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Cyber Deterrence and Stability

Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, deterrence and arms control have been cornerstones of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, the weaponization of the cyber realm by State actors and the multipolar nature of cyber conflict now undermines that stability. Strategic stability is the state in which nations believe that if they act aggressively to undermine U.S. national interests and the post-World War II liberal democratic order, the consequences will outweigh the benefits. The sense of lawlessness and lack of consequences in the cyber realm embolden States to be more aggressive in taking actions that undermine stability. Accordingly, this paper examines 1) the role of deterrence and arms control in securing cyber stability, and 2) the limitations and challenges associated with these traditional national security paradigms as applied to this emerging threat domain. This paper demonstrates that many 20th-century deterrence and arms control concepts are not particularly applicable in the cyber realm. However, they are not entirely irrelevant. The United States can distill lessons learned from this rich deterrence and arms control experience to develop and deploy a strategy to advance cyber stability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Making sense of the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy

A tool dubbed the “spaghetti monster” helps users navigate the tangle of laws, directives, and agencies that make up the US biodefense enterprise—and reveals its formidable complexity. It has been 100 years since the end of World War I, the “war to end all wars,” which set the precedent for modern biological warfare. The 1925 Geneva Protocol subsequently banned the use of biological weapons in war but did not stop the proliferation of state-sponsored bioweapons programs. With the spread of such programs and other biologically based threats, the United States and other nations have made a variety of efforts to defend against them.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Method development for comprehensive extraction and analysis of marine toxins: Liquid-liquid extraction and tandem liquid chromatography separations coupled to electrospray tandem mass spectrometry

Toxins from biological sources are recognized as potential chemical weapon threats, with saxitoxin and ricin listed by the chemical weapons convention (CWC) as schedule one agents (CWC reference). These two toxins represent a metabolite (saxitoxin) and protein (ricin) from algal and plant sources, respectively. An array of toxins have been listed as "select agents" by the Health and Human Services (HHS) select agent program, including ricin, abrin, saxitoxin, tetrodotoxin, specific paralytic alpha conotoxin peptides, T-2 toxin, diacetoxyscirpenols, botulinum toxins, and staphylococcal enterotoxins [1]. The quantities of these toxins dictate whether they are considered select agents with federal oversight of their storage and use. While this list captures some of the naturally occurring toxins that may pose a threat to the public, there are a number of other naturally occurring toxins that may also be a concern.

biodetection↗

Contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and competition: A SOCOM perspective. Part of Section: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Chemical and Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on Strategic Trade Controls

The use of contract manufacturing services in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries has grown significantly in recent years, but the potential for such service providers to be exploited for chemical or biological weapons proliferation has garnered relatively little attention, despite the role of contract manufacturers in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Here, we examine the dual-use potential and global spread of chemical and biological contract manufacturing and their ramifications for related strategic trade controls (STCs). Hundreds of providers of dual-use contract services were found worldwide, but they were primarily located in jurisdictions with comprehensive STC regulations. This then provides some degree of protection against their misuse. However, the results outlined below also suggest that chemical and biological contract manufacturers are a critical community to target for STC outreach activities and efforts to increase industry compliance. Targeted outreach would help prevent contract manufacturing service providers from unwittingly contributing to the production and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Tools and Incentives for Implementing Codes of Ethics to Help Prevent the Reemergence of Chemical Weapons

Since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the establishment of the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1997, 96% of the world’s declared stockpile, comprising 72,305 metric tons of chemical warfare agents have been destroyed. Despite this notable progress, the convergence of chemistry and biology brings new challenges to preventing chemical weapons production, as the technical capability to manipulate the chemistry of microorganisms has diffused beyond the chemical industry and academic research communities. The development and voluntary adoption by chemical practitioners around the world of ethical codes or guidelines, such as The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) , are important steps in strengthening international nonproliferation efforts through their potential to impact the intent of the individual by normalizing ethical behavior. However, the simple act of adopting a code does not guarantee ethical behavior. Care must be taken to ensure those adopting the code understand specifically the behavior being asked of them, and they must be given ample opportunities to practice exercising those behaviors in low-risk situations and encouragement to keep trying when they fail. Furthermore, in small-to-medium chemical companies, concerns that adopting such measures could negatively impact profit margins may dissuade some business owners from voluntarily adopting ethical codes, while a country’s decision makers may not prioritize establishment of new regulatory mechanisms that could address some of these concerns. In this paper, factors that may positively influence a chemical company’s decision to adopt ethical guidelines, such as integration of social sustainability elements into frameworks and approaches to maintain social legitimacy in the eyes of the broader community, are explored. Voluntary adoption of ethical codes gives teeth to arms control regimes. By encouraging chemical companies to become engaged in the community around them and providing easy-to-use tools like scenario-based E-learning to enable remote engagement and facilitate understanding of the principles undergirding the GCCE, they actively participate in making the world a better place and minimizing the potential for reemergence of chemical weapons.

