in Japan and the U.S. This working scenario involves transitioning from a once-through fuel cycle utilizing light water reactors to a one-pass uranium-plutonium fuel recycle in light water reactors to a combination of light water reactors and fast reactors with plutonium, uranium, and minor actinide recycle, ultimately concluding with multiple recycle passes primarily using fast reactors. Considering the scenario, current and future expected waste streams, treatment and inventory were discussed, and the relevant information was summarized. Second, the waste management/disposal system optimization was discussed. Repository system concepts were reviewed, repository design concepts for the various classifications of nuclear waste were summarized, and the factors to consider in repository design and optimization were then discussed. Japan is considering various alternatives and options for the geologic disposal facility and the framework for future analysis of repository concepts was discussed. Regarding the advanced waste and storage form development, waste form technologies developed in both countries were surveyed and compared. Potential collaboration areas and activities were next identified. Disposal system optimization processes and techniques were reviewed, and factors to consider in future repository design optimization activities were also discussed. Then the potential collaboration areas and activities related to the optimization problem were extracted.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Implementation of Glycolic Acid Flowsheet in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) - 17348

The disposition of high level waste (HLW) into canistered waste forms began at Savannah River Site (SRS) in 1996. For its entire processing history, DWPF has added formic acid as a pretreatment step in producing acceptable melter feed from incoming waste sludges sent from the HLW Tank Farms. While this process has been used to successfully produce more than 4,000 radioactive canisters, the addition of formic acid and its tendency to catalytically decompose in the presence of trace quantities of noble metals adds substantial process complexity in order to safely accommodate hydrogen generation and pH shifting during batch operations. Research efforts have been in progress for several years to identify a chemical surrogate for formic acid which performs the essential process functions without the associated negative consequences. The final analytical work to demonstrate the effectiveness of glycolic acid in the DWPF is nearly complete and a project team has been created to safely integrate the new acid into the chemical process. The project team is currently executing an implementation schedule which addresses safety basis development, revision to operations procedures and training, facility modifications, chemical procurement, and updated process monitoring. Introduction of glycolic acid into DWPF is currently scheduled to take place in early 2017, beginning with a blended flowsheet of glycolic and formic acid and ultimately transitioning to glycolic-only processing. This paper provides an overview of planned glycolic acid flowsheet implementation in the DWPF. This paper discusses several issues related to implementing such a significant change to the chemical process including: 1) Process chemistry differences between the two flowsheets with quantitative comparison for several properties of interest; 2) Technical approach to hazards analysis and safety basis development strategy; 3) Status of project execution for major deliverables; and 4) Path forward for facility modifications related to legacy formic acid support equipment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design - R00

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of cooling accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)], Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components, and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004 design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by U.S. ITER. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design-basis accident:1 a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassettes lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout anddimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction.

Cooling Water↗

Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)]; Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components; and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004-design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by US ITER and AREVA Federal Services, the US ITER A and E Company. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design basis accident: a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassette lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout and dimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

A Data-Centered Collaboration Portal to Support Global Carbon-Flux Analysis

Carbon-climate, like other environmental sciences, has been changing. Large-scalesynthesis studies are becoming more common. These synthesis studies are often conducted by science teams that are geographically distributed and on datasets that are global in scale. A broad array of collaboration and data analytics tools are now available that could support these science teams. However, building tools that scientists actually use is hard. Also, moving scientists from an informal collaboration structure to one mediated by technology often exposes inconsistencies in the understanding of the rules of engagement between collaborators. We have developed a scientific collaboration portal, called fluxdata.org, which serves the community of scientists providing and analyzing the global FLUXNET carbon-flux synthesis dataset. Key things we learned or re-learned during our portal development include: minimize the barrier to entry, provide features on a just-in-time basis, development of requirements is an on-going process, provide incentives to change leaders and leverage the opportunity they represent, automate as much as possible, and you can only learn how to make it better if people depend on it enough to give you feedback. In addition, we also learned that splitting the portal roles between scientists and computer scientists improved user adoption and trust. The fluxdata.org portal has now been in operation for ~;;1.5 years and has become central to the FLUXNET synthesis efforts.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