Small Chemical Companies, Codes of Ethics, E-learn↗

PCR Based Microbial Monitor for Analysis of Recycled Water Aboard the ISSA: Issues and Prospects

The monitoring of spacecraft life support systems for the presence of health threatening microorganisms is paramount for crew well being and successful completion of missions. Development of technology to monitor spacecraft recycled water based on detection and identification of the genetic material of contaminating microorganisms and viruses would be a substantial improvement over current NASA plans to monitor recycled water samples that call for the use of conventional microbiology techniques which are slow, insensitive, and labor intensive. The union of the molecular biology techniques of DNA probe hybridization and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) offers a powerful method for the detection, identification, and quantification of microorganisms and viruses. This technology is theoretically capable of assaying samples in as little as two hours with specificity and sensitivity unmatched by any other method. A major advance in probe-hybridization/PCR has come about in a technology called TaqMan(TM), which was invented by Perkin Elmer. Instrumentation using TaqMan concepts is evolving towards devices that could meet NASA's needs of size, low power use, and simplicity of operation. The chemistry and molecular biology needed to utilize these probe-hybridization/PCR instruments must evolve in parallel with the hardware. The following issues of chemistry and biology must be addressed in developing a monitor: Early in the development of a PCR-based microbial monitor it will be necessary to decide how many and which organisms does the system need the capacity to detect. We propose a set of 17 different tests that would detect groups of bacteria and fungus, as well as specific eukaryotic parasites and viruses; In order to use the great sensitivity of PCR it will be necessary to concentrate water samples using filtration. If a lower limit of detection of 1 microorganism per 100 ml is required then the microbes in a 100 ml sample must be concentrated into a volume that can be added to a PCR assay; There are not likely to be contaminants in ISSA recycled water that would inhibit PCR resulting in false-negative results; The TaqMan PCR product detection system is the most promising method for developing a rapid, highly automated gene-based microbial monitoring system. The method is inherently quantitative. NASA and other government agencies have invested in other technologies that, although potentially could lead to revolutionary advances, are not likely to mature in the next 5 years into working systems; PCR-based methods cannot distinguish between DNA or RNA of a viable microorganism and that of a non-viable organism. This may or may not be an important issue with reclaimed water on the ISSA. The recycling system probably damages the capacity of the genetic material of any bacteria or viruses killed during processing to serve as a template in a PCR desinged to amplify a large segment of DNA (less than 650 base pairs). If necessary, vital dye staining could be used in addition to PCR, to enumerate the viable cells in a water sample; The quality control methods have been developed to insure that PCR's are working properly, and that reactions are not contaminated with PCR carryover products which could lead to the generation of false-positive results; and The sequences of the small rRNA subunit gene for a large number of microorganisms are known, and they consititue the best database for rational development of the oligonucleotide reagents that give PCR its great specificity. From those gene sequences, sets of oligonucleotide primers for PCR and Taqman detection that could be used in a NASA microbial monitor were constructed using computer based methods. In addition to space utilization, a microbial monitior will have tremendous terrestrial applications. Analysis of patient samples for microbial pathogens, testing industrial effluent for biofouling bacteria, and detection biological warfare agents on the battlefield are but a few of the diverse potential uses for this technology. Once fully developed, gene-based microbial monitors will become the fundamental tool in every lab that tests for microbial contaminants, and serve as a powerful weapon in mankind's war with the germ world.

Cassell, Gail H.↗